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1.
Theory and Decision - Social identity is embedded in social structures, generated by various social processes, and has multiple dimensions. We report findings from a laboratory experiment eliciting... 相似文献
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The choice of the proper discount rate is important in the analysis of projects whose costs and benefits extend into the future,
a particularly striking feature of policies directed at climate change. Much of the literature, including prominent work by
Arrow et al. (1996), Stern (2007, 2008), and Dasgupta (2008), employs a reduced-form approach that conflates social value judgments and individuals’ risk preferences, the latter raising
an empirical question about choices under uncertainty rather than a matter for ethical reflection. This article offers a simple,
explicit decomposition that clarifies the distinction, reveals unappreciated difficulties with the reduced-form approach,
and relates them to the literature. In addition, it explores how significant uncertainty about future consumption, another
central factor in climate policy assessment, raises further complications regarding the relationship between social judgments
and individuals’ risk preferences. 相似文献
3.
《The Social Science Journal》1999,36(3):541-548
This paper responds to a recent article by Ahlander and Bahr (1995) on moral dimensions of housework in families. The purpose of this paper is to point out important ways in which Ahlander and Bahr’s work represents an academic form of “backlash” against feminist scholarship and leaves much social science research on housework either unsynthesized in their review or misinterpreted much of the work they did cite, particularly the work of feminist scholars. A second goal of this paper is to offer a perspective in which researchers can simultaneously examine moral dimensions of housework and explore issues of gender, power, and identity in families. 相似文献
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In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes towards risk are found to be consistent with a mix of individual attitudes, women being more influent on couples’ preferences at low probability levels. 相似文献
5.
The impact of perceived gender role violations on the willingness of evaluators to label a deadly act to "end suffering" as euthanasia was explored in two studies. It was predicted that "killing" (even mercy killing) would be perceived as more role contradictory for a female actor than for a male actor. Therefore, it was expected that the deadly actions of a female actor would be judged as less justified (i.e., less likely to be labeled as euthanasia) than the same action committed by a male actor. A total of 486 undergraduates participated in one of two studies. It was found that although perceptions of justification for a deadly act were clearly influenced by whether or not the method of action taken was direct and proactive (commission) vs. indirect and passive (omission), the gender of the actor did not impact differently on the judgments of the participants. Possible explanations and future research directions are discussed. 相似文献
6.
Amélie Vrijdags 《Theory and Decision》2013,75(2):233-266
The current paper is the first to report an experimental study of “Min- and Max-induced rankings” (MMIR), i.e., a family of set rankings that require preferences over sets to be induced from comparison of the best and/or worst elements within those sets. These MMIR do not perform well in predicting preferences over simple sets of monetary outcomes. In this paper, we investigate the axiomatic underpinnings of these models by means of pairwise choice experiments. From this investigation, some important conclusions can be drawn: Axioms that prevent rankings to be based on total-goodness, as well as monotonicity conditions (ensuring that replacing a set element with a better one results in a better set) cannot be refuted. Axioms that rule out any utilization of the relative difference in the values of the outcomes and axioms that prevent rankings to be based on average-goodness are all systematically violated. The Uniform Expected Utility (UEU) criterion seems to meet the apparent shortcomings of the MMIR. Some frequently occurring preference patterns, however, suggest that a significant portion of the participants uses neither a Min- or Max-induced ranking, nor UEU, but some other unspecified decision rule, possibly characterized by the tendency to prefer a diversification of uncertainty. 相似文献
7.
We conducted a set of experiments to compare the effect of ambiguity in single-person decisions and games. Our results suggest that ambiguity has a bigger impact in games than in ball and urn problems. We find that ambiguity has the opposite effect in games of strategic substitutes and complements. This confirms a theoretical prediction made by Eichberger and Kelsey (J Econ Theory 106:436–466, 2002). In addition, we note that subjects’ ambiguity attitudes appear to be context dependent: ambiguity loving in single-person decisions and ambiguity averse in games. This is consistent with the findings of Kelsey and le Roux (Theory Decis 79:667–688, 2015). 相似文献
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When randomly assigning participants to experimental roles and the according payment prospects, participants seem to receive “manna from heaven.” In our view, this seriously questions the validity of laboratory findings. We depart from this by auctioning off player roles via the incentive compatible random price mechanism thus avoiding the selection effect of competitive second price auctions. Our experiment employs the generosity game where the proposer chooses the size of the pie, facing an exogenously given own agreement payoff, and the responder is the residual claimant. We find that entitlement crowds out equality seeking and strengthens efficiency seeking. More generally, we find that inducing entitlement for the roles in which participants find themselves makes a difference. Interpreting participants’ willingness to pay for their role as their aspiration level further allows to test satisficing and explore “mutual satisficing.” We find that responder participants apparently do not anticipate proposer generosity in aspiration formation. 相似文献
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Theory and Decision - 相似文献
11.
Although many economic decisions involve choices between uncertain outcomes occurring at different times, most theoretical
and empirical work restricts attention to one dimension or another. In this paper, we investigate whether both risk and time
preferences can be represented by a single parameter. We collect experimental data to estimate models which allows for a disentanglement
of risk and time preferences. Results reveal that the discounted expected utility model assumption, that risk and time preferences
can be explained by a single parameter, is not supported by the data. The model estimates imply people prefer to delay the
resolution of risky outcomes. 相似文献
12.
Andreas Nicklisch 《Theory and Decision》2011,71(4):539-558
I present an experiment on learning about a game in an initially unknown environment. Subjects play repeatedly simple 2 ×
2 normal-form coordination games. I compare behavioral learning algorithms for different feedback information. Minimal feedback
only informs about own payoffs, while additional feedback informs about own payoffs and the opponent’s choice. Results show
that minimal feedback information leads to a myopic learning algorithm, while additional feedback induces non-myopic learning
and increases the impulse with which players respond to payoff differences. Finally, there is evidence for a strategy transfer
across games which differ only according to the relabel of actions, but not according to permutation in the payoff matrix. 相似文献
13.
We experimentally investigate the role of information transparency for equilibrium selection in stag hunt coordination games. These games can be transformed from a prisoner’s dilemma game by introducing a centralized reward or punishment scheme. We aim to explore the impact of the disclosure of information on how final payoffs are derived on players’ incentive to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. We find that such information disclosure significantly increases the tendency of players to play the payoff-dominant strategy and reduces the occurrence of coordination failure. The mechanism works directly through the positive impact of disclosure on the saliency of the payoff-dominant equilibrium, and indirectly through the positive influence of disclosure on players’ belief about the likelihood of cooperation by the opponent. 相似文献
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Theory and Decision - The existence of a strong link between socio-economic background and individual preferences has been documented among both children and grown-ups. Here, we study whether such... 相似文献
17.
Jeffrey P. Carpenter Justin R. Garcia J. Koji Lum 《Journal of Risk and Uncertainty》2011,42(3):233-261
Outside of economics, researchers have recently identified genetic predictors of “sensation-seeking” that have been linked
to risky and impulsive behaviors. We examine the implications of these genetic polymorphisms for economic behavior. Our analysis
indicates that the 7-repeat allele of the DRD4 gene that regulates dopamine uptake in the brain predicts risk-taking and time
preferences in economic experiments that allow for ambiguity, losses and discounting. These genetic polymorphisms can also
be used to directly predict financial choice patterns that are consistent with previous findings in the behavioral genetics
literature. 相似文献
18.
The objective of this article is to investigate the impact of agent heterogeneity (as regards their attitude towards cooperation)
and payoff structure on cooperative behaviour, using an experimental setting with incomplete information. A game of chicken
is played considering two types of agents: ‘unconditional cooperators’, who always cooperate, and ‘strategic cooperators’,
who do not cooperate unless it is in their interest to do so. Overall, our data show a much higher propensity to cooperate
than predicted by theory. They also suggest that agent heterogeneity matters: the higher the proportion of ‘strategic cooperators’
in the population, the higher their probability to cooperate. Finally, our data confirm that higher rewards to cooperation
(embedded in the payoff structure) tend to lower defection. Taken together, our results suggest that the subjects might be
non-expected utility maximizers, dealing with both outcomes and probabilities in a non-linear manner. 相似文献
19.
Recursive expected utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: an experimental study 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
We use the multiple price list method and a recursive expected utility theory of smooth ambiguity to separate out attitude
towards risk from that towards ambiguity. Based on this separation, we investigate if there are differences in agent behaviour
under uncertainty over gain amounts vis-a-vis uncertainty over loss amounts. On an aggregate level, we find that (i) subjects
are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, displaying a “reflection effect” and (ii) they are ambiguity neutral
over gains and are mildly ambiguity seeking over losses. Further analysis shows that on an individual level, and with respect
to both risky and ambiguous prospects, there is limited incidence of a reflection effect where subjects are risk/ambiguity
averse (seeking) in gains and seeking (averse) in losses, though this incidence is higher for ambiguous prospects. A very
high proportion of such cases of reflection exhibit risk (ambiguity) aversion in gains and risk (ambiguity) seeking in losses,
with the reverse effect being significantly present in the case of risk but almost absent in case of ambiguity. Our results
suggest that reflection across gains and losses is not a stable individual characteristic, but depends upon whether the form
of uncertainty is precise or ambiguous, since we rarely find an individual who exhibits reflection in both risky and ambiguous
prospects. We also find that correlations between attitudes towards risk and ambiguity were domain dependent.
相似文献
20.
Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We report on an experiment designed to capture this feature of communication. The messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world; however, the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. Here the sender learns the state of the world, then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and provides a best guess about the state. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receiver’s guess. We find that the size of the language endogenously emerges as a function of the costs of communication. Specifically, we find that higher communication costs are associated with a smaller language. Although the equilibrium predictions do not perform well, this divergence occurs in a manner which is consistent with the experimental communication literature: overcommunication. We find that the sender’s payoffs, relative to equilibrium payoffs, are decreasing in the cost of communication. We also find that the receiver’s payoffs, relative to equilibrium payoffs, are increasing in the cost of communication. Finally, we find imperfections in coordination on the basis of the experimental labels. 相似文献