Does television terrify tourists? Effects of US television news on demand for tourism in Israel

We analyze the impact on US tourist flows to Israel of variations in both the actual intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the intensity implicit in US television news coverage. Conditional on actual events, changes in reported conflict intensity could influence tourists because alternative sources of information are costly; this explanation is consistent with a rational choice model. However, television news could influence tourist behavior because of its emotional impact, or because it causes the conflict to be brought to mind more readily, increasing the subjective probability of conflict events. We find that tourists respond to variations in actual Israeli casualties and reported Palestinian casualties; both effects are large. Reports of Israeli casualties and unreported Palestinian casualties have no significant impact on tourist flows. These asymmetries are consistent with asymmetric information costs within a rational choice framework, but are more difficult to square with the alternative explanations for media influence.

Counting casualties: A framework for respectful,useful records

Counting casualties in conflict zones faces both practical and ethical concerns. Drawing on procedures from risk analysis, we propose a general approach. It represents each death by standard features, having either essential value, for capturing the social and cultural meaning of individual casualties, or instrumental value, for relating patterns of casualties to possible causes and effects. We illustrate the approach with the choices involved in attempts to record casualties in Iraq and the Israel-Palestine conflict, and with natural disasters, as exemplified by Hurricane Katrina. We advocate institutionalizing the approach, so that recording casualties increases understanding, rather than suspicion.

Three-valued simple games

In this paper we study three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. We analyze to which extent well-known results on the core and the Shapley value for simple games can be extended to this new setting. To describe the core of a three-valued simple game we introduce (primary and secondary) vital players, in analogy to veto players for simple games. Moreover, it is seen that the transfer property of Dubey (1975) can still be used to characterize the Shapley value for three-valued simple games. We illustrate three-valued simple games and the corresponding Shapley value in a parliamentary bicameral system.     

Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources

In this article, we discuss some aspects of Eliaz and Ok ’s (Games Econ Behav 56:61–86, 2006) choice theoretical foundations of incomplete preferences. Our aim is to clarify some aspects of their regularity condition for preorders, showing that, as far as rationalization of a choice correspondence alone is concerned, no further restriction is imposed by requiring the preorder to be regular. However, if one is also interested in capturing other observable aspects of the individual’s choice procedure, such as Eliaz and Ok’s notion of c-incomparability or the notion of behavioral indifference introduced in this paper, then the only option is to use a regular preorder. We also argue that their weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority (WARNI) is too strong a property if our aim is to characterize the rationalizability of a choice correspondence by a (possibly incomplete) preorder. Finally, as we have mentioned above, we introduce the notion of behavioral indifference and argue, not only that Eliaz and Ok’s notion of c-incomparability (observable incomparability) can be derived from it, but also that it has a wider range of applicability than their notion of observable incomparability.     

Workplace Characteristics and Work-to-Family Conflict: Does Caregiving Frequency Matter?

Many workers can expect to provide care to an elder relative at some point during their tenure in the workforce. This study extends previous research by exploring whether caregiving frequency (providing care on a regular, weekly basis vs. intermittently) moderates the relationship between certain workplace characteristics and work-to-family conflict. Utilizing a sample of 465 respondents from the National Study of the Changing Workforce (Families and Work Institute, 2008 Families and Work Institute. (2008). National Study of the Changing Workforce [data file and code book]. https://store.familiesandwork.org (http://https://store.familiesandwork.org)  [Google Scholar]), results indicate that access to workplace flexibility has a stronger effect on reducing work-to-family conflict among intermittent caregivers than among those who provide care regularly.     

Conditional expected utility

Let \({\mathcal {E}}\) be a class of events. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences \(\succsim _{E}\), \(E\in {\mathcal {E}}\), satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory. We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional preferences that are not necessarily SEU. We study a subclass of these preferences, namely those that satisfy dynamic consistency. We give a representation theorem, and show that these preferences are Invariant Bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato et al. (Journal of Economic Theory 118:133–173, 2004). We also show that these preferences have only a trivial overlap with the class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences, but there are plenty of preferences of the \(\alpha \)-Maxmin Expected Utility type that satisfy our assumptions. We identify several concrete settings where our results could be applied. Finally, we consider the special case where the unconditional preference is itself SEU, and compare our results with those of Fishburn (Econometrica 41:1–25, 1973).     

A systems concept of society: Beyond individualism and holism

Three rival views of the nature of society are sketched: individualism, holism, and systemism. The ontological and methodological components of these doctrines are formulated and analyzed. Individualism is found wanting for making no room for social relations or emergent properties; holism, for refusing to analyze both of them and for losing sight of the individual.A systems view is then sketched, and it is essentially this: A society is a system of interrelated individuals sharing an environment. This commonsensical idea is formalized as follows: A society is representable as an ordered triple Composition of , Environment of , Structure of , where the structure of is the collection of relations (in particular connections) among components of . Included in the structure of any are the relations of work and of managing which are regarded as typical of human society in contrast to animal societies.Other concepts formalized in the paper are those of subsystem (in particular social subsystem), resultant property, and emergent or gestalt property. The notion of subsystem is used to build the notion of an F-sector of a society, defined as the set of all social subsystems performing a certain function F (e.g. the set of all schools). In turn, an F-institution is defined as the family of all F-sectors. Being abstractions, institutions should not be attributed a life and a mind of their own. But, since an institution is analyzable in terms of concrete totalities (namely social subsystems), it does not comply with the individualist requirement either.It is also shown that the systems view is inherent in any mathematical model in social science, since any such schema is essentially a set of individuals endowed with a certain structure. And it is stressed that the systems view combines the desirable features of both individualism and holism.     

Mean variance preferences and the heat equation

Chipman (1979) proves that for an expected utility maximizer choosing from a domain of normal distributions with mean and variance ² the induced preference functionV(, ) satisfies a differential equation known as the heat equation. The purpose of this note is to provide a generalization and simple proof of this result which does not depend on the normality assumption.     

The inferred referendum — A rule for committee decisions

We present a new method of social choice. The result of our method coincides with that of majority voting when it does not produce an intransitivity among the alternatives under consideration. When majority voting would produce an intransitivity, our method orders the alternatives in the same way as the transitive constituency would whom the committee members are most likely to represent. Analysis of the application of our method to three alternatives shows that (a) the resulting order depends only on the committee members' votes between pairs of alternatives (b) the resulting order is less in conflict with Sen's Property than the orders provided by other schemes (c) when majority voting provides an intransitivity, the hypothesis that, in fact, the committee's constituency is as we assume it to be is almost as likely as the hypothesis that it precisely mirrors the committee.     

The impossibility of the Paretian liberal and its relevance to welfare economics

The purpose of this study is to analyse the implications of Sen's impossibility result, the liberal paradox, for orthodox welfare economics. Because the rather special format of social choice theory makes it a little difficult to be sure of the relevance of this result, the whole dilemma is posed here in terms of a rather informal analysis of information al patterns.On the one hand, it is argued that the traditional approach to welfare economics, including both utilitarianism and Paretian ordinalism, contains severe informational constraints eliminating the use of all kinds of independent non-utility information in the social evaluation process. This property, called welfarism, is also present in the weak Pareto principle, which conflicts with even minimal requirements of personal liberty according to Sen's result.On the other hand, it is argued that there is in fact little to be resolved in this problem in spite of several attempts to circumvent the conflict. These studies are argued to be mainly ad hoc solutions to the formal problem and relevant only to the extent they indicate how severe restrictions are needed to avoid the paradox. The analogy with the prisoner's dilemma does not work either. Since liberal values are intrinsically non-welfaristic, the liberal paradox can be interpreted as only one, but a rather powerful, example of the informational deficiency of the orthodox approach.Finally, it is argued that the liberal paradox has striking implications for both the concept of preference and social optimum as well as empirical research on social welfare. This means that if the impossibility is to be taken seriously we need to revalue both the status of utility information and the role of the Pareto principle in social welfare analysis.The author is grateful to Professor Amartya Sen and Matti Tuomala for helpful comments and suggestions.     

When an Event Makes a Difference

For (S, Σ) a measurable space, let and be convex, weak^* closed sets of probability measures on Σ. We show that if ∪ satisfies the Lyapunov property , then there exists a set A ∈ Σ such that min_μ1∈ μ₁(A) > max_μ2 ∈ (A). We give applications to Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) and to the core of a lower probability.     

A note on identification in discrete choice models with partial observability

This note establishes a new identification result for additive random utility discrete choice models. A decision-maker associates a random utility \(U_{j}+m_{j}\) to each alternative in a finite set \(j\in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,J\right\} \), where \(\mathbf {U}=\left\{ U_{1},\ldots ,U_{J}\right\} \) is unobserved by the researcher and random with an unknown joint distribution, while the perturbation \(\mathbf {m}=\left( m_{1},\ldots ,m_{J}\right) \) is observed. The decision-maker chooses the alternative that yields the maximum random utility, which leads to a choice probability system \(\mathbf { m\rightarrow }\left( \Pr \left( 1|\mathbf {m}\right) ,\ldots ,\Pr \left( J| \mathbf {m}\right) \right) \). Previous research has shown that the choice probability system is identified from the observation of the relationship \( \mathbf {m}\rightarrow \Pr \left( 1|\mathbf {m}\right) \). We show that the complete choice probability system is identified from observation of a relationship \(\mathbf {m}\rightarrow \sum _{j=1}^{s}\Pr \left( j|\mathbf {m} \right) \), for any \(s<J\). That is, it is sufficient to observe the aggregate probability of a group of alternatives as it depends on \(\mathbf {m}\). This is relevant for applications where choices are observed aggregated into groups while prices and attributes vary at the level of individual alternatives.     

A Note On Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules

We characterize seniority rules, also known as lexical dictatorships, under weak consistency constraints on the groups choice function. These constraints are base triple-acyclicity in the case of binary choices and rationalizability (although not rationality) in the case of choices between an arbitrary number of alternatives. Existing results on these weakened constraints remain silent on the treatment of the groups most junior individuals and therefore do not yield a complete characterization of seniority rules. We also impose a universal domain, binary strict Pareto optimality, binary Pareto indifference, binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the newly introduced condition of conflict resolution. The latter condition requires a social choice rules not to remain indecisive between alternatives for which individuals have conflicting preferences.JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: D63, D71This revised version was published online in May 2005 with a corrected article title.     

A μ-σ-Risk Aversion Paradox and Wealth Dependent Utility

We report a surprising property of --preferences: the assumption of nonincreasing relative risk aversion implies the optimal portfolio being riskless. We discuss a solution of that paradox using wealth dependent utility functions in detail. Using the revealed preference theory we show that (general, i.e. not necessary -) wealth dependent utility functions can be characterized by Wald's axiom.     

Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures

Two players, A and B, bargain to divide a perfectly divisible pie. In a bargaining model with constant discount factors, \(\delta _A\) and \(\delta _B\), we extend Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–110, 1982)’s alternating offers procedure to more general deterministic procedures, so that any player in any period can be the proposer. We show that each bargaining game with a deterministic procedure has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoff outcome, which is efficient. Conversely, each efficient division of the pie can be supported as an SPE outcome by some procedure if \(\delta _A+\delta _B\ge 1\), while almost no division can ever be supported in SPE if \(\delta _A+\delta _B < 1\).     

Recall searching with and without recall

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (J Econ Behav Organ 8:137–144, 1987). In a 2 \(\times \) 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (1987). Our results provide clear evidence for Hey’s (1987) conjecture that recall negatively affects performance in sequential search. With experience, however, search behavior with and without recall converges toward the optimal reservation rule. We further find that the utilization of optimal reservation rules is independent from the stochastic nature of the search cost.     

On nonexistence of reconsideration-proof equilibrium with state variables

Reconsideration-proofness is a solution concept proposed by Kocherlakota (Games Econ Behav 15(1):33–54, 1996) for infinite horizon single-player problems in which time inconsistency is important. Kocherlakota’s (1996) definition has a limitation: it is not applicable to environments with state variables. The limitation is important because many time-inconsistent problems have state variables. This paper displays a natural generalization of reconsideration-proofness to environments with state variables, and shows that it leads to nonexistence in three examples. Such nonexistence contrasts with the general existence theorem obtained in environments without state variables in Kocherlakota (1996). In the first two examples, existence can be recovered with a modification in the solution concept. In the last example, nonexistence occurs even with the modified solution concept. Insights about further research are derived from these nonexistence results.     

Domination structures and multicriteria problems in n-person games

Multiple criteria decision problems with one decision maker have been recognized and discussed in the recent literature in optimization theory, operations research and management science. The corresponding concept with n-decision makers, namely multicriteria n-person games, has not yet been extensively explored.In this paper we first demonstrate that existing solution concepts for single criterion n-person games in both normal form and characteristic function form induce domination structures (similar to those defined and studied by Yu [39] for multicriteria single decision maker problems) in various spaces, including the payoff space, the imputation space and the coalition space. This discussion provides an understanding of some underlying assumptions of the solution concepts and provides a basis for generalizing and generating new solution concepts not yet defined. Also we illustrate that domination structures may be regarded as a measure of power held by the players.We then illustrate that a multicriteria problem can naturally arise in decision situations involving (partial) conflict among n-persons. Using our discussion of solution concepts for single criterion games as a basis, various approaches for resolving both normal form and characteristic function form multicriteria n-person games are proposed. For multicriteria games in characteristic function form, we define a multicriteria core and show that there exists a single game point whose core is equal to the multicriteria core. If we reduce a multicriteria game to a single criterion game, domination structures which are more general than classical ones must be considered, otherwise some crucial information in the game may be lost. Finally, we discuss a parametrization process which, for a given multicriteria game, associates a single criterion game to each point in a parametric space. This parametrization provides a basis for the discussion of solution concepts in multicriteria n-person games.     

Resolute majority rules

We investigate resolute voting rules that always rank two alternatives strictly and avoid social indecision. Resolute majority rules differ from the standard majority rule in that whenever both alternatives win the same number of votes, a tie-breaking function is used to determine the outcome. We provide axiomatic characterizations of resolute majority rules or resolute majority rules with a quorum. Resoluteness axiom is used in all these results. The other axioms are weaker than those considered in the characterization of the majority rule by May (1952 Econometrica, 20:680–684). In particular, instead of May’s positive responsiveness, we consider a much weaker monotonicity axiom.