An empirical test of ordinal independence

In this article, we test Green and Jullien's (1988) Ordinal Independence (OI) Axiom, an axiom necessary for any rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) model, including Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). We observe systematic violations of OI (some within-subject violation rates of over 50%). These patterns of choice cannot be explained by any RDEU theory alone. We suggest that subjects are employing an editing operation prior to evaluation: if an outcome-probability pair is common to both gambles, it is cancelled when the commonality is transparent; otherwise, it is not cancelled. We interpret the results with respect to both original and cumulative prospect theory and the known empirical properties of the weighting function.     

Reflections on gains and losses: A 2 × 2 × 7 experiment

What determines risk attraction or aversion? We experimentally examine three factors: the gain-loss dichotomy, the probabilities (0.2 vs. 0.8), and the money at risk (7 amounts). We find that the majority display risk attraction for small amounts of money, and risk aversion for larger amounts. Yet the frequency of risk attraction varies according to the gain-loss dichotomy and the probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky studied gain-loss reflections. We submit that a reflection can be decomposed into a translation and a probability switch. We find significant translation and switch effects, which are of comparable magnitude, a result that is equidistant from the diverging two popular views inspired by Prospect Theory: the gain-loss asymmetry, and the fourfold pattern.     

An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory

This paper presents a method for axiomatizing a variety of models for decision making under uncertainty, including Expected Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory. This method identifies, for each model, the situations that permit consistent inferences about the ordering of value differences. Examples of rankdependent and sign-dependent preference patterns are used to motivate the models and the “tradeoff consistency” axioms that characterize them. The major properties of the value function in Cumulative Prospect Theory—diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion—are contrasted with the principle of diminishing marginal utility that is commonly assumed in Expected Utility.     

Solving the St. Petersburg Paradox in cumulative prospect theory: the right amount of probability weighting

Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) does not explain the St. Petersburg Paradox. We show that the solutions related to probability weighting proposed to solve this paradox, (Blavatskyy, Management Science 51:677–678, 2005; Rieger and Wang, Economic Theory 28:665–679, 2006) have to cope with limitations. In that framework, CPT fails to accommodate both gambling and insurance behavior. We suggest replacing the weighting functions generally proposed in the literature by another specification which respects the following properties: (1) to solve the paradox, the slope at zero has to be finite. (2) to account for the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the probability weighting has to be strong enough.     

Cumulative prospect theory's functional menagerie

Many different functional forms have been suggested for both the value function and probability weighting function of Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). There are also many stochastic choice functions available. Since these three components only make predictions when considered in combination, this paper examines the complete pattern of 256 model variants that can be constructed from twenty functions. All these variants are fit to experimental data and their explanatory power assessed. Significant interaction effects are observed. The best model has a power value function, a risky weighting function due to Prelec (1998), and a Logit function. JEL Classification C52 · D81     

Estimating Risk Attitudes using Lotteries: A Large Sample Approach

Attitudes towards risk play a major role in many economic decisions. In empirical studies it is quite often assumed that attitudes towards risk do not vary across individuals. This paper questions this assumption and analyses which factors influence an individual's risk attitude. Based on questions on lotteries in a large household survey we first semiparametrically estimate an index for risk aversion. We only make weak assumptions about the underlying decision process and our estimation method allows for generalisations of expected utility. We then estimate a structural model based on Cumulative Prospect Theory. Expected utility is strongly rejected and both the value function and the probability weighting function vary significantly with (among other things) age, income, and wealth of the individual.     

Acceptance of empirical statements: A Bayesian theory without cognitive utilities

What criteria should we use in deciding whether to accept any empirical statement as being true? A popular theory suggests that we should assign subjective probabilities to all possible statements representing alternative answers to any given question; and should assign cognitive utilities to acceptance and to nonacceptance of each statement in case it is true, and also in case it is false. Then, as to acceptance or nonacceptance of all these statements we should adopt that particular policy that would maximize our expected utility. This paper will propose an alternative Bayesian theory of acceptance for empirical statements, which will make no use of special cognitive utilities. It will be argued that the new theory will avoid the paradoxes created by some other theories of acceptance and will help us in resolving some important philosophical problems.     

An experimental test of prospect theory for predicting choice under ambiguity

Prospect theory is the most popular theory for predicting decisions under risk. This paper investigates its predictive power for decisions under ambiguity, using its specification through the source method. We find that it outperforms its most popular alternatives, including subjective expected utility, Choquet expected utility, and three multiple priors theories: maxmin expected utility, maxmax expected utility, and a-maxmin expected utility.     

Qualitative Heuristics For Balancing the Pros and Cons

Balancing the pros and cons of two options is undoubtedly a very appealing decision procedure, but one that has received scarce scientific attention so far, either formally or empirically. We describe a formal framework for pros and cons decisions, where the arguments under consideration can be of varying importance, but whose importance cannot be precisely quantified. We then define eight heuristics for balancing these pros and cons, and compare the predictions of these to the choices made by 62 human participants on a selection of 33 situations. The Levelwise Tallying heuristic clearly emerges as a winner in this competition. Further refinements of this heuristic are considered in the discussion, as well as its relation to Take the Best and Cumulative Prospect Theory.     

Market failure in light of non-expected utility

This paper merges the non-expected utility approach (Tversky and Kahneman, J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323, 1992 and Quiggin, J Econ Behav Organ 3:323–343, 1982) into Akerlof’s (Quart J Econ 84:488–500, 1970) model of Market for Lemons. We derive the results for different probability weighting functions and analyze the phenomenon of market failure in light of non-expected utility maximization. Our main finding suggests that when the proportion of traded lemons is high (low), the problem of market failure is mitigated (enhanced). In addition, for the case of Cumulative Prospect Theory, we show that (a) the higher the loss aversion is, the more pronounced is the market failure; (b) gain-domain elevation is negatively related to the extent of market failure; and (c) the value function is (i) negatively monotonic in the gain-domain diminishing sensitivity parameter when the market is characterized by a high proportion of “peaches,” and (ii) positively monotonic in the loss-domain diminishing sensitivity parameter when the market is characterized by a high proportion of “lemons.”     

Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power — A critical re-appraisal

This paper re-evaluates the problem of measuring thea priori relative voting power of a voter in an assembly. We propose several new intuitively compelling postualtes that any reasonable index of voting power ought to satisfy. At the same time we argue that most of the paradoxes of voting power discussed in the literature are paradoxical only in a weak sense, if at all. This leaves three crippling paradoxes — the well-known paradox ofweighted voting, and two new ones presented here: thebloc anddonation paradoxes. We evaluate the four main relative power indices discussed in the literature with respect to these three severe paradoxes. The Shapley-Shubik index is seen to be immune to all three paradoxes, while the Deegan-Packel index is vulnerable to all three. The Banzhaf and the Johnston indices are demonstrably immune to the paradox of weighted voting. However, they are shown to suffer from both the bloc and the donation paradoxes. We argue that this seriously undermines these indices in a hitherto unsuspected way. Several other theoretical issues relating to voting power are discussed.     

Goals as reference points in marathon running: A novel test of reference dependence

In a large-scale field study of marathon runners, we test whether goals act as reference points in shaping the valuation of outcomes. Theories of reference-dependent preferences, such as Prospect Theory, imply that outcomes that are just below or just above a reference point are evaluated differently. Consistent with the Prospect Theory value function, we find that satisfaction as a function of relative performance (the difference between a runner’s finishing time goal and her actual finishing time) exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in both predictions of and actual experienced satisfaction. However, in contrast to Prospect Theory, we observe that loss aversion is partially driven by a discontinuity or jump at the reference point. In addition, we find that a runner’s time goal as well as their previous marathon times simultaneously impact runner satisfaction, providing support for the impact of multiple reference points on satisfaction.     

Retrospective on the utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern

This article offers an exegesis of the passages in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947, 1953) that discuss their conception of utility. It is occasioned by two factors. First, as we approach the semicentennial of the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, its immense impact on economic thought in the intervening years encourages serious reflection on its authors' ideas. Second, misleading statements about the theory continue to appear. The article will have accomplished its purpose if it helps others appreciate the genius and spirit of the theory of utility fashioned by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.     

Techniques and paradoxes in performing performance measurements: concluding reflections

ABSTRACT

Performance measurement has an implicit performance theory embedded within its practice; performance measurement perforce performs. Performance measurement has a performative effect on performance. Drawing together and building on the various empirical observations from the preceding papers in this collection, this concluding paper firstly examines the circumstances in which performance measurement performs, that is, when it produces ‘authentic’ performance improvements, compared to when performance measurements misfire. The paper secondly explores several paradoxes of performance measurement – such that performance measurement measures only part of the performance it seeks to be performative on, incentives to perform incentivise poor performance and so on. These paradoxes, contradictions and ironies must be apprehended and appreciated in discovering, discerning and deciphering the diverse dynamics of measuring performance. They also demonstrate that analysing and working with performance measurement requires a perspective that eschews absolutes and clear directions, and embraces the uneasy and potentially destabilising tension of Escher’s performative art.     

The Promise and the Pitfalls of Learned Helplessness Theory for Social Work Practice

Summary Because it articulates a psychology of powerlessness and becauseit focuses on the interactions between the individual and thesocial environment, Learned Helplessness Theory deserves tobecome an important new practice theory within social work.However, the theory also suffers from certain unresolved problemswhich currently limit its usefulness. This paper reviews LearnedHelplessness Theory for social workers and directs the attentionof practitioners to some crucial theoretical issues to be bornein mind when applying the theory to practice.     

Prospect theory and the “forgotten” fourfold pattern of risk preferences

Markowitz (Journal of Political Economy 60:151–158, 1952) identified a fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome magnitude: When outcomes are large, people are risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses, but risk preferences reverse when the outcomes are small, with people exhibiting risk seeking in gains and risk aversion in losses. This fourfold pattern was not addressed by either version of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky Econometrica 47:363–391, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323, 1992). We show how prospect theory can accommodate the pattern by combining an overweighting of low probabilities with a decreasingly elastic value function. We then examine the performance of prospect theory with two decreasingly elastic value functions: Prospect theory performs better, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with a normalized logarithmic value function than with a normalized exponential value function. We discuss several issues, and speculate about why Tversky and Kahneman did not address Markowitz’s fourfold pattern.     

Harsanyi’s critical rule utilitarianism

In his recent book,Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium In Games and Social Situations, John C. Harsanyi devotes a chapter to his new theory of morality, which he calls ‘Critical Rule Utilitarianism’, and which contains his solution to the problem of the interpersonal comparison of utility. After a detailed exposition of his theory, arguments will be presented to show that:

1. there are certain formal difficulties in the solution that he offers which leads to a rejection of the axiom that there is to be agreement between an individualj’s personal preferences and individuali’s (i ≠j) extended utility function out of which the social welfare function is to be constructed; and
2. Harsanyi’s theory of critical rule utilitarianism cannot be accepted as a theory of morality because it presupposes a more fundamental theory in its actual construction.

     

Is There an Indian Policy Process? An Investigation into Two Social Policy Processes

India is a huge, poor, fast developing, centralized and increasingly unequal, democratic country. The core argument of this article is that these and other contextual factors have an impact on the way in which social policies are formulated and implemented. The focus of the article is on two such policies on food and primary education. Based on secondary material and own fieldwork, the shaping of these two policies is discussed and some major characteristics of the two social policy processes are highlighted. This analysis brings to light the existence of two paradoxes present in social policy processes in India: one related to the fact that social policies are important for regime legitimacy but nevertheless suffer from a lack of political commitment; the other related to the fact that centralized decision‐making goes together with the widespread involvement of local politicians in policy implementation. These two paradoxes, the article concludes, are the result of the wider context in which social policies are shaped and are hence not easily resolved.     

Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model, the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete messages which are ordered by the cost incurred by the sender. We characterize the resulting equilibria without refining out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Subsequently, we apply an adapted version of the no incentive to separate (NITS) condition to our model. We show that if the sender and receiver have aligned preferences regarding the action of the receiver, then NITS only admits the equilibrium with the largest possible number of induced actions. When the preferences between players are not aligned, we show that NITS does not guarantee uniqueness, and we provide an example where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show, this improvement can occur to such an extent that the equilibrium outperforms the Goltsman et al. (J Econ Theory 144:1397–1420, 2009) upper bound for receiver’s payoffs in mediated communication.