Financial Edgework and the Persistence of Rogue Traders

This work explores financial edgework by professional speculative traders as an explanation for the persistence of rogue trading in financial markets. The article joins in the scholarly application of “edgework,” the social psychological study of voluntary risk, to speculative trading. The discussion focuses on the origins and persistence of that subset of behavior wherein the trader knowingly creates the condition in which he or she endangers the brokerage house that employs them and even, at times, threatens the public's perception of the integrity of the securities industry. Going over the edge between risk taking and unauthorized rogue trading is explained by looking at five inducements to escalate risk taking provided in the securities industry. This examination of financial edgework demonstrates how and, to a lesser degree, why rogue trading is a result of the security industry's pursuit of and desire to capitalize upon yet not publicize an occupational culture stressing a “risk‐and‐win” ethos.     

中国股市跨行业系统性风险空间溢出关联及风险预测分析——基于尾部风险网络模型

基于条件风险价值CoVaR和SIM单指数分位数回归技术,选取2012-2018年我国股市24行业指数周频数据,构建时变的跨行业尾部风险网络,通过网络拓扑结构反映系统性风险的空间关联及潜在变化趋势。此外,引入ARDL模型探究网络结构和宏观经济变量对股市系统性风险的长短期效应,最后对系统性风险进行预测。结果表明：(1)我国股市行业板块间存在明显的系统性风险空间关联和传染效应,风险溢出网络具有“小世界”特征;(2)网络连边集中度HHI呈明显的周期性变化。在尾部事件期间,HHI指标显著增加,风险网络呈较单一的中心节点结构,网络稳定性差;(3)通过节点风险传播强度和中心化程度发现,仅通过节点内部属性判断节点的系统重要性已不够全面和准确,应结合节点在网络中的位置和关联关系来判断;信息技术、医疗保健、商业和专业服务行业是风险网络中最有影响力的行业;(4)通过ARDL-ECM模型发现网络连边集中度是系统性风险的主要影响因素,并对股市系统性风险进行了高度准确的预测。本研究可为监管机构有效识别我国股市中有影响力的行业提供参考,依据关键行业的溢出关联制定针对性的风险防范措施,同时对风险溢出效应设立预警机制。     

Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets

This paper studies the impact of credit markets on optimal contracting, when the agent's “interim preference” over upcoming contracts is private information because personal financial decisions affect it via the wealth effect. The main result is a severe loss of incentive provision: equilibrium contracts invariably cause the agent to shirk (i.e., exert minimal effort) if the agent's private financial decision precedes moral hazard contracting. The basic intuition is that committing on another private variable, other than the effort level, exposes the parties to further exploitation of efficient risk‐sharing by relaxing the incentive constraint that was binding ex ante, unless the risk‐sharing was fully efficient to begin with.     

Shareholders' Wealth‐Maximizing Operating Decisions and Risk Management Practices in a Mixed Contracts Economy

This paper establishes a critically important positive role for operations management practices and financial hedging. We show that operations management decisions and financial hedging are intertwined, and we advance a framework that can identify their combined effects on investors' wealth. We show that: (a) firms (publicly traded corporations) will optimally hold adequate riskless working capital (e.g., cash) to minimize the cost of obtaining non‐financial inputs, and the magnitude of this cash holding depends on operating details, and (b) operations management and financial hedging can lower firms' cash requirements, and boost productivity, defined as the wealth created in the firm per dollar of invested capital. Productivity‐enhancing practices—by “freeing up” some of the firm's cash—can maximize the investors' wealth. We show that these results obtain because firms' contracts with many of the providers of non‐financial inputs are not traded, and because investors can invest not just in public corporations but also in businesses “outside the markets” (e.g., proprietorships, partnerships, and private equity).     

In Good Times but Not in Bad: The Role of Managerial Discretion in Moderating the Stakeholder Management and Financial Performance Relationship

We examine the role of managers in controlling the positive impact of stakeholder management (SM) on firm financial performance (FP) in the long term. We develop and test competing hypotheses on whether managers act as “good citizens” or engage in “self‐dealing” when allowed greater discretion. We test our assertions using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 806 U.S. public firms operating in 34 industries over 5 years (2005–2009). Our results indicate a nuanced influence of managerial discretion contexts on the SM‐FP relationship. We infer that given more latitude in decision making, as long as the “going is good” managers act as good citizens, but otherwise they revert to managerial self‐dealing. In light of our results, firms designing governance mechanisms to encourage managers to balance the needs of both shareholders and stakeholders must remain cognizant of contextual contingencies.     

Understanding Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Financial Decisions

Using a high‐stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both because they learn from his choice (“social learning”) and because his possession of the asset directly affects others' utility of owning the same asset (“social utility”). We randomize whether one member of a peer pair who chose to purchase an asset has that choice implemented, thus randomizing his ability to possess the asset. Then, we randomize whether the second member of the pair: (i) receives no information about the first member, or (ii) is informed of the first member's desire to purchase the asset and the result of the randomization that determined possession. This allows us to estimate the effects of learning plus possession, and learning alone, relative to a (no information) control group. We find that both social learning and social utility channels have statistically and economically significant effects on investment decisions. Evidence from a follow‐up survey reveals that social learning effects are greatest when the first (second) investor is financially sophisticated (financially unsophisticated); investors report updating their beliefs about asset quality after learning about their peer's revealed preference; and, they report motivations consistent with “keeping up with the Joneses” when learning about their peer's possession of the asset. These results can help shed light on the mechanisms underlying herding behavior in financial markets and peer effects in consumption and investment decisions.     

Financial Intermediaries and Markets

A complex financial system comprises both financial markets and financial intermediaries. We distinguish financial intermediaries according to whether they issue complete contingent contracts or incomplete contracts. Intermediaries such as banks that issue incomplete contracts, e.g., demand deposits, are subject to runs, but this does not imply a market failure. A sophisticated financial system—a system with complete markets for aggregate risk and limited market participation—is incentive‐efficient, if the intermediaries issue complete contingent contracts, or else constrained‐efficient, if they issue incomplete contracts. We argue that there may be a role for regulating liquidity provision in an economy in which markets for aggregate risks are incomplete.     

OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATES: A MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE APPROACH

Motivated by the observation that exchange‐rate management resembles market‐making, we use microstructure theory to conduct a welfare analysis of exchange‐rate management, including the “corner solutions” of a free float and a fixed peg. We show that a policy that smoothes out exchange‐rate fluctuations needs to trade off the welfare gain due to lower risk exposure of local producers against the trading losses that the policy would generate due to speculation. We identify the conditions under which exchange‐rate management can increase welfare and argue that these conditions are more likely to be satisfied in illiquid markets, mainly small economies and emerging markets. We also explore the role of a Tobin tax (assuming enforceability) in facilitating exchange‐rate management. (JEL: E58, F31, G14, O24)     

Domain Effects and Financial Risk Attitudes

We investigated whether financial risk preferences are dependent on the financial domain (i.e., the context) in which the risky choice options are presented. Previous studies have demonstrated that risk attitudes change when gambles are framed as gains, losses, or as insurance. Our study explores this directly by offering choices between identical gambles, framed in terms of seven financial domains. Three factors were extracted, explaining 68.6% of the variance: Factor 1 (Positive)—opportunity to win, pension provision, and job salary change; Factor 2 (Positive‐Complex)—investments and mortgage buying; Factor 3 (Negative)—possibility of loss and insurance. Inspection of the solution revealed context effects on risk perceptions across the seven scenarios. We also found that the commonly accepted assumption that women are more risk averse cannot be confirmed with the context structure suggested in this research; however, it is acknowledged that in the students’ population the variance across genders might be considerably less. These results suggest that our financial risk attitude measures may be tapping into a stable aspect of “context dependence” of relevance to real‐world decision making.     

Coping with Gray Markets: The Impact of Market Conditions and Product Characteristics

Gray markets, also known as parallel imports, have created fierce competition for manufacturers in many industries. We analyze the impact of parallel importation on a price‐setting manufacturer that serves two markets with uncertain demand, and characterize her policy against parallel importation. We show that ignoring demand uncertainty can take a significant toll on the manufacturer's profit, highlighting the value of making price and quantity decisions jointly. We find that adjusting prices is more effective in controlling gray market activity than reducing product availability, and that parallel importation forces the manufacturer to reduce her price gap while demand uncertainty forces her to lower prices. Furthermore, we explore the impact of market conditions (such as market base, price sensitivity, and demand uncertainty) and product characteristics (“fashion” vs. “commodity”) on the manufacturer's policy towards parallel importation. We also provide managerial insights about the value of strategic decision‐making by comparing the optimal policy to the uniform pricing policy that has been adopted by some companies to eliminate gray markets entirely. The comparison indicates that the value of making price and quantity decisions strategically is highest for moderately different market conditions and non‐commodity products.     

Financial Health Economics

We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the link between financial and real health care markets. This link is important as financial returns drive investment in medical research and development (R&D), which, in turn, affects real spending growth. We document a “medical innovation premium” of 4–6% annually for equity returns of firms in the health care sector. We interpret this premium as compensating investors for government‐induced profit risk, and we provide supportive evidence for this hypothesis through company filings and abnormal return patterns surrounding threats of government intervention. We quantify the implications of the premium for the growth in real health care spending by calibrating our model to match historical trends, predicting the share of gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to health care to be 32% in the long run. Policies that had removed government risk would have led to more than a doubling of medical R&D and would have increased the current share of health care spending by more than 3% of GDP.     

Consistency of Higher Order Risk Preferences

Risk aversion (a second‐order risk preference) is a time‐proven concept in economic models of choice under risk. More recently, the higher order risk preferences of prudence (third‐order) and temperance (fourth‐order) also have been shown to be quite important. While a majority of the population seems to exhibit both risk aversion and these higher order risk preferences, a significant minority does not. We show how both risk‐averse and risk‐loving behaviors might be generated by a simple type of basic lottery preference for either (1) combining “good” outcomes with “bad” ones, or (2) combining “good with good” and “bad with bad,” respectively. We further show that this dichotomy is fairly robust at explaining higher order risk attitudes in the laboratory. In addition to our own experimental evidence, we take a second look at the extant laboratory experiments that measure higher order risk preferences and we find a fair amount of support for this dichotomy. Our own experiment also is the first to look beyond fourth‐order risk preferences, and we examine risk attitudes at even higher orders.     

Technical Note – Pricing Below Cost Under Exchange‐Rate Risk

Pricing below cost is often classified as “dumping” in international trade and as “predatory pricing” in local markets. It is legally prohibited from practice because of earlier findings that it leads to predatory behavior by either eliminating competition or stealing market share. This study shows that a stochastic exchange rate can create incentives for a profit‐minded monopoly firm to set price below marginal cost. Our result departs from earlier findings because the optimal pricing decision is based on a rational behavior that does not exhibit any malicious intent against the competition to be considered as violating anti‐trust laws. The finding is a robust result, because our analysis demonstrates that this behavior occurs under various settings such as when the firm (i) is risk‐averse, (ii) can postpone prices until after exchange rates are realized, (iii) is capable of manufacturing in multiple countries, and (iv) operates under demand uncertainty in addition to the random exchange rate.     

COMMON COMPONENTS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY ATTITUDES ACROSS CONTEXTS AND DOMAINS: EVIDENCE FROM 30 COUNTRIES

Attitudes towards risk and uncertainty have been indicated to be highly context‐dependent, and to be sensitive to the measurement technique employed. We present data collected in controlled experiments with 2,939 subjects in 30 countries measuring risk and uncertainty attitudes through incentivized measures as well as survey questions. Our data show clearly that measures correlate not only within decision contexts or measurement methods, but also across contexts and methods. This points to the existence of one underlying “risk preference”, which influences attitudes independently of the measurement method or choice domain. We furthermore find that answers to a general and a financial survey question correlate with incentivized lottery choices in most countries. Incentivized and survey measures also correlate significantly between countries. This opens the possibility to conduct cultural comparisons on risk attitudes using survey instruments.     

Invisible Whispering: Restructuring Collaborative Decision Making with Instant Messaging

Organizational decision making is dominated by teams. When an important decision is required, a team is often formed to make it or to advise the individual decision maker, because a team has more resources, knowledge, and political insight than any one individual working alone. As teams have become geographically distributed, collaboration technology has come to play an important role in such collective decision making efforts. Instant messaging (IM) is an increasingly prevalent workplace collaboration technology that enables near‐synchronous text exchanges on a variety of devices. We examined the use of IM during face‐to‐face, telephone, and computer‐mediated team meetings, a practice we call “invisible whispering.” We introduce Goffman's characterization of social interaction as dramatic performance, differentiable into “front stage” and “backstage” exchanges, to analyze how invisible whispering alters the socio‐spatial and temporal boundaries of team decision making. Using IM, workers were able to influence front stage decision making through backstage conversations, often participating in multiple backstage conversations simultaneously. This type of interaction would be either physically impossible or socially constrained without the use of IM. We examine how invisible whispering changes the processes of collaborative decision making and how these new processes may affect the efficiency and effectiveness of collaborative decision making, as well as participation, satisfaction, relationships among team members, and individual attention.     

Designing Graphs that Promote Both Risk Understanding and Behavior Change

Graphs show promise for improving communications about different types of risks, including health risks, financial risks, and climate risks. However, graph designs that are effective at meeting one important risk communication goal (promoting risk‐avoidant behaviors) can at the same time compromise another key goal (improving risk understanding). We developed and tested simple bar graphs aimed at accomplishing these two goals simultaneously. We manipulated two design features in graphs, namely, whether graphs depicted the number of people affected by a risk and those at risk of harm (“foreground+background”) versus only those affected (“foreground‐only”), and the presence versus absence of simple numerical labels above bars. Foreground‐only displays were associated with larger risk perceptions and risk‐avoidant behavior (i.e., willingness to take a drug for heart attack prevention) than foreground+background displays, regardless of the presence of labels. Foreground‐only graphs also hindered risk understanding when labels were not present. However, the presence of labels significantly improved understanding, eliminating the detrimental effect of foreground‐only displays. Labels also led to more positive user evaluations of the graphs, but did not affect risk‐avoidant behavior. Using process modeling we identified mediators (risk perceptions, understanding, user evaluations) that explained the effect of display type on risk‐avoidant behavior. Our findings contribute new evidence to the graph design literature: unlike what was previously feared, we demonstrate that it is possible to design foreground‐only graphs that promote intentions for behavior change without a detrimental effect on risk understanding. Implications for the design of graphical risk communications and decision support are discussed.     

Elusive Critical Elements of Transformative Risk Assessment Practice and Interpretation: Is Alternatives Analysis the Next Step?

This article argues that “game‐changing” approaches to risk analysis must focus on “democratizing” risk analysis in the same way that information technologies have democratized access to, and production of, knowledge. This argument is motivated by the author's reading of Goble and Bier's analysis, “Risk Assessment Can Be a Game‐Changing Information Technology—But Too Often It Isn't” (Risk Analysis, 2013; 33: 1942–1951), in which living risk assessments are shown to be “game changing” in probabilistic risk analysis. In this author's opinion, Goble and Bier's article focuses on living risk assessment's potential for transforming risk analysis from the perspective of risk professionals—yet, the game‐changing nature of information technologies has typically achieved a much broader reach. Specifically, information technologies change who has access to, and who can produce, information. From this perspective, the author argues that risk assessment is not a game‐changing technology in the same way as the printing press or the Internet because transformative information technologies reduce the cost of production of, and access to, privileged knowledge bases. The author argues that risk analysis does not reduce these costs. The author applies Goble and Bier's metaphor to the chemical risk analysis context, and in doing so proposes key features that transformative risk analysis technology should possess. The author also discusses the challenges and opportunities facing risk analysis in this context. These key features include: clarity in information structure and problem representation, economical information dissemination, increased transparency to nonspecialists, democratized manufacture and transmission of knowledge, and democratic ownership, control, and interpretation of knowledge. The chemical safety decision‐making context illustrates the impact of changing the way information is produced and accessed in the risk context. Ultimately, the author concludes that although new chemical safety regulations do transform access to risk information, they do not transform the costs of producing this information—rather, they change the bearer of these costs. The need for further risk assessment transformation continues to motivate new practical and theoretical developments in risk analysis and management.     

Gray Markets and Supply Chain Incentives

“Gray markets” are unauthorized channels that distribute a branded product without the manufacturer's permission. Since gray markets are not officially sanctioned by the manufacturer, their existence is assumed to hurt the manufacturer. Yet manufacturers sometimes tolerate or even encourage gray market activities. We investigate the incentives of a manufacturer and its authorized retailer to engage in (or tolerate) gray markets. The firms need to consider the trade‐off between the positive effects of a gray market (price discrimination and cost savings) and the negative effects (cannibalization of sales and a loss in consumer valuation). Generally, gray markets can be categorized into two types: (i) a “local gray market,” where a retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers operating in the same region as the retailer; and, (ii) “bootlegging,” where the retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers in another market where the manufacturer sells through a direct channel. We characterize the equilibrium in each type of gray market and identify conditions under which the retailer will divert products to the gray market. Incentive problems are more complicated when the retailer bootlegs and, in this case, we show that conflicting incentives may lead to the emergence of a gray market where both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits decrease.     

The Use of Human Experience Data in the EU Risk Assessment Process

The incorporation of human experience data (HD) into the risk assessment process is encouraged by various authorities with the aim of improving the robustness of the subsequent findings. HD, however, can present in many forms, ranging from epidemiological studies to the accumulated experiences from poison centers. This diversity of the human experience, combined with the manner in which it may (or may not) present, creates several challenges for risk assessors if they are to give available HD due weight in the RA process. An evaluation was made of how HD has been cited and used within the 64 human health RAs published by the EU to the end of 2005. In all RAs, HD had been cited to some degree. But there was no consistency between how cited data had subsequently been taken forward and used in the evaluation of different endpoints, either between the RAs authored by the same or different EU Member States. The lack of any accepted guidance for addressing the role that HD can play within the RA process appears to lead to this situation. Recommendations are provided on the scope and focus such guidance could usefully be expected to take.