Head movement during listening turns in conversation

In five subjects, head movement during conversation was monitored by polarised light goniometry, and recorded alongside speech and a signal proportional to peak amplitude of sound waves (peak loudness). Kinematic properties of listeners' head movements, such as amplitude, frequency and cyclicity, differentiated various conversational functions. That is, they were function-specific: symmetrical, cyclic movements were employed to signal yes, no or equivalents; linear, wide movements anticipated claims for speaking; narrow linear movements occurred in phase with stressed syllables in the other's speech (ynchrony movements); and wide, linear movements occurred during pauses in the other's speech. That, it is argued, bears upon the relation between thesignalling of communicative intentions and the synchronisation of interactional rhythm. Thus, the former appears to determine the timing and tempo of responses such as yes and no, while the latter determines the regulation of synchrony movements. The manner in which these factors interact in other conversational functions and their theoretical implications are discussed.     

Ideology and welfare in the UK: the implications for the voluntary sector

The UK has, over recent years, moved from a welfare state to a more market-oriented system of welfare. But the extent of this change has varied considerably according to the ideological position of local government in different parts of the country. This makes it possible within one country to assess the implications for the voluntary sector of different models of welfare. This article develops a framework for looking at different welfare ideologies and the values they espouse, with reference both to the UK and to the models that exist in other countries. It then takes four examples of UK local authorities which demonstrate the different models and examines the implications for the voluntary sector. In doing so, it examines the prospects for the voluntary sector to deliver both service and political pluralism in the future.     

Inequality and welfare evaluation of heterogeneous income distributions

This paper establishes the principles that should govern the welfare and inequality analysis of heterogeneous income distributions. Two basic criteria – the equity preference condition and the compensation principle – are shown to be fundamentally incompatible. The paper favours the latter, thereby vindicating the traditional method of dealing with heterogeneous samples. However, inequality and welfare comparisons will usually be well defined only if equivalent incomes are obtained using constant scale factors; and researchers will need to distinguish clearly between inequality of nominal incomes and inequality of living standards. Furthermore, household observations must always be weighted according to family size.     

Nonbinary social choice for economic environments

Assume a finite integer l2 and a social choice correspondence mapping each (p, Z) into a nonempty subset (p, Z) of Z, where p is a profile of individual preferences and Z is a set of outcomes of cardinality l or more. Suppose that satisfies Arrow's choice axiom, independence of infeasible alternatives, and the Pareto criterion. If the preference domain is the family of profiles of classical economic preferences over the space of allocations of public goods, then is dictatorial.I am grateful for some especially helpful comments by Jerry Kelly, John Weymark, and two anonymous referees. In fact, they uncovered so many errors that I must revive the traditional disclaimer: All remaining mistakes are my own responsibility. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation, grants no. SES 9007953 and SES 9209039.     

On calculating optimal contributory negligence rules

This article considers the problem of finding the optimal rule for assigning liability on the basis of fault when there is (a) error in the assessment of fault, (b) a probability distribution of true fault across the population of possible litigants, and (c) a value attached to the deterrence effect of a rule. The discussion is placed in the legal context of Contributory Negligence, and parallels are drawn between the present approach and the economic approach to liability. A contributory negligence rule is said to be optimal if it minimizes a weighted sum of the cost of assessment error and the cost of the deviation between a rule and the optimally deterrent rule. It is shown that the form of the optimal rule depends on the importance of deterrence and on the probability distribution of plaintiffs with respect to fault. Sufficient conditions are given for each of the extant contributory negligence rules to approximate the optimal rule. It is argued that, in designing the law, the preference among rules should be based on the relative plausibility of these sufficient conditions, some of which may be verifiable empirically.It is a pleasure of thank Richard O. Lempert, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Robert L. Rabin and Patrick Suppes for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. Much of the work reported here was done while the author was a University Fellow at Stanford University. Correspondence should be addressed to Ewart A. C. Thomas, Department of Psychology, Bldg. 420, Stanford University, Stanford, Ca. 94305, USA.     

Rethinking the science-policy nexus: from knowledge utilization and science technology studies to types of boundary arrangements

The relationship between political judgment and science-based expertise is a troubled one. In the media three cliché images compete. The business-as-usual political story is that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, politics is safely on top and experts are still on tap. The story told by scientists is that power-less but inventive scholars only speak truth to power. But there is plenty of room for a more cynical interpretation. It sees scientific advisers as following their own interests, unless better paid by other interests, and politicians as asking for advice only to support and legitimize their pre-formed political decisions. To the extent this cynical perspective gains ascendancy, politics and science lose credibility. If we think the three clichés cloak a more complex reality, we should embark upon a quest for other, possibly better models of the science/politics nexus. That is exactly the purpose of this article. Its claim is that a mutual transgression of the knowledge utilization strand of research in policy studies and the study of science, technology and society will provide us with more sophisticated images of science/politics boundary arrangements. Building upon Habermas well-known distinctions and Wittrocks historical-institutional approach in the construction of a property space, eight models are presented. We should try to discover the conditions under which some of these models may claim greater verisimilitude. This may allow us to rethink the role of scientific expertise in policymaking and generate a model that guides experts and policymakers (and perhaps other stakeholders as well) in their day-to-day boundary work.

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Zusammenfassung Die Beziehung zwischen politischem Urteil und wissenschaftlicher Expertise ist problematisch. In den Medien wetteifern heute drei Klischees dazu. Allem gegenteiligen Anschein zum Trotz ist die Sichtweise der Politik gewöhnlich, dass sie sicher alle Fäden in der Hand hält und die Experten auf Abruf bereitstehen. Wissenschaftler vertreten dagegen die Auffassung, sie seien machtlose, wenngleich erfindungsreiche Gelehrte, die lediglich den Mächtigen die Wahrheit sagen. Daneben ist jedoch reichlich Raum für eine zynischere Betrachtungsweise, nach der wissenschaftliche Berater ihre eigenen Interessen verfolgen, sofern andere Interessen sie nicht besser bezahlen, und Politiker nur solchen Rat suchen, der ihre vorgefassten politischen Entscheidungen stützt und legitimiert. In dem Maße, wie diese zynische Sicht die Oberhand gewinnt, verlieren Politik und Wissenschaft an Glaubwürdigkeit. Wenn wir jedoch meinen, dass diese drei Klischees eine komplexere Realität verhüllen, dann sollten wir nach anderen, möglicherweise besseren Modellen für den Nexus zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik suchen. Genau darauf zielt dieser Artikel ab. Wir behaupten, dass ein beidseitiges Überschreiten des Forschungsansatzes zur Wissensanwendung in den Politikwissenschaften und in der wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung von Naturwissenschaft, Technologie und Gesellschaft hochauflösendere Bilder von den Verhältnissen an der Grenze zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik liefert. Wir präsentieren acht Modelle, aufbauend auf Habermas bekannten Unterscheidungen und Wittrocks historisch-instutionellem Ansatz zur Konstruktion eines Eigenschaftsraums. Wir sollten nach den Bedingungen suchen, unter denen manche dieser Modelle eine größere Wahrheitsnähe für sich beanspruchen können. Dies könnte uns ermöglichen, die Rolle wissenschaftlicher Expertise bei politischen Entscheidungsprozessen neu zu überdenken und ein Modell zu schaffen, an dem sich Experten und politische Entscheidungsträger (und vielleicht auch andere Beteiligte) in ihrer täglichen Arbeit im fraglichen Grenzbereich orientieren können.

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Résumé La relation entre le jugement politique et lexpertise à fondement scientifique est problématique. Dans les médias, trois clichés se disputent la première place. Même si les apparences indiquent le contraire, le langage du monde politique montre que ce dernier tient les rênes et que les experts doivent répondre à lappel. Le message diffusé par les scientifiques consiste à dire quils sont des érudits certes sans pouvoir mais ingénieux, qui se contentent de «dire la vérité aux puissants». Mais ceci laisse assez de place à une interprétation plus cynique, suivant laquelle les conseillers scientifiques poursuivent leurs propres intérêts, à moins que dautres intérêts ne les rémunèrent mieux; et les hommes politiques ne leur demandent leur avis que pour étayer et légitimer les décisions politiques quils ont déjà prises. La politique et la science perdent de leur crédibilité à mesure que cette vision cynique gagne du terrain. Si nous pensons que ces trois clichés cachent une réalité plus complexe, il nous faudra chercher dautres modèles, meilleurs si possible, pour la connexion entre science et politique. Tel est exactement lobjectif de cet article. Il affirme quune transgression mutuelle des filières dutilisation du savoir dans la recherche en sciences politiques et létude de la science, de la technologie et de la socièté nous fournira un tableau plus complexe des rapports en présence sur les lignes de démarcation entre science et politique. Il présente huit modèles sur la base des distinctions bien connues dHabermas et de lapproche historico-institutionnelle de Wittrock sur la construction dun espace de propriété. Nous devrions rechercher les conditions dans lesquelles certains de ces modèles peuvent se targuer dêtre très vraisemblables. Ceci nous permettrait de repenser le rôle de lexpertise scientifique dans la production politique et de créer un modèle capable de guider les experts et les politiques (et peut-être aussi dautres intéressés) dans leur travail quotidien aux frontières de ces deux domaines.

     

Only sane: Autistic barriers in “boring” patients

This paper addresses needs of patients whom Winnicott called boring. Although often functioning well in the work world, they lack a rich inner life and a capacity for intimacy. Thus, psychotherapy is particularly problematic for them. To develop a model for working with this group of patients, the authors elaborate the concept of autistic barriers from British object relations theory, and suggest a changing role for the therapist in four successive phases of the treatment.     

Plan and control

Conclusion Is closer and closer social control the inevitable price of progress, a necessary concomitant of the continued development of modern social forms? We believe that this is indeed the case. Against those who see the new communications technologies as the basis for a coming communications era, and the new information technologies as the panacea for our present Age of Ignorance, our own argument is that their development has, in fact, been closely associated with processes of social management and control. The scale and complexity of the modern nation state has made communications and information resources (and technologies) central to the maintenance of political and administrative cohesion.The Information Revolution is, then, not simply and straight-forwardly a matter of technological progress, of a new technological or industrial revolution. It is significant, rather, for the new matrix of political and cultural forces that it supports. And a crucial dimension here is that of organizational form and structure. Communication and information resources (and technologies) set the conditions and limits to the scale and nature of organizational possibilities. What they permit is the development of complex and large-scale bureaucratic organizations, and also of extended corporate structures that transcend the apparent limits of space and time (transnational corporations). They also constitute the nervous system of the modern state and guarantee its cohesion as an expansive organizational form. Insofar as they guarantee and consolidate these essential power structures in modern society, information and communication are fundamental to political-administrative regulation, and consequently to the social and cultural experience of modernity.The exploitation of information resources and technologies has expressed itself, politically and culturally, through the dual tendency towards social planning and management, on the one hand, and surveillance and control, on the other. In historical terms, this can be seen as the apotheosis of Lewis Mumford's megamachine: technology now increasingly fulfils what previously depended upon bureaucratic organization and structure. But the central historical reference point is the emergence, early in the twentieth century, of Scientific Management (as a philosophy both of industrial production and of social reproduction). It was at this moment that scientific planning and management moved beyond the factory to regulate the whole way of life. At this time, the gathering of social knowledge became the normal accompaniment of action, and the manufacture of consent, through propaganda and opinion management, was increasingly based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. If, through Scientific Management, the planning and administration of everyday life became pervasive, it also became the preeminent form and expression of social control. Planning and management were, necessarily and indissociably, a process of surveillance and of manipulation and persuasion. To the extent that these administrative and dominative information strategies were first developed on a systematic basis, it was at this historical moment, we believe, that the Information Revolution was unleashed. New information and communications technologies have most certainly advanced, and automated, these combined information and intelligence activities, but they remain essentially refinements of what was fundamentally a political-administrative revolution.Recent innovations in information and communications technologies have generally been discussed from a narrow technological or economic perspective. It has been a matter of technology assessment or of the exploitation of new technologies to promote industrial competitiveness and economic growth. This, in the light of our discussion, seems a partial and blinkered vision. The absolutely central question to be raised in the context of the Information Revolution of the eighties, is, we believe, the relation between knowledge/information and the system of political and corporate power. For some, knowledge is inherently and self-evidently a benevolent force, and improvements in the utilization of knowledge are demonstrably the way to ensure social progress. Information is treated as an instrumental and technical resource that will ensure the rational and efficient management of society. It is a matter of social engineering by knowledge professionals and information specialists and technocrats. For us, the problems of the information society are more substantial, complex, and oblique.This, of course, raises difficult political and philosophical issues. These are the issues that Walter Lippmann comes up against when he recognizes in the Great Society that centralization of power which deprives [citizens] of control over the use of that power, and when he confronts the disturbing awareness that the problems that vex democracy seem to be unmanageable by democratic methods. They are the issues that Lewis Mumford addresses when he argues that the tension between small-scale association and large-scale organization, between personal autonomy and institutional regulation, between remote control and diffused local intervention, has now created a critical situation. And they are the monumental issues that concern Castoriadis in his analysis of instrumental reason and the rationalist ideology, those myths which, more than money or weapons, constitute the most formidable obstacles in the way of the reconstruction of human society.Among the significant issues to be raised by the new information technologies are their relation to social forms of organization, their centrality to structures of political power, and their role in the cultural logic of consumer capitalism. Sociological analysis is naïve, we believe, when it treats the new telecommunications, space, video, and computing technologies as innocent technical conceptions and looks hopefully to a coming, post-industrial Utopia. Better to look back to the past, to the entwined histories of reason, knowledge, and technology, and to their relation to the economic development of capitalism and the political and administrative system of the modern nation state.     

Social affinity among top managerial executives of large corporations in Korea

Korea is a society subject to quite diverse social forces. Modernization should encourage reform, but the yoke of tradition restrains this tendency. This paper examines the patterns of preferential treatment of executives, based on family, school, and regional ties, by the owners of large Jaebol corporations in Korea. We found that about 21% of the total number of executive positions in the large corporations were occupied by individuals who had some type of family tie with the owners of the corporations. Also, there is a strong tendency of corporation owners to employ the executives of the same regional origin of birth as their own, but the affinity based on school ties was not as strong as that of regional origin. The findings of this study seem to support the arguments of previous studies that claimed a trust factor as a main cause of social similarity and affinity between the owners and executives in corporations.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 17–22, 1987, Chicago, Illinois.     

“Queer's” Near Absence in Academic and Student Service Websites

This essay studies several Websites that deal with mainly U.S. universities' LGBT/Queer student services and/or LGBT/Queer academic programs, and it considers the terminology such programs apply to name themselves. Notably, the term queer is almost absent on many of these sites, especially sites that are non-academic and provide student services. Drawing on Annamarie Jagose's Queer Theory, the author suggests that the term queer may be too threatening, too ambiguous, and too masculine to be useful in naming these programs and services. While numerous specific university sites have been explored, the essay focuses on the listings of services and programs found on two sites: University of Illinois-Chicago's site College/University Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Centers/Programs at http://www.uic.edu/org/lgbt and John Younger's Website University LGBT Programs: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Studies in the USA and Canada at http://www.duke.edu/web/jyounger/lbgtprogrs.html.     

Choice,freedom, and freedom of choice

This paper argues in favour of a distinction between freedom and freedom of choice – a distinction that economists and political philosophers have so far either ignored or drawn wrongly. Drawing the distinction correctly may help to resolve a number of disputes in contemporary political philosophy and non-welfarist normative economics regarding the so-called preference-based account of freedom and the relevance, to judgements about freedom, of degrees of similarity between agents options. The paper begins by setting out three much discussed axioms for the measurement of freedom (of choice?) originally put forward by Pattanaik and Xu. It is suggested that the problems these axioms give rise to can be solved by distinguishing correctly between freedom and freedom of choice. The paper then sets out definitions of freedom, choice and freedom of choice, justifying these in philosophical terms and arguing their superiority to alternative definitions. Finally, on the basis of these definitions and with reference to Pattanaik and Xus axioms, it is shown that an agent can enjoy freedom without enjoying freedom of choice, and that she can enjoy an increase in one of these without enjoying an increase in the other. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I should like to thank Keith Dowding, Martin van Hees, Matthew Kramer, Marco Negri, Serena Olsaretti, Olof Page, Mario Ricciardi, Alan Ritter, Hillel Steiner, Kotaro Suzumura and audiences at seminars in Manchester, Palermo, Pavia and Oxford. I am grateful to the Italian Ministry for Higher Education (MURST) and the Italian National Research Council (CNR) for funding that facilitated the completion of the paper.     

Lying about running: The functions of talk in a scene

The running scene rests upon a system of beliefs (a code) about the qualities of running performances. Membership in the scene entails the interrelated use of conversational forms and the presentation of a team identity. The forms consist of nomic talk, ritualized lying and code truth telling. Within each form, the runner may lie about or manage information regarding running performances in order to construct, maintain or attack the system of beliefs. The lie, then, plays a major role in the scene as a device of social interaction.     

Predatory,developmental, and other apparatuses: A comparative political economy perspective on the Third World state

Disappointment over the contributions of Third World state apparatuses to industrial transformation and the increasing intellectual dominance of neoutiliarian paradigms in the social science has made if fashionable to castigate the Third World state as predatory and rent seeking. This paper argues for a more differentiated view, one that connects differences in performance to differences in state structure. The incoherent absolutist domination of the klepto-patrimonial Zairian state are contrasted to the embedded autonomy of the East Asian developmental state. Then the internal structure and external ties of an intermediate state — Brazil — are analyzed in relation to both polar types. The comparative evidence suggests that the efficacy of the developmental state depends on a meritocratic bureaucracy with a strong sense of corporate identity and a dense set of institutionalized links to private elites.     

Snarls,Quacks, and Quarrels: Culture and Structure in Political Process Theory

Political process theories of social movements have relied on a set of oppositions between culture and structure that has limited their capacity to capture the supraindividual, durable, and constraining dimensions of culture. The solution is not to abandon an emphasis on objective political structures in favor of potential insurgents' subjective perceptions of political opportunities, but rather to probe the (objective) resources and constraints generated by the cultural dimensions of political structures. Such a perspective would pay closer attention to the cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional memories, and political taboos that create and limit political opportunities; and would link the master frames that animate protest to dominant political structures and processes.     

Welfarist-consequentialism,similarity of attitudes,and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem

Two features of Arrows social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of peoples welfare and nothing else. The second feature is a similarity of peoples attitudes towards social outcomes as a possible resolvent of the Arrow impossibility theorem. Two extended frameworks, one consequentialist and the other non-consequentialist, are developed. Both frameworks are shown to admit some interesting resolutions of Arrows general impossibility theorem, which are rather sharply contrasting with Arrows own perspective.     

Words of power: The power of words

Conclusion The original hapiness of words (Foucault) is gone ; there are no innocent languages (Barthes) anymore. All are related to social experiences, because a language originates in and has its primary reference to the everyday life. (Berger and Luckman, 1967, p.38) Any language is related to a given society, and both language and society are shaped by history. Obviously, American and French histories have been quite different.     

Addiction to fruit machines: A preliminary study among young males

Although most sources treat gambling as an adult phenomenon, adolescent gambling is more widespread than is generally recognized, and in some cases may even be pathological. This paper outlines a preliminary study of eight adolescents addicted to playing and gambling on coin-in-the-slot machines (more commonly known as fruit machines). Factors involved in the onset of fruit machine playing are examined along with their alternative gambling activities and associated problems. The role of skill and excitement components in persistent playing are also discussed.The author would like to thank the United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council for funding this work through a research studentship.     

Brief Communications: Treating Problem Gamblers: A Residential Therapy Approach

The Gordon House Association (GHA) is the UK's only specialist and dedicated residential facility for problem gamblers. This paper describes the GHA therapeutic programme which is centred round a nine-month period of residency. Progression through the programme is described by overviewing each of the phases. These are initial assessment and five distinct phases comprising coping with today (Phase One), coping with yesterday (Phase Two), coping with change (Phase Three), coping with tomorrow (Phase Four), and coping on my own (Phase Five). These phases are themselves underpinned within the GHA core therapeutic approach which is also described.     

Max Weber,critical theory,and the administered world

The sociological perspectives of Max Weber and the Frankfurt School have been viewed as polarities in much of the recent literature. The Frankfurt sociologists were advocates of a neo-Marxism that stressed dialectical reasoning and rejected the notion of value-neutrality. Weber adhered to the canons of causal logic and cultivated the ideal of objectivity in social research. Notwithstanding these theoretical and methodological differences, Weber and the advocates of critical theory arrived at surprisingly similar conclusions about the fate of the modern world. Weber saw the advent of a bureaucratic iron cage which would effectively negate the role of the individual, while the Frankfurt sociologists posited the onset of an administered world in which human activity would be smothered in an ever-expanding network of management and control. Given these commonalities, a revision of the standard evaluation of Weber and critical theory is suggested.     

Expected subjective utility: Is the Neumann-Morgenstern utility the same as the Neoclassical's?

Using axioms no stronger than those for the Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis, with the recognition of finite sensibility, it is shown that the utility function derived by the N-M method is a neoclassical subjective utility function, contrary to the belief otherwise by prominent economists. This result is relevant for issues of utility measurability, social choice, etc. since it is subjective utility that is relevant for social choice. The relevance of individual risk aversion to the form of social welfare functions and the rationality of pure risk aversion are also discussed.