Trust and risk revisited

A trustor faces a risky choice in the trust game when he acts upon his belief regarding the chances of betrayal by the trustee. Despite intensive research there is no clear evidence for a link between lottery risk preferences and risk involved in trusting others. We argue that this is due to crucial differences between the risk measurements in the two settings. Trusting is giving up control to a human while lottery risk arises from a mechanistic randomization device. We propose a risky trust game that experimentally measures risk in the same context as the standard trust game, but nevertheless reduces the trust decision to objective risk. Our results show that transfers in the trust game can indeed be explained by individual risk attitudes elicited with the risky trust game, while lottery risk preferences have no explanatory power.     

The role of beliefs,trust, and risk in contributions to a public good

This paper experimentally investigates if and how beliefs, trust, and risk attitudes are associated with cooperative behavior. By applying incentivized elicitation methods to measure these concepts, we find that beliefs about others’ cooperation and trust are positively correlated with cooperation in a public goods game. However, even though contributing to a public good resembles a situation of making decisions under strategic uncertainty, elicited risk preferences do not seem to explain cooperation in a systematic way.     

Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory

We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve on the unique no-gifts equilibrium by two different types of gift exchange: simple and complex exchange, respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange, but it requires not only mutual trust, like with simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examine whether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected by the move and matching structure of the game. We find that the so-called partners treatment is a precondition for the occurrence of complex exchange.     

What’s in a frame? Goal framing,trust and reciprocity

Economists often rely on the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, or variants thereof, to identify levels of trust and reciprocity, which are fundamental to discussions of social capital. But to what extent is behavior in this game sensitive to the way the instructions are framed? We use the Berg et al. trust game played for ten rounds with random re-matching to study this. We implement a number of variations in the way the game is presented to subjects. We show that levels of trust, reciprocity and returns to trust are significantly higher under “goal framing”, which highlights the conflict inherent in the game, between self-interest and maximizing social surplus. Furthermore, with such framing, trust measured via the experimental game exhibits significant positive correlation with trust measured via the Social Values Orientation questionnaire.     

Fairness as a constraint on reciprocity: Playing simultaneously as dictator and trustee

The dictator and trust games are two common games used to identify the existence of social preferences. However, in many social interactions, individuals face the environments in both games simultaneously: for example we are often engaged in charitable donations to strangers, as well as reciprocal exchange with family members and colleagues. As giving in one game could be prioritised over giving in the other, it is important to have participants play both as a dictator in the dictator game and as a trustee in a trust game simultaneously. The results indicate that when the recipient in the dictator game is significantly poorer relative to the dictator, the dictator tends to return an amount to the trustor such that the trustor neither makes a loss nor profit from trusting. This suggests that the presence of a sufficiently strong incentive to make transfers as a dictator may completely crowd-out any monetary returns to trust.     

Spill‐Up and Spill‐Over of Trust: An Extended Test of Cultural and Institutional Theories of Trust in South Korea1

In comparison to the heated debate over the origins of trust in political institutions, few studies have empirically examined the linkage between trust in political and nonpolitical institutions at the individual level. In this study, we utilize a two‐step methodology to investigate attitudes toward the government in the broader context of attitudes toward related nonpolitical institutions in South Korea. Results from latent class analysis reveal that political trust is an integrated part of a more general set of attitudes toward social and economic institutions. In addition, results from multinomial logistic regression analysis corroborate past studies that found a positive relationship between perceptions of institutional performance and trust in institutions while partially supporting theories advocating the importance of interpersonal trust for institutional trust. This study points to the possibility of interpersonal trust “spilling up” to trust in institutions and the likelihood that trust in one institution “spills over” to trust in other related institutions.     

Sex differences in trust and trustworthiness: A meta-analysis of the trust game and the gift-exchange game

We present a meta-analytic review of the literature on sex differences in the trust game (174 effect sizes) and the related gift-exchange game (35 effect sizes). Based on parental investment theory and social role theory we expected men to be more trusting and women to be more trustworthy. Indeed, men were more trusting in the trust game (g = 0.22), yet we found no significant sex difference in trust in the gift-exchange game (g = 0.15). Regarding trustworthiness, we found no significant sex difference in the trust game (g = −0.04), and we found men, not women, to be more trustworthy in the gift-exchange game (g = 0.33). These results suggest that men send more money than women do when their money is going to be multiplied, thereby creating an efficiency gain. This so-called “male multiplier effect” may be explained by a stronger psychological tendency in men to acquire resources.     

Trust in surveys and games – A methodological contribution on the influence of money and location

This paper explores methods to study trust. In a variety of settings, answers to survey questions and choices in a trust game are obtained from student sample pools. Some subjects are approached by mail and execute their task at home whereas others participate in classroom experiments. No differences between the results obtained by these methods are observed. Furthermore, one additional group plays the trust game with purely hypothetical payments, and another receives random lottery payments. This changes trust behavior dramatically, whereas trustworthiness is unaffected. Subjects without any financial incentives exhibit less trust and their trust choices are significantly correlated with survey trust answers. There is no such correlation for the corresponding choices with real payments.     

Consequences of reducing nonresponse in a national telephone survey

Critics of public opinion polls often claim that methodological shortcuts taken to collect timely data produce biased results. This study compares two random digit dial national telephone surveys that used identical questionnaires but very different levels of effort: a "Standard" survey conducted over a 5-day period that used a sample of adults who were home when the interviewer called, and a "Rigorous" survey conducted over an 8-week period that used random selection from among all adult household members. Response rates, computed according to AAPOR guidelines, were 60.6 percent for the Rigorous and 36.0 percent for the Standard study. Nonetheless, the two surveys produced similar results. Across 91 comparisons, no difference exceeded 9 percentage points, and the average difference was about 2 percentage points. Most of the statistically significant differences were among demographic items. Very few significant differences were found on attention to media and engagement in politics, social trust and connectedness, and most social and political attitudes, including even those toward surveys.     

Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different

Trust-based interactions with robots are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on the road, and in the home. However, a valid concern is that people may not trust robots as they do humans. While trust in fellow humans has been studied extensively, little is known about how people extend trust to robots. Here we compare trust-based investments and self-reported emotions from across three nearly identical economic games: human-human trust games, human-robot trust games, and human-robot trust games where the robot decision impacts another human. Robots in our experiment mimic humans: they are programmed to make reciprocity decisions based on previously observed behaviors by humans in analogous situations. We find that people invest similarly in humans and robots. By contrast the social emotions (i.e., gratitude, anger, pride, guilt) elicited by the interactions (but not the non-social emotions) differed across human and robot trust games. Emotional reactions depended on the trust game interaction, and how another person was affected.     

Sex-related communication with mothers and close friends during the transition to university

The current study examines communication about sex-related topics with close friends and mothers during the first semester of college. Students (N = 182, 50% female, mean age = 18.5) completed surveys about the frequency and quality of their sex-related communication with same-sex close friends and mothers, and sexual experience and attitudes. Sex-related communication was more frequently reported by women than men and with close friends than with mothers. Sexually active students discussed most topics more frequently than abstinent students. Communication with close friends was a stronger correlate of sexual attitudes than communication with mothers. Finally, the quality of communication with close friends was more strongly associated with sexual experience and attitudes than communication with mothers. Findings suggest the importance of understanding the role of friends in assigning meaning to sexual behaviors and beliefs.     

Muslim Mistrust: The Resilience of Negative Public Attitudes after Complimentary Information

Muslims have arguably been the most consistently demonized group in American politics of the past decade, factoring heavily in Republican presidential and congressional politics since 2002. Opinions about Muslims have split the American electorate, and we investigate why. Our explanation focuses on interlocking institutions—party, religion, and media—in encouraging beliefs about American Muslims that prove intransigent. Using data from three nationally representative surveys, including a survey embedded experiment, we examine the correlates of anti-Muslim beliefs. Our analysis finds that ceiling effects in the correlates of holding anti-Muslim attitudes and subject trust in Fox News Channel encourage a negative reaction to information that might repair public opinion about American Muslims.     

TRUST,RECIPROCITY, AND RULES

Many economic interactions rely on trust and trust violations can have serious economic consequences. Simple minimum standard rules are attractive because they prevent egregious trust violations. However, they may undermine more trusting and reciprocal (trustworthy) behavior that otherwise would have occurred, leading to worse outcomes. In an experimental trust game, we test the efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum standard rules. Rules damage trust and reciprocity, reducing economic welfare. While sufficiently restrictive rules restore welfare, trust and reciprocity never return. Results indicate that participants are concerned about payoffs while also using the game to learn about trust and trustworthiness of others. (JEL C72, C90, D63, D64, L51)     

How activating cognitive content shapes trust: A subliminal priming study

The activation of cognitive contents plays a prominent role in social psychological research. Yet, so far this has received little attention in economics. In our research we connect a standard social psychological manipulation to activate cognitive content (a trust vs. distrust priming manipulation) to a classic paradigm from economics (a trust game). Our findings demonstrate that subliminally activating the concept of trust (vs. distrust) leads participants to judge a series of strangers as more (vs. less) trustworthy. Moreover, our research shows for the first time that such a subliminal priming manipulation shapes the subsequent sending behavior in a fictitious version of a standard economic trust game. This suggests that psychological priming techniques allow new insights into what determines beliefs in economic games.     

Trust games: A meta-analysis

We collect data from 162 replications of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe Investment game (the “trust” game) involving more than 23,000 participants. We conduct a meta-analysis of these games in order to identify the effect of experimental protocols and geographic variation on this popular behavioral measure of trust and trustworthiness. Our findings indicate that the amount sent in the game is significantly affected by whether payment is random, and whether play is with a simulated counterpart. Trustworthiness is significantly affected by the amount by which the experimenter multiplies the amount sent, whether subjects play both roles in the experiment, and whether the subjects are students. We find robust evidence that subjects send less in trust games conducted in Africa than those in North America.     

Surveys on Surveys: Limitations and Potentialities

Data from two surveys on surveys in Waterloo, Ontario were usedto assess attitudes toward the survey. Questions in the twosurveys inquired into motives for refusing/consenting to interviews;attitudes toward past experience with surveys; likes/dislikesof form of contact, question format, and topic; perception ofsocial pressure to respond to surveys; views on the social legitimacyof polling and on legislative controls for surveying. The surveysalso collected response histories. Analysis of the attitudesbegan with a factor analysis of 12 items, which identified fourfactors descending from the general to the particular. It wasfound that attitudes are related to exposure to surveying, i.e.,the more times a person reports requests for survey cooperation,the more unfavorable is his or her attitude toward the method.On the whole, however, the author finds that the evidence presentedbelies pessimistic views about surveys on surveys.     

Predicting Commitment to Wed Among Hispanic and Anglo Partners

Ethnic differences in commitment to wed were examined between 46 Hispanics (27 women, 19 men) and 160 Anglos (84 women, 76 men). Although limited by sample sizes, findings indicated that Hispanics and Anglos did not differ, on average, on measures of attitudes toward marriage, perceived family influence, commitment to wed, belongingness, and trust. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that, after controlling for age and income, attitudes toward marriage, perceived family support, and trust predicted commitment to wed for women, whereas only perceived family support emerged as a predictor among men. Finally, although no ethnic differences emerged for men, the degree to which trust, perceived family support, and attitudes toward marriage predicted commitment to wed for women varied by ethnicity.     

Can I Trust You? Laterality of Facial Trustworthiness in an Economic Game

People tend to turn their left or right cheek to express or conceal emotions, respectively. We examined the lateral posing bias for displaying trustworthiness during a trust game in which participants and their virtual partners cooperated or did not cooperate with their counterparts to earn a monetary reward. Right-handed participants (N = 81) were asked to pose for a photograph and then play the trust game. Participants showed an overall left posing bias (i.e., showing their left cheek to the camera). The left cheek bias was more stable for participants that cooperated very little in the trust game (non-cooperators) than for those that cooperated a lot (cooperators). In the rating experiment (N = 28 and 25), non-cooperators showing their left cheek were rated equally as trustworthy as cooperators. On the other hand, non-cooperators who showed their right cheek were rated as less trustworthy than cooperators. These results suggest that non-cooperators intuitively use the left hemiface to exploit others in social interactions.     

Is the beauty premium accessible to all? An experimental analysis

We conducted a trust game experiment to investigate whether women are trusted more when they wear makeup than when they do not. Facial attractiveness, which was manipulated through the application of makeup by a professional makeup artist, was measured before and after makeovers. Trustors were shown a photograph of their female counterparts before they made decisions about money transfers to trustees. The results showed that wearing makeup increased perceived attractiveness, which in turn led trustors to make larger transfers to female trustees during the trust game. Additionally, we discovered a pure makeup premium that was mediated by gender. Specifically, female trustees with makeup received larger transfers than female trustees without makeup when the trustors were men, even after controlling for female trustees’ levels of attractiveness.     

Effects of urbanization on trust: Evidence from an experiment in the field

I conducted a trust game in the field within a natural experiment paradigm to test the effects of urbanization on both in- and out-group trust. I found that urbanization has a larger positive effect on out-group trust than on in-group trust. My findings provide new knowledge to the literature on the intricacy of the urbanization-trust relationship and contribute to the ongoing discourse on the different foundations underpinning in-group and out-group trust.