Ambivalent Interactionist: Anselm Strauss and the “schools” of Chicago sociology

This article takes up the discussion recently stimulated through the volume, A Second Chicago School? That book’s connecting postwar Chicago sociology with the “Chicago approach” of mainly the 1910s to 1930s is extended, going back as far as the turn of the twentieth century and also forward to the 1990s, with a view endorsing Simmelian interactionism as opposed to Spencerian utilitarianism. Albion Small, first Chairman of the Chicago Department, introduced a Simmelian sociology to the U.S., and the question arises to what extent this legacy is being realized until today. Using Anselm Strauss as a case in point, the article has two main parts. Part One recapitulates various attempts at understanding the phases and realms of Chicago sociology. The focus is not only on the various “Chicago Schools” that may be separated, but also the differences in the work of three scholars who often are grouped together under the label of Chicago, namely Herbert Blumer, Robert Park, and Everett Hughes. Part Two recollects Strauss’s intellectual biography, as life of a scholar determined to make a contribution to modern sociology, in the name of “Chicago interactionism.” Strauss’s work, however, came to endorse Spencerian-type utilitarianism more than Simmelian-type interactionism from the middle 1960s onwards—thereby joining in with anti-structural functionalism tendencies in American sociology.     

SOCIOLOGY IN AN ERA OF FRAGMENTATION:From the Sociology of Knowledge to the Philosophy of Science, and Back Again

In this article we revisit Alvin Gouldner's The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970). In part, this article is an attempt to apply Gouldner's own lessons about the sociology of knowledge to his own work, situating it with respect to the dominant epistemological unconscious of late 1960s American sociology as well as the broader historical context of a still-vibrant Fordist mode of societalization. Gouldner's critique of positivism was limited because he was still partially caught up within the dominant epistemological framework in American sociology at that time, a formation we call methodological positivism. With thirty years of hindsight, it is not surprising that contemporary readers interested in following up Gouldner's call for a reflexive sociology of knowledge will find certain aspects of his own program unsatisfactory. We propose an alternative sociology of knowledge based on a more explicit philosophy of scientific understanding, namely, contemporary critical realism. We also trace the vicissitudes of the trope of a "crisis in sociology" which Gouldner unleashed into the world and unpack the tensions between the "western" sociology referred to in the book's title and Gouldner's actual focus on the United States.     

"Free- Will Talk" and Sociology

Hardcore positivistic or humanistic sociologies are rare. In the history of sociology the two extremes have tended to converge, producing an awkward hybrid. A watered-down positivism is brought to the rescue of a stalled Verstehen sociology, or vice versa, and a difficulty like the free nature of human action is covered over with a veneer of pragmatism. Here it will be argued that Paul Tibbetts'recent recasting of the positivism-humanism debate in sociology into an arbitrary choice between linguistic grids perpetuates this unsatisfactory practice. Five propositions will be advanced in opposition to Tibbetts'perspective. First, it will be argued that Tibbetts'discussion clouds the real issues at stake through his failure to really transcend the positivist framework of analysis. Second, it will be shown that the humanistic pre-supposition of voluntarism involves an ontological commitment to a model of rational agency which provides a methodological base for the "scientific" treatment of human freedom. Third, this commitment constitutes a necessary presupposition of all sciences of human action. Fourth, this fact means there are good epistemological reasons why a sociologist's choice of a linguistic grid is not arbitrary. Finally, it will be proposed that the most promising pattern of convergence between humanistic sociology and positivism stems from the formulation of a rough spectrum of principles of rationality to undergird a differentiation of "degrees" and not "kind" between what Tibbetts calls "free-will talk" and "causal-deterministic talk."     

Advancing the Chicago School of Pragmatic Sociology: The Life and Work of Tamotsu Shibutani*

Tamotsu Shibutani is a contemporary proponent of the Chicago School of pragmatic sociology who has devoted his academic efforts to using the Chicago School of pragmatism to analyze problems of contemporary social life and to refine the theoretical tools available to the discipline of sociology. He has evaluated such topics as the Japanese relocation centers, the social construction of rumor, demoralization in Army life, the dynamics of ethnic stratification, and the resolution of ethnic tensions. Shibutani's books on social psychology and general sociology synthesize micro and macro variables, with careful attention to both agency and social control. His work is free of metaphysical puzzles and is true to the scientific method, clearly reflecting the essence of the Chicago School of pragmatic sociology.     

Paretos hermeneutischer Positivismus

An analysis of Pareto’s action theory making use of practical syllogism has as a result the differentiation of an externalist and an internalist part of his model of action. The externalist part is positivist in character and therefore unacceptable. It contains two classical positivist positions: a strict demarcation between metaphysics and science and the conspiracy-theory of error. Both were rightly criticised by Karl Popper. The internalist part contains the principle “reasons as causes”, which was later made famous by Donald Davidson. In comparison with Max Weber it will be shown that this is the rationality principle of interpretative sociology. Bringing internalist and externalist perspective together Pareto’s position can be called hermeneutical positivism. The article describes an hitherto neglected effect of positivist epistemology on sociology, and specifies action-theoretical fundaments of interpretative and explanative sociology.     

A Technological Science Perspective for Sociology1

Abstract The traditional positivist model is an inadequate foundation for sociology as a science. The phenomena of society differ from the phenomena assumed by positivism and existing in the world of nature in ways that prevent the successful use of that traditional approach. Agency, the ability to choose among alternatives where the choice makes an important difference, exists in social phenomena but has no counterpart in nature and cannot be dealt with adequately by positivism. A technological science perspective is suggested as an alternative for a science of sociology that can deal with the reality and importance of agency. Eight differences between the traditional perspective and the alternative are sketched. The alternative requires changes in the kind of generalized knowledge produced and the way it is produced, accumulated, and refined. The changes, though seemingly small, would produce a major reconstruction of much of sociology; such changes could result in important progress by the field of sociology.     

Controversy and Ideological Hegemony in Sociological Theory*

Sociological theory has been characterized by the recurrence of several controversies since its inception. The relationship between the individual and society represents one of these. Cooley's notion of the individual and society being twin-born has been labeled one of the major breakthroughs in this controversy. According to Tiryakian, Cooley's work signaled the end of that controversy, but still it reappears. Drawing heavily from Mannheim, Berger and Pullberg, and Therborn, we examine the recurrence of the individual versus society controversy. Sociology, we contend, occupies an alienated position within capitalist society where positivist epistemology serves as an ideological veil, concealing the existence of ontological presuppositions, distorting social reality, and preventing any meaningful attempt to understand the development of sociology, or the recurrence of the individual-society controversy. As an ideological veil, positivism contributes to the recurring bifurcation of social reality. The dominance of positivism within sociology, moreover, gives it a hegemonic status, further negating any recognition that the individual and society are interdependent.     

MARXISM, POSITIVISM, AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY: Social Gravity and Historicity

Marxism and positivism are often thought to be incompatible perspectives in sociology. Yet, Marxism has a long history of commitment to scientific inquiry. Here, we juxtapose these two scientific paradigms—Marxism and positivism—in ways that can enhance both, while highlighting in particular the power of the former. We argue that many of the key theoretical claims of Marxism can be explored in terms of analytic concepts congruent with and easily accessible to the contemporary positivist tradition. Marxist criticisms of the cruder versions of the positivist program are not antiscience but are rather rational critiques based on scientific principles.     

Culture,the Public Sphere,and Media Sociology: A Search for a Classical Founder in the Work of Robert Park

This article examines the history of media sociology in the U.S., through a critical analysis of articles published in the major sociology journals during the twentieth century. I argue that media sociology has been at its most vibrant when its goal has been to understand the dominant cultural structures that shape the public sphere. Robert Park was the first sociologist to adopt this perspective, with his research on newspapers and the power of the press. This interest continued into the 1950s, with research on media and propaganda. By the 1960s, however, concern had shifted away from the public character of media, focusing instead on the ways in which social factors intervened between media messages and society. While important, this shift in analytical focus ultimately led to a more reductionist media sociology, which failed to explore how media provided a distinctive type of social output. There is evidence that a less reductionist media sociology has begun to emerge since the 1990s, with the rise of cultural sociology and theories of the public sphere. This new media sociology could increase its visibility within mainstream sociology by making more explicit connections to the Chicago School tradition, and by claiming Robert Park as its classical founder.     

Emory Bogardus and the Origins of the Social Distance Scale

This article provides some history of sociology by focusing on the origins of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. The scale was developed by Emory Bogardus in 1924 and is still widely used in measuring prejudice. It has been translated into several languages, and used in many countries in measuring attitudes toward a variety of groups. The authors use primary and secondary data, including an interview with one of Bogardus’s colleagues, Thomas Lasswell, and the Bogardus archive at the University of Southern California. American racial and ethnic conflict, and the increasing scientific emphasis in sociology help explain the genesis of the scale. The personal biography of Bogardus is examined along with trends in sociology during his training at the University of Chicago and developments throughout American society. This study shows how the social environment of Bogardus influenced his personal life circumstances that help account for his creation of the scale. Thanks are due to a group that includes Thomas Lasswell, Jon Miller, Patricia Adolph, Susan Hikida, Claude Zachary, Ruth Chananie, Ann Hunter, Margaret Johnson, James Aho, Donald Granberg, Steve Kroll-Smith, and Nancy Turner Myers.     

Robert E. Park reconsidered: The early writings

Despite Robert E. Park’s prominence in American sociology, his early writings (before 1913) have been neglected. This article argues that Park’s early writings illustrate an important transitional phase in twentieth-century sociological thought. As sociology moved out of German romantic philosophy and toward rationalism and positivism, it had to come to terms with the existence of evil in the world. Park’s essays on the Congo formulated a more complex perspective on modernity’s modes of evil. Along with the Congo essays, Park’s Black Belt studies form a comprehensive portrait of the double-sided moral character and socioeconomic effects of the Reformation. Park’s early writings adumbrate a Gothic sociology of horror, in which the civilizational process erodes the many folk cultures that it draws into its basic forms—civil society and urban life. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 1990. Adapted from Stanford M. Lyman,Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Early Writings of Robert E. Park (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1991).     

Sociological social work: a cartoon

I trace an account of social work—and sociology—that I believe holds a promise for re-forming the relationship between the two. I develop the argument in two ways. First, taking 1920s Chicago as a case study, I will attempt ‘a history of the present’ to suggest how the relationship between sociology and social work came to be as it is. I will suggest that the practice of some (both familiar and forgotten) people in 1920s and 1930s sociology and social work is best explained as a form of ‘sociological social work’. Second, after tracking this genealogy, I suggest an agenda for sociological social work that consists of straining to enact certain kinds of inter-disciplinary relationships, developing methodological social work practice, hearing occasional sociological frontier conversations and shared theorising. I illustrate how these arguments challenge both sociology and social work and both theory and practice.     

Durkheim,Schopenhauer and the Relationship Between Goals and Means: Reversing the Assumptions in the Parsonian Theory of Rational Action*

Scholars have approached Durkheim's thought primarily from the starting point that he was a positivist. Although Schopenhauer's philosophy is not generally invoked in Durkheim's work, it appears that Schopenhauer's philosophy supplanted Comte's positivism at the turn of the century and that Durkheim was enamored with Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this essay Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim is traced, and the implications of this influence are discussed in terms of their effect upon sociology. By applying this starting point to Durkheim's thought and the Parsonian-Mertonian goals-means schema, it is demonstrated that Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, assumed the opposite of the Enlightenment belief that human reason could dominate passion. Implications for interpreting Durkheim's work are also discussed.     

The nature of ‘schools’in the sociology of knowledge: The case of the ‘Chicago School’

The nature of 'schools’as a metascientific construct is reviewed. Tiryakian's (1979a) increasingly popular construction of a school of sociology is examined and the case of ‘The Chicago School’is considered in detail. The efficacy of a 'schools’approach to understanding the nature of the growth and development of scientific knowledge is called into question. It is suggested that schools, as used in the literature, tend to be convenient groupings of practitioners rather than metascientific categories and that they fail to adequately engage knowledge transformative processes.     

THE ROMANTIC ANTECEDENTS OF MEADIAN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*

Mead's life-long interest in Romanticism is the least studied aspect of his work. As summarized in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Meadian explorations in romantic philosophy and sociology provide a valuable insight into his substantive contributions. The present paper seeks to amplify this insight and explores its relevance to the interactionist tradition in sociology. Special attention is given to the Meadian claim that the modern notion of self first appears in the romantic literature. Mead's emphasis on the interplay between the social structure and the structure of the self is linked to the romantic vision of the self as the microcosm of the social macrocosm. The current controversy over Mead and Chicago sociology is given a new interpretation in light of the dialectical premises inherent in the Meadian and romantic theories of self.     

Chrysalid Goffman: A Note on “Some Characteristics of Response to Depicted Experience”

Goffman's first substantial sociological work, his M.A. thesis entitled “Some Characteristics of Response to Depicted Experience,” has hitherto escaped critical commentary. Inspection of the thesis yields insights into the early development of Goffman's sociology. It shows that Goffman's later dismissal of positivistic and experimental approaches, his suspicion of interview methods, and his valorization of observational data have their origins in his research experiences in late 1940s Chicago while he worked toward his first graduate degree. The thesis fails to deliver the findings promised by the approved thesis proposal but succeeds as a demonstration of Goffman's methodological acuity.     

The musical composition of social reality? Music,action and reflexivity1

Developments in the sociology of music during the 1980s have brought the sub-field more firmly in to the center of sociological concerns, The ‘worlds’ concept, and the concern with music and social status have helped to ground and specify links between music and society. Meanwhile however, questions concerning music's social content have been sidelined. This paper explores music as an active ingredient in the constitution of lived experience. As with other cultural/technical forms, music provides a resource for the articulation of thought and activity. Bodily conduct and movement, the experience of time, and social character within opera are used to illustrate this point. Recent developments in feminist music analysis have been suggestive for the ways in which music metaphorizes social processes and categories of being. These developments can enrich the sociology of music. However, as with all attempts to ‘read’ music's social content, they should be conceived as claims made by analysts who are themselves engaged in social projects. Analytical readings of music have no a priori claim of privilege. A constructivist sociology of music should therefore be devoted to the question of how specific music users forge links between musical significance and social life. A sociology of the construction and deployment of musical realities is capable of avoiding the naive positivism otherwise implicit in attempts to ‘read’ music's social content.     

Sociology,Psychoanalysis, and Marginalization: Unconscious Defenses and Disciplinary Interests

American sociology as a field tends to marginalize psychoanalytic perspectives despite scholars Cavalletto and Silver showing that this was not the case during Talcott Parson's intellectual heyday in the 1940s. From the 1970s on, though, constructionists emphasized the conservative rather than liberatory side of the Freudian tradition and symbolic interactionism took the place of psychoanalysis as the legitimized framework for understanding individuals. Marginalization has occurred for at least three reasons: (1) the legacies of positivism created a bias toward empirically observable rather than relatively unmeasurable concepts like the Freudian unconscious; (2) psychoanalysis uses internal data whereas sociologists look externally rather than inward; (3) because psychoanalysis focuses on individuals and sociology on groups, it is argued that the two are incommensurate. Nevertheless, even in the face of marginalization, some scholars have combined psychoanalytic and sociological perspectives in myriad ways conceiving of multi dimensional rather than rationalistic individuals within social and cultural settings; exploring interactional dynamics that are at once psychic‐and‐social; and, as in the work of Wilfred Bion, studying the psychoanalytic mechanisms of groups themselves. I posit that the ongoing marginalization of psychoanalysis deprives the discipline of an innovative tool of analysis, an especially salient one at times when the emotional and psychological dimensions of social life are glaringly evident.     

Michael Polanyi and the sociology of a free society

Michael Polanyi’s defense of freedom in science and society conflicts in major ways with Weber (process of rationalization, value neutrality of sociologists), Popper (objective knowledge, open society), and technological or oppositional sociology. Polanyi rejects positivism, utilitarianism, and Marxism, and defends freedom as a necessary condition for pursuit of spiritual ideals such as truth, justice, charity, and tolerance. Half truths about science seen as rejecting tradition, faith, authority, values, and the subjective, have helped bring valuable social results, but in the form taken by radical philosophical skepticism (doubt), also called objectivism, they also threaten freedom itself. A more truthful account is needed. Scientists and citizens who would maintain a free society are morally responsible persons, joined together in quest of truth and certain other ideals, demanding of themselves and each other that they be faithful to that quest. Polanyi’s thought has connections with that of Shils, and has implications for what Shils calls a consensual sociology. Louis H. Swartz teaches law, and is interested in the development of sociological theory and legal sociology, building upon the contributions of Polanyi and Shils.