共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where subjects declare their income after receiving either a communication of the average tax evasion rate (“official information”) or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior (“unofficial information”). We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion and find three main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent, but less so in the presence of information. Second, the higher the officially communicated past tax evasion rate, the higher the degree of persistence: former evaders are more likely to evade again (and evade more), and former compliant individuals are more likely to comply again (and, when evading, evade less). Third, when an unofficial communication of past evasion (compliance) from all their peers is received, both former evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply) again. 相似文献
2.
Agent-based models are flexible analytical tools suitable for exploring and understanding complex systems such as tax compliance and evasion. The agent-based model created in this research builds upon two other agent-based models of tax evasion, the Korobow et al., 2007, Hokamp and Pickhardt, 2010 models. The model utilizes their rules for taxpayer behavior and apprehension of tax evaders in order to test the effects of network topologies in the propagation of evasive behavior. Findings include that network structures have a significant impact on the dynamics of tax compliance, demonstrating that taxpayers are more likely to declare all their income in networks with higher levels of centrality across the agents, especially when faced with large penalties proportional to their incomes. These results suggest that network structures should be chosen selectively when modeling tax compliance, as different topologies yield different results. Additionally, this research analyzed the special case of a power law distribution and found that targeting highly interconnected individuals resulted in a lower mean gross tax rate than targeting disconnected individuals, due to the penalties inflating the mean gross tax rate in the latter case. 相似文献
3.
Framing of information on the use of public finances, regulatory fit of recipients and tax compliance 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Marianne Holler Erik Hoelzl Erich Kirchler Susanne Leder Lucia Mannetti 《Journal of Economic Psychology》2008,29(4):597-611
Information campaigns to increase tax compliance could be framed in different ways. They can either highlight the potential gains when tax compliance is high, or the potential losses when compliance is low. According to regulatory focus theory, such framing should be most effective when it is congruent with the promotion or prevention focus of its recipients. Two studies confirmed the hypothesized interaction effects between recipients’ regulatory focus and framing of information campaigns, with tax compliance being highest under conditions of regulatory fit. To address taxpayers effectively, information campaigns by tax authorities should consider the positive and negative framing of information, and the moderating effect of recipients’ regulatory focus. 相似文献
4.
Different tax systems, and their impact on work motivation and tax compliance are significant issues in contemporary political and economic debates. The proportional feature of a flat tax system is assumed to lead to higher performance, while the fairness of the redistributive progressive tax system is assumed to result in higher tax compliance. However, empirical findings on the topic are inconclusive. Both work performance and tax compliance under different tax systems were examined in an experiment, with special attention devoted to the effect of a change in tax systems. A flat tax system was supposed to induce greater work performance, whereas a progressive tax system was expected to increase tax compliance based on fairness perceptions, allowing for the opposite effect due to higher complexity. Furthermore, it was assumed that performance and tax payments would be influenced by motives of self-interest. The design included 20 rounds with a real-effort task in each round, determining participants’ experimental income. Participants (N = 191) made decisions about their tax payments from round-to-round in four different experimental conditions: (1) a flat tax system, (2) a progressive tax system, (3) starting with a flat and changing to a progressive, and (4) starting with a progressive and changing to a flat tax system. Results indicate higher work performance in a progressive system. However, a change from a progressive tax system to a flat system led to increased tax compliance. 相似文献
5.
This paper examines the effect of “empathy” and “sympathy” on tax compliance. We run a series of laboratory experiments in which we observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot Tax Compliance Games presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Importantly, we employ methods to identify subjects’ sympathy, such as the Davis Empathic Concern Scale and questions about frequency of prosocial behaviors; we also use priming in order to promote subjects’ empathy. Our results suggest that the presence of sympathy in most cases encourages more tax compliance. Our results also suggest that priming to elicit empathy also has a positive impact on tax compliance. These results support the inclusion of noneconomic factors in the analysis of tax compliance behavior. 相似文献
6.
Using country-level data from 2003–2014, we examine the association between auditing level (measured as number of verification actions taken by tax authorities per 100 taxpayers in each country) and tax compliance (measured as business executives’ perception of tax evasion). Our hypothesis is that compliance increases until a certain auditing level is reached, and decreases beyond that level (i.e., an elevated auditing level backfires). In line with our expectation, the results of a series of tests indicate that there is a U-shaped association between auditing and tax evasion. We discuss how a potential backfiring effect may depend on the extent to which compliance is voluntary. 相似文献
7.
Observed levels of tax compliance are higher than predicted levels (when predictions are based on Allingham and Sandmo's neoclassical model of tax evasion). They are higher if social norms recognise the importance of compliance. But how do social norms frame decisions to pay tax? Can prospect theory be applied to shed insight into the way that social norms exert their influence? An analysis of questionnaire responses (from Italy and from the UK) suggests that they exert their influence by changing the reference points that individuals use when they code changes as ‘gains’, or ‘losses’. The evidence suggests that social norms frame the decision to pay tax by changing individuals’ perceptions of their entitlement to income. This consideration is important when designing policy to deter evasion. 相似文献
8.
This study employs a laboratory experiment to explore the joint effect of income source (earned versus endowed) and decision context (tax versus nontax) on tax compliance behavior. During the experiment, subjects faced various income levels and made multiple reporting decisions. The results indicate that overall compliance is not significantly affected by the interaction of income source and context. However, this joint effect influences the relationship between income level and compliance and how compliance behavior evolves over time. In both cases, the treatment group with earned income in a tax context displays behavior that is distinct from the other three groups. 相似文献
9.
Experimental and empirical literature on individual decision-making has shown a remarkable difference between planning and ongoing decisions: when asked to plan their actions, people overweight events with low probability; on the contrary, in ongoing decisions, they tend to ignore them. We report on a laboratory experiment designed to explore the presence of this decisional inconsistency in taxpayers’ behavior, by means of a commitment system for compliance. In line with the overweighting of events with small probabilities (i.e. fiscal audits), we find that planning induces the majority of people not only to adopt a mechanism of commitment to tax compliance, but also to actually comply. 相似文献
10.
Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) presented with the so-called ‘slippery slope’ framework a new approach to understand tax compliance. The slippery slope approach supposes two routes to tax compliance: deterrence of tax evasion by audits and fines on the one hand, and building a trusting relationship with taxpayers by services and support on the other hand. In this paper, the slippery slope framework is formalized by assuming two groups of taxpayers: compliance-minded and evasion-minded persons. Defining reaction functions for persons of both groups with respect to coercive and persuasive power instruments of tax authorities, the typical slippery slope picture emerges that characterises the authorities’ work. As a consequence, both groups of policy tools are considered necessary to generate tax compliance. In addition to that, it is shown that coercive and persuasive power may be substitutes or complements to each other, depending of the parameters of the taxpayers’ reaction functions. As a further crucial determinant of tax compliance, the behaviour of the fellow citizens with respect to taxpaying is identified. 相似文献
11.
Boris Maciejovsky Erich Kirchler Herbert Schwarzenberger 《Journal of Economic Psychology》2007,28(6):678-691
Previous experimental studies on tax behavior have been particularly concerned with determining the absolute effect of detection rate and punishment on tax filing, leading to mixed results. In this paper, we shed some additional light on the effectiveness of audit probability and sanctions by drawing upon a dynamic setting with particular focus on the time lag between audits. Our results showed that tax compliance decreased immediately after a random audit, suggesting that subjects were prone to misperception of chance. Sanctions decreased compliance to a lesser extent; they were, however, associated with the tendency of subjects to repair their losses by increasing their capital stock. 相似文献
12.
In this paper we present a model of tax compliance with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility based on income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. We formally include psychological drivers in this model. These drivers affect individual behavior, such as risk aversion, together with appreciation of public expenditure, expectations about peers’ compliance and a natural inclination to comply, all of which we summarize in a quality termed “citizenship”. The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is standard and only partially known to agents.The agent-based model is simulated under a variety of settings, representing different “societies”. We use the artificial data produced by the model to estimate the effects of taxpayers’ traits on personal tax behavior and to build a compliance societal slippery slope. At the individual level, we find a positive dependence of compliance on all variables, with the significant exception of the tax rate, which has a negative impact. As far as societies are concerned, we show how aggregate tax compliance depends on composite indices of citizenship and power, and we find that the former is more important than the latter. 相似文献
13.
Compliance costs of taxpayers should not only be affected by the tax law itself but also by its implementation through the tax authorities. In this paper we analyze the effect of authority behavior on the burden of complying with tax regulations. Using survey data of Belgian businesses, we develop an estimation strategy to overcome simultaneity bias by the construction of proxy variables. According to our estimate, a customer-unfriendly tax administration increases the average compliance burden by about 27%. Our outcome has interesting implications for further research. First of all, authority behavior does not only affect “soft” tax compliance factors like fairness and trust, but also “hard” aspects like costs. Second, the distribution of administrative cost burdens between the taxpayer side and the authorities may be important regarding the cost-efficiency of the tax system as a whole. 相似文献
14.
Bonus-malus taxes appear to have been successful in encouraging people to change to less polluting travel options in France (e.g. the tax on large and small engined cars). We hypothesize that they have three possible effects on consumer behaviour. The positive effects are: (1) a price effect (the less polluting option is subsidized and the polluting option is taxed); and (2) a social norm effect (the less polluting option is classified as pro-social and the polluting option as antisocial). The negative effect (3) is that they may decrease intrinsic motivation (crowding out). We provide an initial test of this tripartite model using survey data on students given a choice between taking the plane or the train between Toulouse to Paris. The first study shows that imposing a hypothetical bonus-malus tax has both a price effect (relative to a control condition where only the norm justifying the tax is presented) and a norm effect (relative to a control condition in which only the corresponding price difference is presented without mention of the tax). The second study presents a set of choices where the environmental norms and price differences are held constant, but the size of the contribution of the bonus-malus tax to the final price of each option is varied. This study confirms our prediction that a larger bonus-malus subsidy/tax reduces propensity to choose the less polluting option (i.e. the train). As the positive effects outweigh the negative effects in most of the choices studied, we conclude that bonus-malus taxes constitute a promising policy instrument. 相似文献
15.
The paper analyses the emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance when individuals interact in a social network. It develops a model in which taxpayers possess a range of individual characteristics – including attitude to risk, potential for success in self-employment, and the weight attached to the social custom for honesty – and make an occupational choice based on these characteristics. Occupations differ in the possibility for evading tax. The social network determines which taxpayers are linked, and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked taxpayers. Using agent-based simulations, the analysis demonstrates how attitudes and beliefs endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population. Compliance behaviour is different across occupational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. Taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree of risk aversion, the subjective probability of audit is sustained above the objective probability, and the weight attached to the social custom differs across occupations. These factors combine to lead to compliance levels that differ across occupations. 相似文献
16.
Individuals often do not take taxes correctly into account, which results in distorted or unexpected investments. We shed further light on the discussion of such behavioral tax perception biases by analyzing intrinsic and extrinsic effects on investment decisions. We study two dimensions: (1) the influence of emotions and perceived risk (individual dimension, intrinsic effects) and (2) the influence of available tax information by varying tax complexity and salience (tax system dimension, extrinsic effects). In our laboratory experiment, we construct the payoff structure such that the subjects are confronted with exactly the same choices in net terms in a situation with or without a capital gains tax. This design allows us to identify pure tax perception biases. We show that both dimensions are able to explain tax perception biases. In particular, we find evidence that perceived risk is lower and consequently willingness to take risk is higher with a capital gains tax (with full loss offset provision) than without taxation. Furthermore, this positive effect on risky investment is higher in a situation with a rather low level of tax information in which tax complexity is high and tax salience is low. 相似文献
17.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships among selected socioeconomic variables — perceived locus of control, perceived income adequacy, and satisfaction with financial status. Results of the study indicate that age, household income, household net worth, perceived locus of control, and perceived income adequacy are significantly related to satisfaction with financial status. Household income and household net worth have indirect effects on satisfaction through perceived locus of control and perceived income adequacy. Perceived locus of control also has an indirect effect on satisfaction through perceived income adequacy. These findings suggest that counselors and educators should emphasize the importance of perceptions of income adequacy and control over financial aspect in their courses and programs.Journal Paper No. J-14499 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 2809.His research interests include consumer credit and family resource management. He received his Ph.D. from Iowa State University in 1993.Her research interests include family financial management and consumer bankruptcy. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Missouri. 相似文献
18.
We investigated the interactive roles of procedural justice of the tax authority, trust in the tax authority, and identification with the nation in predicting voluntary tax compliance. Drawing from fairness heuristic theory and relational models of justice, we predicted that the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance that has been found particularly among citizens with low (vs. high) trust in the tax authorities is restricted to citizens who weakly (vs. strongly) identify with the nation. The results of a field study with samples of Ethiopian and US taxpayers as respondents largely support our predictions. This research integrates the role of important and well-studied social psychological factors that shape voluntary tax compliance and reveals support for the hypothesis in a developing (i.e., Ethiopia) and a developed (i.e., US) nation – nations with strongly divergent tax climates. 相似文献
19.
We explored the moderating roles of legitimate and coercive power held by the tax authority in the relationship between procedural justice, trust in the tax authority, and voluntary tax compliance. Drawing from fairness heuristic theory and the slippery slope framework of tax compliance, we predicted that procedural justice fosters voluntary tax compliance, particularly when legitimate power of the tax authority is low and when coercive power of the authority is high. Moreover, we predicted that these interactive effects are mediated by (cognition-based) trust. Finally, we predicted that coercive power of the tax authority is positively related with enforced tax compliance. The results of a field study among Ethiopian business owners supported most predictions. This research is among the first to integrate social–psychological and deterrence-related factors to understand tax compliance behavior in a developing country. 相似文献
20.
Compliance with tax authorities has been studied mainly in the fields of economics and psychology. The focus has respectively been on self-interest motives and justice concerns in tax compliance. We argue that both concerns are less divergent than is often thought. Specifically, we studied the moderating role of distributive justice on the relationship between outcome favorability and tax compliance in two cross-sectional surveys. It is generally believed that favorable outcomes increase compliance because they decrease what can be gained from non-compliance. The present research addresses the role of distributive justice in this process. Since people believe that distributive fairness guarantees their long-term outcomes, favorable present outcomes now imply favorable future outcomes and unfavorable present outcomes now imply unfavorable future outcomes. Thus, we expected fair outcomes to result in a strong relationship between outcome favorability and compliance. On the basis that unfair outcomes are believed to result from chance, outcome favorability should have a weaker relationship with compliance when outcomes are unfair. Even when controlling for other variables, this prediction was supported by both studies. 相似文献