The minimum wage and tipped employees

Using data from theCensus of Retail Trade, I estimate that allowing restaurants to use servers’ tipped income to satisfy minimum wage requirements would create at least 360,000 new high-paying jobs and increase total income for tipped workers by at least 8 percent. Conversely, if the minimum wage were increased 10 percent, tipped workers would experience a 4 percent decrease in employment and a 6 percent reduction in hours worked, and all servers (tipped and non-tipped) would experience a 3 to 5 percent decrease in total income because the tipped jobs lost paid more than the minimum wage. By not allowing employers to use all of a worker’s tipped income to meet the minimum wage, state and federal minimum wage laws inhibit the creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs paying well above the minimum wage. Total elimination of this credit would decrease employment at least 10 percent.     

THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECT OF DEREGULATING SHOPPING HOURS: EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN FOOD RETAILING

We study the effect of deregulating weekday shop opening hours on employment in retailing. Using administrative data on all German food shops, a difference‐in‐differences analysis shows that relaxing restrictions on opening hours raised employment by 0.4 workers per shop corresponding to an increase by 4%. This effect is driven by part‐time employment and employment in large shops, and it implies an increase by 0.1 workers per additional actual weekly opening hour. While the wage bill increased by less than employment, the deregulation seems not to have reduced earnings of workers already employed in retailing before the deregulation. (JEL J23, L51, L81)     

Noncitizen Employment and the Wages of Healthcare Support Workers in the US

This study examines the relative wages of citizens and noncitizens employed as healthcare support workers as well as examines the effect of noncitizen support worker employment on the wages of citizen support workers. Relative wage findings reveal noncitizen support workers with less than eight years of US residency receive a noncitizen-citizen wage discount statistically significantly greater than the legal maximum of 5% below the local prevailing wage. These low relative wage levels could contribute to lower wages for citizen support workers, however elasticity of substitution findings suggest noncitizen support workers are not close substitutes for healthcare support workers who are US citizens. In addition, wage effect findings do not reveal a negative influence of noncitizen employment on the wages of native born US citizen support workers, while these findings reveal a relatively small wage decline for naturalized support workers. These findings are consistent with the citizen status job heterogeneity hypothesis. Nonetheless, finding noncitizen-citizen wage differences does not allow for ruling out the possibility of weak enforcement of prevailing wage legislation and possible employment of undocumented workers.     

SELF‐EMPLOYMENT,EFFICIENCY WAGE,AND PUBLIC POLICIES

Empirical evidence suggests that unemployed workers are much more likely to become self‐employed than wage‐employed workers. Also, higher unemployment benefits significantly reduce the rate of self‐employment. This article develops a model of self‐employment which incorporates transitions between unemployment and self‐employment. It integrates two strands of theoretical literature—models of occupational choice and the efficiency wage models. In this model, a higher unemployment benefit reduces the self‐employment rate and the transition rate of unemployed workers to self‐employment, which is consistent with empirical evidence. (JEL J23, J58, J64)     

OPTIMAL WAGE TAXATION WHEN HUMAN CAPITAL AND EMPLOYMENT ARE ENDOGENOUS

This paper studies how optimal wage tax conclusions from the classic two‐period life cycle model of human capital accumulation are affected by endogenizing the number of taxpaying workers. In the absence of a corrective policy, young individuals underinvest in human capital from a social perspective because tax premiums for transfers to nonworkers are not actuarially adjusted downward for human capital attainment. A combination of wage taxes and wage subsidies can restore proper price signals. Numerical simulations suggest that even modest employment elasticities can be sufficient to substantially impact the magnitudes and even the signs of optimal wage tax rates. (JEL H21, H3, J24)     

EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF TWO NORTHWEST MINIMUM WAGE INITIATIVES

This article exploits a natural experiment initiated by Oregon and Washington voter referendums to show that the minimum wage is a blunt instrument that differentially affects low-wage workers within and across industries. Specifically, employment growth specifications indicate that the minimum wage generates consistently negative employment effects for eating and drinking workers where the minimum is shown to be relatively binding, but not for hotel and lodging workers where the minimum is less binding. Regressions using job-specific want-ad data from Portland and Seattle newspapers also indicate a reduction in hiring solicitation relating to the extent that the minimum wage binds. ( JEL J31, J38)     

State minimum wage laws: Youth coverage and impact

Federal minimum wage statutes cover only 70 percent of the work force and 30 percent of all employers. State laws are designed to close some of these coverage gaps and in some cases to set higher wage floors. Hence, differences in state wage floors and coverage should affect employment rates and wage distributions, particularly among low-skilled workers. Evidence from the National Longitudinal Ssurveys of Youth is mixed, however: State wage floors appear to have no impact on youth employment or entry wages, but coverage exemptions appear to increase both employment and wages. These observations underscore the need to include state provisions in models of minimum wage impacts, particularly for later periods (e.g., 1988–1991) when state wage floors were relatively higher.     

Revisiting multi-tier wage structures: Equity,employment mobility,and tier effects

This study considers the competing conclusions reached by Martin and Peterson (1987) and Cappelli and Sherer (1990) regarding two-tier wage systems and examines how worker perceptions of their own employment mobility affect attitudes about two-tier systems. Findings from a hybrid multi-tier wage system in the retail food industry containing both permanent and merging or temporary tiers indicates that workers on the permanently lower B tier possessed more negative attitudes than their A-tier counterparts, with some evidence that the effects of permanent and temporary plans differ. Employment mobility moderates these attitudes, for low mobility workers report more positive attitudes than do high mobility workers.     

Job security and unemployment in an efficiency-wage model

Job security and its effects on unemployment are controversial issues. I investigate the effects of job security in an efficiency-wage model of unemployment. Though efficiency-wage ideas have wide appeal and provide strong foundations of involuntary unemployment, not much has been written about the ramifications of job security in these scenarios. I show that job security creates wage and unemployment effects when efficiency-wage aspects are relevant, because employment guarantees shift the burden of workers' effort attraction to the wage mechanism. These effects are further enhanced when workers have some bargaining power. My results, therefore, suggest a trade-off between employment stability and employment: High employment security leads to smaller employment (or larger involuntary unemployment). I thank Ron Oaxaca and participants at the W.E. Upjohn Conference on Unemployment Insurance for useful comments.     

Have unions impeded growing wage dispersion among young workers?

Wage inequality is examined for young males over the period 1980–1993. While wage inequality increased substantially for nonunion workers over this period, wage inequality increased only modestly for union workers. In part, this difference results from divergent trends in skill prices—returns to skill rose in the nonunion sector but contracted slightly in the union sector. In particular, returns to education increased sharply in the nonunion sector while remaining stagnant in the union sector. At least for young workers, these findings suggest that unions have been largely successful in resisting market pressures for greater wage inequality. We also uncover evidence suggesting that, as relative returns to education decline in the union sector, highly educated young workers become less likely to choose union employment. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Dek Terrell, Steve Trejo, and Carol Horton Tremblay.     

Unionization and nonunion wage patterns:

conclusion We argue that a nonunion worker’s support for unionization depends not only on the expected gain in wages, but also on the probability of retaining employment after union-ization. Incorporating this point generates no prediction that low-wage workers will receive the largest threat-induced supplements as they are the ones who are least likely to retain their jobs after unionization. In short, which group of workers will receive the largest union induced wage supplement is ambiguous.     

Regional wages and subjective measures of employment opportunities

We utilise a rich set of regional labour market variables to explain regional variation in Norwegian manufacturing wages. In particular, regional indicators of labour market conditions are computed from survey data in which respondents are asked to evaluate local employment opportunities. We find that average reported satisfaction with local job prospects and other survey-based indicators perform better in regional wage equations than traditional labour market variables, including the regional unemployment rate. Our results suggest that subjective measures of employment opportunities provide useful information about wage pressure.     

ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS

We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (JEL L41, L40, J42)     

A Reexamination of Card and Krueger's State-Level Study of the Minimum Wage

Card and Krueger's (1995) difference-in-difference study of the 1990-1991 federal minimum wage hikes compared states by the proportion of workers directly affected by the minimum wage. They found "no evidence that the increase in the minimum wage significantly lowered teenage employment rates more in highly affected states" and they concluded the minimum wage did not reduce employment. Their paper was highly influential and convinced many that the minimum wage did not reduce employment. However, when I apply their model to the 1996-1997 federal minimum wage hike, I find that increases in the minimum wage significantly lowered teenage employment rates more in highly affected states. Using Card and Krueger's interpretation, this implies the minimum wage did reduce teenage employment.     

Underemployment and depression: longitudinal relationships

We conceptualize employment status not as a dichotomy of working versus not working but as a continuum ranging from adequate employment to inadequate employment (involuntary part-time or low wage) to unemployment. Will shifts from adequate to inadequate employment increase depression as do shifts from employment to unemployment, and to what extent does prior depression select workers into such adverse employment change? We analyze panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the years 1992-1994 for the 5,113 respondents who were adequately employed in 1992. Controlling for prior depression, both types of adverse employment change resulted in similar, significant increases in depression. These direct effects persisted despite inclusion of such potential mediators as changes in income, job satisfaction, and marital status. Marital status buffered the depressive effect of both types of adverse change, but education and job dissatisfaction amplified the effect of unemployment on depression. Prior depression did not predict higher risk of becoming inadequately employed but did predict increased risk of unemployment, particularly for those with less education. These results confirm that both unemployment and inadequate employment affect mental health, and they invite greater efforts to monitor the extent and impact of underemployment.     

The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Covered Teenage Employment

Unlike previous studies on the minimum wage, which focused on its effect on total teenage employment, we examine its effect on covered employment. A covered job was defined to be one paying the minimum wage or more. Using contemporary wages to classify workers this way may inflate the estimated effect of minimum wages on covered employment. To avoid this bias, covered jobs are identified using a logit procedure run over years in which the minimum age was not increased. We find that minimum wages reduced covered employment significantly more than total employment. We also show that covered employment may be overstated in the period following an increase in the minimum wage.     

A THEORY OF TURNOVER AND WAGE DYNAMICS

We develop a model of turnover and wage dynamics with insurance, match‐specific productivity, and long‐term contracting. The model predicts that wages are downward rigid within firms but can decrease when workers are fired. We apply the model to study the impact of business cycles on subsequent wages and job mobility. Workers hired during a boom have persistent higher future wages if staying with the same firm. However, these boom hires are more likely to be terminated and have shorter employment spells. (JEL C73, D23, D82, J33)     

IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR THE U.S. FARM SECTOR AND WORKFORCE

We develop a theoretical model using migration and trade theory to examine the effects of domestic and border enforcement policies on unauthorized workers and the U.S. agricultural sector. The theoretical results show that heightened immigration policies increase the illegal farm wage rate, and reduce the employment of unauthorized farm workers and exports. The empirical analysis show that increased domestic enforcements curtail the number of undocumented farm workers by an average of 8,947 and commodity exports to Mexico by an average of $180 million. The tighter border control curbs illegal farm workers by 8,147 and reduces farm exports by $181 million. (JEL F160)     

Efficiency Wages,Unemployment Benefits and Union—Firm Wage Bargaining: The Issue of the Choice of the Outside Option

This paper points out that there may be a logical consistency issue in choosing the reference wage in efficiency wage models. We have shown that defining the outside option in the efficiency wage logic as the market-clearing wage solves this difficulty, and is justifiable in terms of the assumed behaviour of workers and employers. The model that we examine confirms earlier findings of reinforcing effects between union-firm bargaining and efficiency wages. However, if union preferences vary between wages and employment, Summers’ reinforcing effect is no longer present for each value of the parameter describing these preferences. Above a certain threshold value of union preferences for employment, the two mechanisms do not reinforce each other anymore.