Perspectives on union corruption: Lessons from the databases

Most of the surprisingly small number of studies of union corruption done over the years have focused either on longitudinal analysis of particularly aggressive unions in their prime or on the relationship between union leaders and organized crime characters who have acquired middle names in quotes. Since the 1930s, these studies have usually been based on prosecutorial initiatives of federal or state agencies seeking to rein in Mafia, Cosa Nostra, or Outfit crime families for whom control of unions has been a major income source, not the unions, themselves. I use two new, recently available data sources that allow an overview of the whole spectrum of union corruption, that quantify it, and that differentiate certain aspects of it from the corruption found in other societal organizations. My analysis reveals that union corruption is both broadly practiced and multifaceted, with some forms having brutal ancient antecedents not yet completely lost while others are new and not yet completely developed. Only a few are broadly shared with businesses or other societal organizations. Overall, I identify 25 separate categories of significant union corruption and find that among these embezzlement remains the most common, but kickbacks and malfeasance with respect to pension plan management are of much greater financial concern. Peculation associated with gaining and maintaining high union office together with the bloated perks and emoluments that obtain thereto fuel internal corruption without diminishing the practice of extortion, bribery, conspiracy, selling labor peace, licensing loose contracts, selling job access, and other traditional external corrupt practices. All are a blight on organized labor.     

Corruption as a site for contested meaning: Elite constructions in India

This paper investigates the problem of corruption in India from a social constructionist perspective. The constructions of corruption among five elite groups (bureaucrats, judges, politicians, industrialists, and journalists) in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh were obtained through a total of 60 interviews. Members of these five elite groups play a critical role in constructing the problem of corruption for public discourse. These elite groups, with the possible exception of the media elite, are also primary targets of public accusations of corrupt behavior. This paper examines three major issues related to corruption: the definition of corruption, the so-called functionality of corruption, and the role of culture in fostering or inhibiting corruption. Narrow/legalistic or broad/moralistic definitions of corruption, the acceptance or rejection of functionality, and modernist or nationalist responses to the question of culture are shown to constitute the varied structures of reality constructed by the different elite groups. These constructions of the corrupt reality in India are explained with reference to specific interests of the elites and their positions in the social structure. Instead of treating corruption as an objective condition, this study seeks to view corruption as a process in which strategic elites in society, define the problem and negotiate solutions to it.A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1991 New York Conference for Asian Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca.     

Political Narratives and the Production of Legitimacy: The Case of Corruption in Post-Mao China

China watchers have predicted that corruption would lead to a crisis for the ruling regime. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party has somehow managed to retain and even strengthen its political legitimacy. This article analyzes corruption not as a crime or a political problem but as a topic of political narratives, thereby revealing the political processes which led to this result. This study, based on interviews and archival data, examines narratives on the topic of corruption produced in the post-Mao era by the ruling regime and political dissidents in their struggle to influence the populace's views on political legitimacy. In the 1980s, disgruntled intellectuals drew upon the traditionalist collective narrative of corruption to teach citizens to blame the leadership and the structure of the government for social problems, essentially rewriting the narratives used to assess and judge the regime. In doing so, they successfully threatened the political authority of the Party-state. However, in the 1990s, China's leaders and the official media revised the story of corruption so that the Party-state battled corruption on behalf of its citizens in order to bring them economic opportunities, rising living standards, and social stability. In these new narratives, the role of the state was no longer that of ideological or moral leadership, but of economic management. Through these narratives of economic management, the regime managed to control the corruption crisis and recapture its political legitimacy, but was also forced to deal with the consequences of this new vision of state-society relations.     

The Open Government Partnership: Mere Smokescreen or New Paradigm?

In 2011, on the initiative of US President Barack Obama 8 governments and 9 civil society organizations (CSOs) came together to create the Open Government Partnership (OGP). The OGP was proclaimed as a new paradigm in promoting open government and democratic principles through the creation of participatory mechanisms involving governments and CSOs. This article aims to examine in more detail if the OGP, after 5 years in existence, has lived up to the initial proclamations as a new model of democracy-promotion at the global level. Departing from theoretical considerations on the potential of participatory mechanisms for the promotion of democratic processes, the article analyzes the OGP processes of 3 founding members, Brazil, the US, and the UK. Although the structure of the OGP is highly innovative in many respects, the findings suggest that the governments of the 3 countries examined have used the OGP as a smokescreen to distract from on-going corruption, lacking transparency, and government secrecy. This article contributes to research on the possibilities and challenges of effectively democratizing global governance mechanisms through the involvement of governments and civil society actors.     

Police Crime: The Criminal Behavior of Sworn Law Enforcement Officers

This essay examines the criminological conceptualizations and research on police crime, that is, the criminal behavior of sworn law enforcement officers. It starts with an overview of the conceptualization of police crime as it relates to organizational and scholarly perspectives of social deviance. Police deviance is often conceptualized to include various misconduct, corruption, and/or crime committed by police organizations and police officers. This essay focuses on police crime resulting in the arrest of a sworn law enforcement officer and is organized within a conceptual framework that incorporates five types of police crime: sex‐related police crime, alcohol‐related police crime, drug‐related police crime, violence‐related police crime, and profit‐motivated police crime.     

Deception in the Workplace: Recent Research and Promising New Directions

This review identifies some of the promising new directions that scholars are pursuing in current research on deceptions in places of work. I identify and explore five main emphases that have emerged. These directions are comprised of studies that count the pervasiveness of deceptions; examine deception in service provision and emotional labor; identify varied workplace cultures of deception; examine accounts for deception in the wake of corruption, financial misconduct and other misbehaviors; and studies of Internet and computer technologies as new territories for deception. I conclude by suggesting some additional arenas for research into workplace deception, specifically, on professions that produce deception as a form of legitimate work; on deceptions in non‐profit organizations, and research into the technical and dramaturgical efforts that people put into making lies appear believable.     

CORRUPTION,PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION,AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. STATES

This article argues that the effect of corruption on competition is dependent on the institutional environment. When institutions are relatively efficient, observed corruption is likely to be associated with relatively less competition. Conversely, in areas with low quality institutions (e.g., excessively burdensome regulations), corruption may lead to relatively more competition. I employ unique data on competition, corruption, and institutional quality across U.S. states from 1997 to 2009 and report that a higher level of corruption is associated with relatively more competition in states with low levels of institutional quality. However, as institutional quality improves, the effect of corruption worsens. Thus, institutional quality is a fundamental determinant of the corruption‐competition relationship. Improving institutional quality, while at the same time reducing corruption, will increase competition and likely improve economic outcomes. (JEL D73, O17, L26)     

The Social Psychology of Corruption: Why It Does Not Exist and Why It Should

In recent decades, corruption has emerged as a major cause of global inequality and an important subject of social scientific research. This article argues that social psychologists have not taken full advantage of analytical tools at their disposal to generate explanatory accounts of corruption in non‐Western contexts. In the first part of the article, the author maintains that the lack of social psychological research on why people engage in corruption is due to the dearth of empirical data on corruption, the theoretical complexity of this phenomenon, and current popularity of neoliberalism in politics and academic research. In the second part of the article, the author argues that the symbolic interactionism school of social psychology has a number of tools that could be more helpful in exploring the causes of corruption in non‐Western settings than rational‐choice approaches that are currently en vogue. The article concludes with an argument that such analyses could generate culturally sensitive as well as policy‐relevant theories of corruption.     

Catching the ‘big fish’: The (ab)use of corruption‐related prosecutions across sub‐Saharan Africa

This analysis concerns the use of punitive actions to curb corruption. Propositions from the literature on corruption state that by prosecuting offenders for corruption‐related crimes and thus ending impunity, particularly among high‐level political figures (‘big fish’), a political culture of less corruption will evolve. This, however, hinges on there being no impunity and politicization of prosecutions. This study empirically assesses whether this condition holds in the sub‐Saharan African political context. A unique database on corruption‐related prosecutions at the level of ministers across Africa was compiled and patterns were found that suggest that prosecutions are indeed politicized and serve as a way to eliminate political rivals. These findings are a warning in the face of the international community's overly technical and apolitical approach to anti‐corruption in sub‐Saharan Africa.     

Corruption,Culture, and Communism

Cultural factors, as measured by the two dimensions of values identified by Inglehart, explain 75% of the variation in the Perceived Corruption Index across non-communist countries. A strong ‘survival’ orientation contributes twice as much as a strong ‘traditional’ orientation to higher levels of corruption. When controlling for these cultural variables, communism and post-communism increase the levels of corruption even further, both directly and by contributing to heavier emphasis on survival values. Communism created structural incentives for engaging in corrupt behaviors, which became such a widespread fact of life that they became rooted in the culture in these societies – that is, the social norms and practices prevailing in communist societies. The transitions toward democracy and market economies have not yet erased this culture of corruption. In addition, the process of privatization itself has opened myriad opportunities for corruption. The effects are manifest in comparisons of corruption in non-communist and (post-)communist countries in five cultural zones.     

THE ROLE OF MONITORING OF CORRUPTION IN A SIMPLE ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL

This article analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the monitoring of corruption. In our theoretical model, we derive a nonlinear relationship between the level of monitoring and economic growth, as well as between corruption and economic growth. At low monitoring levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption and medium growth rates, whereas no corruption occurs at intermediate monitoring levels, but low growth rates are recorded. At high monitoring levels, no corruption takes place and high growth rates are observed. The model is estimated using a dynamic panel data approach for Italy. Empirical results support the theoretical model. (JEL C33, D73, K42)     

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption

Corruption has become one of the most popular topics in the social scientific disciplines. However, there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication about corruption. Models developed by different academic disciplines are often isolated from each other. The purpose of this paper is to review several major approaches to corruption and draw them closer to each other. Most studies of corruption fall into three major categories: (i) rational‐actor models where corruption is viewed as resulting from cost/benefit analysis of individual actors; (ii) structural models that focus on external forces that determine corruption; and (iii) relational models that emphasize social interactions and networks among corrupt actors. Focusing on actors' behavior and the social context, this article explains corruption concepts taken from sociology, economics, organization studies, political science, social anthropology, and social psychology.     

The Structure of Russian Organizations

This paper examines the extent to which the structure of Russian organizations is similar to that observed among organizations in the West. Data were obtained in 1995 from a sample of organizations in the greater Moscow area by means of a structured interview schedule administered to the chief executive officer within each organization. The interview schedule contained measures developed by the Aston Group which have been used widely in previous research. The structure of Russian organizations was evaluated in terms of a causal model based upon consistent findings of previous research in this area. The results suggest that the structure of Russian organizations differs in important ways from the type of structure observed in most Western organizations. The major differences are that size, specialization and formalization are positively associated with centralization in Russian organizations. It is suggested that the historical tradition of centralized rule in Russia and the criminal environment of current Russian organizations are, in part, responsible for this difference.     

CORRUPTION: TOP DOWN OR BOTTOM UP?

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.     

IS MORE COMPETITION ALWAYS BETTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF EXTORTIONARY CORRUPTION

Using a laboratory experiment, we assess whether increasing competition among public officials reduces extortionary corruption. We find that increasing the number of providers has no effect on bribe demands when citizens' search costs are high, but it increases corruption when search costs are low. The effect is absent in a parallel setting framed as a standard market, which we attribute to citizens using a nonsequential search strategy as opposed to sequential search in the corruption setting. We conclude that efforts to reduce search costs, such as infrastructure investments, are preferable to anti‐corruption policies aimed at increasing the number of providers. (JEL D73, D49, C91)     

Institutionalized corruption in Indonesian irrigation: An analysis of the upeti system

This article analyzes the internal logic of the upeti system in Indonesian irrigation and brings to light how corruption rules are shaped through complex socio‐political relationships reflected in the organizational culture of the irrigation agency. Based on 100 interviews with water sector professionals the article highlights: (1) the importance of social relations in shaping institutionalized corruption, (2) how the upeti system justifies corruption practices as the prevailing social norm, and (3) the need for structural change to eradicate corruption. Illustrating how corruption rules are embedded in project management procedures, with projects highly dependent on donor funding, the article highlights the importance of the issue for international agencies and the need to be more politically grounded in promoting their development agenda.     

Struggling for One’s Name: Defense Narratives by those Accused of Small-Time Corruption

ABSTRACT

Under scrutiny (what we term a “bribery gaze”), many interpersonal exchanges in work contexts are perceived as bribes rather than gifts, tokens of appreciation, or mundane favors. Current Swedish bribery laws are strong, and the media keep a vigilant eye out for suspicious activities. From a wide set of qualitative data, we selected 13 interviews with formally-accused middle managers and low-level officials in Sweden who claimed to be innocent of small corruption. We discovered that they were more concerned with defending their honor than with job losses, material losses, or legal repercussions. The interviewees used a contrast structure: While they defined the humiliating accusations and disproportionate measures as turning points, they narrated their moral struggles and claimed their innocence by retelling significant events. These personal narratives from those accused of corruption showed that honor remains very important in contemporary society.     

A Short History of the Sociology of Corruption: the Demise of Counter-Intuitivity and the Rise of Numerical Comparisons

This article examines the history of the sociology of corruption. It is shown that from the 1950s until the early 1970s, the sociological discourse on corruption was dominated by a functionalist approach that tried to offer a counter-intuitive perspective on deviant behavior in arguing that corruption has positive functions for political and economic development. Because of a political reading of this discourse, its ambiguous terminology and some difficulties in methodology, it was largely abandoned in sociology. However, this not only led to a change in paradigmatic orientations in the sociology of corruption, but also to a general decline in interest for the phenomenon in sociology. This gap was filled by economic models of corruption that could bypass some terminological difficulties in defining corruption and, building on this, also enabled a largely quantitative approach in numerically comparing, correlating and ranking corruption. The effect was a consensus on the mostly negative effects of corruption on development, a proliferation of the transparency ideal and the disability of sociology to offer an alternative perspective on evaluating the effects of corruption.     

Advocacy Tactics and Policy Outcomes of Sex Offender Rights Organizations

Social movement organizations for sex offender rights work to reduce harm to registrants and their family members by influencing sex offender registration and community notification policies. This study draws on two theories of social movement organizations—organizational emergence and political opportunities—to investigate the capacity (i.e., structure, resources, knowledge and skills) of these organizations to bring about policy changes. Data were gathered using in-depth, telephone interviews with 19 leaders of state-level advocacy organizations in the United States. Two types of strategies emerged, distinguishing organizations as proactive or reactive in their approach to policy change. Proactive organizations contribute to policy amendment, development or adoption, whereas reactive organizations focus on blocking policy. These two types of organizations have similar tactical repertoires; however, more proactive organizations report the use of networking and coalition building and media stories, and more reactive organizations report the use of legislative testimony and research and policy analysis tactics. This study informs social work policy and practice by highlighting effective and ineffective tactics used by highly stigmatized advocacy organizations.     

Twenty‐Five Years After the Fall of Communism: The Cultural Peculiarities of Fighting Corruption and Building Civil Society in Romania

Even when the domestic political system has undergone reform, it sometimes seems unlikely that any outside force can introduce enough of a “carrot and stick” approach to persuade a country to maintain momentum. This article is concerned with understanding the cultural peculiarities of fighting corruption and building civil society in Romania, where despite the tough EU monitoring and domestic anti‐sleaze efforts, corruption, and low trust remain significant problems. Many of the theorists in the post‐communist literature argue that socioeconomic factors and the communist legacy have weakened post‐communist civil society in the region. This article explores the question whether corruption has replaced the legacy of communism as a factor undermining trust in others and government in Romania and presents an examination of the association between corruption and post‐communist civil society. The article argues that future research needs to switch focus from discussing Romanian social, political, and cultural behaviors from a longue durée perspective to evaluating the impact of political corruption on trust and, hence, civil society in Romania.