EMPLOYEE EVALUATION OF PENSION CLAIMS AND THE IMPACT OF INDEXING INITIATIVES

There is discussion in both Canada and the United States of proposals which require private pension plans to provide indexed pension benefits. This paper employs both an auction and an implicit contract model to identify the compensating wage differentials required of possible policy initiatives. The contract model, motivated by the prevalence (especially in Canada) of ad hoc cost-of-living adjustments to pensions in pay, presumes that workers have a call option on the investment earnings in excess of the interest rate assumption used to value the plan. The analysis indicates that wage offsets are potentially quite large, may be difficult to predict, and may vary substantially across firms. In addition, the case for policy action would appear to rest largely on the implicit assumption that workers misperceive the value of their pension benefits.     

Relative wages and exit behavior among registered nurses

I examine the exit decision of registered nurses using the longitudinal data files generated by the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1983 through 1994. By examining the wages of workers outside of nursing, a measure of the reservation wage is constructed and related to the decision to leave nursing, either for an alternative job or to exit employment. My results indicate that nurses respond to outside wage opportunities. A one standard deviation decrease in the difference between the actual and predicted log wage results in an 8 percent increase in the exit of nurses. Secretaries, however, are shown to have a much greater sensitivity to outside wages due to the lower degree of occupation-specific training required for secretarial jobs. A similar increase in the wage gap for secretaries results in an 18 percent increase in turnover. RNs employed in hospitals, covered by a union contract, and employed in the public sector are relatively attached to the nursing profession. The author appreciates the helpful comments of Barry Hirsch, David Macpherson, and Leola Ross.     

THE ECONOMICS OF JOB SEARCH: A COMMENT

This paper expands the conventional model of job search by relaxing the assumption that uncertainty about the job offer disappears once search is completed. Instead, we hypothesize that uncertainty continues even after search since the job offer contains not only an observable money wage but also an unobservable job consumption component. We show that the reservation wage decision rule is robust even under these very general conditions. The paper also analyzes the effect of this type of residual uncertainty on the level of the reservation wage.     

Household job search: A theoretical and empirical model

This article links the literature on family decision making and the economics of job search by examining job search by an unemployed individual within a household context. A theoretical model was developed which demonstrates the interdependence of the utility of household members when one is searching for work. The costs of search are borne by all household members while the benefits are captured in the searcher's expected future wage. A reservation wage was shown to be determined by household financing options, and the perception of relevant labor market parameters. An empirical model of the reservation wage for a sample of unemployment insurance recipients was estimated using two-stage least squares. Results, reported for male and female subgroups, support the hypotheses derived from the household job search model. In particular, the reservation wage was shown to depend on unemployment duration, labor market conditions, increased labor force participation of other household members, use of household assets to finance search, existence of dependents, and unemployment insurance benefits.     

Short Term Gain, Long Term Pain

This paper examines the role of informal job search methods on the labour market outcomes of displaced workers. Informal job search methods could alleviate short-term labour market difficulties of displaced workers by providing information on job opportunities, allowing them to signal their productivity and may mitigate wage losses through better post-displacement job matching. However if displacement results from reductions in demand for specific sectors/skills, the use of informal job search methods may increase the risk of job instability. While informal job search methods are associated with lower wage losses, they lead to increased job instability and increased risk of subsequent job displacement.     

Job security and unemployment in an efficiency-wage model

Job security and its effects on unemployment are controversial issues. I investigate the effects of job security in an efficiency-wage model of unemployment. Though efficiency-wage ideas have wide appeal and provide strong foundations of involuntary unemployment, not much has been written about the ramifications of job security in these scenarios. I show that job security creates wage and unemployment effects when efficiency-wage aspects are relevant, because employment guarantees shift the burden of workers' effort attraction to the wage mechanism. These effects are further enhanced when workers have some bargaining power. My results, therefore, suggest a trade-off between employment stability and employment: High employment security leads to smaller employment (or larger involuntary unemployment). I thank Ron Oaxaca and participants at the W.E. Upjohn Conference on Unemployment Insurance for useful comments.     

LABOR SUPPLY ESTIMATION BIASES FROM DISREGARDING NONWAGE BENEFITS

Labor supply models and research underpinned by labor supply decisions often assume that workers' choices are functions of wage and wage offers. However, the literature shows evidence that such decisions at least partly depend on nonwage benefits encompassed in jobs and occupations. In this paper, I develop and estimate a stochastic dynamic model of occupation and job choice, where nonwage benefits are directly incorporated into the decision alongside wages (a full model). Nested within the full model is a wage model, which represents the common practice in the literature of basing selection solely on wages and disregarding nonwage benefits. I separately estimate the full model and the nested wage model to compare the implications (biases) of omitting nonwage benefits. I compare the two models' estimates of elasticities and an inequality reduction intervention policy. I find that disregarding nonwage benefits generally causes biases. There are cases when the two models predict very similar outcomes and have close estimates, such as in occupation‐specific elasticities and job transition elasticities. But these special cases are products of canceling biases. In most cases, ignoring nonwage benefits will bias estimates by overestimating the importance of wage in the selection process and by disregarding changes in relative prices between wage and nonwage benefits. (JEL J20, J32, D91)     

LOCUS OF CONTROL AND JOB TURNOVER

In this article, I investigate how a worker's locus of control, that is, the perception of control over daily events, affects job‐to‐job and job‐to‐nonemployment turnover. I find that an increase in internality—the degree to which respondents believe that the outcomes of their life events are determined by their own actions versus external factors—increases job‐to‐job transitions. In addition, the annual wage growth rate and the wage gains from job‐to‐job transitions increase with internality. The influence of the locus of control on job‐to‐nonemployment turnover, however, is insignificant on controlling for the worker's level of attained education. (JEL D83, J63)     

THE DURABILITY OF HUMAN CAPITAL: SOME NEW EVIDENCE

This paper analyzes the effect of chronological aging, experience, job search, change of job and/or employer, and formal training on the wage growth of a sample of young men. Following the human capital literature, wage growth directly corresponds to human capital and the analysis allows for the assessment of the durability or rate of depreciation of human capital if further investments are not made. The findings suggest that human capital is not very durable, contrary to some previous estimates given in the literature.     

Are labour inspections effective when labour regulations vary according to the size of the firm? Evidence from Peru

This article analyses the impact of enforcement of four labour standards (pension system enrolment, minimum wage, maximum weekly working hours and written employment contract) on compliance in Peru, where labour regulations and penalties vary according to firm size. The author uses household survey data to analyse a factor not previously studied – adjustment by firms through downsizing to benefit from lower fines and less stringent regulations. The empirical findings indicate that enforcement efforts have little effect on either the degree of compliance or the size of firms.     

On-the-Job Search,Mismatch and Worker Heterogeneity

This paper empirically examines the search behavior of currently employed workers to understand changes in on-the-job search across different types of employed individuals and varying labor market conditions. Using data from the American Time Use Survey, we estimate the responsiveness of workers with varying levels of productivity and job-match quality to regional labor market conditions. We find that those workers who are less-productive, mismatched in their current position, and high-productivity, mismatched workers are more likely to engage in search than other workers. These results have implications for models built on job mismatch, as well as for models seeking to explain increasing inequality and wage dispersion.     

QUIT BEHAVIOR UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION: SEARCHING, MOVING, LEARNING

The paper provides a search ––– theoretic interpretation of a well-known empirical regularity ––– the inverse relationship between quit rates and job tenure. We consider a setting where the employed job searcher has incomplete information about non-wage job attributes at the time acceptance decisions are made; hence jobs will be accepted (or refused) without full knowledge of the value of the offers. The model implies that workers with long tenure will be less likely to quit, holding wage rates constant. We also show that a risk-neutral worker is willing to accept a wage offer that falls below his current "full" wage (in the absence of moving costs).     

The retirement behavior of workers covered by union and nonunion pension plans

Previous authors have noted that there are significant differences between the provisions of union and nonunion pension plans. I present evidence that sheds light on two hypotheses. The first (Parsons, 1983) posits that union pensions should encourage earlier retirement because productivity falls as workers age, but union rules prohibit firms from lowering wages. The second (Freeman, 1985) argues that union pension plans reflect the preferences of older, more senior workers. I find some support for both hypotheses. I conducted some of the research for this paper as an economist with Unicon Research Corporation. I thank the National Institute on Aging for funding (grant number 5 RO1 AG06133-03). I also thank Fran Horvath, Mark Kennet, Mark Loewenstein, Bob McIntire, Tom Plewes, Bill Wiatrowski, and three anonymous referees for useful comments. All views and opinions expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the National Institute on Aging, or Unicon Research Corporation.     

The effects of prevailing wage laws: A comparison of individual workers’ wages earned on and off prevailing wage construction projects

I evaluate the effects of prevailing wage laws using a unique data set that shows the wages paid to workers on prevailing wage projects and the wages paid to the same workers during the same time period for work on projects not covered by prevailing wage regulations. The wage comparison shows that workers are generally paid more for work on prevailing wage projects than they are for work on nonprevailing wage projects. Thus, prevailing wage laws likely do increase the cost of public construction. In addition, to the extent that the quality of construction is improved, prevailing wage laws appear to be an inefficient mechanism by which to achieve additional quality, as the regulations often result in workers being paid more than they earn in the private market. This research was done originally for the Program Review and Investigations Committee of the Kentucky State Legislature. I thank the staff of the Program Review and Investigations Committee and the Legisla-tive Research Commission for assistance with data collection and Mark Berger for helpful comments. Due to confidentiality requirements, the data cannot be made available.     

Gender inequalities in pensions: different components similar levels of dispersion

While the average gender gap in pensions is quite well documented, gender differences in the distribution of pensions have rarely been explored. We show in this paper that pension dispersion is very similar for men and women within the French pension system of a given sector (public or private). Gender differences are less marked among retired civil servants than among former private sector employees. However, the determinants of these inequalities are not the same for men and women. Using a regression-based decomposition of the Gini coefficient, we find that pension dispersion is mostly due to dispersion of the reference wage for all retirees but gender differences exist. For women, in particular, pension dispersion is also due to the dispersion in contribution periods. We also decompose the Gini coefficient by source of pension to measure the impact of institutional rules (minimum pensions, survivor’s pension) on the extent of pension inequality. Unexpectedly, we find that the impact of minimum pensions is limited, although slightly larger for civil servants than for private-sector employees. Survivor’s pension schemes, on the other hand, contribute positively to pension dispersion among retired women.     

Employee preferences for pension plan features

Data from 517 survey respondents were used to analyze the determinants of the shares of a hypothetical $1,000 budget that employees were given to allocate to cash wages and pension plan features involving early retirement, postponed retirement, and infla-tion protection. Employee preferences for pension plan features generally reflected the potential for pensions to deal with such factors as risk sharing, family lifecycle decision making, and cash constraints, as those factors were related to observable per-sonal and demographic characteristics of employees as well as to their labor market circumstances and wealth embodied in their pension plans. Amongst other implica-tions, our analysis highlights that the demand is greater for early retirement and infla-tion protection than for postponed retirement, and the demand for early retirement is likely to increase as the work force ages, dual pension families become more promi-nent, and layoffs and job changing continue. Financial assistance from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.     

MOBILIZING SOCIAL RESOURCES: Race, Ethnic, and Gender Differences in Social Capital and Persisting Wage Inequalities

Drawing on a social capital theoretical framework, I examine race, ethnic, and gender wage inequalities. Specifically, I extend past research by analyzing differences in the mobilization of different types of job contacts, what these types of contacts and their level of influence "buy" job seekers in the labor market, and the extent to which differences in social resources explain between-group variations in wages. Four aspects of job contacts are implicated: the race and gender of the job contact, the strength of the relationship between the job seeker and the job contact, and the job contact's influence. Employing the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, I find that white men are more likely to mobilize weak, white, male, and influential contacts, those contacts hypothesized to positively impact employment outcomes. Moreover, their greater mobilization of male and influential ties helps to explain a substantial part of their wage advantage over white women and Lations. However, in many ways, their overall social resource advantage seems somewhat overstated. They reap no advantages over blacks, Latinos, and white women in their use of weak and white ties. Furthermore, results indicate that the benefits of social resources appear largely contingent on the social structural location of job seekers mobilizing them, less on any benefits inherent in different "types" of job contacts.     

Employment effects of spatial dispersal of refugees

Refugees subjected to a spatial dispersal tend to be assigned to a location outside the immigrant-dense cities. We argue that such locations are associated with low place utility. Our partial equilibrium search model with simultaneous job and residential location search predicts that the reservation wage for local jobs decreases with place utility. We test the theoretical prediction by estimating the effects of characteristics of the location of assignment on the transition rate into the first job. Our sample is male refugees aged 30–59 who were subjected to the Danish spatial dispersal policy carried out in the period 1986–1998. We find little empirical support for the theoretical prediction. Empirically we find that the transition rate into the first job decreases with the local population size and the number of immigrants while the effect of the local number of co-nationals is insignificant.     

Occupations,Human Capital and Skills

Economists have long recognized that occupations can be used as proxies for skills in wage regressions. Yet the potential existence of non-market factors such as discrimination and occupational choice (sorting) on the basis of job attributes that are separate from, but potentially correlated with, wages makes occupations an imperfect control for skills. In this paper, we consider whether inter-occupational wage differentials that are unexplained by measured human capital are indeed due to differences in unmeasured skill. Using the National Compensation Survey, a large, nationally-representative dataset on jobs and ten different components of job requirements, we compare the effects on residual wage variation of including occupation indicators and these skill requirements measures. We find that although these skill requirements vary across 3-digit occupations, occupation indicators decrease wage residuals by far more than can be explained by skill alone. This indicates that “controlling for occupation” does not equate to controlling for only these skill measures, but also for other factors. Additionally, we find that there is considerable within-occupation variation in skill requirements, and that the amount of variation is not constant across skill levels. As a result, including occupation indicators in a wage model introduces heteroskedasticity that must be accounted for. We suggest that caution be applied when using and interpreting occupation indicators as controls in wage regressions.     

International job search: Mexicans in and out of the US

It is argued that migration from Mexico to the US and return migration are determined by international wage differentials and preferences for origin. We use a model of job search, savings and migration to show that job turnover is a crucial determinant of the migration process. We estimate this model by Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) and find that migration practically disappears, it goes down from 19 to 0.5%, had Mexico US arrival rates while employed. A lower decrease in migration, to 7%, occurs by an increase in Mexican wage offers. On the other hand, doubling migration costs reduces migration rates from 19 to 5%, while subsidizing return migration in $300 reduces migration rates only to 14%.