On the Social Dimensions of Moral Psychology

Contemporary moral psychology has been enormously enriched by recent theoretical developments and empirical findings in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and social psychology and psychopathology. Yet despite the fact that some theorists have developed specifically “social heuristic” (Gigerenzer, 2008) and “social intuitionist” (Haidt, 2007) theories of moral judgment and behavior, and despite regular appeals to the findings of experimental social psychology, contemporary moral psychology has largely neglected the social dimensions of moral judgment and behavior. I provide a brief sketch of these dimensions, and consider the implications for contemporary theory and research in moral psychology.     

Alienation as Atrophied Moral Cognition and Its Implications for Political Behavior

I present a theory of alienation that accounts for the cognitive processes involved with moral thinking and political behavior in modern societies. On my account, alienation can be understood as a particular kind of atrophy of moral concepts and moral thinking that affect the ways individuals cognize and legitimate the social world and their place within it. Central to my argument is the thesis that modern forms of social integration—shaped by highly institutionalized, rationalized and hierarchical forms of social life—serve to constrain the moral‐ cognitive powers of subjects leading to a condition of alienation as moral atrophy. This state results from the withering of the subject's internal powers of moral reflection and an overriding predisposition to rely on external value schemas to make sense of moral and political problems. I then present an analysis of alienated moral consciousness and its implications for modern social theory.     

From the molecules the history of life

Nucleic acids, the molecules responsible for the storage and transmission of genetic information, can disclose the beguiling history of the evolution of life on the Earth. In this paper, the molecular mechanisms underlying the evolutionary processes are illustrated together with the methods for the recollection of their history. The impact of molecular data on the evolutionary studies is stressed together with the importance of suitable mathematical models for the treatment of sequence data.

Possible future scenarios are conceived for the evolutionary process in relation to environmental phenomena, on account of the new technologies and the development of genetic engineering.     

Sex Differences in Moral Interests: The Role of Kinship and the Nature of Reciprocity

Although moral psychologists and feminist moral theorists emphasize males' interest in justice or fairness and females' interest in care or empathy, recent work in evolutionary psychology links females' interests in care and empathy for others with interests in fairness and equality. In an important work on sex differences in cognitive abilities, David Geary (1998 ) argues that the evolutionary mechanism of sexual selection drives the evolution of particular cognitive abilities and selection for particular interests. I mount two main challenges to Geary's claims. First, I argue that female social and intrasexual competitive environments evolve, which challenges the assumption that such environments are largely nonkin-based and characterized by reciprocity. Second, I grant Geary's entire characterization of female environments, but argue that the natures of reciprocal relationships themselves do not require and may not select for interests in fairness and equality. This analysis not only challenges claims regarding sex differences in moral interests, but also suggests the need for a diachronic model of male and female social and intrasexual competitive environments. In addition, I propose a return to Trivers's (1971 ) focus on the suite of emotions underlying reciprocal altruism as properties and features of individuals as fodder for selection.     

哲学嫉妒

关于“人的科学”的观念长期以来诱惑着西方的思想家们。自然科学的每一次突破都被用来佐证哲学已经被自然科学所取代。自然科学家们常常对哲学家和文学家们不能达成一致不厌其烦。他们把这种不一致与作为自然科学的经验性的信条的标志的共识和稳步前进进行不公平的比较。最近在对大脑功能的研究方面和进化论生物学领域都取得的一些研究成果,在这种意义上也被认作为对哲学的部分的取代。然而斯蒂夫·平克用这些自然科学信条解决政治和社会问题的企图并没有什么意义。对于政治和社会问题,平克和他的盟友们提供不了任何具体的、实用的建议。他们错误地认为我们需要关于人性的理论作为解决政治和社会问题的原理。但事实并非如此,政治和社会指针只能从对人类历史的研究而不是生物学的研究中产生。西方哲学史的精神在于关于人性的理论应被关于历史的研究所取代,关于非历史的人类本质的理论,不论是哲学的还是生物学的,都不值得我们认真对待。     

Intentionality in Nature. Against an All-Encompassing Evolutionary Paradigm: Evolutionary and Cognitive Processes are not Instances of the Same Process

Three examples of theoretical analysis of evolutionary processes are presented. It is shown that the mechanisms involved have little to do with cognitive processes except for superficial and formal analogies. That is the case not only for classical models of adaptive evolution (example I), but also for more recent ones (exanples II and HI) making use of neural network computation and self-organization theories.
Recent works on functional self-organization exhibiting some features of intentionality are discussed in this context. It is argued that Dennett's (or other) intentional stance cannot be used as a theoretical framework common to human prepositional attitudes, animal behaviour and adaptive (or non-adaptive) evolution. Indeed, a physical theory of intentionality could account, at least in principle, for the production of intentional self-organizing systems. However, except for a renewed theological "argument from design", there is no justification to attribute intentionality to evolutionary processes and "Mother Nature", for the reason that they have produced organisms endowed with intentional psycholinguistic capabilities.     

Why Do They Help People with AIDS/HIV Online? Altruistic Motivation and Moral Identity

Abstract

With the help of information and communication technologies, people can enjoy online social services, especially some stigmatized groups. In China, it is popular for AIDS patients to seek help online since the anonymity of cyberspace can protect people from stigmas and mocking evaluations. This article conducts a content analysis on 216 volunteers’ applications in an AIDS forum and measures their online helping behavior after application to explore what motivates volunteers to help AIDS patients online, how it affects them, and why the moral implication attached to AIDS fails to prevent them. The author indicates that helping behavior may be inspired by varied motivation from altruism to egoism, including kindness, values, sympathy, reward, atonement and benefit. Among them, the closer to altruism the motivation is, the more likely it is to be mentioned, while the “reward” motivation has the most significant effect. This article then examines volunteers’ moral identity of AIDS, arguing that the moral identity of humanitarianism can counteract the moral criticism of high-risk behavior related to AIDS. Future research in this area should examine the relationship between motivation and moral identity, the change in different phases, and compare different helping situations to encourage more forms of social services and supportive behavior.     

Reflections on September 11: Lessons From Four Psychological Perspectives

Several of the major theoretical perspectives within psychology can contribute to our understanding of the September 11 attacks and their aftermath. An argument derived from the psychodynamic approach suggests that terrorism may be a product of ambivalence rather than anger. From an evolutionary standpoint, the resentment that breeds terrorism, and the altruism that has arisen in its wake, may be seen as two sides of the same coin. The decision theoretic approach suggests that in the attempt to prevent future terrorist attacks, we face a seeming tradeoff between civil rights and civil liberties. Finally, the personality development approach suggests that difficult times can help forge new moral leaders.     

Contingency,novelty and choice. Cultural evolution as internal selection

Sociological, economic and evolutionary paradigms of human agency have often seen social agents either as the rational controllers of their fate or as marionettes on the strings of historical, functional or adaptive necessity. They found it therefore difficult to account for the variability, intentionality and creativity of human behaviour and for its frequently redundant or harmful results. This paper argues that human agency is a product of evolution, but that genetic variation and inheritance can only provide a limited explanation of its complex nature. The primary evolutionary problem which human agents face while they are alive is not to adapt to stable environments, but to respond flexibly and creatively to a contingent, uncertain world. Variation and selection therefore take two connected but distinct forms, one external, genetic, and inherited across generations, the other internal and cognitive, and operating during the lifetime of individuals. An examination of this lived part of evolution provides a better understanding of key properties of agency.     

文学的道德诉求与道德超越--文学与道德关系的一个悖论

文学作为一种精神存在方式,体现了对人的生存状态深刻的道德关注甚至终极关怀,优秀的文学作品常常包含了道德上的自省和反思,能够通过启迪和诱导人们的行为方式而发挥道德感化功能.文学中的道德判断是以情感判断的形式表现出来的,并且是从主体出发,由情感而生判断,个人的价值观念和主观好恶免不了渗透其中.因而文学的道德评判是有一定的适用性和局限性的,优秀的文学作品常常超越道德判断的层次,把人物或行为纳入多维价值系统进行立体的观照,从而做出更高的富于人生哲理意味的把握,因此,文学的道德诉求与道德超越是文学与道德关系的两面.     

On the Distinctively Human: Two Perspectives on the Evolution of Language and Conscious Mind

In this paper, two alternative naturalistic standpoints on the relations between language, human consciousness and social life are contrasted. The first, dubbed “intrinsic naturalism,” is advocated among others by the realist philosopher John Searle; it starts with intrinsic intentionality and consciousness emerging from the brain, explains language as an outgrowth of consciousness and ends with institutional reality being created by language‐use. That standpoint leans on what may be described as the standard interpretation of Darwinian evolution. The other type of naturalism, in contrast, making use of the concept of evolutionary niches, suggests that the search for the explanatory mechanisms of language and consciousness should begin with the human community (of social action), because that is the cultural niche for everything distinctively human to evolve, including language and human consciousness.     

Rule utilitarianism,rights, obligations and the theory of rational behavior

The paper first summarizes the author's decision-theoretical model of moral behavior, in order to compare the moral implications of the act-utilitarian and of the rule-utilitarian versions of utilitarian theory. This model is then applied to three voting examples. It is argued that the moral behavior of act-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a noncooperative game, played in the extensive mode, and involving action-by-action maximization of social utility by each player. In contrast, the moral behavior of rule-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a cooperative game, played in the normal mode, and involving a firm commitment by each player to a specific moral strategy (viz. to the strategy selected by the rule-utilitarian choice criterion) — even if some individual actions prescribed by this strategy, when considered in isolation, should fail to maximize social utility.The most important advantage that rule utilitarianism as an ethical theory has over act utilitarianism lies in its ability to give full recognition to the moral and social importance of individual rights and personal obligations. It is easy to verify that action-by-action maximization of social utility, as required by act utilitarianism, would destroy these rights and obligations. In contrast, rule utilitarianism can fully recognize the moral validity of these rights and obligations precisely because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy, independent of action-by-action social-utility maximization.The paper ends with a discussion of the voter's paradox problem. The conventional theory of rational behavior cannot avoid the paradoxical conclusion that, in any large electorate, voting is always an irrational activity because one's own individual vote is extremely unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of any election. But it can be shown that, by using the principles of rule-utilitarian theory, this paradox can easily be resolved and that, in actual fact, voting, even in large electorates, may be perfectly rational action. More generally, the example of rule utilitarianism shows what an important role the concept of a rational commitment can play in the analysis of rational behavior.     

Beyond Difference: A Biologist's Perspective

This piece addresses some of the challenges to social scientific thought originating from the field of evolutionary psychology and from social scientists committed to making biological arguments an important component of the sociological discussion of gender. I provide my own biological perspective on these contemporary discussions, noting especially the different kinds of explanatory value one can expect from particular kinds of argument. I also call for the application of stricter scientific standards to arguments about the evolution of sex differentiated human behaviors. I introduce some basic genetic concepts, such as the norm of reaction, which focus attention on the interaction between genes and environment during intra-generational development. Finally, I challenge the idea that there is a necessary correlation between hormone levels and reproductive behavior in vertebrates.     

Children's Moral Reasoning Regarding Physical and Relational Aggression

Elementary school children's moral reasoning concerning physical and relational aggression was explored. Fourth and fifth graders rated physical aggression as more wrong and harmful than relational aggression but tended to adopt a moral orientation about both forms of aggression. Gender differences in moral judgments of aggression were observed, with girls rating physical and relational aggression as more wrong and relational aggression as more harmful than boys. In addition, girls were more likely to adopt a moral orientation when judging physical and relational aggression and girls more often judged relational aggression than physical aggression from the moral domain. Finally, moral reasoning about aggression was associated with physically and relationally aggressive behavior. Considered together, the results indicate that children tend to adopt a moral orientation about aggression, but that they nonetheless differentiate between physical and relational aggression in their moral judgments.     

Moral dialogs

Moral dialogs are social processes through which people form new shared moral understandings. They differ from reasoned deliberations because they are focused on values and not on facts, logic or reason. They differ from irrational passions because value statements require moral justifications. Such dialogs take place not just in families and communities, but often on national levels and sometimes even on transnational ones. They played a core role in major societal changes brought about by social movements, such as those that advanced civil rights, women's rights, and the protection of the environment. Most importantly, when successfully concluded, moral dialogs affect not just attitudes and values, but also voluntary behavior as well as laws. Although dialogs may differ greatly in their normative content, they have the same basic sociological format and follow the same basic ‘natural history.’ The article introduces the author's conception of what constitutes moral dialogs by drawing on available evidence, and provides a framework for additional research on the subject at hand.     

Norms and rationality. Is moral behavior a form of rational action?

This article addresses major arguments in the controversy about the “rationality” of moral behavior: can moral behavior be explained by rational choice theory (RCT)? The two positions discussed are the incentives thesis (norms are incentives as any other costs and benefits) and the autonomy thesis claiming that moral behavior has nothing to do with utility. The article analyses arguments for the autonomy thesis by J. Elster, A. Etzioni, and J. G. March and J. P. Olsen. Finally, the general claim is discussed whether norm following and norm emergence are utility maximizing. The conclusion is that the autonomy thesis is not tenable if one applies a wide subjectivist, social psychological version of RCT that includes the assumption of “bounded rationality.” The autonomy thesis is only compatible with a narrow version of RCT that excludes internal outcomes and that refers to norms that do not have external outcomes. It is argued that such a narrow version is not capable of explaining many forms of behavior social scientists are interested in.     

The evolution of Homo Discens: natural selection and human learning

This article takes an evolutionary “reverse engineering” standpoint on Homo discens, learning man, to track down the (learning) mechanisms that played a pivotal role in the natural selection of human being. The approach is “evolutionary sociological”—as opposed to gene‐centred or psychologising—and utilises notions of co‐evolutionary organism–environment transactions and niche construction. These are compatible with a Deweyan theory of action, which entails that in action one cannot but learn and one can only learn in action. Special attention is paid to apprentice‐like learning‐by‐doing peculiar to human socio‐cultural niches since the Pleistocene, which has permitted each subsequent generation to learn the many habits and skills needed in utilising the affordances of action that constitute their ecological niche. Affordances and actions have changed over the history of human–environment transactions, but the core mechanisms of human learning have not changed much. It is increasingly important to appreciate these mechanisms now in the global age “knowledge society,” which is in a way similar to the Pleistocene era: characterised by uncertainty and life‐determining problem‐situations without any ready‐made solutions, it calls for capacities to adapt to changing circumstances, and thus apprentice‐like learning in action supported by savvy epistemological engineering of learning environments.     

Development of the Distinction Among the "Desirable", Morality, and Personal Preference

Israeli children of grades 1, 4, and 7 were asked, with respect to nine types of behavior, whether such behavior is bad, whether a child should be brought up to behave otherwise (and why), whether a child should be required to behave otherwise, and whether such behavior should be punished. Analysis of their responses and the reasons they provided supports the hypothesized distinction between three categories of behaviors or reasons for action—morality, “the desirable” and personal preferences—in terms of two dimensions: desirability and obligatoriness. Specifically, moral norms were perceived as both desirable and strictly obligatory, and were justified in terms of inherent goodness/badness and the welfare of others. Behaviors in the category of “the desirable” were perceived as desirable but not obligatory, and were justified in terms of self-development and long-term utility. Behaviors in the category of personal preferences were perceived as non-obligatory and neither desirable nor undesirable, and were justified in terms of personal choice. This distinction was less sharp among first graders, who exhibited some tendency to view desirables and preferences, as well as moral behavior, as obligatory. In light of these findings, it is suggested that the young child's “intuitive morality” relates only to the dimension of desirability and not to that of obligatoriness, which seems to develop somewhat later.     

论企业制度的演进

文章讨论市场经济里的企业制度演进过程 ,即从单一业主制企业到合伙制企业再到现代公司制企业。一方面从交易费用角度揭示了企业制度演进的根本原因 ,另一方面则探讨了不同企业制度内部要素所有者的权力与利益关系演变的基本特征。     

Moral distress among social workers: The role of insufficient resources

The present study examined moral distress among Finnish social workers and the role of perceived resource insufficiencies in explaining it. The aim was to shed light on this understudied phenomenon in the field of social welfare. The study focused on work‐related moral distress, defined as impaired wellbeing that is connected to the continual inability to implement actions that one considers morally appropriate. The survey data were collected with an electronic questionnaire between the years 2011 and 2012. The respondents (n = 817) were social workers in the public social welfare services and the overall response rate was 46.5 per cent. Nearly 11 per cent of the respondents reported experiencing moral distress and perceived resource insufficiencies strongly explained this experience. Moreover, social workers with moral distress reported that they were less willing to continue in their post, were more frequently on sick leave and had positive work‐related experiences less often than their colleagues who did not experience moral distress. Key Practitioner Message: ● The concept of moral distress is useful in describing the experiences of social welfare workers when they are unable to practise their profession according to their moral code and the emotional burden related to this inability; ● Perceived resource insufficiencies are strongly associated with experiences of moral distress among frontline social workers; ● Social workers experiencing moral distress are less willing to continue in their work, take sick leave more often and less frequently have positive experiences related to their work.