THE BEHAVIOR OF REGULATORY ACTIVITY OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

This paper tests a prediction of the interest-group theory of regulation which suggests that regulators generally will not force any one group to bear the full adjustment costs associated with variations in the business cycle. That is, the interest-group model predicts that regulatory agencies will redistribute cyclical gains and losses by supplying more "producer protection" regulation during contractions and more "consumer protection" regulation during expansions; i.e., regulatory activity which reduces consumer welfare will tend to be countercyclical, intensifying when aggregate demand falls and abating as demand increases.
The empirical results show a countercyclical and statistically significant ceteris paribus relationship between Federal Trade Commission enforcement efforts under the Robinson-Patman Act and several alternative measures of general business conditions. Since the Robinson-Patman Act is viewed widely as anti-consumer, the findings suggest that in cyclical downturns the Commission moves to protect producers against losses by bringing more cases which limit the tendency for prices to fall. This result may be rationalized under the view that during recessions, the Federal Trade Commission is in the business of transferring wealth from consumers either to protect small business or to bolster cartels. On the other hand, during business expansions the Commission reduces its Robinson-Patman case load, and such a change in enforcement may serve to mitigate producer gains, transferring wealth to consumers at the margin. In any case the paper offers empirical support for the interest-group model by providing evidence that the business cycle plays an important part in explaining the level and pattern of regulatory activity.     

NEW FACTS ABOUT FIRM RISK ACROSS COUNTRIES AND OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE

The characteristics of firm‐level risk over the cycle and across countries are studied in this paper. Low idiosyncratic firm‐level risk is found to be a feature of highly developed, stable economies, whereas the countercyclicality of firm‐level risk is associated with flexible as well as stable economies. These facts are uncovered with the help of a theoretical model where small, risk‐averse firms display procyclical risk, whereas larger, risk‐neutral firms have countercyclical risk patterns that depend on the rigidity of the business environment. The predictions of the model are then confirmed by the data using a large international firm‐level database (ORBIS) together with the World Bank Doing Business Database, during the “Great Recession” across 55 countries. The findings are critical for the growing literature of uncertainty driven business cycles, and show that firm‐level uncertainty cannot be treated as an exogenous parameter. (JEL D21, D22, E32, F44, L11, L25)     

CATASTROPHE THEORY AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

We use the approach of R. Thom's "Catastrophe Theory" to construct a generalization of Kaldor's 1940 trade cycle. The model allows for cyclic behavior which exhibits either rapid recoveries (recessions) or slow recoveries (depressions) .     

THE MONTE CARLO CYCLE IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY

NBER business"cycle" reference dates and aggregate economic time series are examined for evidence of regular cyclic behavior. A simple contingency table test is used on the reference dates, and aggregate series are fit with a second-order autoregression. The results are negative. Apparently the business "cycle" is an optical illusion or, as Irving Fisher called it, a "Monte Carlo cycle." These are the cycles superstitious gamblers believe govern their luck.     

POLITICAL MODELS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE SHOULD BE REVIVED

Political models of the business cycle have typically been ignored because they appear inconsistent with rational behavior and because empirical evidence is inconclusive. This paper addresses the second issue, demonstrating for U.S. real GNP, unemployment, and inflation that electoral cycles (persistent patterns across electoral terms) are significant, but apparently only for Republican incumbents, and that partisan cycles (persistent differences between parties) are also significant. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that a minority party is more constrained by electoral concerns, whereas a majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives.     

INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON FRIEDMAN'S THEORY OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE

Milton Friedman's theory of the business cycle implies two empirical regularities tested for here. One regularity is that business cycles are asymmetric: The size of a contraction affects the size of the following expansion, but not vice versa. The second regularity is that a supply-side ceiling to aggregate output limits the size of expansions. Friedman's correlation methods yield only very weak support for the asymmetry hypothesis when applied to real GNP data of eight OECD countries. A time series model with a ceiling component fits the data well for a majority of the countries.     

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE MONTE CARLO CYCLE IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY

This paper tests the null hypothesis that "cycles" in business activity are merely Monte Carlo cycles. It compares the actual distribution of expansionary and contractionary phase duration times with those which would be expected under the null hypothesis. If the probability of a phase turning point is constant during a small interval of time, rather than increasing, the duration times of upswings and downswings should be exponentially distributed. Goodness of fit statistics were calculated for each phase for the post World War II time series of: five coincident indicators, inverted unemployment rate, and production index. The evidence found here supports the Monte Carlo thesis.     

INSTITUTIONS,HOUSEHOLD CREDIT COMPOSITION,AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

We show that the negative effect of household credit growth on subsequent economic growth documented in the recent literature is not the same across countries. The effect is stronger in countries with weak institutions where the fraction of consumer credit in total household credit is greater. That is an important nuance as consumer credit is a sizable part of household credit in many emerging markets and its rapid buildup should be observed with the same caution as a rapid buildup in housing credit. (JEL G21, E32, E44)     

ENTRY AND EXIT,PRODUCT VARIETY,AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

We study the stochastic behavior of a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. Each seller sells his product in the consumption goods as well as the investment goods market and has market power in both. Consumers derive utility from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of all the consumption goods and augment their capital stock by a CES aggregate of all the investment goods. We analyze the equilibrium of this economy allowing for an endogenous determination of the number of firms and therefore of products. The principal effect we wish to highlight is the endogenous propagation and magnification of technology and preference disturbances through product space variations. (JEL E32, D43, L16)     

BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS WITH THE DIVISION OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

In the mainstream real business cycle (RBC) model, labor can be viewed as temporary employment since the firm's demand for labor behaves directly in response to stochastic productivity shocks in each period. This paper provides a tractable way of analyzing fluctuations in permanent and temporary employment over the business cycle, as well as the underlying driving forces. This inclusion of heterogeneity helps reconcile the RBC model with the U.S. data given that temporary employees in general only account for a small proportion of total private‐sector employment (about 2%–3%). We draw an explicit division between permanent and temporary employment and resort to this separation to account for stylized facts that characterize a two‐tier labor market. In particular, with regard to the U.S. labor market, our benchmark model can well explain the motivating facts: (1) temporary employment is much more volatile than permanent employment, (2) the share of temporary employment (the ratio of temporary to aggregate employment) exhibits strong pro‐cyclicality, (3) permanent employment lags by two quarters on average, and (4) the correlation between temporary employment and output is stronger than that involving the permanent counterpart. The quantitative analysis suggests that our proposed channels explain the main facts well and the model further provides plausible reasoning for a firm's labor hoarding. (JEL E24, E32)     

THE SHIFTS IN LEAD-LAG PROPERTIES OF THE U.S. BUSINESS CYCLE

We document shifts in the lead-lag properties of the U.S. business cycle since the mid-1980s. Specifically, (1) the well-known inverted leading indicator property of real interest rates has completely vanished; (2) labor productivity switched from positively leading to negatively lagging output and labor inputs over the cycle; and (3) the unemployment rate shifted from lagging productivity negatively to leading positively. Many contemporary business cycle models produce counterfactual cross-correlations revealing that popular frictions and shocks provide an incomplete account of business cycle comovement. Determining the underlying sources of these shifts in the lead-lag properties and their consequences for macroeconomic forecasts is therefore a promising direction for future research. (JEL E24, E32, E43)     

IDENTIFYING THE ROLE OF RISK SHOCKS IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE USING STOCK PRICE DATA

I analyze the sources of U.S. business cycle fluctuations in an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with a rich set of nominal and real rigidities and various exogenous disturbances. The model includes a shock to the expected risk‐premium, which introduces a time‐varying wedge between the policy rate set by the central bank and the cost‐of‐capital of firms. In the aggregate data, most U.S. corporations finance their investment using internal funds, and stock prices reveal the opportunity cost of this type of financing. I therefore use corporate market value and dividend data in the Bayesian estimation of the model to identify risk shocks. Variance decomposition exercises show that these shocks account for a substantial part of the variation in the stock market, as well as the variation in output and investment, especially at short forecast horizons. The variation of these variables at longer forecast horizons are mainly captured by shocks to investment‐specific technological change. Historical decomposition points to the important role played by risk shocks in the run up of stock prices and output in the late 90s, and in the reversal of these variables in the early 2000s and during the recent recession. (JEL E32, E44)     

A MONETARY BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL FOR INDIA

A New Keynesian monetary business cycle model is constructed to study why monetary transmission in India is weak. Our models feature banking and financial sector frictions as well as an informal sector. The predominant channel of monetary transmission is a credit channel. Our main finding is that base money shocks have a larger and more persistent effect on output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. The presence of an informal sector hinders monetary transmission. Contrary to the consensus view, financial repression in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, does not weaken monetary transmission. (JEL E31, E32, E44, E52, E63)     

BUSINESS CYCLE ASYMMETRY: A DEEPER LOOK

This paper distinguishes two types of asymmetry in business cycles: deepness and steepness. Deepness is defined as the characteristic that troughs are further below trend than peaks are above. Most previous research has focused exclusively on steepness, which refers to cycles in which contractions are steeper than expansions. A test for deepness is proposed and applied to U.S. post-war quarterly unemployment, real GNP, and industrial production. Evidence of deepness is found for unemployment and industrial production, while the evidence for real GNP is weaker. Previous evidence of steepness in unemployment is confirmed.     

INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND WORLD BUSINESS CYCLE

Understanding international transmission mechanism that generates the world business cycle is of immense interest. In this paper, we compile a rich global dataset and utilize a trade‐linked structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model with a relatively realistic identification scheme to construct a worldwide dynamic interdependency system. Empirical results indicate that the trade‐linked SVAR system can largely capture the common dynamic properties of national business cycle fluctuations, providing a meaningful transmission foundation to the world business cycle derived from dynamic factor models. Based on the worldwide trade‐linked SVAR system, we further shed light on three crucial topics in international economics. The findings and methods in this paper help to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of recent trade dispute between world major economies. (JEL F41, F44, O19)     

NONLINEAR BUSINESS CYCLE DYNAMICS: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE ON THE PERSISTENCE OF AGGREGATE SHOCKS

We look for asymmetries in the dynamics of real GDP growth for the G7 countries, using a model by Beaudry and Koop that allows the depth of a recession to influence the rate of growth of output. We find evidence supporting these nonlinearities in four countries, including the United States, but we do not find evidence that the asymmetries are common even among the four countries exhibiting asymmetric behavior. A modification of the model to distinguish between the recession and recovery phases of a business cycle does not change this general finding. The asymmetries discovered by Beaudry and Koop do not appear to be common among the G7 nations. (JEL E32)     

RECESSIONS AND RECOVERIES IN REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS

We evaluate the ability of a simple real business cycle model to generate business cycles in the classical NBER sense of the term, where recessions are periods of absolute declines in economic activity. We use the "phase" classification of Burns and Mitchell [1946] to determine the "shape" of the business cycle and to look for asymmetries between expansions and contractions. We show that such a model can generate business cycles of plausible duration and depth, but cannot match the actual "Shape" of the business cycle. Nonlinear models, such as Friedman's [1993] "plucking" model may more closely match the observed shape.     

STOCK RETURNS, ASYMMETRIC VOLATILITY, RISK AVERSION, AND BUSINESS CYCLE: SOME NEW EVIDENCE

We study how three interrelated phenomena—excess stock returns and risk relation, risk aversion, and asymmetric volatility movement—change over business cycles. Using an asymmetric generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in mean model and a Markov switching model, we find that excess stock return increases and asymmetric volatility movement is weakened during boom periods. This suggests that investors become more risk-averse during boom periods (i.e., procyclical risk aversion), which we confirm using a calibration of a simple equilibrium model . ( JEL C32, E32, G12)