基于不完全契约的高新技术风险企业控制权结构选择及其影响因素研究

文章从风险企业家与风险投资家风险偏好、风险投资家干预行动、控制权私有收益以及分阶段融资等方面对Gebhardt-Schmidt(2006)与Jean-Etienne(2008)模型进行综合与扩展,比较分析了相机控制与联合控制两类控制权配置结构的适用范围与影响因素。理论研究得出,风险投资家的监控干预成本、风险企业家的融资额与控制权私人非货币收益、风险投资家在重新谈判中的讨价还价能力与持有的企业赎回权、项目失败时风险企业的清算价值以及风险投资家风险规避系数,与联合控制的选择概率正相关、与相机控制的选择概率负相关;风险投资家战略目标的实现度与联合控制的选择概率负相关、与相机控制的选择概率正相关。     

公司创业投资支持企业控制权配置实证研究

控制权治理是公司治理的重要内容,由控制权配置带来的控制权收益是激励投资家物质资本和企业家人力资本投入的重要手段。基于不完全契约理论,从控制权收益和企业家人力资本的视角,研究公司创业投资支持企业的控制权配置问题。分析创业企业中公司创业投资者与企业家的控制权收益构成和类型以及企业家的人力资本专用性和专有性特征,厘清公司创业投资者与企业家各自私人收益、货币收益与其拥有的企业剩余控制权和特定控制权之间的对应关系。根据控制权共享收益来源,构建基于企业家人力资本专用性和专有性的控制权共享收益函数,分析控制权私人收益和战略收益、企业家人力资本专用性和专有性以及控制权收益与人力资本交互作用对公司创业投资支持企业剩余控制权和特定控制权配置的作用机理。以公司创业投资支持的110家不同行业上市企业3年数据为样本,运用面板数据混合回归模型,实证检验控制权收益、企业家人力资本及其交互项对中国经济背景下公司创业投资支持企业两类控制权配置的影响。 研究结果表明,公司创业投资者拥有的特定控制权和剩余控制权与企业家人力资本专用性正相关,与企业家人力资本专有性负相关,企业家控制权私人收益对公司创业投资者获得创业企业特定控制权比例具有正向影响,公司创业投资者控制权战略性私人收益对其自身获得创业企业特定控制权比例具有负向影响;企业家控制权私人收益正向调节企业家人力资本专用性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系,负向调节企业家人力资本专有性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系;公司创业投资者战略性私人收益负向调节企业家人力资本专用性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系,正向调节企业家人力资本专有性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系。由于不同产业类型的创业企业会给公司创业投资者和企业家带来不同的控制权收益,进而导致双方对控制权的关注程度和类型发生变化。同时,处于不同发展阶段的创业企业,公司创业投资者和企业家对剩余控制权、特定控制权关注的重点也不相同。因此,需要对不同类型的创业企业进行控制权分类治理。 研究结论为完善公司创业投资支持企业的控制权治理、提升控制权激励效果进而促进被投资创业企业发展具有重要的理论参考价值。     

创业型企业的成长:基于企业家团队资本的实证研究

本文基于企业家团队资本构建了一个创业型企业成长模型,即"企业家团队资本—组织能力—经济环境—创业企业成长",并以我国402家IPO上市企业为研究对象,从企业家团队资本、组织能力的单因素、综合因素以及它们的相互作用3个方面,进行了实证分析,检验结果表明:(1)企业家团队的抱负水平与创业企业的成长存在正相关关系,尤其是年龄和在位时间的影响非常显著;(2)企业家团队的决策能力促进了创业型企业的成长,尤其是企业家教育水平的积极作用非常明显;(3)企业家团队的异质性对创业企业的影响作用并不大,但团队成员之间持股的差异性将有助于改进企业绩效;(4)企业家团队资本的综合指标ETC与创业企业成长存在显著的稳健的正相关关系,并且ETC与创业型企业的组织能力之间存在显著的互补关系,即在组织能力较强的制度环境下,企业家团队资本所发挥的功能更加明显。     

创业企业成长中的企业家战略领导能力研究

创业企业成长中离不开企业家的战略领导能力,企业家肩负着管理和培育企业创新的重任。在界定企业家战略领导能力内涵基础上,分析企业家战略领导能力、组织学习、战略创新与创业企业成长关系,并提出基于企业家战略领导能力的创业企业成长整合模型。     

企业家社会网络、组织能力与集群企业成长绩效

通过将社会网络理论和组织能力理论引入集群企业成长研究,以浙江省集群企业为对象,对企业家社会网络是否以及如何通过组织能力影响企业成长绩效进行了实证分析.研究发现:企业家社会网络对组织能力具有正向影响;组织能力的2个维度对集群企业成长绩效均有显著的正向影响;企业家社会网络与集群企业成长绩效正相关,其中,除了关系强度外,达高性和开放性并不对集群企业成长绩效产生直接影响,而是通过组织能力这一中介变量对集群企业成长绩效产生间接影响.     

灵活信任、企业家能力资本化与治理--对家族化合伙创业企业的分析

本文对家族化合伙创业企业治理结构进行了研究.以个人信任和权威为主要特征的家族化治理结构,在企业成长的不同阶段呈现出阶段性的差异化,对收益索取权和经营控制权的调整是突破治理效率瓶颈的根本.本文指出,信任的灵活性、企业家能力差异度、企业家能力资本化过程等是影响这一过程的重要因素.     

专用性投资、信任与创业企业控制权治理

基于控制权收益交互作用视角,研究创业投资模式下的异质性创业企业控制权治理问题,分析控制权共享收益和私人收益综合影响下投资家投资专用性和合作双方信任度对创业企业剩余控制权和特定控制权治理的作用机理,以193家不同产业类型创业企业为样本,运用混合回归模型,实证检验投资专用性、信任及其交互作用对异质性创业企业两类控制权治理的影响。研究结果表明,由于异质性企业的控制权收益类型和大小存在差异,导致投资专用性和信任对不同产业类型创业企业控制权治理的影响存在差异;创业企业家控制权私人收益较大、创业投资家的战略收益较小时,创业投资家获得的剩余控制权与其投入资本的专用性、合作双方间的信任度呈非线性倒U形关系;创业企业家控制权私人收益较小、创业投资家的战略收益较大时,创业投资家获得的剩余控制权与其投入资本的专用性、合作双方间的信任度呈非线性U形关系;投资专用性与合作双方信任度的交互项与创业投资家拥有的剩余控制权和特定控制权负相关,在高新技术创业企业样本中交互效应尤为显著。     

学习和控制行为与企业成长价值——我国上市公司的实证检验

本文以中国上市公司为样本,以实物期权理论为基础,实证分析了企业的学习(以研发费用为代表)和控制行为(以广告费用为代表),管理者的学习行为(以管理经验和社会网络关系为代表)对企业成长价值的影响.结果表明,管理者的学习行为与企业成长价值显著正相关;在一定支出水平下,企业的学习行为和控制行为与企业成长价值正相关;学习行为相对于控制行为而言更为重要.部分行业存在研发支出和广告支出的临界支出水平.     

债转股企业控制权配置研究

债转股企业治理结构的一个重要方面是如何在拥有"内部人控制权"的企业经营者与资产管理公司之间配置控制权,这是完善债转股运作的重要内容.文章通过建立债转股企业控制权配置的数学模型,导出国企经营者为了获得债转股的"优惠"所必须放弃的控制权的均衡解,并分析了债转股谈判时原国有企业拥有的效益状况及其经营者的个人非货币收益大小(休闲等)等因素对债转股企业控制权配置的影响,进而得出资产管理公司必须根据债转股企业的实际绩效状况以及经营者的能力是否适应企业的发展要求而配置控制权的结论;同时,为了确保这种控制权威胁的实现,必须淡化政府于债转股运作的行政干预.     

企业家战略能力对企业发展的作用机制探讨——以光伏行业企业的战略实践为例

太阳能光伏行业是政府政策补贴引导下的快速发展的新能源行业,本文通过对光伏行业中企业家战略管理的实例研究,验证了企业家战略能力能够促进企业发展,在快速变化和激烈竞争的行业环境中,企业家战略能力对企业成长的促进作用尤其明显。     

终极控股股东超额控制与现金持有量价值的实证研究

文章以我国资本市场2002年非金融类A股公司为样本,实证研究了终极控股股东控制权与现金流权分离对公司现金持有量水平及其市场价值的影响.研究结果发现:(1)当终极控股股东为国有股东时,控制权/现金流权系数与现金持有量水平显著正相关;而当终极控股股东为非国有股东时,控制权/现金流权系数与现金持有量水平虽然正相关,但不能通过显著性检验.表明在两权分离的情况下,国有终极控股股东对高现金持有量水平具有较高的偏好;(2)当终极控股股东为国有股东,且其控制权与现金流权存在分离时,现金持有量的价值为0.769元;而当终极控股股东控制权与现金流权不存在分离或虽存在分离但终极控股股东为非国有股东时,现金持有量的价值为1.206元.从而表明在两权分离的情况下,国有终极控股股东对高现金持有量水平的偏好是一种控股股东利益侵占动机.     

The Property Rights Approach to Nonprofit Organization: The Role of Intrinsic Motivation

The standard property rights approach to nonprofit organization claims that attenuation of property rights in the form of nondistribution constraint stimulates managerial shirking in nonprofit firms and thereby makes them less efficient than for-profit firms. This paper argues that this view neglects the important role played by intrinsic motivation in nonprofit organization. Intrinsically motivated stakeholders provide resources to nonprofit firms and thereby facilitate their economic survival. However, intrinsic motivation is subject to the crowding-out effect, i.e., the danger of being displaced by the use of extrinsic (monetary and administrative) incentives. The property rights structure in nonprofit organization is designed to minimize the crowding-out effect by dampening monetary and administrative incentives through nondistribution constraint and self-governance orientation, respectively. This facilitates not only economic survival of nonprofit firms but also maximization of utility of their intrinsically motivated stakeholders.

Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior

The main purpose of this study is to investigate how organizational slack is created and how it affects a firm’s performance. To address these questions, we construct three equations: managerial incentive function, organizational slack formation function and performance function, and we apply 3SLS simultaneously to these functions by using the data sets of 2,791 Japanese firms from the years 2001 and 2006. From the empirical analysis of these Japanese firms, we obtain the following results: a firm’s performance declines as organizational slack increases; organizational slack is affected by annual change rate of revenues but not by managerial incentive; managerial incentive decreases as a firm’s performance improves while it increases as the structure of corporate governance is strengthened.     

Building Organizational and Scientific Platforms in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Process Perspective on the Development of Dynamic Capabilities

In this paper, we examine the process of dynamic capability development in a large pharmaceutical firm. Using interviews with multiple managers at different organizational levels, we developed two narratives of the process of developing two separate dynamic capabilities in the same firm. We focus on three areas that prior research has shown to be critical in the early stages of the process of implementing new strategic initiatives: the cognitive orientations of key personnel, managerial action undertaken within the firm, and the firm's internal and external contexts. We provide evidence that managers undertake specific initiatives based on their own particular cognitive orientations , and that senior managers play a major role in the development of capabilities by imprinting the organization with their specific cognitive orientation and then orchestrating the multilevel organizational routines necessary for actualization of a capability. These replicable actions by senior management during the early stages of capability development can lead to the development of a capability that is not initially in the cognitive frames of lower level employees. Finally, we will show that internal and external contingencies have a profound impact on the decision to develop a capability, and to discontinue its development. Our findings thus suggest that the process of developing new capabilities shares common elements with other strategic initiatives.     

CEO burnout,managerial discretion,and firm performance: The role of CEO locus of control,structural power,and organizational factors

Despite the possibility of burnout resulting from dynamics in firms' upper echelons, little if any work has focused on chief executive officer's (CEO's) burnout and firm performance. Drawing on managerial discretion theory, this article analyzes the influence of CEO burnout on firm performance and the moderating roles of the individual (CEO locus of control), structural power (CEO duality and CEO tenure), and organizational characteristics (size, age, and resource availability) related to managerial discretion. Using a sample of 156 CEOs in Swedish firms, we find a negative association between CEOs who report higher burnout and firm performance. Our results confirm that CEO duality and resource availability ameliorate and firm size exacerbates the negative association between CEO burnout and firm performance. Contrary to our expectations, CEO locus of control, CEO tenure, and firm age do not influence this relationship. We discuss the implications of our research for upper echelons theory and strategic leadership theory.     

Nondistribution Constraint and Managerial Discretion: Disentangling the Relationship

The paper questions the viewpoint of the property rights theorists that nondistribution constraint makes nonprofit firms particularly prone to managerial shirking. The possibility that utility maximized by nonprofit managers corresponds to their firms’ missions is justified by the inability of the real-world price system to ensure the perfect match between profit maximization and utility maximization. The imperfection of this match means that some consumers’ preferences cannot be gratified through the price system and therefore require nonprofit organization. The possibility of managerial on-the-job consumption in nonprofit firms is shown to be insufficient for inferring inefficiency of their property rights structure.This research has been supported by Marie Curie Incoming International Fellowship of the Sixth Framework Program of the European Community (Contact No. M1F1-CT-2005-514036). The views expressed in this publication are those of the author only. The European Commission is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained in this publication.     

Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) wield considerable power and authority. In many industries and contexts, CEO turnover is studied in terms of antecedents, the event itself, and the related consequences. However, the extent to which CEOs exert their power and attempt to prevent their dismissal has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we examine the role of CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort to prevent their own corporate demise. We hypothesize that CEOs cut discretionary expenses such as research and development, advertising, and rent in order to boost earnings and enhance financial performance. A sample of CEO turnover from Standard and Poor’s ExecComp database for the period 1992–1998 in US firms yielded 474 turnover firms and 2,066 control firm-years. We tested the effects of CEO turnover and managerial discretion on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns. We also compared the turnover and non-turnover firms in terms of pattern of discretionary spending prior to CEO turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction that CEOs facing termination attempt to post higher earnings by reducing discretionary spending after controlling for firm performance, firm diversification, book to market ratio, and CEO ownership, industry-, and year dummies.     

Uncertainty,pluralism, and the knowledge-based theory of the firm: From J.-C. Spender’s contribution to a socio-cognitive approach

J.-C. Spender’s award-winning, knowledge-based theory of the firm is based on four premises: (1) The firm can be sufficiently understood as a system of knowledge, (2) explicit and implicit knowing can be clearly dissociated, (3) organizations are conceived as cognizing entities, and (4) intuition shaped by shared cultural practices is a superior source of managerial knowledge. This line of reasoning represents a social constructionist view of the enactment, transfer, and storage of knowledge according to which managerial knowledge is largely tacitly shaped by industry recipes and the firm’s socio-cultural conventions and other social processes. Although comprehensive in scope, we argue that a knowledge-based theory of the firm needs to integrate a cognitivist approach that includes the synergetic production of tacit and explicit knowledge, the role of reflective thinking in resolving strategic uncertainties, and the interaction between the individual and the social. This socio-cognitive theory of the firm posits that sustained competitive advantage of a firm is founded on the ability to align knowledge internally within the firm as well as externally with its stakeholders through the individual sense-making of feedback from other individuals.     

Strategic management of dynamic growth

A great deal of theoretical and empirical work has been performed on firm growth following Edith Penrose's (1959) classic book, but there is growing concern among researchers and practitioners about the relevance of research as the business environment becomes increasingly dynamic. This Special Issue is motivated by concerns surrounding the need to rethink established theories of firm growth in the face of blurring boundaries among markets and technologies, increased competition, innovation, and intense competitive dynamics. Comprised of six articles, the Special Issue examines growth in a variety of ways and across industries and types of firms, showing how firm choices for pursuing growth extend beyond the dichotomy between internal and external growth. The contributions include a review of existing literature and new ideas on the role of human capital on firm growth, such as recruiting and retaining the right people, or developing managerial capabilities to direct limited resources to more productive uses. The impact of regulatory policies, industry life-cycle, and venture capital on firm growth are also investigated in novel ways.     

家族控制、两权分离与债务期限结构选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文利用我国2002-2008年家族控制上市公司数据,在控制相关变量下,从债务代理成本视角经验检查在中国债权人法律保护较弱的背景中,终极控制股东(家族)是否影响公司债务期限结构。本文提供的经验证据表明,终极控制股东显著影响公司债务期限结构。具体而言:(1)终极控制股东的控制权越大,公司具有显著低的长期债务水平;(2)终极控制股东的控制权与现金流量权分离度与公司债务期限显著负相关;(3)终极控制股东在上市公司中指派高管与公司债务期限显著负相关。