Religion and fertility in the United States: New patterns

In the United States, the baby boom-era pattern of high Catholic and low Protestant fertility has ended. Among non-Hispanic whites in the 1980s, Catholic total fertility rates (TFRs) were about one-quarter of a child lower than Protestant rates (1.64 vs. 1.91). Most of the Protestant-Catholic difference is related to later and less frequent marriage among Catholics. Future research on the demography of religious groups should focus on explaining the delayed marriage pattern of Catholics, the high fertility of Mormons and frequently attending Protestants, and the very low fertility of those with no religious affiliation.     

Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860-1909

Previous studies of the marital fertility transition in Europe have found religious differentials. Using data collected from the population registers of The Hague, our aim in this study is to search for answers to the following questions: whether religious differentials result from socio-economic characteristics; to what extent religious ideology explains the behaviour of religious groups; which proximate determinants account for the religious differentials; and whether the Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition in Europe. The results provide some evidence of relatively low levels of parity-dependent fertility control among Jews before the transition and among Catholics during the transition. Religious ideology probably accounts for the low level of fertility control among Catholics. The ultimate reason for the relatively high marital fertility among Jews before the transition remains unclear. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition.     

Adolescent fertility and religion in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in the year 2000: the role of Protestantism

Social transformations in Brazil in recent years have included a substantial increase in adolescent fertility, a dramatic rise in membership of Protestant religious denominations, and an accompanying decline in the number of Catholics. We used the 2000 Brazil Census to examine differentials in fertility and family formation among adolescents living in Rio de Janeiro by the following religious denominations: Catholic; Baptist; other mainline Protestant; Assembly of God Church; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; other Pentecostal Protestant; and no religion. Results from logistic regression models show that the majority of the Protestants are at a lower risk of adolescent fertility than Catholics, and that among adolescents who have had a child, most Protestants are more likely than Catholics to be in a committed union. Our findings offer some support for the hypothesis that Protestant churches are more effective than the Catholic Church in discouraging premarital sexual relations and childbearing among adolescents.     

Marital fertility and religion in Spain, 1985 and 1999

Since the transition to democracy in Spain in 1975, both total fertility and rates of church attendance of Catholics have dropped dramatically. In this study the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys were used to investigate whether the significance of religion for fertility behaviour -- current family size and the spacing of births -- changed between the survey dates. In the 1985 survey, family size was similar for those Catholics who actively participated in religious activities and those who, though nominally Catholic, were not active participants. By 1999, the family size of the latter was lower and comparable to the family size of those without religious affiliation. These findings accord with the declines in both church attendance and fertility in Spain. The small groups of Protestants and Muslims had the highest fertility. Women in inter-faith unions had relatively low fertility.     

Reproductive ideals and educational attainment among white Americans, 1943-1960

Abstract Would the persistent inverse relation between educational attainment and family size in the United States be removed if actual fertility were equal to ideal? Data on ideal family size from 10 national surveys among white Americans of both sexes (from 1943 to 1960) show that gradeschool level respondents have higher ideals than the more educated even when age, religious affiliation, and farm residence are used as controls. Comparison of these ideals with the actual family size or ever-fertile women in the United States indicates that, on the average, the actual family size of all major educational groups falls below the ideal, but the college-educated are furthest from their ideal. If this group lessened the gap between actual and ideal family size, the educational differential in fertility would decrease, but at the price of increasing the rate of population growth.     

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.     

The seasonality of births in Canada: A comparison with the northern United States

This paper presents evidence that there are substantial differences in the seasonal birth patterns of Canada and the northern United States. The seasonal birth pattern in Canada is characterized by a birth peak in April–May, and a trough in December–January. The birth pattern in the northern U.S. is characterized by a trough in April–May, and a peak in August–September. The influence of climate on the birth patterns is explored in an attempt to explain the discrepancies. In both Canada and the United States, there is an inverse relationship between temperature and conceptions during the summer months. The study concludes that variation in temperature alone cannot explain the discrepancy between the birth patterns of southern Canada and the northern United States.     

Fertility trends in Australia

Using published data from the Australian vital registration and census systems, several time series are compiled: crude birth rates from the 1860s; fertility rates from the 1880s; age-specific and parity-specific measures from the 191Os; cumulative fertility measures by birth year of parent beginning with the 1890s; and cumulative fertility measures for marriages by year contracted from the 1910s.The decline in fertility to the 1930s, the upswing to 1961, and declines thereafter revealed by annual fertility measures show far more variation than do measures of total generation fertility—2.7 children per woman born in 1893–95, 2.3 1906–10, 2.8 1921–25, and perhaps 3.0 for women born in the 1930s. Both annual and generation measures show a younger age at parenthood, a decrease in childlessness, and progressively fewer large families. In the light of present experience, it seems not unreasonable to project generation fertility of 2.5 children, implying a crude birth rate of about 20 per thousand for the next fifteen years or so.     

Does It Matter What She Wants? The Role of Individual Preferences Against Unmarried Motherhood in Young Women’s Likelihood of a Nonmarital First Birth

Most young people in the United States express the desire to marry. Norms at all socioeconomic levels posit marriage as the optimal context for childbearing. At the same time, nonmarital fertility accounts for approximately 40 % of U.S. births, experienced disproportionately by women with educational attainment less than a bachelor’s degree. Research has shown that women’s intentions for the number and timing of children and couples’ intent to marry are strong predictors of realized fertility and marriage. The present study investigates whether U.S. young women’s preferences about nonmarital fertility, as stated before childbearing begins, predict their likelihood of having a nonmarital first birth. I track marriage and fertility histories through ages 24–30 of women asked at ages 11–16 whether they would consider unmarried childbearing. One-quarter of women who responded “no” in fact had a nonmarital birth by age 24–30. The ability of women and their partners to access material resources in adulthood were, as expected, the strongest predictors of the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. Nonetheless, I find that women who said they would not consider nonmarital childbearing had substantially higher hazards of fertility postponement and especially of marital fertility, even after controlling for race/ethnicity, mother’s educational attainment, family of origin intactness, self-efficacy and planning ability, perceived future prospects, and markers of own educational attainment and work experience into early adulthood.     

U. S. population growth as an abstractly-perceived problem

Recent public opinion polls report that a majority of Americans consider the nation’s population growth rate to be a “serious” problem. Little systematic evidence exists on whether they view the problem as a factor that the individual married couple should consider in deciding on family size. A survey of 134 adult women living in a limited-income family housing project in a relatively small and isolated American community suggests: the view that continued population growth is a problem in the United States is endorsed more strongly than the view that the couple has a responsibility to limit its fertility because of overpopulation; and concern with population growth is only loosely associated with acceptance of the individual responsibility attitude. Among subgroups of respondents, Catholics were more likely to hold a negative attitude toward population growth than to possess the individual responsibility view and they exhibited a correlation between the two attitudes. Protestants were distinguished by no difference in or correlation between the acceptance of the two attitudes. A correlation between the attitudes was especially pronounced among Catholics with high achievement values. It is suggested that measures explicitly intended to control population growth probably cannot be adopted until there is a strong correlation between the two attitudes.     

The Americanization of catholic reproductive ideals

Abstract This paper considers the attitude of Roman Catholics in the United States of America towards family size and suggests that large family ideals are still being put forward by the Church in publications and periodicals. The second part of the paper considers the attitudes of American Roman Catholics towards family size and shows that though there are indications that Roman Catholics regard slightly larger families as ideal than do members of other religions, the difference is not now very great.     

The effects of formal church affiliation and religiosity on the fertility patterns of Mexican-American catholics

The effects of religion on the fertility patterns of Mexican Americans are examined with two different path models, the Institutional Model using formal affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church as a measure of religion, and the Religiosity Model using a measure of religiosity. Each model, tested separately for husbands and wives, examines the effects of religion on types of contraceptive methods used and on wanted family size. Although the majority of Mexican Americans are Catholics and tend to have large families, religion does not seem to have the same effect on their fertility patterns as on that of other Catholics in the United States. Among the men, neither formal affiliation nor religiosity affect the fertility patterns in any way, while among the women the effect is slight. Considering the Catholic Church’s position on contraceptive usage, it is especially noteworthy that religion does not affect the use or non-use of the more effective means of contraception, a factor contributing to the generally weak association between the measures of religion and wanted family size. The last section attempts a partial explanation of why the results turned out as they did.     

Recent net alien immigration to the United States: Its impact on population growth and native fertility

Estimates of the size and structure of recent alien immigration to the United States are made. Substituting these revised estimates in the Series II projections of the U.S. Bureau of the Census implies a future U.S. population smaller than that implied by the Census Bureau’s estimates of immigration. The analysis of Coale (1972)—which calculates the decline in native-born fertility required to accommodate immigration and, at the same time, maintain a stationary population—is replicated, using both the Census Bureau’s estimates and the revised estimates reported here. The revised estimates indicate a smaller reduction in native fertility and a smaller ultimate size of the stationary population than are implied by the Census Bureau’s immigration estimates. The importance of age structure in all of these calculations is demonstrated.     

Explaining religious differentials in family-size preference: Evidence from Nepal in 1996

We examine how religio-ethnic identity, individual religiosity, and family members' religiosity were related to preferred family size in Nepal in 1996. Analyses of survey data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study show that socio-economic characteristics and individual experiences can suppress, as well as largely account for, religio-ethnic differences in fertility preference. These religio-ethnic differentials are associated with variance in particularized theologies or general value orientations (like son preference) across groups. In addition, individual and family religiosity are both positively associated with preferred family size, seemingly because of their association with religious beliefs—beliefs that are likely to shape fertility strategies. These findings suggest the need for improvements in how we conceptualize and measure supra-individual religious influence in a variety of settings and for a range of demographically interesting outcomes.     

Age,education and occupation differentials in interregional migration: Some evidence for Canada

This paper attempts to bring together the demographic literature on differential migration with economic analysis of regional labor mobility. This is done by estimating a rather simple form of economic model of migration by means of linear regression analysis for specific age, education and occupation groups of male interprovincial migrants in Canada. The data on migration are from the population sample of the 1961 Census of Canada. The pattern of migration differentials displayed by these data is broadly similar to that observed in the United States and elsewhere. The regression results suggest that differential migration by education and occupation groups may be accounted for by the varying responsiveness of the various groups to economic gains obtained through migration. While this seems to be generally true of age differentials as well, the relationship of those to regional income differentials is weaker and points up an important role of motivations other than economic gain.     

Age distribution and the stable equivalent

Some populations, like that of the United States in the 1950's, have a smaller proportion of women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with continuance of their age-specific birth and deaths rates, a continuance which produces the condition known in demography as stability. Others, like that of the United States in the 1930's, have relatively more women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with stability. A way of studying ages is to calculate how many women of stable age distribution would be equivalent from the viewpoint of reproduction to the women observed. This stable equivalent was 69,535,000 or 16 percent below the observed United States female population in 1955, and 12 percent above the observed in 1935. The stable equivalent is a measure of fertility potential, closely related to R. A. Fisher's reproductive value. Calculations for four countries illustrate how a fall of the birth rate, for example in demographic transition, occasions an age distribution in which the stable equivalent is greater than the observed number of women. The notion of stable equivalent is useful for comparison because changes in it are nearly invariant with respect to the age-pattern of fertility used. The statement that the United States stable equivalent increased by 11 percent between 1960 and 1965 holds irrespective of whether the 1960 or the 1965 age-specific fertility and mortality rates are used as standard.     

Some aspects of the use of birth expectations data from sample surveys for population projections

The value of national sample survey data relating to birth expectations for projecting births is reassessed in the light of data limitations pointed out by Ryder and Westoff among others and of the methods of projection used by the United States Bureau of the Census. The annual level of fertility under the cohort-fertility projection method depends on the assumptions regarding completed fertility, about which the available survey data are fairly informative, and on the assumptions regarding the timing of births, about which the survey data tell us very little. Test calculations suggest that Ryder and Westoff have overstated the significance of timing relative to completed family size for the level of future births. We believe that the fall in the annual total fertility rate in the first half of the sixties is to be explained only in part by a general delay in childbearing; a moderate to substantial decrease in completed family size has also occurred. Analysis of the latest set of fertility projections of the Census Bureau also suggests that the assumptions about completed fertility are a much more important determinant of the level of future births than timing, both in the short and long term. Although the available expectations data cannot help in predicting short-term annual changes in fertility, they appear useful for making long-term projections of annual fertility. Expansion of the size, frequency, and content of the sample surveys and incorporation of parity and birth interval into the projection method may improve projections.     

The Role of Religion in Union Formation: An Economic Perspective

Previous research has shown that the faith in which a young woman is brought up has important effects on the subjective costs and/or benefits of many decisions that she makes over the life cycle, including schooling, employment, and fertility. Based on this evidence, the present paper develops hypotheses regarding patterns of entry into marriage and cohabitation for the main religious groups in the United States: mainline Protestants, conservative Protestants, Catholics, Mormons, Jews, and the unaffiliated. The empirical results, based on young women from the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, are generally supportive of the hypotheses.     

Age at marriage as a variable in socio-economic differentials in fertility

Earlier studies have pointed out that socio-economic differentials in fertility depend upon both religion and farm background. These studies report a negative relation between fertility and socio-economic status for non-Catholic American couples in contrast to a positive relation for Catholics. Likewise, a negative differential for American couples with farm background has been observed in contrast to no differential for twogeneration urbanites. Age at marriage is a third such interaction variable: the strong negative socio-economic differential observed when wife’s age at marriage is under 19 diminishes with advancing age at marriage and becomes positive for wives who married at age 23 or older. Moreover, for both non-Catholics and Catholics, couples with and without farm background, the differential by wife’s education is negative when wife’s age at marriage is young, positive when her age at marriage is old. Both sociological factors (the incidence of non-familial adult roles) and differential fecundity appear to underlie the interaction. The analysis is based on reports of once-married, white, nonfarm wives aged 30 to 39 included in the 1955 or 1960 Growth of American Families Studies or the 1965 National Fertility Study (approximately 1,000 in each survey).     

Family composition and the labor force activity of American wives

This is a study of the employment patterns of American wives in relation to the composition of their families. The data are taken from the 1960 United States Census, both from published tabulations and the 1/1000 sample. The population studied is non-Negro, non-farm, married, husband present women who are under the age of sixty. The methods of analysis used include the comparison of employment rates among subpopulations and a dummy variable regression technique. Aspects of family composition studied include age of the youngest child (in single years in order to determine whether there are discontinuities in the rates of employment when youngest children enter school, etc.), number of children in the family, and the presence of other relatives in the family. The paper concludes with a discussion of the meaning of family status differentials in employment including differential preferences for employment, differential fertility experience, and differential demands on the mother’s time. Some discussion of the use of cross section data of this sort to infer life cycle patterns of employment is included.