Does Anti‐Hispanic Bias Motivate Opposition to Non‐English Languages?*

Contemporary political debates about language policy in the United States focus on three primary policy issues: bilingual education in public schools, English‐only legislation, and the access of non‐English speaking citizens to political rights. Using the “Multi‐Ethnic United States” module from the 2000 General Social Survey (GSS), this article tests multiple attitudinal, behavioral, demographic, and contextual hypotheses for how Anglos and African Americans view bilingual policy issues. We examine the role of linguistic contact, self‐interest, group threat, and discriminatory views of Latinos, finding that the latter—as measured by the “Three Ds” (Derogation, Disrespect, and Distance)—are the strongest predictors of attitudes toward bilingualism. Distance (social distance from Latinos) is consistently significant, disrespect (doubts about Latino contributions to the United States.) is mostly significant, and derogation (Latino stereotypes) is occasionally significant. Also, political ideology and knowledge of a non‐English language play important roles in the formation of favorable bilingualism opinions. However, the self‐interest and group threat variables were largely insignificant. Taken together, these findings indicate the importance of understanding how policy views may be structured by opinions about out‐group individuals and cultures. Language can serve as a proxy for immigrants themselves, as negative attitudes toward Latinos are associated with negative attitudes toward bilingualism.     

Crusading for Moral Authority: Christian Nationalism and Opposition to Science

Numerous studies show biblicist Christianity, religiosity, and conservative political identity are strong predictors of Americans holding skeptical attitudes toward publicly controversial aspects of science, such as human evolution. We show that Christian nationalism—meaning the desire to see particularistic and exclusivist versions of Christian symbols, values, and policies enshrined as the established religion of the United States—is a strong and consistent predictor of Americans’ attitudes about science above and beyond other religious and political characteristics. Further, a majority of the overall effect of political ideology on skepticism about the moral authority of science is mediated through Christian nationalism, indicating that political conservatives are more likely to be concerned with particular aspects of science primarily because they are more likely to be Christian nationalists. Likewise, substantial proportions of the well-documented associations between religiosity and biblical “literalism” with views of science are mediated through Christian nationalism. Because Christian nationalism seeks to establish a particular and exclusivist vision of Christianity as the dominant moral order, adherents feel threatened by challenges to the epistemic authority undergirding that order, including by aspects of science perceived as challenging the supremacy of biblicist authority.     

A Chronological Bibliography of the College Novel

Abstract

Although Muslims in the United States are highly assimilated into American society, they represent less than 1 percent of the total population. Therefore, most of the information Americans receive about this group comes from secondary sources. Two theoretical perspectives of opinion formation—image of God and low information rationality—shed light on the subject of trust in this marginalized group. For highly religious Americans, nearly two-thirds of the 2005 Baylor Religion Survey's national sample, Muslims may represent the ultimate outsiders. We compare the effect of the central religious narrative, or an image of God as creator or judge, to the effect of political ideology, or the likely exposure to forms of low information rationality such as framing, spinning, and buzzwords. We use indicators of these concepts in a multivariate analysis of trust in Muslims as a test of these competing perspectives of opinion formation. Using the 2005 Baylor Religion Survey data, we find that not only does trust in Muslims decrease with both a more conservative political ideology and a stronger view of God as vengeful and angry but that these effects interact to produce individuals who are far less likely to trust Muslims compared to their Democrat, Independent, and “loving God” counterparts.     

Fake News Is Real: The Significance and Sources of Disbelief in Mainstream Media in Trump’s America

Are appeals to discredit mainstream media reporting of political news in the guise of “fake news” merely a diversion from more fundamental threats to democratic politics and policymaking? Or is the emerging belief in “fake news” itself a looming threat? Using data from the Voter Study Group’s panel survey, we examine the relationship between disbelief in mainstream media and a wide range of social attitudes and policy preferences. We find that in December 2016, just after Trump’s election, belief in fake news wields an outsized influence, independent of partisanship, ideology, media consumption, and other established foundations of public opinion. The effects of fake news beliefs are especially pronounced on key elements of Trump’s rhetoric as candidate and as president—hostility toward immigrants, racial and religious minorities, gender equality, perceptions of America’s “greatness,” and even support for democratic norms and institutions itself. We also find some evidence that by January 2019, the belief in fake news has become even more focally associated with Trump. These findings portend the possibility of an emerging exclusionary, populist variant of American conservatism, of which disbelief in media institutions is a key component.     

Selling slumber: American neoliberalism and the medicalization of sleeplessness

Sleeplessness is an ancient and cross‐cultural phenomenon that is socially structured and restructured against a backdrop of ideology and inequality. In an effort to make sense of sleeplessness, some scholars have invoked the medicalization framework, which highlights consumerism, managed care, biotechnology, and physicians as key “engines” that foster the transformation of this formerly “normal” condition to one that people view as a medical problem. However, this burgeoning literature has not answered the call of medical sociologists to situate the medicalization process in a political economic context. In this article, we employ the case study of sleeplessness and the creation of the “Sleep Industrial Complex” to expand the medicalization framework and illustrate how American neoliberalism creates an ideal environment for the primary engines of medicalization. We identify three critical features of American neoliberalism—enhancement culture, commodification of health, and a “productivity imperative”—that act in concert with the driving engines to foster an environment wherein medicalization not only survives but also thrives.     

UNRAVELING RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEWS: The Relationship between Images of God and Political Ideology in a Cross‐Cultural Analysis

Not only do few studies address the issue of how religious belief relates to political ideology, but little attempt has also been made to analyze this relationship from a comparative perspective. Using data from the International Social Survey Program, we examine how images of God, as measured by God's perceived level of engagement and authority, relate to political ideology in seven Western industrial and postindustrial societies. We find that variation in images of God has no effect on whether individuals are politically liberal or conservative in five of seven countries. Nonetheless, beliefs about God are strongly related to abortion and sexual morality attitudes in every country, but only sporadically related to ideas about social and economic justice. In the end, we argue that theological beliefs tend to be unrelated to a general measure of political ideology, not because religious beliefs are politically unimportant in these societies, but rather because religious perspectives are rarely fully liberal or conservative in their political orientation. In addition, we find that Americans hold unique views of God in comparison to other countries in our sample and that the American tendency to view God as more active and authoritative affects policy attitudes in ways contrary to the effects of church attendance.     

Sophistication and the Antecedents of Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes: Racism, Ideology, and Affirmative Action in America

A number of researchers have argued that the effects of prejudiceon the racial policy attitudes and general political beliefsof white Americans may be restricted to the poorly educatedand politically unsophisticated. In contrast, rather than beingmotivated by prejudice, the racial policy attitudes and ideologicalvalues of the politically sophisticated white Americans shouldbe more firmly informed and motivated by the tolerant valuesat the heart of American political culture. These values includesuch things as individualism, notions of fair play, and devotionto the principle of equality of opportunity. We tested thishypothesis using white respondents from the 1986 and 1992 NationalElection Studies. Our evidence generally indicated that racialpolicy attitudes and political ideology were more powerfullyassociated with ideologies of racial dominance and superiorityamong politically sophisticated white Americans than among politicalunsophisticated white Americans. Moreover, even among the sophisticated,we found that various forms of egalitarianism predicted supportfor—affirmative action and that support for equal opportunityis not uniformly distributed across the political spectrum.     

Is a “Christian America” a More Patriarchal America? Religion,Politics, and Traditionalist Gender Ideology

Recent research shows that Americans who adhere to Christian nationalism—an ideology that idealizes and advocates a fusion of Christianity and American civic life—tend to hold authoritarian and exclusionary attitudes, particularly regarding ethno‐racial minorities and nontraditional family forms. Such findings suggest a fundamental connection between Christian nationalism and rigid symbolic boundaries, which would likely extend to Americans’ understanding of gender roles. Drawing on notions connecting religious nationalism with defenses of patriarchal norms and utilizing a recent national, random sample of American adults, the current study examines the link between contemporary Christian nationalism and traditionalist gender ideologies. Our analyses reveal that Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of holding a more traditionalist gender ideology, even after taking into account a host of political and religious characteristics. Moreover, the relationship between Christian nationalism and gender traditionalism holds across religious traditions, including more gender‐egalitarian groups like Mainline Protestants and even the unaffiliated. We conclude by highlighting the implications of these findings for understanding contemporary populist support for Donald Trump, which previous studies have shown is undergirded by both Christian nationalism and sexism.     

GLOBALIZATION,CULTURE WARS,AND ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCCER IN AMERICA: An Empirical Assessment of How Soccer Explains the World†

This study examines the “culture wars” using the lens of attitudes toward soccer. Despite soccer's increasing popularity in the United States, anti‐soccer rhetoric is fairly common. In his widely read book, How Soccer Explains the World (2004), Foer contends that the “culture wars,” including divisions over soccer, are better explained by reactions to globalization than social class or political ideology. Using data from a survey of Nebraskans, we find that attitudes about cultural globalization are the best predictor of soccer sentiment. Contrary to popular claims about the “culture wars,” most respondents were moderate in their attitudes toward both soccer and globalization.     

Political Position and Social Knowledge1

The nature of social cognition—how we “know about” the social world—is one of the most deceptively obvious problems for sociology. Because we know what we know, we often think that we know how or why we know it. Here, we investigate one particular aspect of social cognition, namely, what we will call “political ideology”—that is, people’s self‐placement on a dimension on which persons can be arrayed from left to right. We focus on that understanding that is in some ways the “ur‐form” of social cognition—our sense of how we stand by others in an implicit social formation whose meaning is totally relational. At the same time, these self‐conceptions seem to be of the greatest importance for the development of the polity and of civil society itself. Our question is, when citizens develop such a “political ideology,” what does this mean, and what do they do with it? We examine what citizens gain from their subjective placement on the dimension from liberalism to conservatism by using the results of a survey experiment that alters aspects of a hypothetical policy.     

The Moral Economy of Neoliberalism: How Voters Use Neoliberal Ideology to (De)Legitimate Undocumented Worker Access to Labor Markets

Neoliberalism is prevalent in American life. While researchers have documented the use of neoliberal ideology in institutional and macrolevel policy contexts, they have yet to investigate how voters use neoliberal ideology to legitimate their position on economic policy. I use data from semi‐structured interviews with 85 Tucsonans about why they voted the way they did on Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring”—which sought to reregulate undocumented worker labor market access—to address this gap. I found evidence of two distinct neoliberal ideological legitimations: “fair market competition” and “individual responsibility.” Furthermore, I use these data to shed light on the debate over whether neoliberalism spans partisan affiliation or converges with American conservatism. I found that voters across party lines who supported the measure paired neoliberal legitimations with conservative legitimations. We can interpret this bipartisan use of neoliberal ideology as evidence of a neoliberal “moral economy”—or consensus about the moral principles in which market action is embedded. Evidence of this moral economy indicates that moral principles from neoliberal ideology are simultaneously bipartisan and converge with American conservatism. These findings suggest that there could be a broader moral consensus among voters concerning the legitimacy of anti‐immigration economic policies.     

Conspiracies beyond Fake News. Produsing Reinformation on Presidential Elections in the Transnational Hybrid Media System

As presidential elections carry the promise of distilling the contested and elusive “will of the people,” the protracted media event intensifies the public demand for exposing the transgressions of the aspiring political elite. This expectation provides fertile ground for investigative journalism, ultrapartisan smear campaigns, fake news, and full-fledged conspiracy theories that are sometimes difficult to differentiate from one another in a hybridized media space. We compare three unique conspiracy stories—Macronleaks, Pizzagate, and Voter fraud—emerging during the previous French and American elections. We assess the divergent strategies of social action that contribute to the stories’ dissimilar patterns for intervening the political news cycle with the “reinformative toolkit” and deconstruct the common conspiratorial “masterplot” for “reinforming” the public. Focusing on online “produsers”—media users functioning as (dis)information producers—we analyze how the grassroots level participated in shaping the conspiracy stories’ synopses and channeling news-framed, conspiratory content between mainstream and “countermedia” outlets.     

Out of Step? Voters and Social Issues in U.S. Presidential Elections

Recent political commentary has argued that the Republican Party is “out of step” with voters on social issues, costing Republicans the 2012 presidential election. This dramatic claim is deserving of scrutiny in its own right and also for the way it offers new perspective on long‐standing controversies concerning the role of social issues in U.S. national elections. We present results that seek to advance established scholarship on electoral politics as well as journalistic claims concerning the rising importance of social issues for elections. Using data from the American National Election Study, we find that social issues mattered to voters in presidential elections from 1992 through 2012. The influence of social issues on voter choice rivals those of attitudes toward defense spending and government provision. We find further evidence that liberalizing trends in social issue opinion consistently benefited Democratic candidates in presidential elections. We consider the relevance of these results for scholarship on voter choice and elections, noting further implications for commentary on the 2012 presidential election.     

BUILDING ENVIRONMENTALISM: The Founding of Environmental Movement Organizations in the United States, 1900–2000

Between the 19th and the mid‐20th century, the environmental movement transformed American culture, forcing a rethinking of the “Manifest Destiny” ideology that had long dominated political thinking toward an understanding of the need to protect and restore the balance between humans and nature. In 1900, there were only a few environmental movement organizations (EMOs), but by 2000, there were over 6,000 national and regional EMOs and over 20,000 local EMOs. What drove this phenomenal growth of EMOs? We examine a 100‐year time series of EMO founding, showing that, in addition to the “legitimation‐and‐competition” effects of organizational density, EMO founding is facilitated by the discourse‐creative activities of critical communities, objective threats in terms of air pollution, foundation giving, and powerful political allies in the presidency and Congress. Environmental discourses also legitimized and competed against one another, favoring “early risers” and preservationist discourse. Environmental mobilization needs to be understood in terms of the creation of new discursive frames that identify environmental problems, as well as objective environmental threats, resources, and political opportunities.     

THE AMBIGUITIES OF EXTERNAL MINORITY PROTECTION

This article focuses on the special and prominent place that the “Jewish question” occupied in the general discussion about Russian modernisation in the pre‐1914 period, both in American society and in the arena of US–Russian relations. It analyses the role that anti‐Jewish violence in Russia had in effecting a dramatic shift in the way Americans viewed the Russian Empire, which was being depicted by the American Jews and the leaders of the crusade for a “Free Russia” as a barbarous oppressor of political dissent and a savage persecutor of religious, national, and ethnic minorities. American society’s reaction to anti‐Jewish violence in the Russian Empire at the turn of the twentieth century helped, on the one hand, to shape the idea of the American belief that the United States bore special responsibility for carrying out reforms in Russia, and, on the other hand, to place relations between the two countries within such binary oppositions as “light and darkness,” “civilization and barbarity,” “modernity and medievalism,” “democracy and authoritarianism,” “freedom and slavery,” “the West and the Orient.” The article uses a broad range of verbal and graphic sources from the American press and new sources from archival collections. These sources help to illustrate one of the author’s principal tenets which holds that the United States’ view of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire was a result of the Americans’ projection of their own vision of the nature of the US foreign policy. In their official and public discourses, Americans considered Russia’s foreign policy an extension of Russia’s political regime. This study examines US foreign policy as a vital sphere in which national identity is redefined and reaffirmed and gives an opportunity to draw attention to the cultural and ideological dimensions of Russian–American relations, to understand the origins of dualistic American myths about Russia that have proven so enduring, and to demonstrate how a demonised Russia serves to revitalise American nationalism and how the Russian “Other” was used, in part, to construct the American “Self.”     

Americans’ Approval of the 2010 Affordable Care Act: Self‐interest and Symbolic Politics*

Public opinion data show substantial variation in attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Utilizing a 2013 Gallup survey of U.S. adults, we examine the effects of self‐interest and symbolic politics measures on several dimensions of ACA approval. Supporting symbolic politics, we find liberal political ideology, democratic party affiliation, and positive evaluations of President Obama are consistently associated with greater approval of the ACA generally, as well as the belief that the ACA will improve the healthcare situation of the United States and one's family specifically. In contrast, self‐interest variables produce less consistent results. Self‐reported familiarity with the law and being uninsured due to one's employer not offering health insurance are associated with greater belief the ACA will improve the healthcare situation of one's family specifically, but not the U.S. healthcare situation generally. Together these findings suggest that political values and symbols—in particular perceptions of President Obama—may be more important in shaping attitudes toward the ACA than self‐interest variables, especially in contexts assessing more generalized support for the legislation.     

The “American Dream” in Poor Urban Neighborhoods: An Analysis of Home Ownership Attitudes and Behavior and Financial Saving Behavior

Abstract

The desire for home ownership and saving to accumulate wealth are two hallmarks of the “American Dream” that are typically associated with middle class values. Much urban research has suggested that continual exposure to neighborhood poverty has produced attitudes and behavior that differ dramatically from these values. In this study, we examined whether residents in poor urban areas embraced these tenets of the American Dream. Based on the Urban Poverty and Family Life Survey of Chicago, logistic and multivariate analyses were used to assess the relationship of neighborhood poverty, race/ethnicity, household economics, and social variables to attitudes and behavior about home ownership and saving. The effects of “ghetto poverty” and neighborhood poverty “tipping points” were evaluated. Findings showed varying effects of race / ethnicity, neighborhood poverty, and social indicators depending on whether attitudes or behavior were under consideration. We also found that household economic status consistently was better in explaining participation in these tenets of the American Dream than variables that directly measure neighborhood poverty.     

The “Homeless Problem” and the Double Consciousness*

The purpose of this article was to identify manifestations of a social discourse that construct those who are homeless as an existential problem. Based on 4 years of ethnographic data and grounded theory analysis, we illustrate the nature of exclusionary social practices that emerge from discourse on the “homeless problem” as well as the conflicting identities experienced by those who are homeless. Herein we frame the data using DuBois concept of “double consciousness.” Our findings indicate that those who are homeless mix together discourses of value and legitimacy with self‐applied stigmas and self‐denigrating political perspectives in ways that directly mirror DuBois’ notion of the conflicting nature of African and American identities around the end of the nineteenth century. We illustrate identity problems that manifest in the contemporary conflict between being both “homeless” and “American.”     

Human Rights: What the United States Might Learn from the Rest of the World and,Yes, from American Sociology

The U.S. Constitution includes civil and political rights—as individual rights—but does not include what is internationally understood to be “human rights,” namely rights we enjoy as equals, including economic, social, and cultural rights, and protections for vulnerable persons, such as children, minorities, mothers, and refugees. The United States has not ratified any international (United Nations) or regional (Organization of American States) human rights treaty, is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court, and is no longer a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. It might be concluded that Americans do not know what human rights are. It is more complicated than that. While opinion polls show that Americans often endorse individual rights—e. g., the rights of women—they do not frame them as being interdependent or being within the purview of government. Can we conclude that human rights have no place in the United States? Not at all. This article concludes by showing that many U.S. institutions of higher learning have programs in human rights and that some academic associations, including the American Sociological Association, recognize human rights.     

Economy “versus” Environment: The Influence of Economic Ideology and Political Identity on Perceived Threat of Eco‐Catastrophe

Using data from a national survey of American adults, we examine the relationships between economic, political, sociodemographic, and religious characteristics with perception of the potential for eco‐catastrophe. We employ the treadmill of production theory to frame our understanding of views about ecological concerns, arguing that the treadmill discourse associated with economic development is hegemonic and fundamentally shapes public views of eco‐catastrophe. In line with this approach, economic ideology is the strongest predictor of attitudes about eco‐catastrophe, and its influence is conditioned by political identity. There is also significant patterning in these perceptions based on gender, race, education, and religion, but the influence of social characteristics is primarily indirect—mediated by economic ideology and political identity. These results provide useful information for addressing environmental problems in public discourse and bridging policy divides.