Determinants of Priority for Risk Reduction: The Role of Worry

One hundred twenty-two members (experts) of the Society for Risk Analysis completed a mailed questionnaire and 150 nonexperts completed a similar questionnaire on the World Wide Web. Questions asked included those about priorities on personal and government action for risk reduction, badness of the risk, number of people affected, worry, and probabilities for self and others. Individual differences in mean desire for action were largely explained in terms of worry. Worry, in turn, was largely affected by probability judgments, which were lower for experts than for nonexperts. Differences across risks in the desire for action, within each subject, were also determined largely by worry and probability. Belief in expert knowledge about the risk increased worry and the priority for risk reduction. A second study involving 91 nonexperts (42 interviewed and 49 on the Web) replicated the main findings for nonexperts from the first study. Interviews also probed the determinants of worry, attitudes toward government versus personal control, and protective behaviors.     

What Number is “Fifty‐Fifty”?: Redistributing Excessive 50% Responses in Elicited Probabilities

Studies using open-ended response modes to elicit probabilistic beliefs have sometimes found an elevated frequency (or blip) at 50 in their response distributions. Our previous research suggests that this is caused by intrusion of the phrase "fifty-fifty," which represents epistemic uncertainty, rather than a true numeric probability of 50%. Such inappropriate responses pose a problem for decision analysts and others relying on probabilistic judgments. Using an explicit numeric probability scale (ranging from 0-100%) reduces thinking about uncertain events in verbal terms like "fifty-fifty," and, with it, exaggerated use of the 50 response. Here, we present two procedures for adjusting response distributions for data already collected with open-ended response modes and hence vulnerable to an exaggerated presence of 50%. Each procedure infers the prevalence of 50s had a numeric probability scale been used, then redistributes the excess. The two procedures are validated on some of our own existing data and then applied to judgments elicited from experts in groundwater pollution and bioremediation.     

Effects of Acknowledging Uncertainty about Earthquake Risk Estimates on San Francisco Bay Area Residents’ Beliefs,Attitudes, and Intentions

We test here the risk communication proposition that explicit expert acknowledgment of uncertainty in risk estimates can enhance trust and other reactions. We manipulated such a scientific uncertainty message, accompanied by probabilities (20%, 70%, implicit [“will occur”] 100%) and time periods (10 or 30 years) in major (≥magnitude 8) earthquake risk estimates to test potential effects on residents potentially affected by seismic activity on the San Andreas fault in the San Francisco Bay Area (n = 750). The uncertainty acknowledgment increased belief that these specific experts were more honest and open, and led to statistically (but not substantively) significant increases in trust in seismic experts generally only for the 20% probability (vs. certainty) and shorter versus longer time period. The acknowledgment did not change judged risk, preparedness intentions, or mitigation policy support. Probability effects independent of the explicit admission of expert uncertainty were also insignificant except for judged risk, which rose or fell slightly depending upon the measure of judged risk used. Overall, both qualitative expressions of uncertainty and quantitative probabilities had limited effects on public reaction. These results imply that both theoretical arguments for positive effects, and practitioners’ potential concerns for negative effects, of uncertainty expression may have been overblown. There may be good reasons to still acknowledge experts’ uncertainties, but those merit separate justification and their own empirical tests.     

Explosion Probability of Unexploded Ordnance: Expert Beliefs

This article reports on a study to quantify expert beliefs about the explosion probability of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Some 1,976 sites at closed military bases in the United States are contaminated with UXO and are slated for cleanup, at an estimated cost of $15–140 billion. Because no available technology can guarantee 100% removal of UXO, information about explosion probability is needed to assess the residual risks of civilian reuse of closed military bases and to make decisions about how much to invest in cleanup. This study elicited probability distributions for the chance of UXO explosion from 25 experts in explosive ordnance disposal, all of whom have had field experience in UXO identification and deactivation. The study considered six different scenarios: three different types of UXO handled in two different ways (one involving children and the other involving construction workers). We also asked the experts to rank by sensitivity to explosion 20 different kinds of UXO found at a case study site at Fort Ord, California. We found that the experts do not agree about the probability of UXO explosion, with significant differences among experts in their mean estimates of explosion probabilities and in the amount of uncertainty that they express in their estimates. In three of the six scenarios, the divergence was so great that the average of all the expert probability distributions was statistically indistinguishable from a uniform (0, 1) distribution—suggesting that the sum of expert opinion provides no information at all about the explosion risk. The experts' opinions on the relative sensitivity to explosion of the 20 UXO items also diverged. The average correlation between rankings of any pair of experts was 0.41, which, statistically, is barely significant (p= 0.049) at the 95% confidence level. Thus, one expert's rankings provide little predictive information about another's rankings. The lack of consensus among experts suggests that empirical studies are needed to better understand the explosion risks of UXO.     

Testing and Characterizing Properties of Nonadditive Measures Through Violations of the Sure‐Thing Principle

In expected utility theory, risk attitudes are modeled entirely in terms of utility. In the rank‐dependent theories, a new dimension is added: chance attitude, modeled in terms of nonadditive measures or nonlinear probability transformations that are independent of utility. Most empirical studies of chance attitude assume probabilities given and adopt parametric fitting for estimating the probability transformation. Only a few qualitative conditions have been proposed or tested as yet, usually quasi‐concavity or quasi‐convexity in the case of given probabilities. This paper presents a general method of studying qualitative properties of chance attitude such as optimism, pessimism, and the “inverse‐S shape” pattern, both for risk and for uncertainty. These qualitative properties can be characterized by permitting appropriate, relatively simple, violations of the sure‐thing principle. In particular, this paper solves a hitherto open problem: the preference axiomatization of convex (“pessimistic” or “uncertainty averse”) nonadditive measures under uncertainty. The axioms of this paper preserve the central feature of rank‐dependent theories, i.e. the separation of chance attitude and utility.     

The Effects of Presenting Imprecise Probabilities in Intelligence Forecasts

How to assess and present analytic uncertainty to policymakers has emerged as an important topic in risk and policy analysis. Due to the complexity and deep uncertainty present in many forecasting domains, these reports are often fraught with analytic uncertainty. In three studies, we explore the effect of presenting probability assessments and analytic uncertainty through probability ranges. Participants were presented with mock intelligence forecasts that include narrative evidence as well as numerical probability assessments. Participants were sensitive to the ambiguity communicated through the confidence range. The narrative appeared to have a smaller effect on judgments when accompanied by a probability range as opposed to a point assessment. In one study, participants also thought that the probability range was more useful for decision making at a higher probability whereas the point estimate was more useful at a lower probability. When evaluating a forecast in hindsight, decisionmakers tended to report lower levels of blame and higher levels of source credibility for forecasts that reported ranges as compared to point assessments. These findings suggest that decisionmakers are not necessarily “ambiguity averse” in the forecasting context. Presenting ranges of probability may have distinct advantages as a way to communicate probability and analytic confidence to decisionmakers.     

Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets

This paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the distinction between uncertainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents have incomplete preferences over state‐contingent consumption bundles, as in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, individual decision making depends on a set of probability distributions over the state space. A bundle is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all probabilities in this set. When preferences are complete this set is a singleton, and the model reduces to standard expected utility. In this setting, we characterize Pareto optima and equilibria, and show that the presence of uncertainty generates robust indeterminacies in equilibrium prices and allocations for any specification of initial endowments. We derive comparative statics results linking the degree of uncertainty with changes in equilibria. Despite the presence of robust indeterminacies, we show that equilibrium prices and allocations vary continuously with underlying fundamentals. Equilibria in a standard risk economy are thus robust to adding small degrees of uncertainty. Finally, we give conditions under which some assets are not traded due to uncertainty aversion.     

Does Iconicity in Pictographs Matter? The Influence of Iconicity and Numeracy on Information Processing,Decision Making,and Liking in an Eye‐Tracking Study

Researchers recommend the use of pictographs in medical risk communication to improve people's risk comprehension and decision making. However, it is not yet clear whether the iconicity used in pictographs to convey risk information influences individuals’ information processing and comprehension. In an eye‐tracking experiment with participants from the general population (N = 188), we examined whether specific types of pictograph icons influence the processing strategy viewers use to extract numerical information. In addition, we examined the effect of iconicity and numeracy on probability estimation, recall, and icon liking. This experiment used a 2 (iconicity: blocks vs. restroom icons) × 2 (scenario: medical vs. nonmedical) between‐subject design. Numeracy had a significant effect on information processing strategy, but we found no effect of iconicity or scenario. Results indicated that both icon types enabled high and low numerates to use their default way of processing and extracting the gist of the message from the pictorial risk communication format: high numerates counted icons, whereas low numerates used large‐area processing. There was no effect of iconicity in the probability estimation. However, people who saw restroom icons had a higher probability of correctly recalling the exact risk level. Iconicity had no effect on icon liking. Although the effects are small, our findings suggest that person‐like restroom icons in pictographs seem to have some advantages for risk communication. Specifically, in nonpersonalized prevention brochures, person‐like restroom icons may maintain reader motivation for processing the risk information.     

The Measurement of Subjective Probability: Evaluating the Sensitivity and Accuracy of Various Scales

The RISK of an event generally relates to its expected severity and the perceived probability of its occurrence. In RISK research, however, there is no standard measure for subjective probability estimates. In this study, we compared five commonly used measurement formats—two rating scales, a visual analog scale, and two numeric measures—in terms of their ability to assess subjective probability judgments when objective probabilities are available. We varied the probabilities (low vs. moderate) and severity (low vs. high) of the events to be judged as well as the presentation mode of objective probabilities (sequential presentation of singular events vs. graphical presentation of aggregated information). We employed two complementary goodness‐of‐fit criteria: the correlation between objective and subjective probabilities (sensitivity), and the root mean square deviations of subjective probabilities from objective values (accuracy). The numeric formats generally outperformed all other measures. The severity of events had no effect on the performance. Generally, a rise in probability led to decreases in performance. This effect, however, depended on how the objective probabilities were encoded: pictographs ensured perfect information, which improved goodness of fit for all formats and diminished this negative effect on the performance. Differences in performance between scales are thus caused only in part by characteristics of the scales themselves—they also depend on the process of encoding. Consequently, researchers should take the source of probability information into account before selecting a measure.     

Probability Information in Risk Communication: A Review of the Research Literature

Communicating probability information about risks to the public is more difficult than might be expected. Many studies have examined this subject, so that their resulting recommendations are scattered over various publications, diverse research fields, and are about different presentation formats. An integration of empirical findings in one review would be useful therefore to describe the evidence base for communication about probability information and to present the recommendations that can be made so far. We categorized the studies in the following presentation formats: frequencies, percentages, base rates and proportions, absolute and relative risk reduction, cumulative probabilities, verbal probability information, numerical versus verbal probability information, graphs, and risk ladders. We suggest several recommendations for these formats. Based on the results of our review, we show that the effects of presentation format depend not only on the type of format, but also on the context in which the format is used. We therefore argue that the presentation format has the strongest effect when the receiver processes probability information heuristically instead of systematically. We conclude that future research and risk communication practitioners should not only concentrate on the presentation format of the probability information but also on the situation in which this message is presented, as this may predict how people process the information and how this may influence their interpretation of the risk.     

Probability and Possibility‐Based Representations of Uncertainty in Fault Tree Analysis

Expert knowledge is an important source of input to risk analysis. In practice, experts might be reluctant to characterize their knowledge and the related (epistemic) uncertainty using precise probabilities. The theory of possibility allows for imprecision in probability assignments. The associated possibilistic representation of epistemic uncertainty can be combined with, and transformed into, a probabilistic representation; in this article, we show this with reference to a simple fault tree analysis. We apply an integrated (hybrid) probabilistic‐possibilistic computational framework for the joint propagation of the epistemic uncertainty on the values of the (limiting relative frequency) probabilities of the basic events of the fault tree, and we use possibility‐probability (probability‐possibility) transformations for propagating the epistemic uncertainty within purely probabilistic and possibilistic settings. The results of the different approaches (hybrid, probabilistic, and possibilistic) are compared with respect to the representation of uncertainty about the top event (limiting relative frequency) probability. Both the rationale underpinning the approaches and the computational efforts they require are critically examined. We conclude that the approaches relevant in a given setting depend on the purpose of the risk analysis, and that further research is required to make the possibilistic approaches operational in a risk analysis context.     

When Does Information about Probability Count in Choices Under Risk?

The question addressed in the present research is whether in naturalistic risky decision environments people are sensitive to information about the probability parameter. In Study 1, we showed that in naturalistic scenarios participants generally revealed little interest in obtaining information about the outcomes and probabilities. Moreover, participants asked fewer questions about probabilities for scenarios containing moral considerations. In Study 2, it was shown that, when supplied with information on probabilities, people could be sensitive to this information. This sensitivity depends on two factors. People were less sensitive to probabilities in scenarios perceived as containing ethical considerations. People were also less sensitive to probabilities when they were faced with a single-choice situation than when they were faced with a series of lotteries with different probabilities. This can be accounted for in terms of the evaluability principle.     

Reducing Overconfidence in the Interval Judgments of Experts

Elicitation of expert opinion is important for risk analysis when only limited data are available. Expert opinion is often elicited in the form of subjective confidence intervals; however, these are prone to substantial overconfidence. We investigated the influence of elicitation question format, in particular the number of steps in the elicitation procedure. In a 3‐point elicitation procedure, an expert is asked for a lower limit, upper limit, and best guess, the two limits creating an interval of some assigned confidence level (e.g., 80%). In our 4‐step interval elicitation procedure, experts were also asked for a realistic lower limit, upper limit, and best guess, but no confidence level was assigned; the fourth step was to rate their anticipated confidence in the interval produced. In our three studies, experts made interval predictions of rates of infectious diseases (Study 1, n = 21 and Study 2, n = 24: epidemiologists and public health experts), or marine invertebrate populations (Study 3, n = 34: ecologists and biologists). We combined the results from our studies using meta‐analysis, which found average overconfidence of 11.9%, 95% CI [3.5, 20.3] (a hit rate of 68.1% for 80% intervals)—a substantial decrease in overconfidence compared with previous studies. Studies 2 and 3 suggest that the 4‐step procedure is more likely to reduce overconfidence than the 3‐point procedure (Cohen's d = 0.61, [0.04, 1.18]).     

Individual differences in numerical representations of risk in health decision making: A fuzzy-trace theory approach

Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that decisionmakers process numerical information about risk at multiple levels in parallel: the simplest level, nominal (categorical some-none) gist, and at more fine-grained levels, involving relative comparison (ordinal less-more gist) and exact quantities (verbatim representations). However, little is known about how individual differences in these numerical representations relate to judgments and decisions, especially involving health tradeoffs and relative risks. To investigate these differences, we administered measures of categorical and ordinal gist representations of number, objective numeracy, and intelligence in two studies (Ns = 978 and 956). In both studies, categorical and ordinal gist representations of number predicted risk judgments and decisions beyond objective numeracy and intelligence. Participants with higher scores in categorical gist were more likely to choose options to avoid cancer recurrence risks; those who were higher in ordinal gist of numbers were more likely to discriminate relative risk of skin cancer; and those with higher scores in objective numeracy were more likely to choose options that were numerically superior overall in terms of relative risk of skin cancer and of genetic risks of breast cancer (e.g., lower numerical probability of cancer). Results support parallel-processing models that assume multiple representations of numerical information about risk, which vary in precision, and illustrate how individual differences in numerical representations are relevant to tradeoffs and risk comparisons in health decisions. These representations cannot be reduced to one another and explain psychological variations in risk processing that go beyond low versus high levels of objective numeracy.     

Perceived Ambiguity and Relevant Measures

We axiomatize preferences that can be represented by a monotonic aggregation of subjective expected utilities generated by a utility function and some set of i.i.d. probability measures over a product state space, S^∞. For such preferences, we define relevant measures, show that they are treated as if they were the only marginals possibly governing the state space, and connect them with the measures appearing in the aforementioned representation. These results allow us to interpret relevant measures as reflecting part of perceived ambiguity, meaning subjective uncertainty about probabilities over states. Under mild conditions, we show that increases or decreases in ambiguity aversion cannot affect the relevant measures. This property, necessary for the conclusion that these measures reflect only perceived ambiguity, distinguishes the set of relevant measures from the leading alternative in the literature. We apply our findings to a number of well‐known models of ambiguity‐sensitive preferences. For each model, we identify the set of relevant measures and the implications of comparative ambiguity aversion.     

Communication With Unknown Perspectives

Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). She also chooses a target individual and observes the target's opinion. This choice involves a trade‐off between well‐informed targets, whose signals are precise, and well‐understood targets, whose perspectives are well known. Opinions are informative about the target's perspective, so observed individuals become better understood over time. We identify a simple condition under which long‐run behavior is history independent. When this fails, each individual restricts attention to a small set of experts and observes the most informed among these. A broad range of observational patterns can arise with positive probability, including opinion leadership and information segregation. In an application to areas of expertise, we show how these mechanisms generate own field bias and large field dominance.     

CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR ABSORBING MARKOV CHAIN PROBABILITIES APPLIED TO LOAN PORTFOLIOS

The problem of estimating steady state absorption probabilities for first order stationary Markov chains having a finite state space is examined. As model parameters, these probabilities are analytic functions of transition probabilities Q and R, and they can be represented as P= (I-Q)^-1R. Estimators P̌ may be obtained by replacing the transition probabilities by their maximum likelihood estimators Q and Ř under multinomial theory. Using large sample multivariate normal theory, one can derive the asymptotic distribution of these estimators and can obtain large sample confidence intervals. Finally, an application related to estimating loss reserves for an installment loan portfolio assumed to satisfy a Markov chain is discussed.     

Fault and Event Tree Analyses for Process Systems Risk Analysis: Uncertainty Handling Formulations

Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is a systematic approach for evaluating likelihood, consequences, and risk of adverse events. QRA based on event (ETA) and fault tree analyses (FTA) employs two basic assumptions. The first assumption is related to likelihood values of input events, and the second assumption is regarding interdependence among the events (for ETA) or basic events (for FTA). Traditionally, FTA and ETA both use crisp probabilities; however, to deal with uncertainties, the probability distributions of input event likelihoods are assumed. These probability distributions are often hard to come by and even if available, they are subject to incompleteness (partial ignorance) and imprecision. Furthermore, both FTA and ETA assume that events (or basic events) are independent. In practice, these two assumptions are often unrealistic. This article focuses on handling uncertainty in a QRA framework of a process system. Fuzzy set theory and evidence theory are used to describe the uncertainties in the input event likelihoods. A method based on a dependency coefficient is used to express interdependencies of events (or basic events) in ETA and FTA. To demonstrate the approach, two case studies are discussed.     

Affective and Cognitive Factors Influencing Sensitivity to Probabilistic Information

In study 1 different groups of female students were randomly assigned to one of four probabilistic information formats. Five different levels of probability of a genetic disease in an unborn child were presented to participants (within‐subject factor). After the presentation of the probability level, participants were requested to indicate the acceptable level of pain they would tolerate to avoid the disease (in their unborn child), their subjective evaluation of the disease risk, and their subjective evaluation of being worried by this risk. The results of study 1 confirmed the hypothesis that an experience‐based probability format decreases the subjective sense of worry about the disease, thus, presumably, weakening the tendency to overrate the probability of rare events. Study 2 showed that for the emotionally laden stimuli, the experience‐based probability format resulted in higher sensitivity to probability variations than other formats of probabilistic information. These advantages of the experience‐based probability format are interpreted in terms of two systems of information processing: the rational deliberative versus the affective experiential and the principle of stimulus‐response compatibility.     

Risk Perception in the U.K. Oil and Gas Production Industry: Are Expert Loss‐Prevention Managers' Perceptions Different From Those of Members of the Public?

This article investigates potential differences in risk perception between experts (loss-prevention managers in the U.K. oil and gas production industry) and nonexperts (managers and students). Extant research on expert versus nonexpert perceptions of risk is reviewed, followed by the present study concerning risk perceptions of seven pen-picture scenarios involving the occurrence of hazardous events in the U.K. oil and gas production industry. In contrast to many of the earlier studies of expert versus nonexpert perceptions of risk, the present analysis concludes that experts did not judge the overall riskiness of the portrayed hazardous events as less risky than the nonexperts. Nevertheless, the experts believe more strongly than our nonexperts that the risks portrayed in the scenarios pose little threat to future generations, are more precisely known, and are relatively controllable. Use of multiple regression analysis to help uncover the basis of overall riskiness assessments for expert and lay respondents was inconclusive, however. Finally, little evidence was found that nonexperts were any more heterogeneous in their risk perceptions than experts. It may be that the nature of the risks assessed in the present study may account for the general lack of clear expert versus nonexpert differences in overall perceptions of the riskiness of hazardous events in the North Sea. Earlier findings of strong expert versus nonexpert differences in risk perception assessed hazards of major public concern. It is inferred that using such extreme hazards may have resulted in an exaggerated view of differences in expert versus public (nonexpert) perception of risk.