Quantitative Assessment of the Risk of Release of Foot‐and‐Mouth Disease Virus via Export of Bull Semen from Israel

Various foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) virus strains circulate in the Middle East, causing frequent episodes of FMD outbreaks among Israeli livestock. Since the virus is highly resistant in semen, artificial insemination with contaminated bull semen may lead to the infection of the receiver cow. As a non‐FMD‐free country with vaccination, Israel is currently engaged in trading bull semen only with countries of the same status. The purpose of this study was to assess the risk of release of FMD virus through export of bull semen in order to estimate the risk for FMD‐free countries considering purchasing Israeli bull semen. A stochastic risk assessment model was used to estimate this risk, defined as the annual likelihood of exporting at least one ejaculate of bull semen contaminated with viable FMD virus. A total of 45 scenarios were assessed to account for uncertainty and variability around specific parameter estimates and to evaluate the effect of various mitigation measures, such as performing a preexport test on semen ejaculates. Under the most plausible scenario, the annual likelihood of exporting bull semen contaminated with FMD virus had a median of 1.3 * 10^?7 for an export of 100 ejaculates per year. This corresponds to one infected ejaculate exported every 7 million years. Under the worst‐case scenario, the median of the risk rose to 7.9 * 10^?5, which is equivalent to the export of one infected ejaculate every 12,000 years. Sensitivity analysis indicated that the most influential parameter is the probability of viral excretion in infected bulls.     

Risk Perception and Human Health Risk in Rural Communities Consuming Unregulated Well Water in Saskatchewan,Canada

Rural communities dependent on unregulated drinking water are potentially at increased health risk from exposure to contaminants. Perception of drinking water safety influences water consumption, exposure, and health risk. A community‐based participatory approach and probabilistic Bayesian methods were applied to integrate risk perception in a holistic human health risk assessment. Tap water arsenic concentrations and risk perception data were collected from two Saskatchewan communities. Drinking water health standards were exceeded in 67% (51/76) of households in Rural Municipality #184 (RM184) and 56% (25/45) in Beardy's and Okemasis First Nation (BOFN). There was no association between the presence of a health exceedance and risk perception. Households in RM184 or with an annual income >$50,000 were most likely to have in‐house water treatment. The probability of consuming tap water perceived as safe (92%) or not safe (0%) suggested that households in RM184 were unlikely to drink water perceived as not safe. The probability of drinking tap water perceived as safe (77%) or as not safe (11%) suggested households in BOFN contradicted their perception and consumed water perceived as unsafe. Integration of risk perception lowered the adult incremental lifetime cancer risk by 3% to 1.3 × 10^?5 (95% CI 8.4 × 10^?8 to 9.0 × 10^?5) for RM184 and by 8.9 × 10^?6 (95% CI 2.2 × 10^?7 to 5.9 × 10^?5) for BOFN. Probability of exposure to arsenic concentrations >1:100,000, negligible cancer risk, was 23% for RM184 and 22% for BOFN.     

A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing

In this article the development and parameterization of a quantitative assessment is described that estimates the amount of TSE infectivity that is present in a whole animal carcass (bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE] for cattle and classical/atypical scrapie for sheep and lambs) and the amounts that subsequently fall to the floor during processing at facilities that handle specified risk material (SRM). BSE in cattle was found to contain the most oral doses, with a mean of 9864 BO ID₅₀s (310, 38840) in a whole carcass compared to a mean of 1851 OO ID₅₀s (600, 4070) and 614 OO ID₅₀s (155, 1509) for a sheep infected with classical and atypical scrapie, respectively. Lambs contained the least infectivity with a mean of 251 OO ID₅₀s (83, 548) for classical scrapie and 1 OO ID₅₀s (0.2, 2) for atypical scrapie. The highest amounts of infectivity falling to the floor and entering the drains from slaughtering a whole carcass at SRM facilities were found to be from cattle infected with BSE at rendering and large incineration facilities with 7.4 BO ID₅₀s (0.1, 29), intermediate plants and small incinerators with a mean of 4.5 BO ID₅₀s (0.1, 18), and collection centers, 3.6 BO ID₅₀s (0.1, 14). The lowest amounts entering drains are from lambs infected with classical and atypical scrapie at intermediate plants and atypical scrapie at collection centers with a mean of 3 × 10^?7 OO ID₅₀s (2 × 10^?8, 1 × 10^?6) per carcass. The results of this model provide key inputs for the model in the companion paper published here.     

Outbreak-Based Giardia Dose–Response Model Using Bayesian Hierarchical Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis

Giardia is a zoonotic gastrointestinal parasite responsible for a substantial global public health burden, and quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) is often used to forecast and manage this burden. QMRA requires dose–response models to extrapolate available dose–response data, but the existing model for Giardia ignores valuable dose–response information, particularly data from several well-documented waterborne outbreaks of giardiasis. The current study updates Giardia dose–response modeling by synthesizing all available data from outbreaks and experimental studies using a Bayesian random effects dose–response model. For outbreaks, mean doses (D) and the degree of spatial and temporal aggregation among cysts were estimated using exposure assessment implemented via two-dimensional Monte Carlo simulation, while potential overreporting of outbreak cases was handled using published overreporting factors and censored binomial regression. Parameter estimation was by Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation and indicated that a typical exponential dose–response parameter for Giardia is r = 1.6 × 10⁻² [3.7 × 10⁻³, 6.2 × 10⁻²] (posterior median [95% credible interval]), while a typical morbidity ratio is m = 3.8 × 10⁻¹ [2.3 × 10⁻¹, 5.5 × 10⁻¹]. Corresponding (logistic-scale) variance components were σ_r = 5.2 × 10⁻¹ [1.1 × 10⁻¹, 9.6 × 10⁻¹] and σ_m = 9.3 × 10⁻¹ [7.0 × 10⁻², 2.8 × 10⁰], indicating substantial variation in the Giardia dose–response relationship. Compared to the existing Giardia dose–response model, the current study provides more representative estimation of uncertainty in r and novel quantification of its natural variability. Several options for incorporating variability in r (and m) into QMRA predictions are discussed, including incorporation via Monte Carlo simulation as well as evaluation of the current study's model using the approximate beta-Poisson.     

How to Model a Negligible Probability Under the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement?

Since the 1997 EC – Hormones decision, World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Panels have wrestled with the question of what constitutes a negligible risk under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. More recently, the 2010 WTO Australia – Apples Panel focused considerable attention on the appropriate quantitative model for a negligible probability in a risk assessment. The 2006 Australian Import Risk Analysis for Apples from New Zealand translated narrative probability statements into quantitative ranges. The uncertainty about a “negligible” probability was characterized as a uniform distribution with a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 10^?6. The Australia – Apples Panel found that the use of this distribution would tend to overestimate the likelihood of “negligible” events and indicated that a triangular distribution with a most probable value of zero and a maximum value of 10^?6 would correct the bias. The Panel observed that the midpoint of the uniform distribution is 5 × 10^?7 but did not consider that the triangular distribution has an expected value of 3.3 × 10^?7. Therefore, if this triangular distribution is the appropriate correction, the magnitude of the bias found by the Panel appears modest. The Panel's detailed critique of the Australian risk assessment, and the conclusions of the WTO Appellate Body about the materiality of flaws found by the Panel, may have important implications for the standard of review for risk assessments under the WTO SPS Agreement.     

A Quantitative Risk Assessment for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Japan

A predictive case‐cohort model was applied to Japanese data to analyze the interaction between challenge and stability factors for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) for the period 1985–2020. BSE risk in cattle was estimated as the expected number of detectable cases per year. The model was comprised of a stochastic spreadsheet calculation model with the following inputs: (1) the origin and quantity of live cattle and meat and bone meal imported into Japan, (2) the age distribution of native cattle, and (3) the estimated annual basic reproduction ratio (R₀) for BSE. The estimated probability of having zero detectable cases in Japan in 2015 was 0.90 (95% CI 0.83–0.95). The corresponding value for 2020 was 0.99 (95% CI 0.98–0.99). The model predicted that detectable cases may occur in Japan beyond 2015 because of the assumption that continued transmission was permitted to occur (albeit at a very low level) after the 2001 ban on the importation and domestic use of all processed animal proteins for the production of animal feed and for fertilizer. These results reinforce the need for animal health authorities to monitor the efficacy of control measures so that the future course of the BSE epidemic in Japan can be predicted with greater certainty.     

A Case Study Evaluating the Risk of Infection from Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS‐CoV) in a Hospital Setting Through Bioaerosols

Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome, an emerging viral infection with a global case fatality rate of 35.5%, caused major outbreaks first in 2012 and 2015, though new cases are continuously reported around the world. Transmission is believed to mainly occur in healthcare settings through aerosolized particles. This study uses Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment to develop a generalizable model that can assist with interpreting reported outbreak data or predict risk of infection with or without the recommended strategies. The exposure scenario includes a single index patient emitting virus‐containing aerosols into the air by coughing, leading to short‐ and long‐range airborne exposures for other patients in the same room, nurses, healthcare workers, and family visitors. Aerosol transport modeling was coupled with Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the risk of MERS illness for the exposed population. Results from a typical scenario show the daily mean risk of infection to be the highest for the nurses and healthcare workers (8.49 × 10^?4 and 7.91 × 10^?4, respectively), and the lowest for family visitors and patients staying in the same room (3.12 × 10^?4 and 1.29 × 10^?4, respectively). Sensitivity analysis indicates that more than 90% of the uncertainty in the risk characterization is due to the viral concentration in saliva. Assessment of risk interventions showed that respiratory masks were found to have a greater effect in reducing the risks for all the groups evaluated (>90% risk reduction), while increasing the air exchange was effective for the other patients in the same room only (up to 58% risk reduction).     

A Quantitative Assessment of the Risk for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Introduction into Spain via Legal Trade of Live Poultry

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is considered one of the most important diseases of poultry. During the last 9 years, HPAI epidemics have been reported in Asia, the Americas, Africa, and in 18 countries of the European Union (EU). For that reason, it is possible that the risk for HPAI virus (HPAIV) introduction into Spain may have recently increased. Because of the EU free‐trade policy and because legal trade of live poultry was considered an important route for HPAI spread in certain regions of the world, there are fears that Spain may become HPAIV‐infected as a consequence of the legal introduction of live poultry. However, no quantitative assessment of the risk for HPAIV introduction into Spain or into any other EU member state via the trade of poultry has been published in the peer‐reviewed literature. This article presents the results of the first quantitative assessment of the risk for HPAIV introduction into a free country via legal trade of live poultry, along with estimates of the geographical variation of the risk and of the relative contribution of exporting countries and susceptible poultry species to the risk. The annual mean risk for HPAI introduction into Spain was estimated to be as low as 1.36 × 10⁻³, suggesting that under prevailing conditions, introduction of HPAIV into Spain through the trade of live poultry is unlikely to occur. Moreover, these results support the hypothesis that legal trade of live poultry does not impose a significant risk for the spread of HPAI into EU member states.     

A Bayesian Belief Network Model Assessing the Risk to Wastewater Workers of Contracting Ebola Virus Disease During an Outbreak

During an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD), hospitals’ connections to municipal wastewater systems may provide a path for patient waste bearing infectious viral particles to pass from the hospital into the wastewater treatment system, potentially posing risks to sewer and wastewater workers. To quantify these risks, we developed a Bayesian belief network model incorporating data on virus behavior and survival along with structural characteristics of hospitals and wastewater treatment systems. We applied the model to assess risks under several different scenarios of workers’ exposure to wastewater for a wastewater system typical of a mid‐sized U.S. city. The model calculates a median daily risk of developing EVD of approximately 6.1×10⁻¹² (90% confidence interval: 1.0×10⁻¹² to 5.4×10⁻⁹; mean 1.8×10⁻⁶) when no prior exposure conditions are specified. Under a worst‐case scenario in which a worker stationed in the sewer adjacent to the hospital accidentally ingests several drops (0.35 mL) of wastewater, median risk is 5.8×10⁻⁴ (90% CI: 8.8×10⁻⁷ to 9.5×10⁻²; mean 3.2×10⁻²) . Disinfection of patient waste with peracetic acid for 15 minutes prior to flushing decreases the estimated median risk to 3.8×10⁻⁷ (90% CI: 4.1×10⁻⁹ to 8.6×10⁻⁵; mean 2.9×10⁻⁵). The results suggest that requiring hospitals to disinfect EVD patient waste prior to flushing may be advisable. The modeling framework can provide insight into managing patient waste during future outbreaks of highly virulent infectious pathogens.     

The Cancer Risk Associated with Residential Exposure to Soil Containing Radioactive Coal Combustion Residuals

Coal combustion residuals (CCRs) are composed of various constituents, including radioactive materials. The objective of this study was to utilize methodology on radionuclide risk assessment from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to estimate the potential cancer risks associated with residential exposure to CCR‐containing soil. We evaluated potential radionuclide exposure via soil ingestion, inhalation of soil particulates, and external exposure to ionizing radiation using published CCR radioactivity values for ²³²Th, ²²⁸Ra, ²³⁸U, and ²²⁶Ra from the Appalachia, Illinois, and Powder River coal basins. Mean and upper‐bound cancer risks were estimated individually for each radionuclide, exposure pathway, and coal basin. For each radionuclide at each coal basin, external exposure to ionizing radiation contributed the greatest to the overall risk estimate, followed by incidental ingestion of soil and inhalation of soil particulates. The mean cancer risks by route of exposure were 2.01 × 10⁻⁶ (ingestion), 6.80 × 10⁻⁹ (inhalation), and 3.66 × 10⁻⁵ (external), while the upper bound cancer risks were 3.70 × 10⁻⁶ (ingestion), 1.18 × 10⁻⁸ (inhalation), and 6.15 × 10⁻⁵ (external), using summed radionuclide‐specific data from all locations. The upper bound cancer risk from all routes of exposure was 6.52 × 10⁻⁵. These estimated cancer risks were within the EPA's acceptable cancer risk range of 1 × 10⁻⁶ to 1 × 10⁻⁴. If the CCR radioactivity values used in this analysis are generally representative of CCR waste streams, then our findings suggest that CCRs would not be expected to pose a significant radiological risk to residents living in areas where contact with CCR‐containing soils might occur.     

A Quantitative Release Assessment for the Noncommercial Movement of Companion Animals: Risk of Rabies Reintroduction to the United Kingdom

In 2004, the European Union (EU) implemented a pet movement policy (referred to here as the EUPMP) under EU regulation 998/2003. The United Kingdom (UK) was granted a temporary derogation from the policy until December 2011 and instead has in place its own Pet Movement Policy (Pet Travel Scheme (PETS)). A quantitative risk assessment (QRA) was developed to estimate the risk of rabies introduction to the UK under both schemes to quantify any change in the risk of rabies introduction should the UK harmonize with the EU policy. Assuming 100 % compliance with the regulations, moving to the EUPMP was predicted to increase the annual risk of rabies introduction to the UK by approximately 60‐fold, from 7.79 × 10^?5 (5.90 × 10^?5, 1.06 × 10^?4) under the current scheme to 4.79 × 10^?3 (4.05 × 10^?3, 5.65 × 10^?3) under the EUPMP. This corresponds to a decrease from 13,272 (9,408, 16,940) to 211 (177, 247) years between rabies introductions. The risks associated with both the schemes were predicted to increase when less than 100 % compliance was assumed, with the current scheme of PETS and quarantine being shown to be particularly sensitive to noncompliance. The results of this risk assessment, along with other evidence, formed a scientific evidence base to inform policy decision with respect to companion animal movement.     

Quantitative Risk Estimation for a Legionella pneumophila Infection Due to Whirlpool Use

Quantitative microbiological risk assessment was used to quantify the risk associated with the exposure to Legionella pneumophila in a whirlpool. Conceptually, air bubbles ascend to the surface, intercepting Legionella from the traversed water. At the surface the bubble bursts into dominantly noninhalable jet drops and inhalable film drops. Assuming that film drops carry half of the intercepted Legionella, a total of four (95% interval: 1–9) and 4.5×10⁴ (4.4×10⁴ – 4.7×10⁴) cfu/min were estimated to be aerosolized for concentrations of 1 and 1,000 legionellas per liter, respectively. Using a dose‐response model for guinea pigs to represent humans, infection risks for active whirlpool use with 100 cfu/L water for 15 minutes were 0.29 (～0.11–0.48) for susceptible males and 0.22 (～0.06–0.42) for susceptible females. A L. pneumophila concentration of ≥1,000 cfu/L water was estimated to nearly always cause an infection (mean: 0.95; 95% interval: 0.9–～1). Estimated infection risks were time‐dependent, ranging from 0.02 (0–0.11) for 1‐minute exposures to 0.93 (0.86–0.97) for 2‐hour exposures when the L. pneumophila concentration was 100 cfu/L water. Pool water in Dutch bathing establishments should contain <100 cfu Legionella/L water. This study suggests that stricter provisions might be required to assure adequate public health protection.     

Validation of Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment Using Epidemiological Data from Outbreaks of Waterborne Gastrointestinal Disease

The assumptions underlying quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) are simple and biologically plausible, but QMRA predictions have never been validated for many pathogens. The objective of this study was to validate QMRA predictions against epidemiological measurements from outbreaks of waterborne gastrointestinal disease. I screened 2,000 papers and identified 12 outbreaks with the necessary data: disease rates measured using epidemiological methods and pathogen concentrations measured in the source water. Eight of the 12 outbreaks were caused by Cryptosporidium, three by Giardia, and one by norovirus. Disease rates varied from 5.5 × 10^?6 to 1.1 × 10^?2 cases/person‐day, and reported pathogen concentrations varied from 1.2 × 10^?4 to 8.6 × 10² per liter. I used these concentrations with single‐hit dose–response models for all three pathogens to conduct QMRA, producing both point and interval predictions of disease rates for each outbreak. Comparison of QMRA predictions to epidemiological measurements showed good agreement; interval predictions contained measured disease rates for 9 of 12 outbreaks, with point predictions off by factors of 1.0–120 (median = 4.8). Furthermore, 11 outbreaks occurred at mean doses of less than 1 pathogen per exposure. Measured disease rates for these outbreaks were clearly consistent with a single‐hit model, and not with a “two‐hit” threshold model. These results demonstrate the validity of QMRA for predicting disease rates due to Cryptosporidium and Giardia.     

Lung Cancer Risk from Radon in Marcellus Shale Gas in Northeast U.S. Homes

The amount of radon in natural gas varies with its source. Little has been published about the radon from shale gas to date, making estimates of its impact on radon‐induced lung cancer speculative. We measured radon in natural gas pipelines carrying gas from the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Radon concentrations ranged from 1,520 to 2,750 Bq/m³ (41–74 pCi/L), and the throughput‐weighted average was 1,983 Bq/m³ (54 pCi/L). Potential radon exposure due to the use of Marcellus Shale gas for cooking and space heating using vent‐free heaters or gas ranges in northeastern U.S. homes and apartments was assessed. Though the measured radon concentrations are higher than what has been previously reported, it is unlikely that exposure from natural gas cooking would exceed 1.2 Bq/m³ (<1% of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's action level). Using worst‐case assumptions, we estimate the excess lifetime (70 years) lung cancer risk associated with cooking to be 1.8×10^?4 (interval spanning 95% of simulation results: 8.5×10^?5, 3.4×10^?4). The risk profile for supplemental heating with unvented gas appliances is similar. Individuals using unvented gas appliances to provide primary heating may face lifetime risks as high as 3.9×10^?3. Under current housing stock and gas consumption assumptions, expected levels of residential radon exposure due to unvented combustion of Marcellus Shale natural gas in the Northeast United States do not result in a detectable change in the lung cancer death rates.     

Comparative Potency Method for Cancer Risk Assessment: Application to Diesel Particulate Emissions1

An estimation of the human lung cancer “unit risk” from diesel engine particulate emissions has been made using a comparative potency approach. This approach involves evaluating the tumorigenic and mutagenic potencies of the particulates from four diesel and one gasoline engine in relation to other combustion and pyrolysis products (coke oven, roofing tar, and cigarette smoke) that cause lung cancer in humans. The unit cancer risk is predicated on the linear nonthreshold extrapolation model and is the individual lifetime excess lung cancer risk from continuous exposure to 1 μg carcinogen per m³ inhaled air. The human lung cancer unit risks obtained from the epidemiologic data for coke oven workers, roofing tar applicators, and cigarette smokers were, respectively, 9.3 × 10^?4, 3.6 × 10^?4, and 2.2 × 10^?6 per μg particulate organics per m³ air. The comparative potencies of these three materials and the diesel and gasoline engine exhaust particulates (as organic extracts) were evaluated by in vivo tumorigenicity bioassays involving skin initiation and skin carcinogenicity in SENCAR mice and by the in vitro bioassays that proved suitable for this analysis: Ames Salmonella microsome bioassay, L5178Y mouse lymphoma cell mutagenesis bioassay, and sister chromatid exchange bioassay in Chinese hamster ovary cells. The relative potencies of the coke oven, roofing tar, and cigarette smoke emissions, as determined by the mouse skin initiation assay, were within a factor of 2 of those determined using the epidemiologic data. The relative potencies, from the in vitro bioassays as compared to the human data, were similar for coke oven and roofing tar, but for the cigarette smoke condensate the in vitro tests predicted a higher relative potency. The mouse skin initiation bioassay was used to determine the unit lung cancer risk for the most potent of the diesel emissions. Based on comparisons with coke oven, roofing tar, and cigarette smoke, the unit cancer risk averaged 4.4 × 10^?4. The unit lung cancer risks for the other, less potent motor-vehicle emissions were determined from their comparative potencies relative to the most potent diesel using three in vitro bioassays. There was a high correlation between the in vitro and in vivo bioassays in their responses to the engine exhaust particulate extracts. The unit lung cancer risk per μg particulates per m³ for the automotive diesel and gasoline exhaust particulates ranged from 0.20 × 10^?4 to 0.60 × 10^?4; that for the heavy-duty diesel engine was 0.02 × 10^?4. These unit risks provide the basis for a future assessment of human lung cancer risks when combined with human population exposure to automotive emissions.     

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Low- or Zero-Prevalence Countries: The Example of Norway

A predictive case-cohort model is applied to Norwegian data to analyze the interaction between challenge and stability factors for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) during the period 1980-2010. For each year, the BSE risk in cattle is estimated as the expected number of cases. The age distribution of expected cases as well as the relative impact of different challenges is estimated. The model consists of a simple, transparent, and practical deterministic spreadsheet calculation model, in which the following country-specific inputs are entered: (i) annual imports of live cattle and meat and bone meal, (ii) age distribution of native cattle, and (iii) estimated annual basic reproduction ratio (R(0)) for BSE. Results for Norway indicate that the highest risk of BSE cases was in 1989, when a total BSE risk of 0.13 cases per year was expected. After that date, the year-to-year decrease in risk ranged between 3% and 47%, except for a secondary peak in 1994 at 0.06 cases per year. The primary peak was almost entirely (99%) attributable to the importation of 11 cattle from the United Kingdom between 1982 and 1986. The secondary peak, in 1994, originated mainly from the recycling of the U.K. imported cattle (92%). In 2006, the remaining risk was 0.0003 cases per year, or 0.001 per million cows per year, with a maximal age-specific incidence of 0.03 cases per million per year in 10-year-old cattle. Only 15% of the cases were expected in imported cattle. The probability of having zero cases in Norway in 2006 was estimated to be 99.97%. The model and results are compared to previous risk assessments of Norway by the EU.     

Probability of Exporting Infected Carcasses from Vaccinated Pigs Following a Foot‐and‐Mouth Disease Epidemic

Emergency vaccination is an effective control strategy for foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) epidemics in densely populated livestock areas, but results in a six‐month waiting period before exports can be resumed, incurring severe economic consequences for pig exporting countries. In the European Union, a one‐month waiting period has been discussed based on negative test results in a final screening. The objective of this study was to analyze the risk of exporting FMD‐infected pig carcasses from a vaccinated area: (1) directly after final screening and (2) after a six‐month waiting period. A risk model has been developed to estimate the probability that a processed carcass was derived from an FMD‐infected pig (P_carc). Key variables were herd prevalence (P_H), within‐herd prevalence (P_A), and the probability of detection at slaughter (P_SL). P_H and P_A were estimated using Bayesian inference under the assumption that, despite all negative test results, ≥1 infected pigs were present. Model calculations indicated that P_carc was on average 2.0 × 10^?5 directly after final screening, and 1.7 × 10^?5 after a six‐month waiting period. Therefore, the additional waiting time did not substantially reduce P_carc. The estimated values were worst‐case scenarios because only viraemic pigs pose a risk for disease transmission, while seropositive pigs do not. The risk of exporting FMD via pig carcasses from a vaccinated area can further be reduced by heat treatment of pork and/or by excluding high‐risk pork products from export.     

Evaluation of the Influenza Risk Reduction from Antimicrobial Spray Application on Porous Surfaces

Antimicrobial spray products are used by millions of people around the world for cleaning and disinfection of commonly touched surfaces. Influenza A is a pathogen of major concern, leading to up to 49,000 deaths and 114,000 hospitalizations per year in the United States alone. One of the recognized routes of transmission for influenza A is by transfer of viruses from surfaces to hands and subsequently to mucous membranes. Therefore, routine cleaning and disinfection of surfaces is an important part of the environmental management of influenza A. While the emphasis is generally on spraying hard surfaces and laundering cloth and linens with high temperature machine drying, not all surfaces can be treated in this manner. The quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) approach was used to develop a stochastic risk model for estimating the risk of infection from indirect contact with porous fomite with and without surface treatment with an antimicrobial spray. The data collected from laboratory analysis combined with the risk model show that influenza A infection risk can be lowered by four logs after using an antimicrobial spray on a porous surface. Median risk associated with a single touch to a contaminated fabric was estimated to be 1.25 × 10⁻⁴ for the untreated surface, and 3.6 × 10⁻⁸ for the treated surface as a base case assumption. This single touch scenario was used to develop a generalizable model for estimating risks and comparing scenarios with and without treatment to more realistic multiple touch scenarios over time periods and with contact rates previously reported in the literature. The results of this study and understanding of product efficacy on risk reduction inform and broaden the range of risk management strategies for influenza A by demonstrating effective risk reduction associated with treating nonporous fomites that cannot be laundered at high temperatures.     

Characterization of Historical Methane Occurrence Frequencies from U.S. Underground Natural Gas Storage Facilities with Implications for Risk Management,Operations, and Regulatory Policy

Defining a baseline for the frequency of occurrences at underground natural gas storage facilities is critical to maintaining safe operation and to the development of appropriate risk management plans and regulatory approaches. Currently used frequency-estimation methods are reviewed and broadened in this article to include critical factors of cause, severity, and uncertainty that contribute to risk. A Bayesian probabilistic analysis characterizes the aleatoric historical occurrence frequencies given imperfect sampling. Frequencies for the three main storage facility types in the United States (depleted oil-and-gas field storage, aquifer storage, solution-mined salt cavern storage) are generally on the order of 3 to 9 × 10^–2 occurrences, of all causes (surface, well integrity, subsurface integrity) and severities (nuisance, serious, catastrophic), per facility-year. Loss of well integrity is associated with many, but not all, occurrences either within the subsurface or from there up to the surface. The probability of one serious or catastrophic leakage occurrence to the ground surface within the next 10 years, assuming constant number of facilities, is approximately 0.1–0.3% for any facility type. Storage operators and industry regulators can use occurrence frequencies, their associated probabilities and uncertainties, and forecasts of severity magnitudes to better prioritize resources, establish a baseline against which progress toward achieving a reduction target could be measured, and develop more effective mitigation/monitoring/reduction programs in a risk management plan.     

Risk of Fetal Mortality After Exposure to Listeria monocytogenes Based on Dose-Response Data from Pregnant Guinea Pigs and Primates

One‐third of the annual cases of listeriosis in the United States occur during pregnancy and can lead to miscarriage or stillbirth, premature delivery, or infection of the newborn. Previous risk assessments completed by the Food and Drug Administration/the Food Safety Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture/the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (FDA/USDA/CDC)^{( 1 )} and Food and Agricultural Organization/the World Health Organization (FAO/WHO)^{( 2 )} were based on dose‐response data from mice. Recent animal studies using nonhuman primates^{( 3 , 4 )} and guinea pigs^{( 5 )} have both estimated LD₅₀s of approximately 10⁷ Listeria monocytogenes colony forming units (cfu). The FAO/WHO^{( 2 )} estimated a human LD₅₀ of 1.9 × 10⁶ cfu based on data from a pregnant woman consuming contaminated soft cheese. We reevaluated risk based on dose‐response curves from pregnant rhesus monkeys and guinea pigs. Using standard risk assessment methodology including hazard identification, exposure assessment, hazard characterization, and risk characterization, risk was calculated based on the new dose‐response information. To compare models, we looked at mortality rate per serving at predicted doses ranging from 10^?4 to 10¹² L. monocytogenes cfu. Based on a serving of 10⁶ L. monocytogenes cfu, the primate model predicts a death rate of 5.9 × 10^?1 compared to the FDA/USDA/CDC (fig. IV‐12)^{( 1 )} predicted rate of 1.3 × 10^?7. Based on the guinea pig and primate models, the mortality rate calculated by the FDA/USDA/CDC^{( 1 )} is underestimated for this susceptible population.