Leverage and Default in Binomial Economies: A Complete Characterization

Our paper provides a complete characterization of leverage and default in binomial economies with financial assets serving as collateral. Our Binomial No‐Default Theorem states that any equilibrium is equivalent (in real allocations and prices) to another equilibrium in which there is no default. Thus actual default is irrelevant, though the potential for default drives the equilibrium and limits borrowing. This result is valid with arbitrary preferences and endowments, contingent or noncontingent promises, many assets and consumption goods, production, and multiple periods. We also show that only no‐default equilibria would be selected if there were the slightest cost of using collateral or handling default. Our Binomial Leverage Theorem shows that equilibrium Loan to Value (LTV) for noncontingent debt contracts is the ratio of the worst‐case return of the asset to the riskless gross rate of interest. In binomial economies, leverage is determined by down risk and not by volatility.     

Equilibrium in Continuous‐Time Financial Markets: Endogenously Dynamically Complete Markets

We prove existence of equilibrium in a continuous‐time securities market in which the securities are potentially dynamically complete: the number of securities is at least one more than the number of independent sources of uncertainty. We prove that dynamic completeness of the candidate equilibrium price process follows from mild exogenous assumptions on the economic primitives of the model. Our result is universal, rather than generic: dynamic completeness of the candidate equilibrium price process and existence of equilibrium follow from the way information is revealed in a Brownian filtration, and from a mild exogenous nondegeneracy condition on the terminal security dividends. The nondegeneracy condition, which requires that finding one point at which a determinant of a Jacobian matrix of dividends is nonzero, is very easy to check. We find that the equilibrium prices, consumptions, and trading strategies are well‐behaved functions of the stochastic process describing the evolution of information. We prove that equilibria of discrete approximations converge to equilibria of the continuous‐time economy.     

COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS IN A MONETARY ECONOMY

This paper reviews the role of collateral constraints in transforming small monetary shocks into large persistent output fluctuations. We do this by introducing money in the heterogeneous‐agent real economy of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Money enters in a cash‐in‐advance constraint and money supply is managed via open‐market operations. We find that a monetary shock generates persistent movements in aggregate output, the amplitude of which depends upon whether or not debt contracts are indexed. If only nominal contracts are traded, money shocks can trigger large output fluctuations. In this case a money expansion triggers a boom, whereas money contractions generate recessions. In contrast, if contracts are indexed then amplification is not only smaller; it can also generate the reverse results. When the possibility of default and renegotiation is considered, the model can generate asymmetric business cycles with recessions milder than booms. Finally, monetary shocks generate a highly persistent dampening cycle rather than a smoothly declining deviation. (JEL: E32, E43, E44, E52)     

Endogenous Completeness of Diffusion Driven Equilibrium Markets

We study the existence of dynamic equilibria with endogenously complete markets in continuous‐time, heterogenous agents economies driven by diffusion processes. Our main results show that under appropriate conditions on the transition density of the state variables, market completeness can be deduced from the primitives of the economy. In particular, we prove that a sufficient condition for market completeness is that the volatility of dividends be invertible and provide higher order conditions that apply when this condition fails as is the case in the presence of fixed income securities. In contrast to previous research, our formulation does not require that securities pay terminal dividends, and thus allows for both finite and infinite horizon economies.     

Sovereign Cat Bonds and Infrastructure Project Financing

We examine the opportunities for using catastrophe‐linked securities (or equivalent forms of nondebt contingent capital) to reduce the total costs of funding infrastructure projects in emerging economies. Our objective is to elaborate on methods to reduce the necessity for unanticipated (emergency) project funding immediately after a natural disaster. We also place the existing explanations of sovereign‐level contingent capital into a catastrophic risk management framework. In doing so, we address the following questions. (1) Why might catastrophe‐linked securities be useful to a sovereign nation, over and above their usefulness for insurers and reinsurers? (2) Why are such financial instruments ideally suited for protecting infrastructure projects in emerging economies, under third‐party sponsorship, from low‐probability, high‐consequence events that occur as a result of natural disasters? (3) How can the willingness to pay of a sovereign government in an emerging economy (or its external project sponsor), who values timely completion of infrastructure projects, for such instruments be calculated? To supplement our treatment of these questions, we use a multilayer spreadsheet‐based model (in Microsoft Excel format) to calculate the overall cost reductions possible through the judicious use of catastrophe‐based financial tools. We also report on numerical comparative statics on the value of contingent‐capital financing to avoid project disruption based on varying costs of capital, probability and consequences of disasters, the feasibility of strategies for mid‐stage project abandonment, and the timing of capital commitments to the infrastructure investment. We use these results to identify high‐priority applications of catastrophe‐linked securities so that maximal protection can be realized if the total number of catastrophe instruments is initially limited. The article concludes with potential extensions to our model and opportunities for future research.     

A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default

We study, theoretically and quantitatively, the general equilibrium of an economy in which households smooth consumption by means of both a riskless asset and unsecured loans with the option to default. The default option resembles a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Competitive financial intermediaries offer a menu of loan sizes and interest rates wherein each loan makes zero profits. We prove the existence of a steady‐state equilibrium and characterize the circumstances under which a household defaults on its loans. We show that our model accounts for the main statistics regarding bankruptcy and unsecured credit while matching key macroeconomic aggregates, and the earnings and wealth distributions. We use this model to address the implications of a recent policy change that introduces a form of “means testing” for households contemplating a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. We find that this policy change yields large welfare gains.     

FINANCIAL FRAGILITY,LIQUIDITY, AND ASSET PRICES

We define a financial system to be fragile if small shocks have disproportionately large effects. In a model of financial intermediation, we show that small shocks to the demand for liquidity cause either high asset‐price volatility or bank defaults or both. Furthermore, as the liquidity shocks become vanishingly small, the asset‐price volatility is bounded away from zero. In the limit economy, with no shocks, there are many equilibria. However, if banks face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, then the only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of small aggregate risk involve stochastic consumption as well as volatile asset, prices. (JEL: D5, D8, G2)     

Approximate versus Exact Equilibria in Dynamic Economies

This paper develops theoretical foundations for an error analysis of approximate equilibria in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets. While there are several algorithms that compute prices and allocations for which agents' first‐order conditions are approximately satisfied (“approximate equilibria”), there are few results on how to interpret the errors in these candidate solutions and how to relate the computed allocations and prices to exact equilibrium allocations and prices. We give a simple example to illustrate that approximate equilibria might be very far from exact equilibria. We then interpret approximate equilibria as equilibria for close‐by economies; that is, for economies with close‐by individual endowments and preferences. We present an error analysis for two models that are commonly used in applications, an overlapping generations (OLG) model with stochastic production and an asset pricing model with infinitely lived agents. We provide sufficient conditions that ensure that approximate equilibria are close to exact equilibria of close‐by economies. Numerical examples illustrate the analysis.     

Solving the Feldstein–Horioka Puzzle With Financial Frictions

Unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model, long‐term average savings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries—a puzzle first identified by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). We quantitatively investigate the impact of two types of financial frictions on this correlation. One is limited enforcement, where contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties. The other is limited spanning, where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds. We find that the calibrated model with both frictions produces a savings–investment correlation and a volume of capital flows close to the data. To solve the puzzle, the limited enforcement friction needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the data, and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to the observed level. When combined, the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict capital flows and thereby solve the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle.     

Bubbles and Self‐Enforcing Debt

We characterize equilibria with endogenous debt constraints for a general equilibrium economy with limited commitment in which the only consequence of default is losing the ability to borrow in future periods. First, we show that equilibrium debt limits must satisfy a simple condition that allows agents to exactly roll over existing debt period by period. Second, we provide an equivalence result, whereby the resulting set of equilibrium allocations with self‐enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with unbacked public debt or rational bubbles. In contrast to the classic result by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), positive levels of debt are sustainable in our environment because the interest rate is sufficiently low to provide repayment incentives.     

重随机泊松违约概率下库存商品融资业务贷款价值比率研究

确定合适的质押商品贷款价值比率能够使银行有效缓释库存商品融资业务的信用风险。沿着简化式思路,本文假定借款企业违约事件外生并服从重随机泊松过程,建立了一个有关贷款价值比率的模型。在模型中,本文综合考虑了银行的风险偏好,质押商品的预期收益率和价格波动率,贷款周期和盯市频率等因素的影响,为银行在保持风险容忍水平一致的情况下确定特定库存商品融资业务的相应贷款价值比率提供了科学依据。     

中国影子银行违约风险和防范机制研究——来自上市公司委托贷款数据的经验证据

本文运用中国上市公司披露的委托贷款公告数据,实证研究了影子银行的违约风险及其防范机制。数据显示,我国委托贷款的整体违约率为10.09%,远高于同期银行业金融机构的不良贷款率。进一步研究发现,与影子银行风险受信息因素影响的直觉一致,抵押条款和借贷距离会显著影响委托贷款违约率:其一,从抵押视角来看,抵押条款和贷款违约率显著正相关,这表明,为了防范事后的道德风险问题,贷款者会要求借款者提供抵押;其二,从借贷距离视角看,与近距离借贷(或同省借贷)相比,远距离借贷(或异省借贷)的违约风险相对较高,这揭示出,借贷距离越远,贷款者越难对借款者进行甄别和监督,从而推高了借款企业的违约概率。本文研究不仅为我国委托贷款这一影子银行机制的风险状况提供了直接的经验证据,而且对影子银行参与者如何有效防范风险和相关政府部门加强监管具有重要的借鉴意义。     

Information in Securities Markets: Kyle Meets Glosten and Milgrom

This paper analyzes models of securities markets with a single strategic informed trader and competitive market makers. In one version, uninformed trades arrive as a Brownian motion and market makers see only the order imbalance, as in Kyle (1985). In the other version, uninformed trades arrive as a Poisson process and market makers see individual trades. This is similar to the Glosten–Milgrom (1985) model, except that we allow the informed trader to optimize his times of trading. We show there is an equilibrium in the Glosten–Milgrom‐type model in which the informed trader plays a mixed strategy (a point process with stochastic intensity). In this equilibrium, informed and uninformed trades arrive probabilistically, as Glosten and Milgrom assume. We study a sequence of such markets in which uninformed trades become smaller and arrive more frequently, approximating a Brownian motion. We show that the equilibria of the Glosten–Milgrom model converge to the equilibrium of the Kyle model.     

Optimal Dynamic Upgrading in Revenue Management

We consider a revenue management problem involving a two compartment aircraft flying a single leg, with no cancellations or over‐booking. We apply the practice of transforming a choice revenue management model into an independent demand model. Within this assumed independent model, there are two sets of demands, business and economy, each with multiple fare class products. A business passenger can only be accepted into business. An economy passenger can be accepted into economy or upgraded into business. We define a two‐dimensional dynamic program (DP) and show that the value function is sub‐modular and concave in seat availability in the two compartments. Thus the bid prices are non‐decreasing with respect to these state variables. We use this result to propose an exact algorithm to solve the DP. Our numerical investigation suggests that in contrast to standard backward induction, our method could be included in production revenue management systems. Further, when the economy compartment is capacity constrained, we observe a substantial monetary benefit from optimal dynamic upgrading compared to the static upgrading procedures currently used in practice.     

KNOWING THE RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT PLACE: POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

We use a political economy model of Schumpeterian growth with entry to investigate how an incumbent politician can strategically use the level of red tape to acquire incumbency advantage. By setting sufficiently high red tape, the politician induces the incumbent firm in the intermediate sector to invest in political connections, which are valued also by voters, who recognize that bureaucratic costs can be reduced by connected firms. Within this framework, we study the Markov perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated game among politicians, firms, and voters, and show that all equilibria are characterized by investments in political connections and the re‐election of the incumbent politician. Political connections may prevent entry of advanced competitors and cause the economy to lag behind the technological frontier. Our model provides a possible explanation for the persistence of inefficient democracies and political barriers to technology development, where these reflect shared rather than conflicting interests.     

A General Formula for Valuing Defaultable Securities

Previous research has shown that under a suitable no‐jump condition, the price of a defaultable security is equal to its risk‐neutral expected discounted cash flows if a modified discount rate is introduced to account for the possibility of default. Below, we generalize this result by demonstrating that one can always value defaultable claims using expected risk‐adjusted discounting provided that the expectation is taken under a slightly modified probability measure. This new probability measure puts zero probability on paths where default occurs prior to the maturity, and is thus only absolutely continuous with respect to the risk‐neutral probability measure. After establishing the general result and discussing its relation with the existing literature, we investigate several examples for which the no‐jump condition fails. Each example illustrates the power of our general formula by providing simple analytic solutions for the prices of defaultable securities.     

Competition in Financial Innovation

This paper examines the incentives offered by frictionless markets to innovate asset‐backed securities by owners who maximize the assets' values. Assuming identical preferences across investors with heterogeneous risk‐sharing needs, we characterize economies in which competition provides insufficient incentives to innovate so that, in equilibrium, financial markets are incomplete in all (pure strategy) equilibria, even when innovation is essentially costless. Thus, value maximization does not generally result in complete markets.     

Corporate governance and accounting irregularities: Canadian evidence

This study examines the extent to which corporate governance acts as an efficient means of protecting investors against accounting irregularities. It is grounded in the literatures on public enforcement of securities laws by market authorities, governance, and fraudulent financial statements. A unique feature of the Canadian tracking and enforcement system for reporting issuers in default is used to refine the definitions of accounting irregularities or fraudulent financial statements used in other studies. We test and find that the governance mechanisms of firms found in default of financial reporting regulations during the first 5 years of existence of the Canadian system are weak compared to a sample of no-default firms. For instance, they have fewer independent and financial expert directors on their boards and audit committees, are more prone to have recently changed auditor and to having their CEO as chair of the board. They also appear to fulfill their financing requirements through private rather than public funds, which is consistent with the fact that default firms are less likely to be in a position to return to the public market to fulfill their needs. This study offers evidence relevant to policy makers and others who are concerned with the potential role of market authorities and governance in protecting investors against accounting irregularities.     

Self‐Control and the Theory of Consumption

To study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty, we define and characterize dynamic self‐control (DSC) preferences. DSC preferences are recursive and separable. In economies with DSC agents, equilibria exist but may be inefficient; in such equilibria, steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and increases in self‐control. Increasing the preference for commitment while keeping self‐control constant increases the equity premium. Removing nonbinding constraints changes equilibrium allocations and prices. Debt contracts can be sustained even if the only feasible punishment for default is the termination of the contract.     

Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.