Equilibrium Labor Turnover,Firm Growth,and Unemployment

This paper considers equilibrium quit turnover in a frictional labor market with costly hiring by firms, where large firms employ many workers and face both aggregate and firm specific productivity shocks. There is exogenous firm turnover as new (small) startups enter the market over time, while some existing firms fail and exit. Individual firm growth rates are disperse and evolve stochastically. The paper highlights how dynamic monopsony, where firms trade off lower wages against higher (endogenous) employee quit rates, yields excessive job‐to‐job quits. Such quits directly crowd out the reemployment prospects of the unemployed. With finite firm productivity states, stochastic equilibrium is fully tractable and can be computed using standard numerical techniques.     

Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy

This paper develops a new framework for examining the determinants of wage distributions that emphasizes within‐industry reallocation, labor market frictions, and differences in workforce composition across firms. More productive firms pay higher wages and exporting increases the wage paid by a firm with a given productivity. The opening of trade enhances wage inequality and can either raise or reduce unemployment. While wage inequality is higher in a trade equilibrium than in autarky, gradual trade liberalization first increases and later decreases inequality.     

An Empirical Model of Growth Through Product Innovation

Productivity differences across firms are large and persistent, but the evidence for worker reallocation as an important source of aggregate productivity growth is mixed. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the structure of an equilibrium model of growth through innovation designed to identify and quantify the role of resource reallocation in the growth process. The model is a version of the Schumpeterian theory of firm evolution and growth developed by Klette and Kortum (2004) extended to allow for firm heterogeneity. The data set is a panel of Danish firms that includes information on value added, employment, and wages. The model's fit is good. The estimated model implies that more productive firms in each cohort grow faster and consequently crowd out less productive firms in steady state. This selection effect accounts for 53% of aggregate growth in the estimated version of the model.     

Capacity Investment Under Responsive Pricing: Implications of Market Entry Choice*

We consider a manufacturer’s new market entry problem when it already has some established facility in its existing market. We consider two common market entry strategies: the export strategy and the foreign direct investment (FDI) strategy. In the export strategy the firm increases the capacity at its existing facility and subsequently allocates the output to the existing and the new market dynamically, depending on realized market conditions. The export strategy is a flexible strategy. In the FDI strategy, the firm invests in a dedicated capacity to serve the new market only. The FDI strategy is a (partially) dedicated strategy. We study these two strategies from a planning perspective, that is, how the firm’s strategy choice influences the optimal capacity levels. We find that the firm’s strategy choice can significantly impact the optimal capacity investment levels. We prove, for example, that the firm may enter the new market in the export strategy but not in the FDI strategy, even if the capacity investment cost is identical in the existing and the new market. In addition, we prove that the firm may invest a strictly higher capacity level in the export strategy than that in the FDI strategy. We also prove that new market entry in the FDI strategy may strictly decrease the firm’s supply to its existing market but this is not so in the export strategy, and hence policy makers should carefully consider the implications of trade regulations on firms’ market entry choices.     

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

We consider a dynamic Bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first‐order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game. In general, there is a trade‐off between productive efficiency, whereby the low‐cost firm serves the market in a given period, and high prices. We show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm, if the distribution of costs is log‐concave and firms are sufficiently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity: firms set the same price and share the market equally, regardless of their respective costs. When serial correlation of costs is imperfect, partial productive efficiency is optimal. For the case of two cost types, first‐best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks, but not otherwise. We present numerical examples of first‐best collusive schemes.     

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms

We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We define a new equilibrium concept that we call oblivious equilibrium, in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long‐run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. The great advantage of oblivious equilibria is that they are much easier to compute than are Markov perfect equilibria. Moreover, we show that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a certain “light‐tail” condition, then oblivious equilibria closely approximate Markov perfect equilibria. This theorem justifies using oblivious equilibria to analyze Markov perfect industry dynamics in Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style models with many firms.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

Market Orientation,Ownership Type,and E‐Business Assimilation: Evidence from Chinese Firms

While more and more firms have implemented e‐business in business operations, a better understanding of the factors that successfully drive the assimilation of e‐business will provide insights for firm executives and practitioners to develop effective strategies for e‐business. Different from previous studies that focus on individual‐level factors related to business executives and top management teams, this study examines how firm‐level strategic and cultural factors shape e‐business assimilation. Based on the strategy and marketing literature on market orientation and firm ownership, we developed a research model to describe how a firm's market orientation impacts e‐business assimilation. The model also describes the moderating effect of firm ownership type on the relationship between market orientation and e‐business assimilation. Based on data from 301 Chinese international trade firms, we found that two dimensions of market orientation (i.e., customer orientation, competitor orientation) had significant effects on e‐business assimilation. However, the third dimension, interfunctional coordination, was only partially significant. In addition, ownership type was a significant moderator of the effects of customer orientation and competitor orientation on e‐business assimilation, although ownership type was not a moderator of interfunctional coordination. Being one of the first studies of the impact of market orientation and firm ownership type on e‐business assimilation, we conclude with a discussion of the implications for future research and practice.     

Prices,Markups, and Trade Reform

This paper examines how prices, markups, and marginal costs respond to trade liberalization. We develop a framework to estimate markups from production data with multi‐product firms. This approach does not require assumptions on the market structure or demand curves faced by firms, nor assumptions on how firms allocate their inputs across products. We exploit quantity and price information to disentangle markups from quantity‐based productivity, and then compute marginal costs by dividing observed prices by the estimated markups. We use India's trade liberalization episode to examine how firms adjust these performance measures. Not surprisingly, we find that trade liberalization lowers factory‐gate prices and that output tariff declines have the expected pro‐competitive effects. However, the price declines are small relative to the declines in marginal costs, which fall predominantly because of the input tariff liberalization. The reason for this incomplete cost pass‐through to prices is that firms offset their reductions in marginal costs by raising markups. Our results demonstrate substantial heterogeneity and variability in markups across firms and time and suggest that producers benefited relative to consumers, at least immediately after the reforms.     

Does International Economic Integration Lead to a Cleaner Production in China?

In contrast to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, the Trade‐Up Hypothesis holds that international integration helps improve firms' environmental performance in developing countries. Using firm‐level data from Shanghai, this article examines how international linkages, in the form of foreign direct investment or international trade, affect firms' environmental compliance and performance. We find that firms with international linkage via ownership exhibit better compliance with environmental regulation and emit less pollution than firms with no international linkage. We also find that firms with international linkage via market exposure are more likely to exhibit better compliance with environmental regulation than firms with no international linkage, but find no evidence that the former emit less pollution than the latter. This provides a piece of empirical evidence for the Trade‐Up Hypothesis.     

Buy,Keep, or Sell: Economic Growth and the Market for Ideas

An endogenous growth model is developed where each period firms invest in researching and developing new ideas. An idea increases a firm's productivity. By how much depends on the technological propinquity between an idea and the firm's line of business. Ideas can be bought and sold on a market for patents. A firm can sell an idea that is not relevant to its business or buy one if it fails to innovate. The developed model is matched up with stylized facts about the market for patents in the United States. The analysis gauges how efficiency in the patent market affects growth.     

A Theory of the Firm with Non‐binding Employment Contracts

This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power vis‐a‐vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non‐binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers. The paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm's workforce. The analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions. The main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria: the profit maximizing and stationary equilibria. The unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient: it exhibits inefficient over‐employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers' reservation wage. It confirms earlier results derived by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b) in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities. In contrast, in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark‐up over the reservation wage.     

The Productivity Advantages of Large Cities: Distinguishing Agglomeration From Firm Selection

Firms are more productive, on average, in larger cities. Two main explanations have been offered: firm selection (larger cities toughen competition, allowing only the most productive to survive) and agglomeration economies (larger cities promote interactions that increase productivity), possibly reinforced by localized natural advantage. To distinguish between them, we nest a generalized version of a tractable firm selection model and a standard model of agglomeration. Stronger selection in larger cities left‐truncates the productivity distribution, whereas stronger agglomeration right‐shifts and dilates the distribution. Using this prediction, French establishment‐level data, and a new quantile approach, we show that firm selection cannot explain spatial productivity differences. This result holds across sectors, city size thresholds, establishment samples, and area definitions.     

Investment in Facility Changeover Flexibility for Early Entry into High‐Tech Markets

A model is introduced to analyze the manufacturing‐marketing interface for a firm in a high‐tech industry that produces a series of high‐volume products with short product life cycles on a single facility. The one‐time strategic decision regarding the firm's investment in changeover flexibility establishes the link between market opportunities and manufacturing capabilities. Specifically, the optimal changeover flexibility decision is determined in the context of the firm's market entry strategy for successive product generations, the changeover cost between generations, and the production efficiency of the facility. Moreover, the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation is obtained as a function of the firm's market entry strategy and manufacturing efficiency. Our findings provide insights linking internal manufacturing capabilities with external market forces for the high‐tech and high‐volume manufacturer of products with short life cycles. We show the impact of manufacturing efficiency and a firm's ability to benefit from volume‐based learning on the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation. The results demonstrate the benefits realized by a firm that works with its manufacturing equipment suppliers to develop more efficient and flexible technology. In addition, we explore how opportunities afforded by pioneer advantage enable a firm operating a less efficient facility to realize long term competitive advantage by deploying an earlier market entry strategy.     

How Does Centrality in Coopetition Networks Matter? An Empirical Investigation in the Mobile Telephone Industry

This research examines how a firm's position in a coopetitive network (formed through cooperation among firms within an industry) influences the extent of the firm's competitive aggressiveness and market performance. The authors collected data on the competitive and cooperative actions of firms in the mobile telephone industry from 2000 to 2006, using structured content analysis of news reports. The results show that the centrality of a firm in a coopetitive network contributes to the firm's competitive aggressiveness through increased volume and variety of competitive actions. Further, the more central a firm is in the network, the greater is its market performance. Firms that undertake more volume and variety of competitive actions improve their market performance. Overall, these results show that being in a central position in a coopetition network is quite advantageous for the firm.     

Contract Length as Risk Management When Labor is not Homogeneous

This paper examines the choice of contract length for workers who possess unique skills. Uncertainty, facing both the worker and the firm, creates an incentive to reallocate risk. The uncertainty arises from two sources: variation in the market value of the worker's human capital and fluctuation in the worker's physical production. Long‐term contracts are typically modeled as compensating wage differentials, or as a solution to the problem of asymmetric information. This paper develops a model proposing more complex behavior in the reallocation of risk between the contracting parties. The model shows that long‐term labor contracts are most likely to be observed when price uncertainty in the labor market exceeds the worker's productive uncertainty.     

Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

When firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first‐priority capacity. We model firms' investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm's invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms' investment. We also characterize the firms' and supplier's preference about the capacity type. While the non‐investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first‐priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm's access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier's preference depends on the trade‐off between over‐investment and flexibility.     

Compliance Strategies under Permits for Emissions

We characterize the trade‐offs among firms' compliance strategies in a market‐based program where a regulator interested in controlling emissions from a given set of sources auctions off a fixed number of emissions permits. We model a three‐stage game in which firms invest in emissions abatement, participate in a share auction for permits, and produce output. We develop a methodology for a profit‐maximizing firm to derive its marginal value function for permits and translate this value function into an optimal bidding strategy in the auction. We analyze two end‐product market scenarios independent demands and Cournot competition. In both scenarios we find that changing the number of available permits influences abatement to a lesser extent in a dirty industry than in a cleaner one. In addition, abatement levels taper off with increasing industry dirtiness levels. In the presence of competition, firms in a relatively clean industry can, in fact, benefit from a reduction in the number of available permits. Our findings are robust to changes in certain modeling assumptions.     

Industry Clockspeed and the Pace of New Product Development

Recent empirical literature describes an industry's clockspeed as a measure of the evolutionary life cycle, which captures the dynamic nature of the industry. Among other factors, the rate of new product development is found to be associated with an industry's clockspeed. Yet the notion of an industry clockspeed and the essential factors driving suitable decision making in this area have remained relatively unexplored. We develop a simple definition and a corresponding analytic model which explains the interdependent relationship between a firm's own new product development activities and an industry clockspeed. Results from the single firm model show the conditions under which particular firms have an incentive to accelerate their new product development activities. Moreover, we link the single firm's NPD clockspeed decisions to the industry level by creating appropriate metrics which characterize different types of industries. Examples from high‐tech industries such as the personal computer and aerospace industries are included to illustrate our findings. Our intention is not only to offer analytical insights into factors driving the clockspeed for these industries, but also to establish a fundamental structured decision making approach, thereby stimulating future research on this important topic.     

OPTIMAL TAXATION WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND AGGREGATE RETURNS TO SPECIALIZATION

In this article we explore the proposition that, in economies with imperfect competitive markets, the optimal capital income tax is negative and the optimal tax on firms' profits is confiscatory. We show that if the total factor productivity as well as the number of firms or varieties are endogenous instead of fixed, then the optimal fiscal policy can lead to different results. The government faces a trade‐off between the fixed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety. We find that the optimal fiscal policy depends on the relationship between the index of market power, the returns to specialization, and the government's ability to control entry. (JEL: H21, H30, E62)