Labour Market Regulation,Flexibility and Employment

ABSTRACT: Chronic unemployment and slow employment growth in some countries have led to calls for more labor-market “flexibility”. This paper defines the flexibility issue in terms of legally-mandated “severance”, a generalized employment cost linked to seniority. A mandated severance benefit can stand for a variety of programs including employer-provided employment guarantees, payments which must be made to laid-off workers, and compensation for wrongful discharge. Such a mandated cost can be seen as a payroll tax on the employer, raising the issue of tax incidence. Employers often take the view that labor costs are given and that mandated costs are simply add-ons to pre-existing cost levels. However, the literature on tax incidence suggests that a significant portion of “employer-paid” payroll taxes are shifted to labor in the form of lower wages. Such shifting should reduce the dis-employment effects attributed to severance. A model is provided of a firm upon which a severance mandate is imposed. Even at the micro level, the firm can shift some of the cost of severance to employees by lowering wages — although at the expense of higher turnover costs associated with increased quit rates. At the macro level, to the extent that firms reduce employment, there could be still further downward wage adjustments which would shift the severance burden to labor and mitigate the dis-employment effect. Ultimately, if the natural rate of unemployment is raised by severance mandates, the age-old question is raised of why wages do not fall in the face of labor surpluses. The true inflexibility to be explained, therefore, is in wage determination.     

Earnings‐related Severance Pay

Abstract. In an efficiency wage economy, lump‐sum severance pay from which shirkers can be excluded raises employment. However, severance payments are usually related to wages. It is shown that earnings‐related, mandated severance pay will have ambiguous employment effects if effort can be varied continuously. A substitution of the earnings‐related for the lump‐sum component reduces employment. Thus, the prevalent form of severance payments in OECD countries might have less advantageous employment effects than previously conjectured.     

THE JOINT DESIGN OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A FIRST PASS

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk‐averse workers, risk‐neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.     

Firing Costs,Efficiency Wages and Unemployment

This paper uses a Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage model to analyse the effects of firing costs on wages, employment, expected utility and profits. It considers that the probability of a non–shirker being fired depends on an exogenous shock which follows a two–state Markov process. It finds that higher severance payments give rise to lower wages, a lower unemployment rate, an increase in firms’ profits and a decrease in the utility of both workers and the unemployed. These conclusions derive from the finding that a greater probability of keeping one’s job, because of higher firing costs, raises the value of the job and reduces the worker’s incentives to behave opportunistically; this enables firms to reduce wages. Hence, if firms pay efficiency wages, a higher degree of labour market flexibility increases unemployment.     

On Labor Policies Affecting Investment in General Human Capital

Abstract. This paper develops a search model including workers’ investments in general human capital and investigates the effects of labor policies such as subsidies to human capital investment and unemployment benefits on the accumulation of human capital. It is shown that the equilibrium is not optimal because workers underinvest in human capital or firms open too many vacancies in comparison with the number of unemployed workers. Comparative statics show that an increase in subsidies to human capital investment adds to the number of vacancies per unemployed worker and to workers’ investments in human capital and that an increase in unemployment benefits decreases them. Finally, labor policies that remove the distortion are explored.     

Firm Size and Employment Dynamics: Estimations of Labor Demand Elasticities Using a Fractional Panel Probit Model

This paper examines the comprehensive discussion on the relationship between job creation, or destruction and firm size. More specifically, the study will determine whether the argument about small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) showing higher employment dynamics is confirmed or not. As such, the following work applies elasticities from a standard labor demand model derived from the estimations of fractional probit models for panel data, as process recommended in Papke and Wooldridge [2008; Journal of Econometrics 145(1–2): 121–133]. Elasticities are a useful measure of employment dynamics, if it is assumed that SMEs act on the same markets. The elasticity results from German establishment data illustrate that firm size does matter for the increase or decrease of employment. SMEs with less than 10 workers exhibit a higher employment dynamic, compared with other entities, at each respective percentile in the distribution of the wage share. Additionally, the outcome of the analysis weakly confirms the hypothesis that smaller firms are more restricted to capital markets, compared with large entities. The results also illustrate that firm size only explains one aspect of job creation and destruction. As stated in the well‐known Hicks–Marshall rules for elasticities of factor demand, the results illustrate that the reaction of labor demand on economic changes increases with the share of labor. Firms with a high share of labor also have larger elasticities, compared with firms with a strong use of capital. Both effects, the size effect and the effect of the proportion of labor, would blend in reality, and therefore, possibly lead to controversial results for the relationship between firm size and employment dynamics. In addition, a model with a negative relationship among both variables is too simple to explain the behavior of firms.     

Job Tenure,Labour Mobility and Wage Profiles

Abstract. The features and the length of the attachment of workers to firms represent a central aspect of the labour relationship. The length of service is an important determinant of wages and of non-pecuniary benefits; it affects internal mobility in the firm, and insulates workers with long job tenure from unemployment. In this paper it is argued that the traditional “spot” labour market Characterization is difficult to reconcile with the existence of long term employment relationships. A number of alternative theories which predict the existence of an employer-worker attachment proposed, and their implications discussed. The relevance of long term employment relationships is then tested using micro-data for the Italian manufacturing industry. An appropriate methodology for the analysis of the duration of employment is developed. and separate “job tenure” equations for white and blue collar workers are estimated. A higher educational attainment - ceteris paribus- appears to increase the probability of a job separation; conversely, a higher working experience, previous to the current job, tends to reduce it. The effect of firm size is negative, as larger organizations seem to favour longer employment spells. Outside opportunities show a strong positive effect on the probability of separation. Finally, conditional on the current wage, the probability of leaving the job increases with the length of time worked. However, when the unconditional outcome is considered, separation decline with tenure; in this case. it is argued, the wage effect more than outweighs the conditional effect. This result is consistent with the predictions of both “specific” human capital and job matching theories.     

Employment Relationships and Firm Innovation: The Double Role of Human Capital

We examine how employment relationships and human capital influence innovation in a sample of Spanish firms. Previous research has indicated that human capital directly affects innovation, but few studies have considered human capital as a variable that mediates or moderates the effects of other variables on innovation. We tested our hypotheses using a sample of 150 innovative Spanish firms and confirmed that, while human capital favours innovations, employment relationships are not directly associated with innovation unless they take human capital into account. Specifically, our analyses suggest that human capital mediates the relationship between a mutual investment employment relationship and innovation, which is characterized by high levels of incentives and expectations. However, we also found that human capital plays a moderating role when organizations develop an employment relationship characterized by low investments in personnel but high expectations from their work (the underinvestment model). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these results.     

Strategic Design Responsiveness: An Empirical Analysis of US Retail Store Networks

This study uses a service operations management (SOM) strategy lens to investigate chain store retailers' strategic design responsiveness (SDR)—a term that captures the degree to which retailers dynamically coordinate investments in human and structural capital with the complexity of their service and product offerings. Labor force and physical capital are respectively used as proxies for investments in human capital and structural capital, whereas gross margins are proxies for product/service offering complexity. Consequently, SDR broadly reflects three salient complementary choices of SOM design strategy. We test the effects of “brick and mortar” chain store retailers' SDR on current and future firm performance using publically available panel data collected from Compustat and the University of Michigan American Customer Satisfaction Index databases for the period 1996–2011. We find that retailers that fail to keep pace with investments in both structural and human capital exhibit short‐term financial benefits, but have worse ongoing operational performance. These findings corroborate the importance of managers strategically maintaining the complementarity of design‐related choices for improving and maintaining business performance.     

Breach Penalties in Labour Contracts: Advance Notice and Severance Pay

This paper analyses the determining factors of advance notice and severance pay provisions that appear in collective bargaining agreements. The theoretical model constructed is a simple bargaining model in which advance notice and severance pay play the role of breach penalties that the firm must pay for breaking the employment relationship. The hypotheses are tested on data gathered from collective bargaining agreements from different industries that were signed between 1970 and 1989.     

Forms of Network Resource: Knowledge Access and the Role of Inter‐Firm Networks

The leveraging of inter‐firm networks is increasingly considered to be a strategic resource that can potentially be shaped by managerial action. In recent years, scholars have turned to the concept of social capital to understand how the transfer of knowledge occurs within and across firms. However, this has resulted in an overstretching of the social capital concept. The aim of this paper is to refine and add specificity to the current broad application of the social capital concept. It is argued that although the social capital concept explains investments in networks based on a network logic relating to sociability and socialization, it does not explain investments in networks based on a logic relating to economic expectations. These expectations result in network participation that is more calculative than networks containing social capital. The paper introduces the notion of ‘network capital’ to explain the resources contained within inter‐firm networks that do not necessarily equate with the type of trust and obligations associated with social capital. Network capital is defined as an investment in calculative relations through which firms gain access to knowledge to enhance expected economic returns. It is argued that while network capital can be strategically managed, particularly to influence knowledge flow, the nature of social capital is such that it is very difficult to manage. It is concluded that the network capital–social capital framework opens a number of avenues in terms of future research, especially in relation to the extended resource‐based view of the firm and theories of open innovation.     

Network memory,cultural distance and the ebb and flow of international resources – Evidence from 20 years of professional player transfers to big-five European soccer leagues

Human capital flow embeds firms into knowledge sharing–protection tension. In this study we explore whether firms balance this tension by regulating the volume of human capital inflow. Accordingly, we examine the presence of ebb and flow cycle in human capital inflow. Ebb is expressed in terms of net negative change in volume of human capital inflow of a firm, at any given period, with respect to prior period. Flow is expressed in terms of net positive change. As human capital flow embeds firms into interorganizational network, we examine moderating effects of network closure and network status on the ebb and flow. Further, we examine the role of cultural distance on the moderating effect of network closure and status on ebb and flow. We test our hypotheses based on professional football player transfers among the clubs of the Big-five European Leagues. The results indicate presence of ebb and flow in human capital inflow. Also there is moderating effect of network closure and status, such that they diminish the ebb and flow cycle. We also found evidence that cultural distance further determines effectiveness of network closure and status in diminishing ebb and flow.     

HOW DESTRUCTIVE IS CREATIVE DESTRUCTION? EFFECTS OF JOB LOSS ON JOB MOBILITY,WITHDRAWAL AND INCOME

We analyze short and long‐term effects of worker displacement. Our sample consists of male workers displaced from Norwegian manufacturing plants. We find that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31%. The drop‐out rate from the labor force is particularly high in the first years following displacement. The average earnings effects for those who remain in the labor force are moderate, a 3% loss relative to non‐displaced workers after seven years. Splitting displaced workers on within‐ and between‐firm movers, we find that the estimated earnings loss is entirely driven by between‐firm movers who experience a 3.6% loss. Transfers to other plants within multi‐plant firms upon displacement are quite common. Our results support the view that human capital is partly firm specific and partly industry specific. We find no evidence suggesting that human capital is plant specific.     

Social Increasing Returns and the Effects of Immigration on the Host Country Economy

In this paper we analyse the impact of both the number of immigrants and their human capital on the welfare of the host economy. We will show that in the presence of ‘social increasing returns’ in human and physical capital accumulation, arising from a labour market characterized by a costly search and by randomness of the matching technology, immigrants’ skill level may influence the investments in human capital of natives as well as the investments in physical capital. We will find that the immigrants’ human capital interacts with social increasing returns making them stronger or weaker according to the level of immigrants’ human capital relative to that of natives. If immigrants have a higher level of human capital, increasing returns are accelerated, while if immigrants’ human capital is lower, increasing returns are weakened if not reversed. The consequence of this behaviour is that in the first case immigration has a positive impact on native welfare and there is a positive interrelation between the skills of natives, the skills of immigrants and the firms’ level of physical capital. In the second case immigration may have a negative impact on the welfare of natives, on the skills of native workers and on the physical capital of firms.     

An educational option for those facing lay-off: a human capital perspective

This research assesses factors that affect the choice of an educational support severance package when an employee is offered an array of severance packages that also includes a lump-sum buyout and a retirement package. Hypotheses developed from human capital theory were tested using multinomial logistic regression. The sample comprised 446 current and former employees of a large unionized manufacturing firm. This sample is of interest because the jobs held by these individuals, manufacturing jobs with high wages and benefits, are rapidly disappearing. Results indicated that women were more likely to accept the educational option, as were younger and single respondents. Two groups who were not eligible for retirement were of particular interest in this study. Those who accepted the educational option and those who chose the lump-sum payment did not differ on educational attainment or tenure, but differed on age, partnered status, gender and salary.     

Relative Performance Evaluation and Risk Taking in Delegated Investment Decisions*

Providing proper incentives to firm managers is increasingly important in the current competitive environment. Analytical research has suggested that evaluating a manager's performance relative to that of a peer group, in conjunction with standard-based pay, can induce efficient risk-sharing between firm owners and managers while maintaining the latter's incentives to exert effort. To date, direct empirical tests of this proposition have not been reported. This study uses a laboratory experiment to test the effect of relative performance evaluation on the risk-aversion of delegated investment decisions. Project-specific risk is operationalized using operating leverage, in part because the variability of a project's operating profits generally increases with this variable, and in part because many of the new manufacturing approaches held to be important to competitive advantage require significant capital investments and attendant increases in operating leverage. Across two levels of environmental uncertainty, subjects under a relative (as opposed to absolute) performance standard selected investments with significantly higher project-specific risk. Also, as environmental uncertainty increased, subjects under an absolute standard significantly reduced the riskiness of their investments. In contrast, subjects shielded from environmental uncertainty by a relative standard chose investments of about equal riskiness under both low and high uncertainty conditions. If supported by future research, these findings would suggest that relative performance evaluation may reduce managers' reluctance to adopt risky capital investments, especially in firms operating in high-risk economic or technological environments.     

Insolvency Proceedings and Workers’Rights: the Italian Case

ABSTRACT: In this paper the author analyses different types of insolvency proceedings in the context of the Italian legal system, focusing on the possible effects of bankruptcy law on employment relationships. The concept of‘privileged workers’claims is discussed, taking into account their rank of preference as stated by statutory law and according to the interpretations offered by jurisprudence. One section is expressly devoted to the recent legislation providing a Guarantee Fund for severance allowance claims in case of insolvency, but also in the event of mere nonpayment by the employer. After having covered the concept of 'super-privileged claims', the paper discusses more widely possible forms of protecting workers in a situation of company crisis and links between social legislation on the one hand, and bankruptcy law on the other. Finally, the author emphasizes the more effective protection now offered by the Italian legal system to workers’claims, although the trade unions have considerable difficulty in keeping the workforce united when insolvency proceedings are opened.     

Analysing the Gender Wage Gap (GWG) Using Personnel Records

We use monthly personnel records of a large German company for the years 1999–2005 to analyse the gender wage gap (GWG). The unconditional GWG is 15 per cent for blue‐collar and 26 per cent for white‐collar workers. Different returns to entry age explain a substantial part of the GWG as well as segregation of men and women in different hierarchical levels. The relative GWG increases with increasing tenure for blue‐collar but declines for white‐collar workers. Taking into account the different impact of general and firm‐specific human capital on white‐collar and blue‐collar occupation, this is consistent with theories of statistical discrimination.     

Subsidies on Labour and Capital under Wage Bargaining

ABSTRACT: Micro-policy instruments are often grouped into labour subsidies and capital subsidies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect on employment of labour and capital subsidies when the wage rate is endogeneous. The problem is studied within a sequential three-stage model, integrating the investment decision, wage-bargaining and the employment decision. The paper demonstrates that labour subsidies may fail, depending on technology and the risk aversion of the workers.     

A Simple Model of Severance Pay Determination: The Case of Individual Dismissals in Spain

In this article we model the determinants of severance pay for individual dismissals in Spain, following an idea proposed by Jimeno and Toharia (Economistas 55: 243–255, 1993). We point out the importance of severance pay settled before judgment, since the legal framework creates a bargaining space to determine the amount paid by firms in cases of individual dismissal. The model is a simple pre‐trial bargaining game between the firm and the worker. It predicts a higher settled severance pay for dismissals on economic grounds than on disciplinary ones, which could explain the perceptions held about the wide use of disciplinary dismissals in Spain. In addition, this approach could be useful in designing labour market reforms aimed at changing dismissal costs, because it allows us to determine the key variables affecting settled severance pay. Our simple model predicts that the key variables for Spain are the severance pay for unfair dismissal and the probability of unfair dismissal.