Multilateral Contracting with Externalities

This paper proposes a model for multilateral contracting, where contracts are written and renegotiated over time, and where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. Equilibria always exist and the equilibrium value function is linear and monotonically increasing on the contracts. If the grand coalition, or contracting among all agents, is inefficient, we show that bargaining delays arise in positive‐externality games and equilibrium inefficiency may remain bounded away from zero even as bargaining frictions converge to zero. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays, convergence to the grand coalition occurs in a finite number of contracting rounds, and the outcome becomes efficient as players become more patient.     

A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements

Rationalizability is a central solution concept of game theory. Economic models often have many rationalizable outcomes, motivating economists to use refinements of rationalizability, including equilibrium refinements. In this paper we try to achieve a general understanding of when this multiplicity occurs and how one should deal with it. Assuming that the set of possible payoff functions and belief structures is sufficiently rich, we establish a revealing structure of the correspondence of beliefs to sets of rationalizable outcomes. We show that, for any rationalizable action a of any type, we can perturb the beliefs of the type in such a way that a is uniquely rationalizable for the new type. This unique outcome will be robust to further small changes. When multiplicity occurs, then we are in a “knife‐edge” case, where the unique rationalizable outcome changes, sandwiched between open sets of types where each of the rationalizable actions is uniquely rationalizable. As an immediate application of this result, we characterize, for any refinement of rationalizability, the predictions that are robust to small misspecifications of interim beliefs. These are only those predictions that are true for all rationalizable strategies, that is, the predictions that could have been made without the refinement.     

面向关键设备维修服务的PBC合同与营业中断险集成设计模型及分析

高可用度运行是关键设备系统运营企业产生收益的根本保障。为了减小因小概率突发故障造成的严重收益损失以及可能地继发资金流风险,既要设计合理的服务合同增强对服务供应商的激励,又要同时考虑收益损失减缓策略。基于性能合同（PBC）是根据服务结果给予补偿的新兴激励合同,而购买营业中断保险（BI）是减缓关键设备故障继发资金流风险的有效策略。本文以委托-代理理论为建模框架,研究BI保险与PBC合同集成设计模型,探讨购买保险与否两种情景下的PBC合同最优设计和供应商的最优服务能力决策,分析BI保险决策对PBC合同设计方案的影响规律,调查运营商购买BI保险的决策条件。该成果是维修服务运作与金融保险领域跨界研究的首次尝试,其理论分析结果有助于为关键设备运营企业跨部门决策提供指导。     

设施失灵风险下不确定需求应急定位-路径鲁棒优化研究

为抵御突发灾害对路网造成的破坏性和设施失灵风险,降低系统成本,并快速完成应急救援任务,本文考虑到受灾点物资需求量的不确定和风险对救援系统的影响,采用直升机进行物资运送以规避路径风险。建立了最小化应急物流系统总成本和物资到达需求点总救援时间为双目标的应急物流定位-路径鲁棒优化模型,基于相对鲁棒优化方法处理需求不确定,采用偏差鲁棒优化思想描述设施失灵风险损失,采用遗传算法进行求解。通过对三个算例进行数据仿真实验,证明了相对鲁棒优化方法在处理需求不确定和偏差鲁棒优化方法在处理设施失灵风险方面的有效性,进而为解决应急设施点的开设和救援物资的安全及时准确配送,增强应急物流系统的风险应对能力提供了有效的方法。     

质量预防水平不确定下供应链质量控制鲁棒设计模型

研究了由一个制造商和一个购买商构成的多产品、多阶段供应链质量控制鲁棒运作问题.将制造商、购买商质量收益最大和制造商交付量等于购买商订货量三个运作目标整合成目标函数,以制造商和购买商的质量运作能力限制为基本约束条件,采用基于区间分析法描述制造商质量预防水平不确定性,建立目标规划模型,并进行优化求解.模型能够实现供应链协调运作和制造商、购买商的利润目标,并且在制造商质量预防水平不确定的情况下具有鲁棒性.数值算例的结果表明,制造商质量预防水平在一定范围内波动不改变供应链的质量控制运作策略,仅对其运作性能产生一定影响,即所提出的质量控制模型是鲁棒的.     

交叉销售下基于支持向量聚类的数据驱动多产品库存鲁棒优化模型

针对单周期环境下考虑交叉销售的多产品库存决策问题,在市场需求不确定条件下,建立了带有预算约束的交叉销售多产品库存鲁棒优化模型。针对不确定市场需求,采用支持向量聚类(SVC)方法构建了满足一定置信水平的数据驱动不确定集。进一步,运用拉格朗日对偶方法将所建模型等价转化为易于求解的线性规划问题。最后,通过数值计算对比分析了SVC不确定集下及传统不确定集下的零售商利润绩效,并评估了SVC数据驱动鲁棒优化方法导致的绩效损失,进而分析了预算及交叉销售系数对零售商利润绩效的影响。结果表明,SVC数据驱动鲁棒优化方法具有良好的鲁棒性,能够有效抑制需求不确定性对从事多产品销售的零售商利润绩效的影响。特别地,需求分布信息的缺失虽然会给零售商带来一定的绩效损失,但损失值很小,表明文中提出的基于SVC的数据驱动鲁棒优化方法可以为管理者在需求不确定性环境下制定库存策略提供有效决策借鉴。     

Scenario Discovery with Multiple Criteria: An Evaluation of the Robust Decision‐Making Framework for Climate Change Adaptation

There is increasing concern over deep uncertainty in the risk analysis field as probabilistic models of uncertainty cannot always be confidently determined or agreed upon for many of our most pressing contemporary risk challenges. This is particularly true in the climate change adaptation field, and has prompted the development of a number of frameworks aiming to characterize system vulnerabilities and identify robust alternatives. One such methodology is robust decision making (RDM), which uses simulation models to assess how strategies perform over many plausible conditions and then identifies and characterizes those where the strategy fails in a process termed scenario discovery. While many of the problems to which RDM has been applied are characterized by multiple objectives, research to date has provided little insight into how treatment of multiple criteria impacts the failure scenarios identified. In this research, we compare different methods for incorporating multiple objectives into the scenario discovery process to evaluate how they impact the resulting failure scenarios. We use the Lake Tana basin in Ethiopia as a case study, where climatic and environmental uncertainties could impact multiple planned water infrastructure projects, and find that failure scenarios may vary depending on the method used to aggregate multiple criteria. Common methods used to convert multiple attributes into a single utility score can obscure connections between failure scenarios and system performance, limiting the information provided to support decision making. Applying scenario discovery over each performance metric separately provides more nuanced information regarding the relative sensitivity of the objectives to different uncertain parameters, leading to clearer insights on measures that could be taken to improve system robustness and areas where additional research might prove useful.     

不确定需求下考虑大数据投资决策的供应链鲁棒优化及协调模型

针对由数据公司、制造商和零售商组成的三级供应链系统,在仅知需求均值和方差信息下,建立了集中和分散两种决策情况下的供应链鲁棒优化模型。集中决策下,全体供应链成员共同决定产品零售价和产品生产数量;分散决策下,数据公司作为主方,决定需求信息零售价,制造商和零售商作为从方,分别决定产品批发价和产品订货数量。针对两种决策下的供应链鲁棒优化模型,给出了相应的最优决策,分析了大数据投资成本、消费者异质性需求满足程度等系统参数对供应链决策的影响。进一步,设计了能实现三级供应链完美协调的利润共享契约。最后,通过数值算例验证了所建模型和契约协调的有效性。研究表明,在集中和分散决策下,大数据投资成本只有在满足一定条件下,投资大数据才有利于供应链成员及系统利润的改善。特别地,与无协调时的情况相比,虽然协调机制下相关系统参数对供应链成员决策及利润绩效的作用机制存在差异,但文中提出的利润共享契约在一定条件下能够显著改进供应链成员利润且实现供应链完美协调。