DO HIRING SUBSIDIES REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG OLDER WORKERS? EVIDENCE FROM NATURAL EXPERIMENTS

Abstract We estimate the effects of hiring subsidies for older workers on transitions from unemployment to employment in Germany. Using a natural experiment, our first set of estimates is based on a legal change extending the group of eligible unemployed persons. A subsequent legal change in the opposite direction is used to validate these results. Our data cover the population of unemployed jobseekers in Germany and was specifically made available for our purposes from administrative data. Consistent support for an employment effect of hiring subsidies can only be found for women in East Germany. Concerning other population groups, firms’ hiring behavior is hardly influenced by the program and hiring subsidies mainly lead to deadweight effects. (JEL: J64, H24, C31)     

Immigration Policy,Equilibrium Unemployment,and Underinvestment in Human Capital

We analyse the impact of different immigration policies on human capital investment in a search‐theoretic model. This class of models features unemployment and underinvestment in human capital. The underinvestment in human capital can be solved by combining immigration policy with appropriate education subsidies. Extending the model with respect to different skill groups allows to analyse the observed bimodal skilled immigration of the USA.     

TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL

According to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), high European unemployment since the 1980s can be explained by a rise in economic turbulence, leading to greater numbers of unemployed workers with obsolete skills. These workers refuse new jobs due to high unemployment benefits. In this paper we reassess the turbulence‐unemployment relationship using a matching model with endogenous job destruction. In our model, higher turbulence reduces the incentives of employed workers to leave their jobs. If turbulence has only a tiny effect on the skills of workers experiencing endogenous separation, then the results of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004) are reversed, and higher turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment. Thus, changes in turbulence cannot provide an explanation for European unemployment that reconciles the incentives of both unemployed and employed workers. (JEL: E24, J64)     

Vacancy Referrals,Job Search,and the Duration of Unemployment: A Randomized Experiment

One goal of the Public Employment Service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job‐seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job‐seekers to vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report results from a randomized Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is examined. To what extent do unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they are referred to? Does information to job‐seekers about increased monitoring affect the probability of applying and the probability of leaving unemployment? The experiment indicates that a relatively large fraction (one‐third) of the referrals do not result in job applications. Information about intensified monitoring causes an increase in the probability of job application, especially among young people. However, we find no significant impact on the duration of unemployment.     

Social Increasing Returns and the Effects of Immigration on the Host Country Economy

In this paper we analyse the impact of both the number of immigrants and their human capital on the welfare of the host economy. We will show that in the presence of ‘social increasing returns’ in human and physical capital accumulation, arising from a labour market characterized by a costly search and by randomness of the matching technology, immigrants’ skill level may influence the investments in human capital of natives as well as the investments in physical capital. We will find that the immigrants’ human capital interacts with social increasing returns making them stronger or weaker according to the level of immigrants’ human capital relative to that of natives. If immigrants have a higher level of human capital, increasing returns are accelerated, while if immigrants’ human capital is lower, increasing returns are weakened if not reversed. The consequence of this behaviour is that in the first case immigration has a positive impact on native welfare and there is a positive interrelation between the skills of natives, the skills of immigrants and the firms’ level of physical capital. In the second case immigration may have a negative impact on the welfare of natives, on the skills of native workers and on the physical capital of firms.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FLEXICURITY

We document the presence of a trade‐off in the labor market between the protection of jobs and the support offered to unemployed people. Different countries’ locations along this trade‐off represent stable political‐economic equilibria. We develop a model in which individuals determine the mix of job protection and support for the unemployed in a political environment. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status (insiders and outsiders) and skills (low and high). Unlike previous work on the political economy of labor market institutions, we emphasize the role of job protection and unemployment benefits in the wage‐setting process. A key implication of the model is that flexicurity configurations with low levels of job protection and high levels of support to the unemployed should emerge in the presence of a highly educated workforce. Panel regressions of countries’ locations along this institutional trade‐off are consistent with the implications of our model.     

The Determinants and Some Consequences of Unemployed Workers' Wage Demands

This paper studies the determinants and consequences in the early stages of the hiring process of unemployed workers' wage demands using direct data on workers' wage requests. We show that most unemployed workers want a wage close to their previous wage, and thus much more than they get in unemployment benefits. However, some groups, such as women, tend to demand lower wages. Moreover, we find that workers with high wage demands are contacted by firms less often than otherwise similar workers with lower wage demands. Thus, our results suggest that too high wage demands may contribute to high unemployment.     

The Influence of Unemployment Benefits on Unemployment Duration: Evidence from Spain

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the duration of unemployment spells and the possible incidence of unemployment insurance on job search behaviour and voluntary duration of unemployment in Spain. To do so, a longitudinal data set containing information on unemployment recipients during the period 1987-93 is used. Hazard rates and survival profiles are constructed for the cohorts of unemployed workers entering the benefit system at different points in time, and a logit model of the probability of leaving the system before exhausting entitlement period is presented. The results do not support the view that the unemployed tend to intensify their job search when benefits are near exhaustion.     

Wage Flexibility for Skilled and Unskilled Workers: New Evidence on the Norwegian Wage Curve

Empirical evidence is provided in favour of a hypothesis that wages for unskilled workers are more responsive to unemployment than wages for skilled workers. The results imply vigorous wage responsiveness to low levels of unemployment for both groups, while the wage curves become almost entirely flat for unemployment rates above 1.7 percent. One interpretation of this result is that firms have strong incentives to increase wages in order to recruit and retain workers when unemployment is below some critical level. Since unemployed workers will certainly find work, the expected costs of a job loss are small, as are costs associated with an egalitarian wage policy.     

A Stock–Flow Matching Approach to Evaluation of Public Training Programme in a High Unemployment Environment

Abstract. Monthly panel (1998–2003) data from regional labour offices in Latvia are used to analyse the matching process in a high unemployment–low labour demand environment and to evaluate the impact of active labour market policy programmes on outflows from unemployment. Results suggest that the hiring process is driven by a stock–flow rather than by a traditional matching function: the stock of unemployed at the beginning of the month and flow of vacancies arriving during the month are the key determinants of outflows from unemployment to employment, whereas stock of vacancies and inflow of unemployed do not play any significant role. We find positive and significant effect of training programmes on outflows from unemployment to employment, thus providing strong evidence against cuts in training expenditures.     

Measuring Unemployment in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia

Abstract. Measuring unemployment in developing countries is not straightforward due to the presence of a large number of discouraged workers. Including them into the labor force is sometimes appropriate in order to reflect the true state of unemployment. However, the decision must be based on careful research. This study provides a case study of Indonesia, whose decision to include discouraged workers into its labor force resulted in an artificially high unemployment rates and disguised the actual post‐crisis decline in unemployment in Indonesia. The discouraged workers can be classified based on their willingness to work. If Indonesia still wants to include discouraged workers into the labor force, only those willing to work should be included.     

Unemployment Duration in an Unemployment Blackspot

This paper analyses the factors affecting the duration of an unemployment spell amongst a sample of exclusively long-term unemployed individuals. The results indicate that person-specific unemployment propensities have a significant effect on re-employment probabilities. These effects, however, vary significantly by gender and religion. The results also indicate statistically significant negative ‘duration dependence’ effects. The evidence suggests that employers regard long unemployment durations as a ‘negative signal’ about an applicant's potential productivity. The latter implies that, in terms of government policies aimed at reducing unemployment, the demand-side of the unemployment equation should be given greater emphasis.     

Firing Costs,Efficiency Wages and Unemployment

This paper uses a Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage model to analyse the effects of firing costs on wages, employment, expected utility and profits. It considers that the probability of a non–shirker being fired depends on an exogenous shock which follows a two–state Markov process. It finds that higher severance payments give rise to lower wages, a lower unemployment rate, an increase in firms’ profits and a decrease in the utility of both workers and the unemployed. These conclusions derive from the finding that a greater probability of keeping one’s job, because of higher firing costs, raises the value of the job and reduces the worker’s incentives to behave opportunistically; this enables firms to reduce wages. Hence, if firms pay efficiency wages, a higher degree of labour market flexibility increases unemployment.     

工人工资决定因素前沿研究综述

劳动者工资如何决定是劳动力经济学中的一个核心问题。本文依据现有的研究文献并加上个人的理解,对工人工资决定因素的前沿文献研究进行梳理和归纳。工人工资主要受制于三个方面因素:工人自身的人力资本特征、市场(或企业)特征以及工人与企业(市场)之间的互动关系。工人自身的人力资本特征是工人获得工资的基础,工人与企业(市场)之间的互动关系反映的是企业(市场)与工人的信息学习和工作安排比较优势在工资决定机制中的作用,市场特征反映的是制度层面对工人工资的影响。工人工资的形成是多种因素共同作用的结果。     

Macroeconomic Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance

This paper proposes a new modeling strategy as regards the definition of an optimal level of unemployment benefits. While the traditional methodology privileges labor market equilibrium to derive optimal employment, wage and unemployment benefit levels, we present a model in which the optimal level of unemployment benefits is a function of the government’s macroeconomic objectives in terms of inflation and output fluctuations. In a second stage, the model allows for the investigation of unemployment insurance effects on labor market equilibrium.     

TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION,TURBULENCE, AND THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Starting in the late 1970s, European unemployment began to increase while US unemployment remained constant. At the same time, capital‐embodied technical change began to accelerate, and the United States adopted the new capital much faster than Europe. I argue that these two facts are related. The main idea is that if there is capital‐embodied technical change, then the unemployment rate depends critically on how obsolete the installed capital stock is compared to the frontier. In particular, European workers initially worked with relatively obsolete capital, and so they lacked the skills required to work with frontier capital. When they lost their jobs they therefore stayed unemployed for longer than their American counterparts. I find that this channel accounts for about 70% of the discrepancy between the behavior of unemployment rates in Europe and the United States.     

Unemployment and Retirement in a Model with Age‐specific Heterogeneity

This paper presents a model where young and old workers compete for one type of jobs in the presence of retirement opportunity. Within this framework, we show that increased retirement opportunities (such as a decrease of the retirement age) has most of the time a depressing impact on the unemployment rate. Indeed the number of vacancies posted by firms is influenced by the probability that an old worker is going into retirement. We show that the degree to which younger workers are influenced by retirement of older workers depends on the relative productivity of young and older workers. It is only when older workers are much more productive than young workers that retirement may benefit to unemployment.     

Discrimination and Resistance to Low‐skilled Immigration

Abstract. This paper shows that the immigration of some low‐skilled workers can be of advantage for low‐skilled natives when the host economy suffers from unemployment due to the presence of trade unions and an unemployment insurance scheme. This benefit arises if trade unions have appropriate bargaining power and preferences for members’ income, labor market discrimination against immigrants is strong enough and the unemployment tax rate is low.     

Unemployment in Urban China: an Analysis of Survey Data from Shanghai

Abstract. We analyse the unemployment problem in the largest Chinese city, Shanghai, based on a survey of the unemployed conducted in late 1989. We find, as expected, that unemployment is particularly serious among school-leavers and contract and temporary workers, but also find a surprisingly high incidence of unemployment amongst permanent state employees and relatively long unemployment durations. The Shanghai unemployed rely heavily on occasional work for support, and only a small proportion-receive state benefit. We identify problems of interpretation stemming from the stock-sampling nature of the survey, and use non-parametric methods to reveal an underlying strong downward movement in individual re-employment probabilities.     

Market Volatility and the Structure of US Earnings

This paper studies the relationship between volatility of industry‐specific shipments and real earnings. In an efficiency wage theoretical framework I show that wage premiums for the risk of unemployment depend on the value of the worker’s outside offer net of his/her mobility costs. Empirically it is shown that wage premiums for the risk of unemployment markedly vary in a cross section of workers. The main finding is that market volatility changes the return to skill such as labor market experience and education. Its impact markedly varies across occupation groups, with managers receiving returns to labour market experience that significantly increase with product market volatility.