Temporary Contracts,Employment Protection,and Collective Bargaining

This paper examines the effect of employment protection in a matching model with endogenous job destruction, collective bargaining, and two types of employment contracts. Using this framework, we show that (i) the impact on job creation and job destruction caused by reducing the firing costs associated with temporary jobs depends on the labour unions' bargaining strength and the gap in firing costs between contracts; (ii) reducing the firing costs associated with permanent jobs unambiguously decreases equilibrium unemployment if labour unions have strong bargaining power; and (iii) the impact caused by the firing costs differs between collective and individual bargaining.     

The Burden of Labour Costs in Mexico

Abstract. We analysed labour costs in Mexico and evaluated their impact in terms of firm performance. Using a new survey, we studied how firms chose to conduct a firing procedure (i.e. mandatory payment, negotiation, or legal dispute) and the actual costs derived from that decision. We found that firms that negotiate have, on average, lower costs. This may mean that workers subvaluate the legal benefits. Moreover, legal disputes may increase firing costs by 50 per cent. We contributed to the analysis of the impact of such costs on employment and found that, when firms negotiate or pay higher costs, this decreases the level of employment. We also analysed the impact of Social Benefits on employment using an industrial survey. We found that a 10 per cent increment in these benefits may have a negative long‐term impact of 9 per cent on the level of employment.     

Regional Labour Market Adjustment: Are Positive and Negative Shocks Different?

This paper analyses regional labour market adjustment in the Finnish provinces during 1971–96. It investigates the interrelations of employment, unemployment and labour force participation to examine how a change in labour demand is adjusted to. The study questions the usual assumption that positive and negative shocks evoke similar adjustment processes. Instead, we test for the possibility that the effects of positive and negative shocks are asymmetric. The analysis reveals that there is little asymmetry in the adjustment to region‐specific labour demand shocks, but adjustment to total (region‐specific plus common component) shocks displays more asymmetry. The region‐specific component of a labour demand shock has short‐lived effects on unemployment and participation, and its effect on employment is very small but permanent [persistent?]. Initially, most of the fall in employment is absorbed by the unemployment and participation rate, but after a few years migration plays a larger role in the adjustment process.     

Modelling Labour Demand Dynamics beyond the Frictionless Environment

Abstract. In this study we develop a simple econometric model for labour demand dynamics by explicitly considering deviations from the standard frictionless economic environment. In particular, we explore the potential effect on labour demand of capital market imperfections, labour market institutional rigidities in the form of union power, and the impact of uncertainty. In addition, in the presence of uncertainty, adjustment costs and irreversibility emerge as an important factor that introduces an option value of waiting. According to our results, leverage exerts a direct negative impact on employment dynamics indicating that capital market imperfections are indeed present. Moreover, leverage is found to also affect the adjustment process of employment. Finally, we document asymmetric effects of frictions on labour demand across different size groups that imply a higher vulnerability of small and medium sectors with respect to debt levels. Uncertainty exerts a significantly negative impact on labour demand, which is compatible with presence of partial irreversibility of employment decisions. Finally, unions over and above their effect via higher wages are positively related to employment, a finding that is indicative of their pursue for job security.     

The Pace of Job Creation and Destruction,Cyclical Shocks and Employment Dynamics

This paper investigates (un)employment dynamics in response to labour demand shocks using a small empirical flow model for the labour market in The Netherlands. The model explicitly takes account of the propagation of shocks through the various duration classes of unemployment and allows for duration dependence in the state of unemployment. A sensitivity analysis shows that 1. congestion in the matching process due to the increase in the pace of job creation and destruction may have substantial effects on (un)employment dynamics; 2. the effects depend very much on the initial pace of labour market dynamics and they are larger when the initial pace is low; 3. the labour market may be out of its equilibrium for quite a long time after a shock occurs; 4. fluctuations in the pace of job creation and destruction only lead to unemployment persistence in the model when the escape probability from long term unemployment is zero; otherwise, the economy returns to its original equilibrium, albeit with long adjustment lags in the case that the initial pace of structural change and/or the escape probability for long term unemployed is low.     

Subsidies on Labour and Capital under Wage Bargaining

ABSTRACT: Micro-policy instruments are often grouped into labour subsidies and capital subsidies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect on employment of labour and capital subsidies when the wage rate is endogeneous. The problem is studied within a sequential three-stage model, integrating the investment decision, wage-bargaining and the employment decision. The paper demonstrates that labour subsidies may fail, depending on technology and the risk aversion of the workers.     

Union Power and (Un)Employment

Is the monopoly face of unions, i.e. their ability to enforce wages above what non-unionised firms would pay, harmful to employment and output? It is shown that a positive answer to this question is far less compelling than commonly held views based on a negatively sloped labour demand curve suggest. First, the labour demand curve may be irrelevant for the employment decision of unionised firms. Second, even if the labour demand curve is relevant, selfish union workers are likely to accept a system of wage discrimination which does away with discrepancies between the marginal product and the reservation wage. And third, the labour demand curve may have a positive slope.     

The Effect of Trade on Employment and Wages in Italian Industry

The paper analyses the labour market impact of international trade on the Italian manufacturing sector. Using data for a panel of manufacturing industries the effects of trade‐induced changes in sales on employment and wages are investigated. The evidence suggests that the industry adjustment to demand shocks took place mainly through employment changes. However, increased exposure to foreign competition had a small effect on the Italian labour market, while technological change seems to have a major role in explaining the increase in unemployment.     

Collective Wage Agreements and Firms’ Employment Policies

This paper provides evidence on the way collective wage agreements affect the adjustment of employment, working hours and other production factors when service‐sector firms are faced with demand shocks. The estimation results indicate that collective wage agreements significantly influence firms’ employment policies. It is shown that recruitment is a widespread instrument for service firms to cope with demand fluctuations which are negatively affected by collective wage agreements. The employment of freelance workers is also negatively affected by collective wage agreements, while their effect on using short‐term employment contracts as a reaction to demand shocks is positive.     

How Much Does Hiring and Firing Cost? Survey Evidence from a Sample of Italian Firms

We analyse the Italian labour market, which is typically considered to be highly regulated. We focus on the costs imposed on firms by the institutional environment in which they operate, and on the adjustment strategies that they pursue as a result. We have followed two complementary approaches: the analysis of the development of the laws relating to hiring and firing, together with a set of interviews of 61 manufacturing firms. This also allows us to quantify the extent of turnover costs on the total labour costs. Hiring costs, which include recruiting and training, range between 2.0 and 2.6 months of labour costs; firing costs range from less than half a monthly labour cost to 20 months of labour costs in cases of conflict.     

Firing Costs,Efficiency Wages and Unemployment

This paper uses a Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage model to analyse the effects of firing costs on wages, employment, expected utility and profits. It considers that the probability of a non–shirker being fired depends on an exogenous shock which follows a two–state Markov process. It finds that higher severance payments give rise to lower wages, a lower unemployment rate, an increase in firms’ profits and a decrease in the utility of both workers and the unemployed. These conclusions derive from the finding that a greater probability of keeping one’s job, because of higher firing costs, raises the value of the job and reduces the worker’s incentives to behave opportunistically; this enables firms to reduce wages. Hence, if firms pay efficiency wages, a higher degree of labour market flexibility increases unemployment.     

Unemployment,Labour Institutions and Innovation

ABSTRACT: This contribution endorses the transactional trilogy of institutional economics in order to suggest a theoretical framework for re-examining the relationships between unemployment, labour institutions, and technological and organisational innovation. Labour institutions are usually called into question in the debates on European unemployment. Although the advocates of the biased technological change thesis defend it in order to improve the employment of unskilled workers, this article argues that a deregulation of the labour market may in fact generate losses of dynamic efficiency with respect to knowledge accumulation, the organisation of production and national capabilities of innovation. In addition, the impact of technological and organisational innovation on employment partly depends on the capabilities of firms and nations to initiate institutional learning, regarding bargaining, managerial and rationing transactions.     

A Stock–Flow Matching Approach to Evaluation of Public Training Programme in a High Unemployment Environment

Abstract. Monthly panel (1998–2003) data from regional labour offices in Latvia are used to analyse the matching process in a high unemployment–low labour demand environment and to evaluate the impact of active labour market policy programmes on outflows from unemployment. Results suggest that the hiring process is driven by a stock–flow rather than by a traditional matching function: the stock of unemployed at the beginning of the month and flow of vacancies arriving during the month are the key determinants of outflows from unemployment to employment, whereas stock of vacancies and inflow of unemployed do not play any significant role. We find positive and significant effect of training programmes on outflows from unemployment to employment, thus providing strong evidence against cuts in training expenditures.     

Employment Protection and Temporary Work Agencies

Employers who use temporary agency staff in contrast to regular staff are not affected by employment protection regulations when terminating a job. Therefore, services provided by temporary work agencies may be seen as a substitute for regular employment. In this paper, we analyse the effects of employment protection on the size of the temporary work agency sector in a model of equilibrium unemployment. We find that higher firing costs may even reduce temporary work agency employment if agencies themselves are subject to employment protection, a consideration that distinguishes our results from those for fixed‐term employment arrangements.     

FROM FLEXIBILITY TO INSECURITY: HOW VERTICAL SEPARATION AMPLIFIES FIRM‐LEVEL UNCERTAINTY

This article presents a model where firms may endogenously externalize part of their production process. We start from the premise that adaptation to uncertainty cannot be contracted upon in the worker/employer relationship. Vertical separation then balances flexibility gains against hold‐up costs of opportunistic behavior by outside contractors. In equilibrium, the degree of separation is shown to depend on the degree of product market competition, contractor's bargaining power, and the volatility of demand shocks. Our main result is that an increase in the degree of vertical separation amplifies the elasticity to demand shocks of firms' sales and employment. It does not, however, amplify aggregate uncertainty. Evidence from firm‐level data is shown to be largely consistent with the main implications of our theory. (JEL: L16, L23, L24)     

Does Uncertainty of Firing Costs Reduce Hirings?

This paper examines hiring decision under uncertainty of firing costs. We extend the labor demand problem of the firm to account for a random shock that hits the firing cost function. We also consider recursive preferences for the employer in order to separate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution. We find that a rise of the variance of the shock decreases hiring investment if and only if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one. The risk aversion parameter does not determine the sign of the uncertainty effect but only its magnitude.     

Unions,Firing Costs,and Unemployment

Abstract. We study the effects of firing costs in unionized economies with heterogeneous workers. We consider an overlapping generations model where workers participate in the labour market both when young and when old. All workers belong to the same union that sets wages unilaterally. We find that at given wages firing costs increase youth unemployment and decrease old‐age unemployment. However, once the wage response is considered, firing costs increase both youth and old‐age unemployment. Indeed, knowing that when firing costs are higher firms refrain from firing, the union increases the wage of old workers, and, therefore, old‐age unemployment increases.     

违约风险、银行信贷筛选与货币政策非对称效应

本文构建一个包含企业违约风险与银行信贷筛选的动态随机一般均衡模型,研究银行信贷筛选对货币政策宏观经济效应产生的影响。在参数校准的基础上,分析了货币政策冲击的长期效应与短期效应。研究结果显示：(1)无论是基于长期还是短期效应的角度,银行信贷筛选均显著抑制了扩张性货币政策对宏观经济产生的积极影响;(2)基于货币政策冲击的短期效应可以发现,银行信贷筛选降低了扩张性货币政策的实际效应,并且放大了货币政策对通胀的影响;(3)通过比较扩张性与紧缩性货币政策的脉冲响应可以发现,银行信贷筛选导致货币政策的宏观经济效应存在非对称性特征。福利分析的结果表明,相比无银行信贷筛选的情形而言,银行信贷筛选导致了整体社会福利的恶化。