Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union II

Abstract The first part of this study (which appeared in the preceding issue of Population Studies) assessed the extent of the decline in fertility in the countries of the area during the last 10-15 years, and analyzed the purely demographic aspects ofthis phenomenon. Part II examines the socio-economic differentials in fertility, with regard to such variables as urban-rural residence, socio-occupational and employment status of women, educational attainment, income and housing conditions, and the consequent impact of structural changes in these characteristics of the population on observed fertility trends. The broad conclusion is that the fertility differentials usually found in western societies are also relevant to the socialist countries of eastern Europe, and that the dramatic falls in fertility in the 1950's and the 1960's have largely been the outcome ofthe deep and rapid structural changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, educational attainment and the incidence of female employment. The last part of the study is concerned with the impact on post-war fertility trends of social legislation and of general economic policies, particularly in the fields of employment and income. An appraisal of the extent of family planning is followed by a discussion of the recent pro-natalist measures introduced in most countries of the area and of their effectiveness.     

Continuity of women's work,breastfeeding, and fertility in Ghana in the 1980s

Much of the inconsistency that has appeared in studies of the effect of women's work on fertility in less developed countries has been attributed to the varying accessibility of employment in the modern sector. The analysis presented in this paper shows that continuity of work matters more than sector of work. It also confirms that, even in a setting of low contraceptive prevalence, increased fecundity associated with the less intense breastfeeding practices of working women do not result in shorter birth intervals. The influence of women's work on fertility control is likely to be underestimated if the effects of sporadic versus continuous work are conflated, or if fecundity differentials by work status are unmeasured.     

Continuity of women's work,breastfeeding, and fertility in Ghana in the 1980s

Much of the inconsistency that has appeared in studies of the effect of women's work on fertility in less developed countries has been attributed to the varying accessibility of employment in the modern sector. The analysis presented in this paper shows that continuity of work matters more than sector of work. It also confirms that, even in a setting of low contraceptive prevalence, increased fecundity associated with the less intense breastfeeding practices of working women do not result in shorter birth intervals. The influence of women's work on fertility control is likely to be underestimated if the effects of sporadic versus continuous work are conflated, or if fecundity differentials by work status are unmeasured.     

Differential fertility in Puerto Rico

In spite of high overall fertility Puerto Rico exhibits fertility differentials resembling those in areas where birth rates are low. The fertility of whites exceeds that of non-whites, educational standards influence child-bearing and there is a rural urban differential of long standing. These differences are documented in the paper and their implication for future population development in Puerto Rico is discussed     

Womens education and diffusion of the fertility transition: The case of Egypt 1960–1996 in 4905 administrative subdivisions

Egypt comprises thousands of small geographic units. Total fertility rates are reconstructed for the 4905qism, qarya, medina, markaz andshiyakhat covering non-desert Egypt at the 1960, 1976, 1986 and 1996 censuses. This fine spatial scale reveals that heterogeneity across subdivisions increased during the fertility transition, illustrating the rapidity of change. Spatial patterns appear in the fertility upsurge of 1974–85, which is accompanied by a large but temporary reduction in heterogeneity. Fertility varies greatly between subdivisions and geographic differentials underlie the expected and observed association between fertility, literacy, family transfers and industrialization. Cairo led the decline of fertility, but that decline is counterbalanced by rapid economic growth and persistently high levels of illiteracy. A similar pattern of fertility change is observed for the chief city of the Muhafaza and its surrounding area. Egypt presents an archetype of demographic transition as improved economic and educational status diffuses across the country, moderated by its specific geography.     

Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860-1909

Previous studies of the marital fertility transition in Europe have found religious differentials. Using data collected from the population registers of The Hague, our aim in this study is to search for answers to the following questions: whether religious differentials result from socio-economic characteristics; to what extent religious ideology explains the behaviour of religious groups; which proximate determinants account for the religious differentials; and whether the Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition in Europe. The results provide some evidence of relatively low levels of parity-dependent fertility control among Jews before the transition and among Catholics during the transition. Religious ideology probably accounts for the low level of fertility control among Catholics. The ultimate reason for the relatively high marital fertility among Jews before the transition remains unclear. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition.     

Marriage patterns and fertility of the world population]

Marriage patterns of the world population may be divided into two major categories; i.e., the traditional marriage pattern, and the European marriage pattern. Characteristics of the traditional marriage pattern are: early marriage, a high percentage of married people, and a low percentage of people who remain single during their lifetime. Characteristics of the European marriage pattern include: late marriage and a higher percentage of females who do not marry in their lifetime. In most parts of Asia and Africa and some Latin American countries, the traditional marriage pattern is dominant, and the birth rate in these countries has remained very high. Most countries in Europe show the characteristics of the European marriage pattern, and the fertility rate in these countries is comparatively low. Some other countries, such as Sri Lanka, are in a process of transformation in their marriage pattern, and their fertility level also shows a transition from a high fertility rate to a lower fertility rate. There is a close relationship between marriage patterns and the level of fertility.     

Residence background and fertility in Greater Bombay

Abstract The residence background of wives who migrate to metropolitan areas plays an important role in determining their fertility. From the data collected during 1966, relating to 7,872 currently married women of Greater Bombay, an attempt was made to establish differentials in marital fertility by residence background of the wives. This was categorized into three groups - non-migrants, urban migrants and rural migrants. It was observed that rural migrant wives exhibited significantly higher fertility compared with the other two groups, and this was explained by their lower educational attainment. Between the non-migrant and the urban migrant wives the latter consistently showed lower fertility for all age groups up to 40, while there was a reversal in the age group 40 and above, where non-migrants exhibited lower fertility. The urban migrant wives showed a somewhat higher level of education, most likely on account of selectivity, compared to the non-migrants. However, presence of a sizeable number of Parsee wives, characterized by a distinct urban culture and considerably lower fertility, was largely responsible for the low fertility of the non-migrant wives in the age group 40 and above. The variable that has emerged as the most influential in creating fertility differentials is education of the wife, which is shown to be negatively associated with the level of fertility. Wife's education explains to a large extent the observed fertility differentials by residence background.     

Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.     

Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Abstract Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.     

Religious fertility differentials in Thailand, 1960

Abstract Although the evidence supporting high fertility in Thailand is clear-cut, little is known about fertility differentials within the population. As part of a larger investigation, a special 1 % tabulation of the 1960 Thai census data on number of children ever-born to married women has been analysed to determine the extent of differentials by religion and urban-rural status. The findings point to considerable differentials among Buddhists, Moslems, and Confucianists. Standardizing for age, the number of children ever-born to 12/loslems averaged well below the number born to Buddhists. Confucian fertility was intermediate. Within specific age groups, the number of children ever-born to Moslem women was considerably below the Buddhist average and the differentials were sharper in the higher age groups. By contrast, Confucian fertility was highest of all in the age groups under 35, but lower than the Buddhist averages among older women. Significant urban-rural differentials also exist. For both the Buddhist and the Confucian women, fertility is markedly lower in urban than in rural categories. When controlling for both age and urban-rural status, Buddhist and Confucian differences tend to be minimal. By contrast, Moslem fertility was highest in the most urban category - Bangkok - but was considerably lower and substantially below the fertility levels of Buddhists and Confucianists in all other urban-rural categories. The census data in themselves do not permit adequate analysis of the reasons for the differentials. Later age at marriage in urban places may be a significant factor in accounting for the overall differentials in urban-rural fertility ; but this relation is much less clear for specific religious groups, particularly since Moslems marry at a considerably earlier age. More frequent divorce and remarriage may lower Moslem rates. Poorer health may also be a factor.     

Urbanization and the fertility transition in Ghana

This paper examines the way in which migration and urban residence operate to alter fertility outcomes. While urban-rural fertility differentials have long been established for most developing societies, the nature of these differences among migrants and between migrants and those of succeeding generations is not well understood. The evidence presented here suggests that rural-urban migration and urbanization may contribute positively to processes of fertility transition. Using data from the 1998 Kumasi Peri-Urban Survey, which included a 5-year retrospective monthly calendar of childbearing, we suggest that migrants adapt quickly to an urban environment. Our results also reveal generational differences in recent and cumulative fertility. While migrants exhibit higher cumulative fertility than urban residents of the second and third generation, their fertility is significantly lower than rural averages in Ghana. Children of migrants exhibit childbearing patterns quite similar to those in higher-order generations. Most noteworthy is the nature of the disparities in childbearing patterns between migrants and the succeeding generations. Migrant women have higher lifetime fertility than urban natives. Migrant women also exhibit higher fertility over the last 5 years than second generation or high-order urban natives. But these first generation women exhibit lower fertility (vs. urban natives) for the year immediately prior to the survey. These patterns lend support to an interpretation that combines rather than opposes theories of selectivity, disruption, adaptation and socialization. We conclude by discussing mechanisms that might explain these interrelated processes of fertility adjustment and suggest that policies discouraging rural-urban migration need to be revisited.     

Child-care availability and fertility in Norway

The child-care and fertility hypothesis has been in the literature for a long time and is straightforward: As child care becomes more available, affordable, and acceptable, the antinatalist effects of increased female educational attainment and work opportunities decrease. As an increasing number of countries express concern about low fertility, the child-care and fertility hypothesis takes on increased importance. Yet data and statistical limitations have heretofore limited empirical tests of the hypothesis. Using rich longitudinal data and appropriate statistical methodology, We show that increased availability of child care increases completed fertility. Moreover, this positive effect of child-care availability is found at every parity transition. We discuss the generalizability of these results to other settings and their broader importance for understanding variation and trends in low fertility.     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

The fertility impact of changes in the timing of childbearing in the developing world

This study examines the role of tempo effects in the fertility declines of less developed countries. These effects temporarily inflate the total fertility of a population during periods when the age at childbearing declines and deflate it when childbearing is postponed. An analysis of data from the World Fertility Surveys and the Demographic and Health Surveys demonstrates that fertility trends observed in many less developed countries are likely to be distorted by changes in the timing of childbearing. In most countries women are delaying childbearing, which implies that observed fertility is lower than it would have been without tempo changes. This pattern is most clearly documented in Taiwan, where accurate birth statistics from a vital registration system make it possible to estimate the tempo components of fertility annually from 1978 to 1993. The small but unexpected rise in the total fertility of Colombia in the early 1990s is attributed to a decline in the negative tempo distortion that prevailed in the 1980s. Similar interruptions of ongoing fertility declines may occur in the future in other countries when existing negative tempo effects are removed.     

Intermediate variables and educational differentials in fertility in Korea and the Philippines

This analysis compares the effects of contraceptive use and infant and fetal mortality on the pace offertility in Korea and the Philippines and explores the mediating effects of these intermediate variables on educational differentials in childspacing. For birth intervals initiated in a recent period before a sample survey, second, third and higher-order intervals are examined. Transitions within successive segments of interval exposure (q _xvalues) are examined rather than cumulative transitions (1 - l _xvalues). This methodological choice is substantively important because breastfeeding should primarily affect early segments of exposure and because it allows empirical examination of the timing of the effects of other variables such as contraceptive use. Further, this choice allows multivariate analysis within the structure of the life-table perspective. The results show substantial differences in patterns between Korea and the Philippines, indicate clearly the effect of each intermediate variable, and illustrate how educational differentials in fertility are affected by contraception and infant and fetal mortality.     

Divergent Patterns in the Ethnic Transformation of Societies

The uneven timing of the demographic transition in different countries of the world will lead to divergence between countries in ethnic and religious homogeneity. Developed‐country populations that began their fertility transitions relatively early are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to the ethnic origin and religion of their inhabitants, primarily as a result of high recent levels of immigration. Many demographic patterns of the developed world, such as low death and birth rates, are becoming universal. It might be expected that less developed countries will also turn from emigration to experiencing immigration, as their populations age and their economies develop. This essay suggests, however, that future ethnic diversity arising from immigration may be less marked in many of those developing countries than in the West, especially among latecomers to the fertility transition. Five reasons are advanced as impediments to the globalization of ethnic heterogeneity arising from immigration: demographic, economic, political, and factors related to resource constraints, and climate change. The essay considers what social, economic, and political consequences might arise if high levels of ethnic diversity, and possibly ethnic replacement, remained an idiosyncratic peculiarity of today's developed countries, which would therefore diverge in important ways from the rest of the world as the twenty‐first century unfolds.     

An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.