The Collapsing Choice Theory: Dissociating Choice and Judgment in Decision Making

Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. Decision choice follows probability estimates and errors in choice derive mainly from errors in judgment. In the studies reported here we use the Monty Hall dilemma to illustrate that judgment and choice do not always go together, and that such a dissociation can lead to better decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that in certain decision problems, exceeding working memory limitations can actually improve decision choice. We show across four experiments that increasing the number of choice alternatives forces people to collapse choices together, resulting in better decision-making. While choice performance improves, probability judgments do not change, thus demonstrating an important dissociation between choice and probability judgments. We propose the Collapsing Choice Theory (CCT) which explains how working memory capacity, probability estimation, choice alternatives, judgment, and regret all interact and effect decision quality.      

The epistemic structure of a theory of a game

This paper is a contribution to the systematic study of alternative axiom-sets for theories of (normal-form, complete-information) games. It provides an introduction to epistemic logic, describes a formulation in epistemic logic of the structure of a theory of a game (the broad theory of that game), and applies methods of epistemic logic to define strategies for dealing with two disturbing features of game theory, its hyperrationality assumptions and its indeterminacy. The analysis of these problems is conducted in terms of two principles which impregnate much game theory, Cleverness and Cloisteredness (the principles that players know respectively all, and only, the logical consequences of their assumed knowledge). Broad theories allow us to formulate and revise these principles despite their metatheoretical character. It is shown how Cleverness may be weakened by using logics which restrict the Rule of Epistemization, and Cloisteredness by using default logic or autoepistemic logic; the latter is used to characterize Nash equilibrium beliefs as parts of certain autoepistemic extensions of players' knowledge bases, but these particular extensions are rejected as ungrounded.I am grateful for most helpful comments to Robin Cubitt, Joe Halpern, Ernest Geffner, Philippe Mongin, David Squires, Elias Thijsse and Tim Williamson.     

The impossibility of the Paretian liberal and its relevance to welfare economics

The purpose of this study is to analyse the implications of Sen's impossibility result, the liberal paradox, for orthodox welfare economics. Because the rather special format of social choice theory makes it a little difficult to be sure of the relevance of this result, the whole dilemma is posed here in terms of a rather informal analysis of information al patterns.On the one hand, it is argued that the traditional approach to welfare economics, including both utilitarianism and Paretian ordinalism, contains severe informational constraints eliminating the use of all kinds of independent non-utility information in the social evaluation process. This property, called welfarism, is also present in the weak Pareto principle, which conflicts with even minimal requirements of personal liberty according to Sen's result.On the other hand, it is argued that there is in fact little to be resolved in this problem in spite of several attempts to circumvent the conflict. These studies are argued to be mainly ad hoc solutions to the formal problem and relevant only to the extent they indicate how severe restrictions are needed to avoid the paradox. The analogy with the prisoner's dilemma does not work either. Since liberal values are intrinsically non-welfaristic, the liberal paradox can be interpreted as only one, but a rather powerful, example of the informational deficiency of the orthodox approach.Finally, it is argued that the liberal paradox has striking implications for both the concept of preference and social optimum as well as empirical research on social welfare. This means that if the impossibility is to be taken seriously we need to revalue both the status of utility information and the role of the Pareto principle in social welfare analysis.The author is grateful to Professor Amartya Sen and Matti Tuomala for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Updating,supposing, and maxent

Conclusion The philosophical controversy concerning the logical status of MAXENTmay be in large measure due to the conflation of two distinct logical roles:(1) A general inductive principle for updating subjective probabilities (2)a supposing rule for moving from one chance probability to another.When judged under standards of dynamic coherence appropriate to (1),MAXENT is found wanting. When judged in terms of the logic appro-priate to (2) MAXENT yields for convex closed constraint sets a reason-able selection function with interesting connections with sufficiency andconditioning. Indeed it is just the features of MAXENT which make itappropriate for (2) which make it inappropriate for (1). MAXENT canbe thought of as part of Bayesian logic. But it is part of the logic ofsupposition rather than the logic of induction.     

真、意义与解释——戴维森意义理论探究

戴维森基于塔斯基的真之理论构造了一种非弗雷格式的意义理论.他放弃了在内涵框架内讨论意义问题,而通过纯外延的方式同时遵循整体论的原则来刻画一种语言的意义.这种做法引来了不少质疑.纯外延的方式与戴维森最初的愿望,即意义理论应该是处理意义而非指称的,是背道而驰的,最终将导致他的意义理论又蜕化为某种意义上的弗雷格式的指称理论.     

. . .and why there is no simple solution, but reasons for optimism

This article has three objectives. First, to apply the debate concerning deliberative or discursive democracy to the subject of social policy in order to renew and update the long-standing attempt to go beyond the paradigm of welfare-state capitalism. The 'crisis of universalism' is outlined and this is then explained in terms of the traditional welfare state's 'democratic deficit'. Second, to suggest that applying these debates reveals two paradoxes that bear implications not only for social policy but also for the entire project of discursive democracy. The first paradox refers to the need to combine proceduralist and pluralist theories of deliberative democracy, despite the ultimate irreconcilability of these philosophies. The second refers to the problem of social transition and the fact that democratisation and social equalisation require one other. The third objective is therefore to suggest that welfare traditionalists have nothing to fear from what are here called 'post-universalist' critiques.     

Judgment aggregation and minimal change: a model of consensus formation by belief revision

When a group of agents attempts to reach an agreement on certain issues, it is usually desirable that the resulting consensus be as close as possible to the original judgments of the individuals. However, when these judgments are logically connected to further beliefs, the notion of closeness should also take into account to what extent the individuals would have to revise their entire belief set to reach an agreement. In this work, we present a model for generation of agreement with respect to a given agenda which allows individual epistemic entrenchment to influence the value of the consensus. While the postulates for the transformation function and their construction resemble those of AGM belief revision, the notion of an agenda is adapted from the theory of judgment aggregation. This allows our model to connect both frameworks.     

The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. When applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is effectively dictatorial.     

Towards a Lacanian Group Psychology: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Trans‐subjective

Revisiting Lacan's discussion of the puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma provides a means of elaborating a theory of the trans‐subjective. An illustration of this dilemma provides the basis for two important arguments. Firstly, that we need to grasp a logical succession of modes of subjectivity: from subjectivity to inter‐subjectivity, and from inter‐subjectivity to a form of trans‐subjective social logic. The trans‐subjective, thus conceptualized, enables forms of social objectivity that transcend the level of (inter)subjectivity, and which play a crucial role in consolidating given societal groupings. The paper advances, secondly, that various declarative and symbolic activities are important non‐psychological bases—trans‐subjective foundations—for psychological identifications of an inter‐subjective sort. These assertions link interesting to recent developments in the contemporary social psychology of interobjectivity, which likewise emphasize a type of objectivity that plays an indispensible part in co‐ordinating human relations and understanding.     

On the integration and development of psychology and logic within the framework of cognitive science

心理学研究感性认识形式，逻辑学研究理性认识形式。二者密切相关但却长期分离。认知科学的建立和发展，为心理学和逻辑学的交叉融合提供了科学依据和学科框架。在认知科学的框架下，逻辑学发生了本质的变化，产生了认知逻辑新的研究框架。在这个框架下，心理学与逻辑学交叉融合，产生了心理逻辑这一新兴学科。它认为逻辑推理受心理因素影响，是由人参与的、涉身的经验科学。认知逻辑开启了当代逻辑学发展的新时代，走上了作为多学科共同工具的广阔发展道路。认知科学的发展将带来一个学科综合交叉、问题引领科学研究、科学研究引领学科建设、人才全面发展的新时代。     

An Important Problem in the Holistic Study of Marxist Doctrine ——The Inner Logic and Implications of Marx＇s Philosophical and Economic Revolution

马克思的哲学革命与经济学革命的内在逻辑联系,是关于马克思学说整体性研究中的一个关键性问题。马克思的哲学革命与经济学革命的内在逻辑联系是在马克思超越政治经济学领域的政治经济学批判和超越哲学领域的哲学批判的过程中展现出来的,即：在超越哲学领域的哲学批判中构建政治经济学的方法论系统,同时在超越政治经济学领域的政治经济学批判中丰富和发展初步完成的哲学革命的成果,最后在这两种“互动”的批判中基本完成经济学革命并使哲学革命的内容和形式趋于完善。马克思的哲学革命与经济学革命的内在逻辑联系对当代中国马克思主义哲学研究的重要方法论启示是：作为马克思主义创始人的马克思（和恩格斯）,其学说的整体性实际上包含着对后人研究和发展其哲学的一个最为根本的方法论要求——从其学说的整体性出发来研究和发展其哲学。为此,就必须形成由批判理念、问题理念和时代理念构筑而成的跨学科意识。     

The chain store paradox

The chain store game is a simple game in extensive form which produces an inconsistency between game theoretical reasoning and plausible human behavior. Well-informed players must be expected to disobey game theoretical recommendations.The chain store paradox throws new light on the well-known difficulties arising in connection with finite repetitions of the prisoners dilemma game. Whereas these difficulties can be resolved by the assumption of secondary utilities arising in the course of playing the game, a similar approach to the chain store paradox is less satisfactory.It is argued that the explanation of the paradox requires a limited rationality view of human decision behavior. For this purpose a three-level theory of decision making is developed, where decisions can be made on different levels of rationality. This theory explains why insight into the rational solution of a decision problem does not necessarily mean that the corresponding course of action will be taken.     

A procedural model of voting

The formal framework of social choice theory is generalized through the introduction of separate representations of preferences and choices. This makes it possible to treat voting as a procedure in which decisions are actually made by interacting participants, rather than as a mere mechanism for aggregation. The extended framework also allows for non-consequentialist preferences that take procedural factors into account. Concepts such as decisiveness, anonymity, neutrality, and stability are redefined for use in the new context. The formal results obtained confirm the universality of strategic voting.     

The Not Altogether Social Construction of Emotions: A Critique of Harré and Gillett

Are emotions like sneezes, unwilled, mechanical, or are they like judgments; are they entirely social constructions? Harré and Gillett believe that emotions are exclusively judgments. We argue that their view misses something important. Imagine a person quaking in anger. Both we and Harré and Gillett believe that he is angry only if he has made an implicit judgment, such as I have been transgressed against. But it is the quaking, not the judgment, that gives authenticity and force to the expression of anger. The quaking does not clarify what the actor means but rather it clarifies the relation of the actor to the meaning of his display. What makes it a genuine expression of anger and not a joke or performance is that the quaking is beyond the will. Bodily displays are not necessary to make expressions authentic; anything that shows that the expression is beyond the will will do, for instance, obsessive thoughts, intrusions, or an inability to concentrate. For Harré and Gillett emotions both as displays and feelings do not merely embody judgments but are also speech acts. We argue that an expression, a feeling or flitting through the mind, cannot be a speech act since only the overt can fit into the convention, the strictures of a community. Nor is the display merely a speech act. Since for an emotional display to be genuine it must slip from the lips unbidden. Further, a speech act account makes the emotions arbitrary; they imply that the set of possible emotions is open. We think, on the other hand, that only some sorts of judgments can become part of an emotion; judgments that relate to things that are important enough in a particular culture that judgment display and feeling are linked together involuntarily.     

Extrapolating human probability judgment

We advance a model of human probability judgment and apply it to the design of an extrapolation algorithm. Such an algorithm examines a person's judgment about the likelihood of various statements and is then able to predict the same person's judgments about new statements. The algorithm is tested against judgments produced by thirty undergraduates asked to assign probabilities to statements about mammals.     

基层信访治理中的“包保责任制” 实践逻辑与现实困境 以鄂中桥镇为例

本文以桥镇为个案,运用国家、基层政权和农民博弈关系的三层分析框架,阐释了乡村基层信访治理中“包保责任制”的实践逻辑和现实困境。研究发现,尽管“包保责任制”能够强化包保责任人的责任意识,并在一定程度上缓解信访治理工作难题,但监控环境与空间隔离、监控技术与社会基础、监控强度与道义压力这三大矛盾使得这一制度的运行陷入困境,滋生了越来越多与制度设计初衷相悖的“目标替代”行为。在此基础上,本文阐释了中国科层制运作的三大矛盾,即理性科层制与非理性运作的矛盾、专业化与综合性的矛盾、常规运作与非常规任务的矛盾,并给出了相应的理论解释。本研究强调,在中国基层权力运作中,长期而广泛存在的名实分离的矛盾现象,不仅仅是科层体制内部各行动主体博弈的结果,也不纯粹是一个组织激励问题,而是由科层体制与乡村社会的合力所催生。由此,在推进基层政权现代化建设进程中,就不能局限于制度建设层面,还要考虑是否具备支撑现代基层政权的社会基础和制度环境。     

马克思学说整体性研究中的一个重要问题(英文)

马克思的哲学革命与经济学革命的内在逻辑联系,是关于马克思学说整体性研究中的一个关键性问题。马克思的哲学革命与经济学革命的内在逻辑联系是在马克思超越政治经济学领域的政治经济学批判和超越哲学领域的哲学批判的过程中展现出来的,即:在超越哲学领域的哲学批判中构建政治经济学的方法论系统,同时在超越政治经济学领域的政治经济学批判中丰富和发展初步完成的哲学革命的成果,最后在这两种互动的批判中基本完成经济学革命并使哲学革命的内容和形式趋于完善。马克思的哲学革命与经济学革命的内在逻辑联系对当代中国马克思主义哲学研究的重要方法论启示是:作为马克思主义创始人的马克思(和恩格斯),其学说的整体性实际上包含着对后人研究和发展其哲学的一个最为根本的方法论要求——从其学说的整体性出发来研究和发展其哲学。为此,就必须形成由批判理念、问题理念和时代理念构筑而成的跨学科意识。     

A note on the information content of a consistent pairwise comparison judgment matrix of an AHP decision maker

A decision maker using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) could be consistent, and still provide no information in the resulting vector of priorities. An extreme example would be a pairwise comparison judgment matrix filled with 1s which is totally consistent under the various definitions of consistency, but has provided no information about the prioritization of alternatives resulting from the decision maker's judgments. In this paper, the quality of a consistent decision maker's judgments using the Analytic Hierarchy Process is placed in the context of the entropy of the resulting vector of priorities. Indeed, it is the purpose of this paper to provide a formal definition of this notion ofentropy of a priority vector, and to provide a framework for a quantitative measurement of the information content of consistent pairwise comparison judgment matrices of a decision maker who is using the Analytic Hierarchy Process. We will prove that the entropy of the vector of priorities for consistent matrices follows a normal distribution and discuss some general considerations of this result.     

The Functional Value of Social Capital

In the decade plus since I raised social capital in the ABC Boyer lectures, too much of recent discussions and work have failed to relate practice and theory. Strong interest in the idea by governments and many practitioners, often looking for measures of community competencies, offer scales of varying merit. At the same time there has been continuing, often bitter, academic debates on the problems of definitions and its possible ideological flaws and origins. This schism has resulted in inadequate rigorous debates on the usefulness or otherwise of the ways in which it is being applied. In exploring this dilemma, I suggest we should accept social capital as the equivalent of fuzzy logic, it works but why isn't clear, so let's focus on how to use it effectively, rather than fighting phantom battles.     

Health system decentralization and recentralization in Italy: Ideas,discourse, and institutions

This paper explores the dynamics of health system decentralization and recentralization in Italy, investigating why and how the territorial organization of the health system has changed over time. Drawing from discursive and historical institutionalism, the explanatory framework revolves around the role of ideational and institutional factors. The methods include process tracing and interpretive‐discourse analysis. Empirical material is drawn from documents and in‐depth interviews to experts and decision‐makers. Through the analysis of the reform trajectories in light of decentralization and recentralization processes, the paper shows that the territorial organization of the Italian health system has changed through a mechanism of gradual transformative change that I here call ideational and institutional bricolage, which involves the interplay between ideas, discourse, and institutions.