Why Near‐Miss Events Can Decrease an Individual's Protective Response to Hurricanes

Prior research shows that when people perceive the risk of some hazardous event to be low, they are unlikely to engage in mitigation activities for the potential hazard. We believe one factor that can lower inappropriately (from a normative perspective) people's perception of the risk of a hazard is information about prior near‐miss events. A near‐miss occurs when an event (such as a hurricane), which had some nontrivial probability of ending in disaster (loss of life, property damage), does not because good fortune intervenes. People appear to mistake such good fortune as an indicator of resiliency. In our first study, people with near‐miss information were less likely to purchase flood insurance, and this was shown for both participants from the general population and individuals with specific interests in risk and natural disasters. In our second study, we consider a different mitigation decision, that is, to evacuate from a hurricane, and vary the level of statistical probability of hurricane damage. We still found a strong effect for near‐miss information. Our research thus shows how people who have experienced a similar situation but escape damage because of chance will make decisions consistent with a perception that the situation is less risky than those without the past experience. We end by discussing the implications for risk communication.     

Airline Safety Improvement Through Experience with Near‐Misses: A Cautionary Tale

In recent years, the U.S. commercial airline industry has achieved unprecedented levels of safety, with the statistical risk associated with U.S. commercial aviation falling to 0.003 fatalities per 100 million passengers. But decades of research on organizational learning show that success often breeds complacency and failure inspires improvement. With accidents as rare events, can the airline industry continue safety advancements? This question is complicated by the complex system in which the industry operates where chance combinations of multiple factors contribute to what are largely probabilistic (rather than deterministic) outcomes. Thus, some apparent successes are realized because of good fortune rather than good processes, and this research intends to bring attention to these events, the near‐misses. The processes that create these near‐misses could pose a threat if multiple contributing factors combine in adverse ways without the intervention of good fortune. Yet, near‐misses (if recognized as such) can, theoretically, offer a mechanism for continuing safety improvements, above and beyond learning gleaned from observable failure. We test whether or not this learning is apparent in the airline industry. Using data from 1990 to 2007, fixed effects Poisson regressions show that airlines learn from accidents (their own and others), and from one category of near‐misses—those where the possible dangers are salient. Unfortunately, airlines do not improve following near‐miss incidents when the focal event has no clear warnings of significant danger. Therefore, while airlines need to and can learn from certain near‐misses, we conclude with recommendations for improving airline learning from all near‐misses.     

Risk Perception and Disaster Preparedness in Immigrants and Canadian‐Born Adults: Analysis of a National Survey on Similarities and Differences

Research has documented that immigrants tend to experience more negative consequences from natural disasters compared to native‐born individuals, although research on how immigrants perceive and respond to natural disaster risks is sparse. We investigated how risk perception and disaster preparedness for natural disasters in immigrants compared to Canadian‐born individuals as justifications for culturally‐adapted risk communication and management. To this end, we analyzed the ratings on natural disaster risk perception beliefs and preparedness behaviors from a nationally representative survey (N = 1,089). Factor analyses revealed three underlying psychological dimensions of risk perception: external responsibility for disaster management, self‐preparedness responsibility, and illusiveness of preparedness. Although immigrants and Canadian‐born individuals shared the three‐factor structure, there were differences in the salience of five risk perception beliefs. Despite these differences, immigrants and Canadian‐born individuals were similar in the level of risk perception dimensions and disaster preparedness. Regression analyses revealed self‐preparedness responsibility and external responsibility for disaster management positively predicted disaster preparedness whereas illusiveness of preparedness negatively predicted disaster preparedness in both groups. Our results showed that immigrants’ risk perception and disaster preparedness were comparable to their Canadian‐born counterparts. That is, immigrant status did not necessarily yield differences in risk perception and disaster preparedness. These social groups may benefit from a risk communication and management strategy that addresses these risk perception dimensions to increase disaster preparedness. Given the diversity of the immigrant population, the model remains to be tested by further population segmentation.     

Perception of Earthquake Risk in Taiwan: Effects of Gender and Past Earthquake Experience

This study explored how individuals in Taiwan perceive the risk of earthquake and the relationship of past earthquake experience and gender to risk perception. Participants (n= 1,405), including earthquake survivors and those in the general population without prior direct earthquake exposure, were selected and interviewed through a computer‐assisted telephone interviewing procedure using a random sampling and stratification method covering all 24 regions of Taiwan. A factor analysis of the interview data yielded a two‐factor structure of risk perception in regard to earthquake. The first factor, “personal impact,” encompassed perception of threat and fear related to earthquakes. The second factor, “controllability,” encompassed a sense of efficacy of self‐protection in regard to earthquakes. The findings indicated prior earthquake survivors and females reported higher scores on the personal impact factor than males and those with no prior direct earthquake experience, although there were no group differences on the controllability factor. The findings support that risk perception has multiple components, and suggest that past experience (survivor status) and gender (female) affect the perception of risk. Exploration of potential contributions of other demographic factors such as age, education, and marital status to personal impact, especially for females and survivors, is discussed. Future research on and intervention program with regard to risk perception are suggested accordingly.     

Public Response to a Near‐Miss Nuclear Accident Scenario Varying in Causal Attributions and Outcome Uncertainty

Many studies have investigated public reactions to nuclear accidents. However, few studies focused on more common events when a serious accident could have happened but did not. This study evaluated public response (emotional, cognitive, and behavioral) over three phases of a near‐miss nuclear accident. Simulating a loss‐of‐coolant accident (LOCA) scenario, we manipulated (1) attribution for the initial cause of the incident (software failure vs. cyber terrorist attack vs. earthquake), (2) attribution for halting the incident (fail‐safe system design vs. an intervention by an individual expert vs. a chance coincidence), and (3) level of uncertainty (certain vs. uncertain) about risk of a future radiation leak after the LOCA is halted. A total of 773 respondents were sampled using a 3 × 3 × 2 between‐subjects design. Results from both MANCOVA and structural equation modeling (SEM) indicate that respondents experienced more negative affect, perceived more risk, and expressed more avoidance behavioral intention when the near‐miss event was initiated by an external attributed source (e.g., earthquake) compared to an internally attributed source (e.g., software failure). Similarly, respondents also indicated greater negative affect, perceived risk, and avoidance behavioral intentions when the future impact of the near‐miss incident on people and the environment remained uncertain. Results from SEM analyses also suggested that negative affect predicted risk perception, and both predicted avoidance behavior. Affect, risk perception, and avoidance behavior demonstrated high stability (i.e., reliability) from one phase to the next.     

Explicating Experience: Development of a Valid Scale of Past Hazard Experience for Tornadoes

People's past experiences with a hazard theoretically influence how they approach future risks. Yet, past hazard experience has been conceptualized and measured in wide‐ranging, often simplistic, ways, resulting in mixed findings about its relationship with risk perception. This study develops a scale of past hazard experiences, in the context of tornadoes, that is content and construct valid. A conceptual definition was developed, a set of items were created to measure one's most memorable and multiple tornado experiences, and the measures were evaluated through two surveys of the public who reside in tornado‐prone areas. Four dimensions emerged of people's most memorable experience, reflecting their awareness of the tornado risk that day, their personalization of the risk, the intrusive impacts on them personally, and impacts experienced vicariously through others. Two dimensions emerged of people's multiple experiences, reflecting common types of communication received and negative emotional responses. These six dimensions are novel in that they capture people's experience across the timeline of a hazard as well as intangible experiences that are both direct and indirect. The six tornado experience dimensions were correlated with tornado risk perceptions measured as cognitive‐affective and as perceived probability of consequences. The varied experience–risk perception results suggest that it is important to understand the nuances of these concepts and their relationships. This study provides a foundation for future work to continue explicating past hazard experience, across different risk contexts, and for understanding its effect on risk assessment and responses.     

Community Resilience and Decision Theory Challenges for Catastrophic Events

Extreme and catastrophic events pose challenges for normative models of risk management decision making. They invite development of new methods and principles to complement existing normative decision and risk analysis. Because such events are rare, it is difficult to learn about them from experience. They can prompt both too little concern before the fact, and too much after. Emotionally charged and vivid outcomes promote probability neglect and distort risk perceptions. Aversion to acting on uncertain probabilities saps precautionary action; moral hazard distorts incentives to take care; imperfect learning and social adaptation (e.g., herd‐following, group‐think) complicate forecasting and coordination of individual behaviors and undermine prediction, preparation, and insurance of catastrophic events. Such difficulties raise substantial challenges for normative decision theories prescribing how catastrophe risks should be managed. This article summarizes challenges for catastrophic hazards with uncertain or unpredictable frequencies and severities, hard‐to‐envision and incompletely described decision alternatives and consequences, and individual responses that influence each other. Conceptual models and examples clarify where and why new methods are needed to complement traditional normative decision theories for individuals and groups. For example, prospective and retrospective preferences for risk management alternatives may conflict; procedures for combining individual beliefs or preferences can produce collective decisions that no one favors; and individual choices or behaviors in preparing for possible disasters may have no equilibrium. Recent ideas for building “disaster‐resilient” communities can complement traditional normative decision theories, helping to meet the practical need for better ways to manage risks of extreme and catastrophic events.     

Sizing Up a Superstorm: Exploring the Role of Recalled Experience and Attribution of Responsibility in Judgments of Future Hurricane Risk

Research suggests that hurricane‐related risk perception is a critical predictor of behavioral response, such as evacuation. Less is known, however, about the precursors of these subjective risk judgments, especially when time has elapsed from a focal event. Drawing broadly from the risk communication, social psychology, and natural hazards literature, and specifically from concepts adapted from the risk information seeking and processing model and the protective action decision model, we examine how individuals’ distant recollections, including attribution of responsibility for the effects of a storm, attitude toward relevant information, and past hurricane experience, relate to risk judgment for a future, similar event. The present study reports on a survey involving U.S. residents in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York (n = 619) impacted by Hurricane Sandy. While some results confirm past findings, such as that hurricane experience increases risk judgment, others suggest additional complexity, such as how various types of experience (e.g., having evacuated vs. having experienced losses) may heighten or attenuate individual‐level judgments of responsibility. We suggest avenues for future research, as well as implications for federal agencies involved in severe weather/natural hazard forecasting and communication with public audiences.     

Improving Risk Management: From Lame Excuses to Principled Practice

The three classic pillars of risk analysis are risk assessment (how big is the risk and how sure can we be?), risk management (what shall we do about it?), and risk communication (what shall we say about it, to whom, when, and how?). We propose two complements as important parts of these three bases: risk attribution (who or what addressable conditions actually caused an accident or loss?) and learning from experience about risk reduction (what works, and how well?). Failures in complex systems usually evoke blame, often with insufficient attention to root causes of failure, including some aspects of the situation, design decisions, or social norms and culture. Focusing on blame, however, can inhibit effective learning, instead eliciting excuses to deflect attention and perceived culpability. Productive understanding of what went wrong, and how to do better, thus requires moving past recrimination and excuses. This article identifies common blame‐shifting “lame excuses” for poor risk management. These generally contribute little to effective improvements and may leave real risks and preventable causes unaddressed. We propose principles from risk and decision sciences and organizational design to improve results. These start with organizational leadership. More specifically, they include: deliberate testing and learning—especially from near‐misses and accident precursors; careful causal analysis of accidents; risk quantification; candid expression of uncertainties about costs and benefits of risk‐reduction options; optimization of tradeoffs between gathering additional information and immediate action; promotion of safety culture; and mindful allocation of people, responsibilities, and resources to reduce risks. We propose that these principles provide sound foundations for improving successful risk management.     

The Influence of Feelings While Driving Regular Cars on the Perception and Acceptance of Self‐Driving Cars

Self‐driving vehicles will affect the future of transportation, but factors that underlie perception and acceptance of self‐driving cars are yet unclear. Research on feelings as information and the affect heuristic has suggested that feelings are an important source of information, especially in situations of complexity and uncertainty. In this study (N = 1,484), we investigated how feelings related to traditional driving affect risk perception, benefit perception, and trust related to self‐driving cars as well as people's acceptance of the technology. Due to limited experiences with and knowledge of self‐driving cars, we expected that feelings related to a similar experience, namely, driving regular cars, would influence judgments of self‐driving cars. Our results support this assumption. While positive feelings of enjoyment predicted higher benefit perception and trust, negative affect predicted higher risk and higher benefit perception of self‐driving cars. Feelings of control were inversely related to risk and benefit perception, which is in line with research on the affect heuristic. Furthermore, negative affect was an important source of information for judgments of use and acceptance. Interest in using a self‐driving car was also predicted by lower risk perception, higher benefit perception, and higher levels of trust in the technology. Although people's individual experiences with advanced vehicle technologies and knowledge were associated with perceptions and acceptance, many simply have never been exposed to the technology and know little about it. In the absence of this experience or knowledge, all that is left is the knowledge, experience, and feelings they have related to regular driving.     

Flood Risk,Flood Mitigation,and Location Choice: Evaluating the National Flood Insurance Program's Community Rating System

Climate change is expected to worsen the negative effects of natural disasters like floods. The negative impacts, however, can be mitigated by individuals’ adjustments through migration and relocation behaviors. Previous literature has identified flood risk as one significant driver in relocation decisions, but no prior study examines the effect of the National Flood Insurance Program's voluntary program—the Community Rating System (CRS)—on residential location choice. This article fills this gap and tests the hypothesis that flood risk and the CRS‐creditable flood control activities affect residential location choices. We employ a two‐stage sorting model to empirically estimate the effects. In the first stage, individuals’ risk perception and preference heterogeneity for the CRS activities are considered, while mean effects of flood risk and the CRS activities are estimated in the second stage. We then estimate heterogeneous marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for the CRS activities by category. Results show that age, ethnicity and race, educational attainment, and prior exposure to risk explain risk perception. We find significant values for the CRS‐creditable mitigation activities, which provides empirical evidence for the benefits associated with the program. The marginal WTP for an additional credit point earned for public information activities, including hazard disclosure, is found to be the highest. Results also suggest that water amenities dominate flood risk. Thus, high amenity values may increase exposure to flood risk, and flood mitigation projects should be strategized in coastal regions accordingly.     

Examining the Relationship Between Affect and Implicit Associations: Implications for Risk Perception

It has been suggested that affect may play an important role in risk perception. Slovic et al. argued that people make use of the “affect heuristic” when assessing risks because it is easier and more efficient to rely on spontaneous affective reactions than to analyze all available information. In the present studies, a single category implicit association test (SC‐IAT) to measure associations evoked by different hazards was employed. In the first study, we tested the extent to which the SC‐IAT corresponds to the theoretical construct of affect in a risk framework. Specifically, we found that the SC‐IAT correlates with other explicit measures that claim to measure affect, as well as with a measure of trust, but not with a measure that captures a different construct (subjective knowledge). In the second study, we addressed the question of whether hazards that vary along the dread dimension of the psychometric paradigm also differ in the affect they evoke. The results of the SC‐IAT indicated that a high‐dread hazard (nuclear power) elicits negative associations. Moreover, the high‐dread hazard evoked more negative associations than a medium‐dread hazard (hydroelectric power). In contrast, a nondread hazard (home appliances) led to positive associations. The results of our study highlight the importance of affect in shaping attitudes and opinions toward risks. The results further suggest that implicit measures may provide valuable insight into people's risk perception above and beyond explicit measures.     

Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest, Romania

The Municipality of Bucharest is one of the capitals with the highest seismic risk in the world. Bucharest is particularly vulnerable to seismic hazard due to: the high density of inhabitants, especially within the residential districts with blocks of flats; the old public utility fund; the out-of-date infrastructure; the numerous industrial parks that are undergoing a restructuring process, not to mention the inefficient organization of civil protection and poor education of the population regarding seismic risk. This research was designed to examine the attitudes and perceptions of people living with the risk of an earthquake hazard in Bucharest. We were interested in how attitudes and perceptions differ depending on gender, age, education, residential area and socioeconomic status, characteristics of seismic hazard, degree of risk exposure, degree of danger, and casualty awareness. At the same time, we compare the results of this study with those from a previous and similar enquiry in 1997. The statistical processing has indicated a significant difference between the declared perception of seismic risk and the independent variables of gender, age, level of education, level of attachment to the residential area, and degree to which the subjects consider they may be affected and could retrieve their losses. Due to the continuous decrease of their living standard, the most vulnerable is the aged population. The feelings toward the residential area is another factor of statistical significance for the population's seismic danger perception. A strong affective bond offers a feeling of safety and leads to the neglect and even total denial of the hazard. In the case of independent variables regarding the type of dwelling, its age, and property form, deviations of empiric values from the theoretical distribution are not relevant for the correlation searched for, which indicates that this issue goes beyond the above-mentioned criteria.     

Passenger Rail Security,Planning, and Resilience: Application of Network,Plume, and Economic Simulation Models as Decision Support Tools

We built three simulation models that can assist rail transit planners and operators to evaluate high and low probability rail‐centered hazard events that could lead to serious consequences for rail‐centered networks and their surrounding regions. Our key objective is to provide these models to users who, through planning with these models, can prevent events or more effectively react to them. The first of the three models is an industrial systems simulation tool that closely replicates rail passenger traffic flows between New York Penn Station and Trenton, New Jersey. Second, we built and used a line source plume model to trace chemical plumes released by a slow‐moving freight train that could impact rail passengers, as well as people in surrounding areas. Third, we crafted an economic simulation model that estimates the regional economic consequences of a variety of rail‐related hazard events through the year 2020. Each model can work independently of the others. However, used together they help provide a coherent story about what could happen and set the stage for planning that should make rail‐centered transport systems more resistant and resilient to hazard events. We highlight the limitations and opportunities presented by using these models individually or in sequence.     

Science for Policy: A Case Study of Scientific Polarization,Values, and the Framing of Risk and Uncertainty

It is well documented that more research can lead to hardened positions, particularly when dealing with complex, controversial, and value‐laden issues. This study is an attempt to unveil underlying values in a contemporary debate, where both sides use scientific evidence to support their argument. We analyze the problem framing, vocabulary, interpretation of evidence, and policy recommendations, with particular attention to the framing of nature and technology. We find clear differences between the two arguments. One side stress that there is no evidence that the present approach is causing harm to humans or the environment, does not ruminate on uncertainties to that end, references nature's ability to handle the problem, and indicates distrust in technological solutions. In contrast, the other side focuses on uncertainties, particularly the lack of knowledge about potential environmental effects and signals trust in technological development and human intervention as the solution. Our study suggests that the two sides’ diverging interpretations are tied to their perception of nature: vulnerable to human activities versus robust and able to handle human impacts. The two sides also seem to hold diverging views of technology, but there are indications that this might be rooted in their perception of governance and economy rather than about technology per se. We conclude that there is a need to further investigate how scientific arguments are related to worldviews, to see how (if at all) worldview typologies can help us to understand how value‐based judgments are embedded in science advice, and the impact these have on policy preferences.     

Who Would Be Willing to Accept Disaster Debris in Their Backyard? Investigating the Determinants of Public Attitudes in Post‐Fukushima Japan

In the wake of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, the Ministry of Environment in Japan asked municipalities nationwide to accept and treat disaster waste. This call for cross‐jurisdictional waste treatment provoked considerable public controversy. To explore how the national and municipal governments can seek more public acceptance in the wake of future disasters, this study implemented a nationwide survey and addressed the question of what factors influence the public's willingness to support their municipalities’ plans to host disaster waste. Three strands of the literature—on risk perception, public dissent, and prosocial behavior—offer valuable insights into hypothesis building, although none has addressed the above question. Estimates from an ordered logistic regression (N = 1,063) reveal that the conditions of a nuclear accident and living with a small child in the household would lower the level of support for accepting disaster waste, although this does not mean that people would give their support in the absence of a nuclear accident. The results also suggest that the national and municipal governments should communicate more with the public about the risks, benefits, and costs associated with hosting disaster debris, and make efforts to improve public trust in the national government.     

Tornado Warning Perception and Response: Integrating the Roles of Visual Design,Demographics, and Hazard Experience

Recent advancements in severe weather detection and warning dissemination technologies have reduced, but not eliminated, large‐casualty tornado hazards in the United States. Research on warning cognition and behavioral response by the public has the potential to further reduce tornado‐related deaths and injuries; however, less research has been conducted in this area compared to tornado research in the physical sciences. Extant research in this vein tends to bifurcate. One branch of studies derives from classic risk perception, which investigates cognitive, affective, and sociocultural factors in relation to concern and preparation for uncertain risks. Another branch focuses on psychological, social, and cultural factors implicated in warning response for rapid onset hazards, with attention paid to previous experience and message design. Few studies link risk perceptions with cognition and response as elicited by specific examples of warnings. The present study unites risk perception, cognition, and response approaches by testing the contributions of hypothesized warning response drivers in one set of path models. Warning response is approximated by perceived fear and intended protective action as reported by survey respondents when exposed to hypothetical tornado warning scenarios. This study considers the roles of hazard knowledge acquisition, information‐seeking behaviors, previous experience, and sociodemographic factors while controlling for the effects of the visual warning graphic. Findings from the study indicate the primacy of a user's visual interpretation of a warning graphic in shaping tornado warning response. Results also suggest that information‐seeking habits, previous tornado experience, and local disaster culture play strong influencing roles in warning response.     

The Quantitative Estimation of IT‐Related Risk Probabilities

How well can people estimate IT‐related risk? Although estimating risk is a fundamental activity in software management and risk is the basis for many decisions, little is known about how well IT‐related risk can be estimated at all. Therefore, we executed a risk estimation experiment with 36 participants. They estimated the probabilities of IT‐related risks and we investigated the effect of the following factors on the quality of the risk estimation: the estimator's age, work experience in computing, (self‐reported) safety awareness and previous experience with this risk, the absolute value of the risk's probability, and the effect of knowing the estimates of the other participants (see: Delphi method). Our main findings are: risk probabilities are difficult to estimate. Younger and inexperienced estimators were not significantly worse than older and more experienced estimators, but the older and more experienced subjects better used the knowledge gained by knowing the other estimators' results. Persons with higher safety awareness tend to overestimate risk probabilities, but can better estimate ordinal ranks of risk probabilities. Previous own experience with a risk leads to an overestimation of its probability (unlike in other fields like medicine or disasters, where experience with a disease leads to more realistic probability estimates and nonexperience to an underestimation).