The Rise of Global Warming Skepticism: Exploring Affective Image Associations in the United States Over Time

This article explores how affective image associations to global warming have changed over time. Four nationally representative surveys of the American public were conducted between 2002 and 2010 to assess public global warming risk perceptions, policy preferences, and behavior. Affective images (positive or negative feelings and cognitive representations) were collected and content analyzed. The results demonstrate a large increase in “naysayer” associations, indicating extreme skepticism about the issue of climate change. Multiple regression analyses found that holistic affect and “naysayer” associations were more significant predictors of global warming risk perceptions than cultural worldviews or sociodemographic variables, including political party and ideology. The results demonstrate the important role affective imagery plays in judgment and decision‐making processes, how these variables change over time, and how global warming is currently perceived by the American public.     

Is There Any Hope? How Climate Change News Imagery and Text Influence Audience Emotions and Support for Climate Mitigation Policies

Using a national sample, this study experimentally tests the effects of news visuals and texts that emphasize either the causes and impacts of climate change or actions that can be taken to address climate change. We test the effects of variations in text and imagery on discrete emotions (i.e., hope, fear, and anger) and, indirectly, on support for climate mitigation policies. Political ideology is examined as a moderator. The findings indicate that news images and texts that focus on climate‐oriented actions can increase hope and, in the case of texts, decrease fear and anger, and these effects generally hold across the ideological spectrum. In turn, the influence of emotions on policy support depends on ideology: Hope and fear increase support for climate policies for all ideological groups but particularly conservatives, whereas anger polarizes the opinions of liberals and conservatives. Implications for climate change communication that appeals to emotions are discussed.     

The Interplay Between Knowledge,Perceived Efficacy,and Concern About Global Warming and Climate Change: A One‐Year Longitudinal Study

If the long‐term goal of limiting warming to less than 2°C is to be achieved, rapid and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are required. These reductions will demand political leadership and widespread public support for action on global warming and climate change. Public knowledge, level of concern, and perceived personal efficacy, in positively affecting these issues are key variables in understanding public support for mitigation action. Previous research has documented some contradictory associations between knowledge, personal efficacy, and concern about global warming and climate change, but these cross‐sectional findings limit inferences about temporal stability and direction of influence. This study examines the relationships between these three variables over a one‐year period and three waves with national data from New Zealand. Results showed a positive association between the variables, and the pattern of findings was stable and consistent across the three data points. More importantly, results indicate that concern mediates the influence of knowledge on personal efficacy. Knowing more about global warming and climate change increases overall concern about the risks of these issues, and this increased concern leads to greater perceived efficacy and responsibility to help solving them. Implications for risk communication are discussed.     

Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States

Despite the growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change, the mass media frequently portray the subject as one of great scientific controversy and debate. And yet previous studies of the mass public's subjective assessments of the risks of global warming and climate change have not sufficiently examined public informedness, public confidence in climate scientists, and the role of personal efficacy in affecting global warming outcomes. By examining the results of a survey on an original and representative sample of Americans, we find that these three forces—informedness, confidence in scientists, and personal efficacy—are related in interesting and unexpected ways, and exert significant influence on risk assessments of global warming and climate change. In particular, more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. We also find that confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. These results have substantial implications for the interaction between scientists and the public in general, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.     

American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?

Public risk perceptions can fundamentally compel or constrain political, economic, and social action to address particular risks. Public support or opposition to climate policies (e.g., treaties, regulations, taxes, subsidies) will be greatly influenced by public perceptions of the risks and dangers posed by global climate change. This article describes results from a national study (2003) that examined the risk perceptions and connotative meanings of global warming in the American mind and found that Americans perceived climate change as a moderate risk that will predominantly impact geographically and temporally distant people and places. This research also identified several distinct interpretive communities, including naysayers and alarmists, with widely divergent perceptions of climate change risks. Thus, "dangerous" climate change is a concept contested not only among scientists and policymakers, but among the American public as well.     

Global Warming Risk Perceptions in India

Few studies have focused on global warming risk perceptions among people in poor and developing countries, who are disproportionately impacted by climate change. This analysis conducts a comprehensive assessment of global warming risk perceptions in India using a national sample survey. Consistent with cultural theory, egalitarianism was positively associated with global warming risk perceptions. In addition, perceived vulnerability and resilience to extreme weather events were also two of the strongest factors associated with global warming risk perceptions. While worry was positively associated with risk perceptions, it accounted for only a small proportion of the variance, unlike studies in developed countries. Finally, the study also collected global warming affective images. The most common responses were “don't know” or “can't say” (25%), followed by “pollution” (21%), “heat” (20%), and “nature” (16%). The study finds that the predictors of global warming risk perceptions among the Indian public are both similar and different than those in developed countries, which has important implications for climate change communication in India.     

The Politicization of Risk: Party Cues,Polarization, and Public Perceptions of Climate Change Risk

Previous research shows that public perceptions of climate change risk are strongly related to the individual willingness to support climate mitigation and adaptation policy. In this article, I investigate how public perceptions of climate change risk are affected by communications from political parties and the degree of polarization among them. Specifically, using survey data from Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, I study the relationship between party source cues, perceived polarization, and public perceptions of climate change risk. The results reveal a positive relationship between party cues and perceptions of climate change risk, indicating that individuals adjust their risk perceptions to align with their party preference. Furthermore, a negative relationship between perceived polarization and individual risk perceptions is also discovered, showing that individuals tend to be less concerned with climate change the more polarization they perceive. However, the effect of perceived polarization is found to be limited to more abstract perceptions of risk, while being unrelated to perceptions of concrete risks. Even with some contextual variance, the results generally hold up well across the four countries.     

Risk and Climate Change: Perceptions of Key Policy Actors in Canada

This article examines factors that predict perceptions of risk associated with global climate change. The research focuses on the perceptions of those associated with climate change policy making in the prairie region of Canada. The data are from an online survey ( n = 851) of those policy actors. The analysis integrates several dominant approaches to the study of risk perception: psychometric approaches that examine the effects of cognitive structure; demographic assessments that examine, for example, differences in perception based on gender or family status; and political approaches that suggest that one's position in the policy process may affect his or her perceived risk. Attitudes toward climate change are to a degree predicted by all of these factors, but only when indirect effects are observed. Sociodemographic characteristics have little direct effect on perceived risk, but do affect general beliefs that affect risk perceptions. Perceived risk is related more strongly to these general beliefs or world views than to more specific beliefs about the effects of climate change on weather patterns. Position within the policy process also contributes to our understanding of perceptions, with industry and governmental actors demonstrating similar attitudes, which contrast with environmental groups and university researchers.     

Climate Change Risk Perception and Communication: Addressing a Critical Moment?

Climate change is an increasingly salient issue for societies and policy‐makers worldwide. It now raises fundamental interdisciplinary issues of risk and uncertainty analysis and communication. The growing scientific consensus over the anthropogenic causes of climate change appears to sit at odds with the increasing use of risk discourses in policy: for example, to aid in climate adaptation decision making. All of this points to a need for a fundamental revision of our conceptualization of what it is to do climate risk communication. This Special Collection comprises seven papers stimulated by a workshop on “Climate Risk Perceptions and Communication” held at Cumberland Lodge Windsor in 2010. Topics addressed include climate uncertainties, images and the media, communication and public engagement, uncertainty transfer in climate communication, the role of emotions, localization of hazard impacts, and longitudinal analyses of climate perceptions. Climate change risk perceptions and communication work is critical for future climate policy and decisions.     

Managing the Risk of Global Climate Catastrophe: An Uncertainty Analysis

Despite much scientific progress over many decades, the nature of global climate change remains highly uncertain, and the possibility of global climate catastrophe is one of the main concerns in public debates about global climate change. In this paper, we present a model which incorporates the risk of climate catastrophe in an analysis of greenhouse gas abatement strategy. In this model, the timing and severity of climate catastrophe are treated probabilistically. The impacts of key uncertainties on optimal policy are analyzed, and the expected values of additional information that reduces the uncertainty associated with the world economy, carbon cycle, climate change, and climate damage are estimated.     

Now What Do People Know About Global Climate Change? Survey Studies of Educated Laypeople

In 1992, a mental‐models‐based survey in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, revealed that educated laypeople often conflated global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion, and appeared relatively unaware of the role of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in global warming. This study compares those survey results with 2009 data from a sample of similarly well‐educated laypeople responding to the same survey instrument. Not surprisingly, following a decade of explosive attention to climate change in politics and in the mainstream media, survey respondents in 2009 showed higher awareness and comprehension of some climate change causes. Most notably, unlike those in 1992, 2009 respondents rarely mentioned ozone depletion as a cause of global warming. They were also far more likely to correctly volunteer energy use as a major cause of climate change; many in 2009 also cited natural processes and historical climatic cycles as key causes. When asked how to address the problem of climate change, while respondents in 1992 were unable to differentiate between general “good environmental practices” and actions specific to addressing climate change, respondents in 2009 have begun to appreciate the differences. Despite this, many individuals in 2009 still had incorrect beliefs about climate change, and still did not appear to fully appreciate key facts such as that global warming is primarily due to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the single most important source of this carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels.     

Public Support for Policies to Reduce Risk After Hurricane Sandy

A phone survey was conducted in New Jersey in 2013 four months after the second of two major devastating tropical storms (Sandy in 2012 and Irene in 2011). The objective was to estimate public support for restricting land uses in flood zones, requiring housing to be built to resist storm waters, and otherwise increasing mitigation and resilience. Respondents who supported these mitigation and resilience policies disproportionately were concerned about global climate change, trusted climate scientists and the federal government, and were willing to contribute to a redevelopment program through taxes, bonds, and fees. They also tended to have collectivist and egalitarian worldviews. Half of the respondents supported at least four of the seven risk‐reducing policies. How their support translates into public policy remains to be seen. Lack of willingness to personally fund these policies is an obstacle.     

Risk Communication,Public Engagement,and Climate Change: A Role for Emotions

This article discusses the potential role that emotions might play in enticing a lifestyle that diminishes climate change. Climate change is an important challenge for society. There is a growing consensus that climate change is due to our behavior, but few people are willing to significantly adapt their lifestyle. Empirical studies show that people lack a sense of urgency: they experience climate change as a problem that affects people in distant places and in a far future. Several scholars have claimed that emotions might be a necessary tool in communication about climate change. This article sketches a theoretical framework that supports this hypothesis, drawing on insights from the ethics of risk and the philosophy of emotions. It has been shown by various scholars that emotions are important determinants in risk perception. However, emotions are generally considered to be irrational states and are hence excluded from communication and political decision making about risky technologies and climate change, or they are used instrumentally to create support for a position. However, the literature on the ethics of risk shows that the dominant, technocratic approach to risk misses the normative‐ethical dimension that is inherent to decisions about acceptable risk. Emotion research shows that emotions are necessary for practical and moral decision making. These insights can be applied to communication about climate change. Emotions are necessary for understanding the moral impact of the risks of climate change, and they also paradigmatically provide for motivation. Emotions might be the missing link in effective communication about climate change.     

碳情绪能否助力碳捕捉与封存项目发展?

碳捕捉与封存(CCS)项目作为解决全球气候变暖问题的一种新兴减排措施,需要从多维微观视角探究其推广机制。本文将参与主体的碳情绪影响纳入博弈分析框架中,将等级依赖期望效用理论(RDEU)与博弈理论相结合,探究碳情绪影响CCS项目发展的微观作用机制。以国华神木富氧燃烧改造项目为例,仿真模拟了5种异质情绪组合下政府和能源企业的均衡策略选择。研究结果显示：当双方处于理性状态时,能源企业和政府的CCS项目参与意愿都很低,这符合当前国际上CCS项目的发展现状;当双方处于悲观情绪时,悲观情绪越高,政府选择无作为策略和能源企业选择CCS技术改造策略的概率就越大,这是社会资源配置优化的表现;当双方处于乐观情绪时,适度乐观的情绪有利于刺激CCS项目的良性发展,过度乐观的情绪会阻碍CCS项目的发展。因此,本文从碳情绪引导方面提出了管理社会碳情绪相关对策建议,以期加快实现CCS项目的规模化和商业化运营。     

Rapid Climate Change and Society: Assessing Responses and Thresholds

Assessing the social risks associated with climate change requires an understanding of how humans will respond because it affects how well societies will adapt. In the case of rapid or dangerous climate change, of particular interest is the potential for these responses to cross thresholds beyond which they become maladaptive. To explore the possibility of such thresholds, a series of climate change scenarios were presented to U.K. participants whose subjective responses were recorded via interviews and surveyed using Q methodology. The results indicate an initially adaptive response to climate warming followed by a shift to maladaptation as the magnitude of change increases. Beyond this threshold, trust in collective action and institutions was diminished, negatively impacting adaptive capacity. Climate cooling invoked a qualitatively different response, although this may be a product of individuals being primed for warming because it has dominated public discourse. The climate change scenarios used in this research are severe by climatological standards. In reality, the observed responses might occur at a lower rate of change. Whatever the case, analysis of subjectivity has revealed potential for maladaptive human responses, constituting a dangerous or rapid climate threshold within the social sphere.     

Public Perception of Uncertainties Within Climate Change Science

Climate change is a complex, multifaceted problem involving various interacting systems and actors. Therefore, the intensities, locations, and timeframes of the consequences of climate change are hard to predict and cause uncertainties. Relatively little is known about how the public perceives this scientific uncertainty and how this relates to their concern about climate change. In this article, an online survey among 306 Swiss people is reported that investigated whether people differentiate between different types of uncertainty in climate change research. Also examined was the way in which the perception of uncertainty is related to people's concern about climate change, their trust in science, their knowledge about climate change, and their political attitude. The results of a principal component analysis showed that respondents differentiated between perceived ambiguity in climate research, measurement uncertainty, and uncertainty about the future impact of climate change. Using structural equation modeling, it was found that only perceived ambiguity was directly related to concern about climate change, whereas measurement uncertainty and future uncertainty were not. Trust in climate science was strongly associated with each type of uncertainty perception and was indirectly associated with concern about climate change. Also, more knowledge about climate change was related to less strong perceptions of each type of climate science uncertainty. Hence, it is suggested that to increase public concern about climate change, it may be especially important to consider the perceived ambiguity about climate research. Efforts that foster trust in climate science also appear highly worthwhile.     

Indiscriminate,Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two “green beliefs,” referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals’ concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs—which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews—differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.     

Emotions,Trust, and Perceived Risk: Affective and Cognitive Routes to Flood Preparedness Behavior

Despite the prognoses of the effects of global warming (e.g., rising sea levels, increasing river discharges), few international studies have addressed how flood preparedness should be stimulated among private citizens. This article aims to predict Dutch citizens’ flood preparedness intentions by testing a path model, including previous flood hazard experiences, trust in public flood protection, and flood risk perceptions (both affective and cognitive components). Data were collected through questionnaire surveys in two coastal communities (n= 169, n= 244) and in one river area community (n= 658). Causal relations were tested by means of structural equation modeling (SEM). Overall, the results indicate that both cognitive and affective mechanisms influence citizens’ preparedness intentions. First, a higher level of trust reduces citizens’ perceptions of flood likelihood, which in turn hampers their flood preparedness intentions (cognitive route). Second, trust also lessens the amount of dread evoked by flood risk, which in turn impedes flood preparedness intentions (affective route). Moreover, the affective route showed that levels of dread were especially influenced by citizens’ negative and positive emotions related to their previous flood hazard experiences. Negative emotions most often reflected fear and powerlessness, while positive emotions most frequently reflected feelings of solidarity. The results are consistent with the affect heuristic and the historical context of Dutch flood risk management. The great challenge for flood risk management is the accommodation of both cognitive and affective mechanisms in risk communications, especially when most people lack an emotional basis stemming from previous flood hazard events.     

Leadership and emotion management for complex tasks: Different emotions,different strategies

Emotions in the workplace influence a number of critical cognitive tasks including information processing and decision-making. Moreover, the effect of emotion on these operations is often emotion-specific. Given these unique effects, leaders may need to learn how to manage subordinates' discrete emotions, and not just general affect. This laboratory experiment examined the effects of leaders suggesting different regulation strategies after subordinates experienced anger or pessimism. Effects of these emotions under different leader-facilitated regulation strategies were evaluated with respect to planning, a critical organizational task, and perceptions of leader effectiveness. Results demonstrated that the type of leader-facilitated regulation strategy moderates the relationships of anger and pessimism to planning. The findings imply that leaders should understand the differential effects of discrete emotions, and be prepared to help subordinates manage emotions accordingly.