The Use of Telematics Devices to Improve Automobile Insurance Rates

Most automobile insurance databases contain a large number of policyholders with zero claims. This high frequency of zeros may reflect the fact that some insureds make little use of their vehicle, or that they do not wish to make a claim for small accidents in order to avoid an increase in their premium, but it might also be because of good driving. We analyze information on exposure to risk and driving habits using telematics data from a pay‐as‐you‐drive sample of insureds. We include distance traveled per year as part of an offset in a zero‐inflated Poisson model to predict the excess of zeros. We show the existence of a learning effect for large values of distance traveled, so that longer driving should result in higher premiums, but there should be a discount for drivers who accumulate longer distances over time due to the increased proportion of zero claims. We confirm that speed limit violations and driving in urban areas increase the expected number of accident claims. We discuss how telematics information can be used to design better insurance and to improve traffic safety.     

Determinants of Probability Neglect and Risk Attitudes for Disaster Risk: An Online Experimental Study of Flood Insurance Demand among Homeowners

Little is known about why individuals place either a high or a very low value on mitigating risks of disaster‐type events, like floods. This study uses panel data methods to explore the psychological factors affecting probability neglect of flood risk relevant to the zero end‐point of the probability weighting function in Prospect Theory, and willingness‐to‐pay for flood insurance. In particular, we focus on explanatory variables of anticipatory and anticipated emotions, as well as the threshold of concern. Moreover, results obtained under real and hypothetical incentives are compared in an experiment with high experimental outcomes. Based on our findings, we suggest several policy recommendations to overcome individual decision processes, which may hinder flood protection efforts.     

Workers’ Risk Tolerance and Occupational Injuries

This study explores the relationship between individuals’ risk tolerance and occupational injuries. We analyze data from a national representative survey of U.S. workers that includes information about injuries, risk tolerance, cognitive and noncognitive attributes, and risky behaviors. We measure risk tolerance through questions regarding individuals’ willingness to gamble on their lifetime income. We estimate zero‐inflated count models to assess the role played by such measures on workers’ recurrent injuries. We discuss some implications of our results for future research and occupational safety policies. Our results highlight the concurrent and changing role played by individual, work, and environmental factors in explaining recurrent incidents. They show that risk tolerance affects recurrent injuries, although not in the direction that proponents of the concept of proneness would expect. Our measure of risk aversion shows that individuals who are somewhat more risk tolerant have fewer recurrent injuries than those who are risk averse. But the estimated relationship is U‐shaped, not monotonic and, therefore, not easy to predict. At the same time, we find that individuals’ “revealed risk preferences”—specific risky behaviors—are related to higher injury probabilities. Demanding working conditions, measures of socioeconomic status, health, and safety problems experienced by workers during their youth remain among the most important factors explaining the phenomena of recurrent injuries. So our results contribute also to the important debate about the relationship between health and socioeconomic status.     

Assessing Risk Factors in the Organic Control System: Evidence from Inspection Data in Italy

Certification is an essential feature in organic farming, and it is based on inspections to verify compliance with respect to European Council Regulation—EC Reg. No 834/2007. A risk‐based approach to noncompliance that alerts the control bodies to activate planning inspections would contribute to a more efficient and cost‐effective certification system. An analysis of factors that can affect the probability of noncompliance in organic farming has thus been developed. This article examines the application of zero‐inflated count data models to farm‐level panel data from inspection results and sanctions obtained from the Ethical and Environmental Certification Institute, one of the main control bodies in Italy. We tested many a priori hypotheses related to the risk of noncompliance. We find evidence of an important role for past noncompliant behavior in predicting future noncompliance, while farm size and the occurrence of livestock also have roles in an increased probability of noncompliance. We conclude the article proposing that an efficient risk‐based inspection system should be designed, weighting up the known probability of occurrence of a given noncompliance according to the severity of its impact.     

比例数据基于Tobit分位数回归模型的贝叶斯变量选择

针对家庭商业健康保险参保比例在[0,1]闭区间上取值的特点,本文基于Tobit模型给出了比例响应数据的贝叶斯分位数回归建模方法。通过引入回归系数的“Spike-and-slab”先验分布,应用EM算法我们提出了基于门限规则的贝叶斯变量选择方法。大量数值模拟研究验证了所提的贝叶斯变量选择方法的有效性,且具有易操作、计算量小等优点。最后,将此方法应用到家庭商业健康保险数据的实证分析,研究不同分位数水平下家庭健康保险参保比例的影响因素,得到了许多有意义的研究结果。     

Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk

This paper studies regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges, motivated by the increasingly important role they play in both public and private insurance provision. We develop a framework that combines data on health outcomes and insurance plan choices for a population of insured individuals with a model of a competitive insurance exchange to predict outcomes under different exchange designs. We apply this framework to examine the effects of regulations that govern insurers' ability to use health status information in pricing. We investigate the welfare implications of these regulations with an emphasis on two potential sources of inefficiency: (i) adverse selection and (ii) premium reclassification risk. We find substantial adverse selection leading to full unraveling of our simulated exchange, even when age can be priced. While the welfare cost of adverse selection is substantial when health status cannot be priced, that of reclassification risk is five times larger when insurers can price based on some health status information. We investigate several extensions including (i) contract design regulation, (ii) self‐insurance through saving and borrowing, and (iii) insurer risk adjustment transfers.     

Adaptive Local Polynomial Whittle Estimation of Long‐range Dependence

The local Whittle (or Gaussian semiparametric) estimator of long range dependence, proposed by Künsch (1987) and analyzed by Robinson (1995a), has a relatively slow rate of convergence and a finite sample bias that can be large. In this paper, we generalize the local Whittle estimator to circumvent these problems. Instead of approximating the short‐run component of the spectrum, ϕ(λ) , by a constant in a shrinking neighborhood of frequency zero, we approximate its logarithm by a polynomial. This leads to a “local polynomial Whittle” (LPW) estimator. We specify a data‐dependent adaptive procedure that adjusts the degree of the polynomial to the smoothness of ϕ(λ) at zero and selects the bandwidth. The resulting “adaptive LPW” estimator is shown to achieve the optimal rate of convergence, which depends on the smoothness of ϕ(λ) at zero, up to a logarithmic factor.     

逆向选择条件下带奖惩金的两期保险契约模型及其Pareto改进性研究

为了更有效的规避影响保险市场交易效率的逆向选择问题，本文分投保人风险类型为两种和多种情形建立了带奖惩金的两期保险契约模型，首次提出可以用奖励金和惩罚金有效甄别投保人的风险类型。该模型根据投保人第一个保险期内的索赔情况在第二个保险期对其进行奖励或惩罚，高风险类型的投保人如果选择为低风险类型投保人设计的保险契约，则其在第二阶段受到惩罚的概率要远远大于得到奖励的概率，即风险越高的投保人越害怕惩罚金，因此所建模型满足斯彭斯-莫里斯分离条件。带奖惩金的两期保险契约模型中保险公司的期望利润仍然为0，并不会给投保人带来额外的经济负担，却能够实现对传统部分保险契约简单重复两次的严格帕累托改进。最后采用一个算例说明了该模型的有效性。     

Insurance,Public Assistance,and Household Flood Risk Reduction: A Comparative Study of Austria,England, and Romania

In light of increasing losses from floods, many researchers and policymakers are looking for ways to encourage flood risk reduction among communities, business, and households. In this study, we investigate risk‐reduction behavior at the household level in three European Union Member States with fundamentally different insurance and compensation schemes. We try to understand if and how insurance and public assistance influence private risk‐reduction behavior. Data were collected using a telephone survey (n = 1,849) of household decisionmakers in flood‐prone areas. We show that insurance overall is positively associated with private risk‐reduction behavior. Warranties, premium discounts, and information provision with respect to risk reduction may be an explanation for this positive relationship in the case of structural measures. Public incentives for risk‐reduction measures by means of financial and in‐kind support, and particularly through the provision of information, are also associated with enhancing risk reduction. In this study, public compensation is not negatively associated with private risk‐reduction behavior. This does not disprove such a relationship, but the negative effect may be mitigated by factors related to respondents' capacity to implement measures or social norms that were not included in the analysis. The data suggest that large‐scale flood protection infrastructure creates a sense of security that is associated with a lower level of preparedness. Across the board there is ample room to improve both public and private policies to provide effective incentives for household‐level risk reduction.     

Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection

This paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection. Prices are determined by zero‐profit conditions, and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry. Crucially for applications, contract characteristics are endogenously determined, consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information, and an equilibrium always exists. Equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products Bertrand game. We apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates. Mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences. With adverse selection, an insurance mandate reduces the price of low‐coverage policies, which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage.     

Adoption of Individual Flood Damage Mitigation Measures in New York City: An Extension of Protection Motivation Theory

This study offers insights into factors of influence on the implementation of flood damage mitigation measures by more than 1,000 homeowners who live in flood‐prone areas in New York City. Our theoretical basis for explaining flood preparedness decisions is protection motivation theory, which we extend using a variety of other variables that can have an important influence on individual decision making under risk, such as risk attitudes, time preferences, social norms, trust, and local flood risk management policies. Our results in relation to our main hypothesis are as follows. Individuals who live in high flood risk zones take more flood‐proofing measures in their home than individuals in low‐risk zones, which suggests the former group has a high threat appraisal. With regard to coping appraisal variables, we find that a high response efficacy and a high self‐efficacy play an important role in taking flood damage mitigation measures, while perceived response cost does not. In addition, a variety of behavioral characteristics influence individual decisions to flood‐proof homes, such as risk attitudes, time preferences, and private values of being well prepared for flooding. Investments in elevating one's home are mainly influenced by building code regulations and are negatively related with expectations of receiving federal disaster relief. We discuss a variety of policy recommendations to improve individual flood preparedness decisions, including incentives for risk reduction through flood insurance, and communication campaigns focused on coping appraisals and informing people about flood risk they face over long time horizons.     

LASSO variable selection in data envelopment analysis with small datasets

The curse of dimensionality problem arises when a limited number of observations are used to estimate a high-dimensional frontier, in particular, by data envelopment analysis (DEA). The study conducts a data generating process (DGP) to argue the typical “rule of thumb” used in DEA, e.g. the required number of observations should be at least larger than twice of the number of inputs and outputs, is ambiguous and will produce large deviations in estimating the technical efficiency. To address this issue, we propose a Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) variable selection technique, which is usually used in data science for extracting significant factors, and combine it in a sign-constrained convex nonparametric least squares (SCNLS), which can be regarded as DEA estimator. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed LASSO-SCNLS method and its variants provide useful guidelines for the DEA with small datasets.     

The Effects of Health Insurance and Self‐Insurance on Retirement Behavior

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of employer‐provided health insurance, Medicare, and Social Security on retirement behavior. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Our results suggest that Medicare is important for understanding retirement behavior, and that uncertainty and saving are both important for understanding the labor supply responses to Medicare. Half the value placed by a typical worker on his employer‐provided health insurance is the value of reduced medical expense risk. Raising the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67 leads individuals to work an additional 0.074 years over ages 60–69. In comparison, eliminating 2 years worth of Social Security benefits increases years of work by 0.076 years.     

Significant Factors of Aviation Insurance and Risk Management Strategy: An Empirical Study of Taiwanese Airline Carriers

Aviation insurance premiums have become a heavy burden for the airline industry since September 11, 2001. Although the industry must constantly balance its operations between profitability and safety, the reality is that airlines are in the business of making money. Therefore, their ability to reduce cost and manage risk is a key factor for success. Unlike past research, which used subjective judgment methods, this study applied quantitative historical data (1999–2000) and gray relation analysis to identify the primary factors influencing ratemaking for aviation insurance premiums. An empirical study of six airlines in Taiwan was conducted to determine these factors and to analyze the management strategies used to deal with them. Results showed that the loss experience and performance of individual airlines were the key elements associated with aviation insurance premiums paid by each airline. By identifying and understanding the primary factors influencing ratemaking for aviation insurance, airlines will better understand their relative operational strengths and weaknesses, and further help top management identify areas for further improvement. Knowledge of these factors combined with effective risk management strategies, may result in lower premiums and operating costs for airline companies.     

The Role of Automatic Stabilizers in the U.S. Business Cycle

Most countries have automatic rules in their tax‐and‐transfer systems that are partly intended to stabilize economic fluctuations. This paper measures their effect on the dynamics of the business cycle. We put forward a model that merges the standard incomplete‐markets model of consumption and inequality with the new Keynesian model of nominal rigidities and business cycles, and that includes most of the main potential stabilizers in the U.S. data and the theoretical channels by which they may work. We find that the conventional argument that stabilizing disposable income will stabilize aggregate demand plays a negligible role in the dynamics of the business cycle, whereas tax‐and‐transfer programs that affect inequality and social insurance can have a larger effect on aggregate volatility. However, as currently designed, the set of stabilizers in place in the United States has had little effect on the volatility of aggregate output fluctuations or on their welfare costs despite stabilizing aggregate consumption. The stabilizers have a more important role when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound, and they affect welfare significantly through the provision of social insurance.     

SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature. In this paper, we study the identification of moral hazard from adverse selection and learning about risk within the context of a multi‐period dynamic model. We extend the model of Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 767–820) to include learning about risk and insurance coverage choice over time. We derive testable empirical implications for panel data. We then perform tests using longitudinal data from France during the period 1995–1997. We find evidence of moral hazard among a sub‐group of policyholders with less driving experience (less than 15 years). Policyholders with fewer than five years of experience have a combination of learning about risk and moral hazard, whereas no residual information problem is found for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience.     

MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE

Rising healthcare costs have sparked debate about the best way to provide high‐quality affordable health insurance. We discuss the potential for regulated insurance markets to outperform single‐payer public insurance. We use as an example the private Medicare plans that now provide insurance to almost a third of seniors in the United States. The evidence suggests that private plans can limit costs and potentially appeal to enrollees, and that well‐designed risk adjustment can mitigate market failures due to adverse selection. However, fostering competition between insurers, especially in smaller markets, is difficult. We discuss how future research might illuminate the relative advantages of public and private health insurance.     

基于变量选择和遗传网络规划的期货高频交易策略研究

高频交易在当前国际金融市场上炙手可热,股指期货的推出、融资融券和转融通业务的开通,使得我国高频交易市场初现端倪。本文立足于我国金融衍生品市场的现状提出了基于LASSO变量选择方法和遗传网络规划的期货高频交易策略。该策略首先使用LASSO从众多技术指标中,选出极少数最有效的指标作为判断函数,然后通过一种进化算法遗传网络规划来搜索合适的买点和买点,从而构建交易策略,并以黄金、铝和橡胶期货的5分钟高频交易数据为例进行回测检验。结果显示:第一,与最优子集法相比,LASSO方法在不降低预测精度的情况下,选出的指标数量最少,且均集中在趋势指标和震荡指标中。第二,通过结合遗传网络规划模型与Q强化学习法,搜索效率得到了显著提高,构建出适合于衍生品市场的简洁有效的交易策略,且在不同品种的期货交易中均超越了"买入并持有"策略,并获取超额收益,在量化投资领域充分体现了实践价值。     

An agent-based model for evaluating reforms of the National Flood Insurance Program: A benchmarked model applied to Jamaica Bay,NYC

Coastal flood risk is expected to increase as a result of climate change effects, such as sea level rise, and socioeconomic growth. To support policymakers in making adaptation decisions, accurate flood risk assessments that account for the influence of complex adaptation processes on the developments of risks are essential. In this study, we integrate the dynamic adaptive behavior of homeowners within a flood risk modeling framework. Focusing on building-level adaptation and flood insurance, the agent-based model (DYNAMO) is benchmarked with empirical data for New York City, USA. The model simulates the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and frequently proposed reforms to evaluate their effectiveness. The model is applied to a case study of Jamaica Bay, NY. Our results indicate that risk-based premiums can improve insurance penetration rates and the affordability of insurance compared to the baseline NFIP market structure. While a premium discount for disaster risk reduction incentivizes more homeowners to invest in dry-floodproofing measures, it does not significantly improve affordability. A low interest rate loan for financing risk-mitigation investments improves the uptake and affordability of dry-floodproofing measures. The benchmark and sensitivity analyses demonstrate how the behavioral component of our model matches empirical data and provides insights into the underlying theories and choices that autonomous agents make.     

Inferring Labor Income Risk and Partial Insurance From Economic Choices

This paper uses the information contained in the joint dynamics of individuals' labor earnings and consumption‐choice decisions to quantify both the amount of income risk that individuals face and the extent to which they have access to informal insurance against this risk. We accomplish this task by using indirect inference to estimate a structural consumption–savings model, in which individuals both learn about the nature of their income process and partly insure shocks via informal mechanisms. In this framework, we estimate (i) the degree of partial insurance, (ii) the extent of systematic differences in income growth rates, (iii) the precision with which individuals know their own income growth rates when they begin their working lives, (iv) the persistence of typical labor income shocks, (v) the tightness of borrowing constraints, and (vi) the amount of measurement error in the data. In implementing indirect inference, we find that an auxiliary model that approximates the true structural equations of the model (which are not estimable) works very well, with negligible small sample bias. The main substantive findings are that income shocks are moderately persistent, systematic differences in income growth rates are large, individuals have substantial amounts of information about their income growth rates, and about one‐half of income shocks are smoothed via partial insurance. Putting these findings together, the amount of uninsurable lifetime income risk that individuals perceive is substantially smaller than what is typically assumed in calibrated macroeconomic models with incomplete markets.