Characteristics of fertility transition in China]

Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.     

Social and economic factors affecting China fertility transition]

China's fertility rate, affected by various economic, cultural and social factors, is in a state of flux. In analyzing the major factors affecting the change, and in determining a fixed ratio for the degree of effectiveness of each factor, it is possible to improve birth policy in terms of predicting trends in fertility changes. Based on data gathered in 1981, the following observations were made: 1) A look at gross output value for industry and agriculture by geography shows that the more economically developed an area is, the lower is the fertility rate, and that the less economically developed an area is, the higher is the fertility rate. For example, Yunnan, with an average gross output value per person of 406.5 yuan, has a total fertility rate of 3.814, whereas Shanghai's average gross output value per person is 5566.4 yuan, and its total fertility rate is 1.316. 2) Figures comparing educational levels with total fertility rates show that cities with a greater number of women with a middle school education tend to have a lower fertility rate than cities with fewer such women. For example, Beijing's 516,000 middle school educated women have a total fertility rate of 1.589, compared to Anhui's 186,000 middle school educated women who have a total fertility rate of 2.799. Also, among college educated women, the fertility rate is 41.5/1000, the 1 child rate is 88.6%, and the multiple child rate is 1.2%, whereas those women with a primary school education have a fertility rate of 86.4/1000, a 1 child rate of 44.3%, and a multiple child rate of 26.7%. 3) As towns become urbanized, the fertility rate of those towns tend to decline. For example, Sichuan, with an Urbanization Index of 14.3 has total fertility rate of 2.650; Tianjin's Urbanization Index is 68.7, and its total fertility rate is 1.645. 4) A comparison of women engaged in physical labor to those in non-physical jobs shows that the former tend to have a higher fertility rate: women working at physical labor have a fertility rate of 86.7/1000, compared to a fertility rate of 65/1000 for those in non-physical jobs. 5) China's family planning programs advocating late marriage, late births and 1 child per couple in itself does not influence fertility rates, but taken with economic factors, it will have far reaching consequences. For example, cities with high gross output value tend to have a higher rate of 1 child per couple. 6) As the average age at marriage for women rose from 18 years in 1949 to 23 years in 1981, the rate of women having multiple children has declined in all age groups since 1964.     

An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

A comment on total fertility]

Total fertility rate (TFR) cannot be interpreted as the average number of children a couple will have, as the TFR is influenced by a number of factors. The most important factor is the fertility rate of each individual age group. A decline in these rates brings about a decline in the TFR, but other elements also play a part. Another important factor is the age at which women are getting married. The natural childbearing years run for 35 years, from age 15 through 49, but if women are not permitted to marry before age 23, this period will be reduced to 27 years, which would in turn lower the TFR. The number of children each couple is permitted to bear also has an influence on the TFR; the lower the number of children permitted, the lower the TFR. Another factor which affects the TFR is the number of women who, by law, cannot bear any more children. On a long-term basis, it does not appear that the TFR will drop to 1 by the end of this century; it will fall somewhere between 1 and 2. If it is maintained below 1.5-1.6 after 1985, and continues to gradually decline, China's population will be approximately 12 billion at the end of the 20th/Century, and the aging of the population will not become a serious problem.     

Urbanization and the fertility transition in Ghana

This paper examines the way in which migration and urban residence operate to alter fertility outcomes. While urban-rural fertility differentials have long been established for most developing societies, the nature of these differences among migrants and between migrants and those of succeeding generations is not well understood. The evidence presented here suggests that rural-urban migration and urbanization may contribute positively to processes of fertility transition. Using data from the 1998 Kumasi Peri-Urban Survey, which included a 5-year retrospective monthly calendar of childbearing, we suggest that migrants adapt quickly to an urban environment. Our results also reveal generational differences in recent and cumulative fertility. While migrants exhibit higher cumulative fertility than urban residents of the second and third generation, their fertility is significantly lower than rural averages in Ghana. Children of migrants exhibit childbearing patterns quite similar to those in higher-order generations. Most noteworthy is the nature of the disparities in childbearing patterns between migrants and the succeeding generations. Migrant women have higher lifetime fertility than urban natives. Migrant women also exhibit higher fertility over the last 5 years than second generation or high-order urban natives. But these first generation women exhibit lower fertility (vs. urban natives) for the year immediately prior to the survey. These patterns lend support to an interpretation that combines rather than opposes theories of selectivity, disruption, adaptation and socialization. We conclude by discussing mechanisms that might explain these interrelated processes of fertility adjustment and suggest that policies discouraging rural-urban migration need to be revisited.     

The fertility transition around the world

In this paper, we study the evolution of the distribution of fertility rates across the world from 1950 to 2005 using parametric mixture models. We demonstrate the existence of twin peaks and the division of the world’s countries in two distinct components: a high-fertility regime and a low-fertility regime. Whereas the significance of twin peaks vanishes over time, the two fertility regimes continue to exists over the whole observation period. In 1950, about two thirds of the world’s countries belonged to the high-fertility regime and the rest constituted the low-fertility regime. By the year 2005, this picture has reversed. Within both the low- and the high-fertility regime, the average fertility rate declined, with a larger absolute decline within the high-fertility regime. Visually, the two peaks moved closer together. For the low-fertility regime, we find both β- and σ -convergence but we cannot establish any convergence pattern for the high-fertility regime. Our results support the idea of conditional convergence where the condition is the successful initiation of the fertility transition. The results are less supportive of the existence of a unique high-fertility equilibrium.     

Different features and conditions of the fertility transition in the developed countries and the developing countries]

Differences between the demographic transition experienced by developed countries and that currently being experienced by developing countries are first discussed. The author then stresses the need for developing countries to lower fertility in order to foster socioeconomic development, rather than waiting for economic development to bring about reductions in fertility.     

Abortion and contraception in the Korean fertility transition

Abstract In this paper the relationship between the use of abortion and contraception among married women in a society experiencing uronid decline in fertility is analysed using data from the Korean National Fertility Survey of 1974. The level and pattern of abortion before and after modern contraceptives became widely available are described, and the implications of the changing patterns of abortion and contraception are discussed.     

Change of marital fertility in China from 1964 to 1981]

In 1982 the Chinese National Family Planning Commission conducted a nationwide (excepting Taiwan and Tibet) .001 random sampling of the total population to gather data on the fertility and age structures of married women. In comparing general marital fertility and standardized fertility, findings show that from 1964 to 1970 both rates averaged 225.1/1000. When family planning work began on a wide scale in 1971, the rates steadily declined, reaching 116.7/1000 in 1980. However, in 1967-68 the standard fertility rate rose by 21.34% due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and in 1980-81 the rate increased by 13.2%, indicating that problems still remain in family planning. The total marital fertility rate dropped 2.84/1000 from 1964 to 1981. The rate of decline in rural areas was greater than in the cities, but the cities had a larger percentage decline than the countryside. In the 5-year periods of 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980, marital fertility rates tended to decline in 1970 and 1975 among women aged 30-40 years because during those periods greater control was placed on women having multiple children. For 1980 and 1975, combined total rates for 15-19 year olds dropped 17.1%, but the combined total rates of 30-49 year olds dropped by 61.2%, indicating that in recent years the drop in marital fertility is mostly among those over 30 years of age.     

New evidence on the fertility transition in Ireland 1880–1911

Recent analyses of Ireland's marital fertility transition based on the Princeton Ig and the Stanford CPA measures are reassessed. Revised county estimates of Ig are subjected to regression analysis, and added insight into CPA is offered by comparing Ireland with Scotland and applying the measure to three specially constructed local data sets.     

A tentative analysis of the effect of income on women's fertility]

The impact of income on women's fertility in China is analyzed using data from official and other published sources. The author notes that there is a clear link between lower fertility and higher income up to a certain point. This point seems to be when family income reaches a level of 300 yan in rural areas. Other factors affecting fertility are also considered, including the national family planning program, female educational level, and female labor force participation.     

A socio-psychological analysis of attitudes toward fertility]

This is an introduction to the study of attitudes toward fertility and the psychosocial factors that influence them. Both individual and group attitudes are included. The author also examines how such attitudes change over time.     

Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

The recent rise in malay fertility: A new trend or a temporary lull in a fertility transition?

Period fertility rates show a recent rise in the fertility of the Malay population of Peninsular Malaysia that became evident in the late 1970s, after more than fifteen years of slow but steady declines. Detailed analysis of age-parity-specific fertility rates suggests that the recent rise is largely due to a “making up” of lower order births (first, second, and third) that had been postponed by a rapid increase in age at marriage. The period trend in higher order births and cohort trends of cumulative fertility from census data point to a continued reduction in completed Malay fertility. Regional analysis shows several states on the east coast with persistent high fertility, although the revolution in marital postponement is national in scope.     

A useful method of calculating age-specific fertility rates]

The practical use of mathematical formulas on the Chinese birth rate as broken down into age groups is analyzed. Through the use of mathematical formulas which are changed to accommodate various parameters, the report comes to 3 conclusions. 1st, the death rate among childbearing women from year T-1 to year T fits the normal distribution. 2nd, the birth rate by age for year T-1 for the above childbearing women seems to be equal to the birth rate by age in year T for all childbearing women. 3rd, every woman who died during childbirth gave birth to 1 live child in the year T-1. The main finding of the report, however, is that formula (1), when used to calculate the birth population for 1981, is quite satisfactory. This finding is supported by the fact that based on the data for 1982 from the general population survey, the birth population in 1981 as calculated by formula (1) is 20,713,434 persons. This figure is higher by 23,730 persons than the figure of 20,689,704 persons which was obtained from the general survey. The relative calculation error is 1.15%. Considering that this error absorbs the impact of 1.83% lost birth registration reports and an error in the number of women by age for 1981, the formula is sufficient.     

Family limitation and the fertility transition: Evidence from the age patterns of fertility in Europe and Asia

Summary The age patterns of marital fertility levels and decline in modern Asia and historical Europe are analysed in order to answer two questions: (1) How closely do the age patterns of marital fertility in both areas prior to a systematic fertility decline conform to the age pattern of natural fertility? (2) How similar are the age patterns of the fertility transition experienced in Europe in the past, and the age pattern of fertility decline now under way in a number of Asian populations? The answers have important implications for our understanding of the fertility transition. They suggest that modern family limitation (i.e. parity-specific fertility control) was largely absent prior to a secular decline in marital fertility in both Europe and Asia. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that once the practice of family limitation starts to spread among the broader strata of the population, it seems almost inevitably to increase until it becomes a common behavioural norm. In this respect, the modern fertility transition appears to result from the spread of innovative behaviour and cannot be viewed simply as an adjustment to new socio-economic circumstances based on previously established behavioural mechanisms.