Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework

In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondences under different rationality assumptions (independence, Pareto optimality, etc.). It is well known that, under some of these assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven ([6] and [10]); but only a partial characterization of the social choice set is obtained. We establish a relationship between the social choice set and the individuals' maximal sets, which explicitly describes a fixed agenda social choice correspondence that satisfies these rationality assumptions. Received: 30 December 1997/Accepted: 20 December 1999     

Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle.     

On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes

We present a model of coalitional property rights (CPR) regimes– regimes in which ownership of a good is attributable to coalitions of various sizes. Specifically, for each good, we define a legal structure that specifies the legal coalitions of individuals that share a communal claim to that good. Generally, each legal coalition may use exclusionary rules to allocate its holdings internally. These rules allow eligible subcoalitions to recontract by expropriating some fraction of the legal coalition's endowment. We then ask: what types of CPR regimes are socially stable in the sense of having a nonempty core? We give conditions on the legal structure and the primitives of the economy that achieve social stability in this sense. We emphasize two cases of particular interest. ( I ) Unanimity. Unanimity is required for a legal coalition to recontract against (block) the status quo. In this case, the core is nonempty under standard assumptions. Each agent's ability to veto an alternative allocation allows a partial characterization in terms of the economies that are privatized by dividing up the communal endowment among the members of each legal coalition. We show that in some economies' collective vs private ownership matters in terms of social stability. ( II ) Exclusion. Many eligible subcoalitions can expropriate the legal coalition's entire endowment. An example is the collection of simple majorities. The presence of cycles can easily lead to social instability. We show that if endowment holdings are sufficiently “specialized” and each agent's “veto power” sufficiently large, then stability can be achieved despite the presence of cycles in some goods. Received: 30 June 1993/Accepted: 28 February 1998     

Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition algebras

 In the very general setting of Armstrong (1980) for Arrow’s Theorem, I show two results. First, in an infinite society, Anonymity is inconsistent with Unanimity and Independence if and only if a domain for social welfare functions satisfies a modest condition of richness. While Arrow’s axioms can be satisfied, unequal treatment of individuals thus persists. Second, Neutrality is consistent with Unanimity (and Independence). However, there are both dictatorial and nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Unanimity and Independence but not Neutrality. In Armstrong’s setting, one can naturally view Neutrality as a stronger condition of informational simplicity than Independence. Received: 11 August 1994/Accepted: 1 April 1996     

Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, 2012) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems     

Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation

We call a domain of preference orderings “dictatorial” if there exists no Arrovian (Pareto optimal, IIA and non-dictatorial) social welfare function defined over that domain. In a finite world of alternatives where indifferences are ruled out, we identify a condition which implies the dictatoriality of a domain. This condition, to which we refer as “being essentially saturated”, is fairly weak. In fact, independent of the number of alternatives, there exists an essentially saturated (hence dictatorial) domain which consists of precisely six orderings. Moreover, this domain exhibits the superdictatoriality property, i.e., every superdomain of it is also dictatorial. Thus, given m alternatives, the ratio of the size of a superdictatorial domain to the size of the full domain may be as small as 6/m!, converging to zero as m increases.     

‘Stuck In The Middle With You’: Towards Enabling Social Work with Disabled People

This article explores progress to date in embedding enabling social work understandings and practices with disabled people by reviewing the UK social work curriculum. Based on these observations and the ideas from UK disability studies, it will offer possible solutions or at least better pathways to enabling practice with disabled people. As Meekosha has pointed out in a global context, to date social work has been experienced as an ambivalent practice [Meekosha, H. & Dowse, L. (2007) ‘Integrating critical disability studies into social work education and practice: an Australian perspective’, Practice, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 59–72], often both enabling and disabling; an intervention that can both lock and unlock resources, and challenge and reaffirm traditional notions of the ‘disability problem’ [Finkelstein, V. (1993) ‘Disability: A Social Challenge or an Administrative Responsibility?’, in Disabiling Barriers ‐ Enabling Environments, eds J. Swain, V. Finkelstein, S. French and M. Oliver, Sage Publications in association with the Open University, London]. Social work also has the potential to both challenge, but also be an (inadvertent) apologist for contemporary social support and welfare systems. Indeed it is clear that social work as a profession and social care as a policy area have been the poor relations of healthcare and health professions [King's Fund (2011) Social Care Funding and the NHS: An Impending Crisis?, King's Fund, London]. Viewed anthropologically, social work remains a largely non-disabled workforce ‘ministering’ to disabled clients (BCODP, 1997). This might reinforce the perception of ‘us and them’ in some social work encounters. As Paul Longmore questioned, can we begin to go ‘beyond affliction’ (2003) in our work with disabled people? Can social work help support the collective struggles of disabled people or is their role inevitably to reinforce that of individual(ised) clients?

The development of the personalisation agenda and self-directed support is clearly welcome in this context [DoH (2006) Our Health, Our Care, Our Say: A New Direction for Community Services, Department of Health, London; DoH (2007) Independence, Choice and Risk: A Guide to Best Practice in Supported Decision-Making, Department of Health, London; DoH (2009) Personalisation of Social Care Services, Department of Health, London]. Such developments reflect the changing service user–professional relationship. The temptation to see these developments as the icing on the social support cake needs, however, to be resisted. Arguably, with the increased rationing of social support, the continued role of social workers in assessment and monitoring of support could be seen to require a yet more reflexive and enabling professional education and training in an age of austerity, one where previously supported disabled people are being told that their needs can no longer be met.     

A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions

This note sharpens the result of Nandeibam (J Econ Theory 68:212–233, 1996). We show that a stochastic social choice function which satisfies regularity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak ex-post Pareto optimality is essentially a weak random dictatorship.     

Divergent Validity of Measures of Cognitive Distortions, Impulsivity, and Time Perspective in Pathological Gambling

The present study assessed the divergent validity of several self-report and objective behavioral measures for assessing pathological gambling using three samples divided by South Oaks Gambling Scale score [Lesieur, & Blume (1987). American Journal of Psychiatry, 144, 1184–1188]: pathological gamblers, potential pathological gamblers, and non-pathological gamblers. Self-report measures included the Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire [GBQ; Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Whelan (2002). Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 16, 143–149], the Gambling Passion Scale [GPS; Rousseau, Vallerand, Ratelle, Mageau, & Provencher, (2002). Journal of Gambling Studies, 18, 45–66], the Eysenck Impulsivity Questionnaire [EIQ; Eysenck, & Eysenck (1978). Psychological Reports, 43, 1247–1255], and the Stanford Time Perspective Inventory [STPI; Zimbardo, & Boyd (1999). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1271–1288]. Behavioral tasks included the delay discounting task [Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel (1997). Experimental & Clinical Psychopharmacology, 5, 256–263] and the Future Time Perspectives [FTP; Wallace (1956). Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 52, 240–245]. The GBQ, GPS, Impulsivity subscale of the EIQ, and DDT all exhibited robust divergent validity, however, neither measure of time perspective discriminated between groups. Applications of these findings to etiological research and clinical contexts are discussed.This work was originally presented in November, 2003 at the 37th annual convention of the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy in Boston, MA.     

A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Chun (2001) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and Ω-continuity. We obtain an alternative characterization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-invariance, instead of Ω-continuity. Furthermore, we prove that the equal division lower bound and separability imply no-envy. Using this result, we strengthen one of Chun’s (2001) characterizations of the uniform rule by showing that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, the equal division lower bound, separability, and either Ω-continuity or duplication-invariance.     

Consequences, opportunities, and procedures

This paper reflects on consequentialism which underlies the traditional normative economics. It asserts that the informational basis of normative economics should be expanded so that the intrinsic value of social choice procedures should be properly taken into account along with the value of their consequences. Three examples – the problem of fair cake division, the role of competition in the promotion of economic welfare, and bilateral trade restrictions – are invoked to pinpoint the services rendered by procedural considerations in making social welfare judgements. The Pareto libertarian paradox is also re-examined within the extended framework incorporating procedural considerations along with consequential considerations. Received: 25 March 1997 / Accepted: 8 July 1997     

Social threshold aggregations

A problem of axiomatic construction of a social decision function is studied for the case when individual opinions of agents are given as m-graded preferences with arbitrary integer m ≥ 3. It is shown that the only rule satisfying the introduced axioms of Pairwise Compensation, Pareto Domination and Noncompensatory Threshold and Contraction is the threshold rule.     

Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems

We study a sequential matching mechanism, an extensive form game of perfect information, to implement stable matchings in marriage problems. It is shown that the SPE (subgame perfect equilibrium) of this mechanism leads to the unique stable matching when the Eeckhout (Econ Lett 69:1–8, 2000) condition for the existence of a unique stable matching holds. This result does not extend to preferences that violate the Eeckhout condition, even if the matching problem has a unique stable matching. We then introduce a weaker condition, called the α ^M condition, under which the SPE outcome of the men-move-first mechanism is the men-optimal stable matching. The α ^M condition is necessary and sufficient for the men-optimal stable matching to be Pareto optimal for men.     

Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

 We establish that the Pareto property is inconsistent with non-dictatorship for social choice rules defined on two-dimensional choice spaces. In addition, we consider applications of this result in higher dimensions. We also establish the existence of Pareto rules with infinite populations, and show that in this case there is a strong manipulator. Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996     

An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result

By using a line of reasoning similar to the one used by Gibbard (Gibbard A (1973) Econometrica 41: 587–601) in the deterministic framework, we provide a more transparent and intuitive proof of the following random dictatorship result in the probabilistic framework, which is a corollary credited to H.␣Sonnenschein of the more general result of Gibbard (Gibbard A (1977) Econometrica 45: 665–681): A decision scheme is Pareto optimific ex post and strategy proof if and only if it is a random dictatorship. Received: 13 February 1996 / Accepted: 14 April 1997     

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided. Received: 25 June 1998/Accepted: 16 March 1999     

Consistency in one-sided assignment problems

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the division of payoffs to agents is flexible as part of the solution. We take a similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as Sasaki (Int J Game Theory 24:373–397, 1995) for two-sided assignment problems, and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions including consistency and weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems (i.e., the subset of one-sided assignment problems with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [Pareto indifference and consistency] or [invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2). However, we also prove that on the class of all one-sided assignment problems (solvable or not), no solution satisfies consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is non-empty (Theorem 4). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further positive results for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems in line with Sasaki’s (1995) characterizations of the core for two-sided assignment problems.     

Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences

The Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria in construction of social preferences: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable whereas y is not. The equity-first principle reverses the order of application of the two criteria. Adopting egalitarian-equivalence as the notion of equity, we examine rationality of the social preference functions based on the efficiency-first or the equity-first principle. The degrees of rationality vary widely depending on which principle is adopted, and depending on the range of egalitarian-reference bundles. We show several impossibility and possibility results as well as a characterization of the social preference function introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). We also identify the sets of maximal elements of the social preference relations in the set of feasible allocations. The results are contrasted with those in the case where no-envy is the notion of equity.This paper is a much extended version of a part of Tadenuma (1998). The author is grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Serge-Chiristophe Kolm, Kotaro Suzumura, and William Thomson for helpful comments on the earlier version of the paper. ‘‘Financial support from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan for the 21st Century Center of Excellence Project on the Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems is gratefully acknowledged’’.     

Cyber-Laundering: The Union Between New Electronic Payment Systems and Criminal Organizations

Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, Sacra Corona Unita, Stidda, Triad, Yacuza, Russian Mafia, American Cosa Nostra, Chinese Triads, Wo Hop To, Sun Yee On, 14 K, these are only some of the criminal organizations considered as the “magnates” (particularly with the meaning in power) of national and international crime and/or organized criminality. Together with the aforementioned criminal organizations, we may consider many other organizations, particularly those of the terroristic type which, although having different characteristic activities as opposed to the former, share the same modalities of financing and/or laundering of the gains deriving from the activities carried out. Studies and research, but mainly financial police operations, have often brought out the channels, systems and modalities, by means of which great amounts of money of criminal origin or destined to criminality are cleaned up and/or introduced into the financial circuits.      

Are We Thinking Straight? The Politics of Straightness in a Lesbian and Gay Social Movement Organization

Daniel Cortese's book, ‘Are we thinking straight: Thepolitics of straightness in a lesbian and gay social movementorganization’ examines the political strategies of theUSA organization, the Straight and Gay Alliance (SAGA), andits efforts to promote ‘safe schools’ for lesbian,gay, bisexual and trans youth (LGBT). The book's main focusis on how SAGA deploys the involvement of ‘straight’or heterosexually-identified individuals as part of SAGA's publicpolitical agenda. As a national organization with numerous localchapters across the United States, SAGA encourages parents,teachers and students to work together to ensure that schoolsactively protect LGBT students from homophobic