How serious is the ‘carelessness’ problem on Mechanical Turk?

This study compared the quality of survey data collected from Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers and college students. Three groups of participants completed the same survey. MTurk respondents completed the survey as paid workers using the Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform. Student Online respondents also completed the survey online after having been recruited in class. Finally, Student Paper-and-Pencil respondents completed the survey on paper in a classroom setting. Validity checks embedded in the survey were designed to gauge participants’ haste and carelessness in survey completion. MTurk respondents were significantly more likely to fail validity checks by contradicting their own answers or simply completing the survey too quickly. Student groups showed fewer careless mistakes and longer completion times. The MTurk sample tended to be older, more educated, and more ethnically diverse than student samples. Results suggest that researchers should pay special attention to the use of validity checks when recruiting MTurk samples.     

The effect of particularism on corruption: Theory and empirical evidence

This paper investigates the role played by the cultural norm of particularism, as opposed to universalism, for collusive bribery. In our theoretical framework, the act of proposing or demanding a bribe violates a commonly held social norm, thus producing a psychological cost. By lowering this psychological cost, particularism increases the probability of offering or asking for a bribe. We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25 countries from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal effect on the probability of offering a bribe. Overall, our findings indicate that policies aimed at favoring universalism may provide an effective tool to reduce corruption.     

Expert advising under checks and balances

This paper attempts to compare the efficiencies of different political institutions (with or without checks and balances) in extracting external “cheap talk” information. We find that a political institution with checks and balances can extract more credible information (measured by the number of signals) from an external partisan expert because no policymaker can unilaterally exploit revealed expert information to her own best advantage. However, there is a tradeoff between signal quantity and distribution under checks and balances, as more signals tend to be distributed more unevenly due to the existence of an “inertia region” where credible communication is more difficult. Institutions using checks and balances are more efficient when conflict of interest between policymakers is relatively small, in which case the signal distribution is less uneven.     

Wie ehrlich berichten männliche Jugendliche über ihr delinquentes Verhalten?

Survey-based studies on the prevalence and causes of deviant behaviour very much depend on the honesty of respondents. However, the validity of self-reports is rarely investigated. We report on a external validation of self-reported delinquency of male juveniles based on two survey samples — face-to-face interviews in households (N=309), and paper and pencil interviews in school (N=337) — which have been done in 1999 and 2000 in Freiburg and are used for record checks of self-reported police contacts both on the individual and aggregate level. Individual-level record checks reveal that a majority of respondents has honestly reported contacts with the police, while there are a considerable number of both ‘false negative’ and ‘false positive’ answers which come predominately from respondents with low educational and social status and of migration background. As these groups show high non-response rates as well, the correlation between delinquency and socio-economic status is likely to be underestimated. The school survey, on the other hand, yields higher and more realistic prevalence rates. However, comparisons between the two survey modes hint at differential effects of social desirability which question the validity of self-reports by respondents with high educational status. Survey results on self-reported delinquency should generally be interpreted with great caution, and more research on the mode effects of class room interviews are deemed necessary.     

声音

印度网站“我行贿了”近日在中国网络上迅速蹿红。该网站专门搜集各种行贿故事，任何人都可以在上面留言，跟网友“分享”行贿经验。目前大约有1万多腐败案例记录在该网站中，涉及印度全国19个部门，347个城市，达到了警醒政府的目的。仅仅数日，中国也出现了一些效仿的克隆网站，如“我贿赂了”和“我行贿网站”，立即吸引了众多网友在上面发帖。     

On the relation between corruption and market competition

We construct a model where bureaucrats are corruptible, in the sense that they may accept bribes in order to mislead the authorities on the actual circumstances of firms that do not comply with a government regulation. We show that corruption increases the number of competing firms. We also show that increased competition (i) increases the likelihood that corruptible bureaucrats will actually transgress, and (ii) increases the bribe that corrupt bureaucrats will demand from each firm. These results are consistent with existing evidence showing a positive relation between competition and corruption, and that this causal relation operates in both directions.     

Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from public service delivery in Kenya

This article empirically examines how an individual's economic, social and political capital affects their propensity to make bribe payments in exchange for public services. Using an individual‐level survey on bribes, the econometric results suggest that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor, but substantially decreases when institutions that constrain bureaucratic corruption are strong and effective. The results also show that the incidence of bribery decreases when social capital is high but increases when political networks are prevalent. These findings support the need to combine anti‐corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies and social policies in order to foster equity in public services provision in Kenya.     

Fingerprint-based background checks for personal care workers: Stakeholder views of policy criteria

Decision makers face difficult choices when tasked with identifying and implementing appropriate mechanisms for protecting the elderly and other vulnerable adults from abuse. A pilot project involving fingerprint-based criminal history background checks for personal care workers in Michigan has supplied an opportunity to examine one such mechanism. In conjunction with the pilot project, we have conducted a stakeholder analysis with the aim of informing decision makers about stakeholder perceptions of standard policy criteria like effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. We employed focus groups and a Web-based survey to collect data from stakeholders. While stakeholders generally see fingerprint-based background checks for personal care workers as potentially effective and as a net benefit, they also point to a variety of contingencies. They also recognize difficulties and constraints for government involvement. This preliminary analysis provides solid foundational information for decision makers and for more extensive benefit–cost analysis.     

RATIONING BY SELLER'S PREFERENCE AND PACIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper investigates the behavior of a seller who has a preference for a certain group of customers. The seller maintains stable prices over time and supplements price rationing with a nonprice rationing. In this situation the preferred buyers would have priority over nonpreferred buyers in purchasing the commodity, and if the latter purchase the commodity they may be paying higher prices. It is proposed here that the premium paid by the nonpreferred buyers is a necessary bribe to induce the seller to forego his search for the preferred buyers.     

CORRUPTION: TOP DOWN OR BOTTOM UP?

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.     

IS MORE COMPETITION ALWAYS BETTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF EXTORTIONARY CORRUPTION

Using a laboratory experiment, we assess whether increasing competition among public officials reduces extortionary corruption. We find that increasing the number of providers has no effect on bribe demands when citizens' search costs are high, but it increases corruption when search costs are low. The effect is absent in a parallel setting framed as a standard market, which we attribute to citizens using a nonsequential search strategy as opposed to sequential search in the corruption setting. We conclude that efforts to reduce search costs, such as infrastructure investments, are preferable to anti‐corruption policies aimed at increasing the number of providers. (JEL D73, D49, C91)     

Human resource issues in university health services

To provide first-rate services to students, college health services need the best possible staff. Managers and supervisors play a critical role in guiding the work of their employees so as to enhance performance. Reference checks for new employees and regular performance appraisal dialogues for ongoing employees are important tools in this process. The author discusses these issues and suggests formats for reference checks and performance appraisals.     

Government Debt and Excess Sensitivity of Private Consumption: Estimates from OECD Countries

This article investigates the role of government debt in the degree of excess sensitivity of private consumption to current disposable income. Because this type of excess sensitivity is generally attributed to liquidity constraints, this amounts to a test of the impact of government debt on the amount of credit extended to individuals. Controlling for financial liberalization we find that, for a panel of OECD countries in the 1990s, a high government debt leads to more excess sensitivity. This result supports the idea that a high government debt induces lenders to tighten credit conditions. Our findings survive several robustness checks.     

Human Resource Issues in University Health Services

Abstract

To provide first-rate services to students, college health services need the best possible staff. Managers and supervisors play a critical role in guiding the work of their employees so as to enhance performance. Reference checks for new employees and regular performance appraisal dialogues for ongoing employees are important tools in this process. The author discusses these issues and suggests formats for reference checks and performance appraisals.     

Structure and accountability a study of national nonprofit associations

In the 1990s, the integrity and performance of nonprofit organizations in the United States have come increasingly under attack, and there are new calls to hold nonprofit organizations more accountable for their behavior and performance. This article reports on a study of the organizational structures of national nonprofit associations and asks how these umbrella organizations can help to self-regulate the sector through appropriate checks and balances between the national organization and local affiliates. The authors identify a number of differences in how associations with alternative structures hold local affiliates and national organizations responsible for their performances, and they conclude that structure is an avenue of self-regulation for nonprofit organizations deserving further attention.     

WHAT DETERMINES CORRUPTION? INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE FROM MICRODATA

This paper uses a microlevel data set from 49 countries to create a direct measure of corruption, which portrays the extent of bribery as revealed by individuals who live in those countries. In addition, it investigates the determinants of being asked for a bribe at the individual level. The results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery. Examples are gender, income, education, marital status, the city size, the country’s unemployment rate, average education, and the strength of the institutions in the country. (JEL K4, D73 P16)     

The Game of Contacts: Estimating the Social Visibility of Groups

Estimating the sizes of hard-to-count populations is a challenging and important problem that occurs frequently in social science, public health, and public policy. This problem is particularly pressing in HIV/AIDS research because estimates of the sizes of the most at-risk populations-illicit drug users, men who have sex with men, and sex workers-are needed for designing, evaluating, and funding programs to curb the spread of the disease. A promising new approach in this area is the network scale-up method, which uses information about the personal networks of respondents to make population size estimates. However, if the target population has low social visibility, as is likely to be the case in HIV/AIDS research, scale-up estimates will be too low. In this paper we develop a game-like activity that we call the game of contacts in order to estimate the social visibility of groups, and report results from a study of heavy drug users in Curitiba, Brazil (n = 294). The game produced estimates of social visibility that were consistent with qualitative expectations but of surprising magnitude. Further, a number of checks suggest that the data are high-quality. While motivated by the specific problem of population size estimation, our method could be used by researchers more broadly and adds to long-standing efforts to combine the richness of social network analysis with the power and scale of sample surveys.     

The efficacy of the Rio Hondo DUI court: a 2-year field experiment

This study reports results from an evaluation of the experimental Rio Hondo driving under the influence (DUI) court of Los Angeles County, California. Interviews and official record checks with 284 research participants who were randomly assigned to a DUI court or a traditional criminal court were assessed at baseline and at 24-month follow-up. The interviews assessed the impact of the DUI court on self-reported drunk driving behavior, the completion of treatment, time spent in jail, alcohol use, and stressful life events. Official record checks assessed the impact of the DUI court on subsequent arrests for driving under the influence and other drinking-related behaviors. Few differences on any outcomes were observed between participants in the experimental DUI court and those assigned to the traditional court. The results suggest that the DUI court model had little additional therapeutic or public safety benefit over the traditional court process. The implication of these findings for the popularity of specialized courts for treating social problems is discussed.     

Independence and effectiveness: Messages from the role of Independent Reviewing Officers in England

This paper draws on research into the role of Independent Reviewing Officers (IROs) in England, exploring the dimensions and challenges of their ‘independence’. IROs are specialist social workers whose function is to review the cases of children in public care and ensure that they have appropriate plans and that these plans are being implemented in a timely manner. IROs are ‘independent’ in the sense that they are not the social worker to whom a child's case is allocated, and do not have line management responsibility for the case, however they are employed by the same local authority. There are detailed regulations and government guidelines on their role, and high expectations, but what does independence mean in this context? The paper draws on a mixed methods study conducted by the authors in 2012–14, which included a survey of 122 files of children in care from four local authorities; interviews with 54 social workers, 54 IROs, 15 parents, and 15 young people; six focus groups; and nationally-distributed questionnaires for IROs (65), social work managers (46) and children's guardians (39). The study found five dimensions of independence: professional, operational, perceived, institutional and effective. The IROs and social workers generally took more nuanced and pragmatic approaches to their inter-professional working than prescribed in the policy guidance or the pronouncements of politicians and judges, seeing this as more likely to be effective. IROs are not, and cannot be, the solution to all the problems that exist in services for children in care, and the other professionals involved should not be seen as necessarily any less capable or committed to the best interests of the children. Rather, the IRO is part of an interactive system of checks and balances which, together, may increase the likelihood that professional judgement will be exercised effectively on the child's behalf.     

Child-related Criminal History Screening and Social Work Education in Australia

Increasingly human service organisations in Australia require staff, volunteers, and social work students on placement to undergo child-related criminal history checks. In turn, many schools of social work require prospective or enrolled students to undergo criminal history checks and provide a clearance of their suitability to work with children. Universities have historically played a role of gatekeeper to the social work profession, but the appropriateness of using past criminal history in this gatekeeping process is contested. This study examines the websites of 30 Australian universities to ascertain the extent to which they require social work students to undertake child-related criminal history screening. Most universities required students to have a child-related criminal history clearance, and all but one of the remaining universities identified that screening may be required, depending upon placement agency requirements. This may limit or close off access to social work education for people with criminal histories and lived experience of hardship and disadvantage.