环境行政处罚能以儆效尤吗?——同伴影响视角下环境规制的威慑效应研究

环境规制是促进企业实施环境保护策略的主要推动力,本文应用犯罪经济学中的威慑理论,分析环境规制发挥治理作用的内在机理,实证研究目标企业环境行政处罚对同伴企业环保投资的影响,验证了环境规制发挥威慑效应的重要途径:同伴影响.以上市公司为样本,结合手工收集的2007年～2015年间企业环境行政处罚数据,实证结果显示:目标企业环境行政处罚增加了同伴企业的环保投资,即通过同伴影响路径,环境规制产生威慑效应.此外,企业规模、处罚性质以及媒体报道等因素影响环境规制的威慑效应,具体体现为被处罚企业规模大、处罚严厉以及媒体报道,对同伴企业的威慑效应更强;行业竞争作为一种外部机制,有助于强化环境规制的威慑效应.研究结论表明政府实施环境规制中提高处罚确定性、典型性、严厉性,以及舆论监督与行业竞争能够增强同伴影响,提高环境规制威慑力.     

When are organizations punished for organizational misconduct? A review and research agenda

Scholars have highlighted the use of punishment as a tool to defend laws and norms, deter deviance, and restore justice in the aftermath of organizational misconduct. However, current theory and research primarily draw on a micro-oriented lens to understand how punishment occurs in response to deviant actors within organizations, neglecting macro-oriented questions of whether and how organizations are punished for their misconduct. We review sociological and macro-organizational work that suggests punitive severity can vary with three key attributes of the organization: status, reputation, and embedded ties. We then develop a mezzo-lens framework motivated at the intersection of micro- and macro-perspectives on organizational misconduct to shed light on opportunities for theoretical expansion by crossing levels of analysis.     

The effects of driving age, driver education, and curfew laws on traffic fatalities of 15-17 year olds

This study examines the effect of state driving age, learning permit, driver's education, and curfew laws on 15-17-year-old driver fatality rates. A multivariate regression model is estimated for 47 states and nine years. The minimum legal driving age and curfew laws are found to be important determinants of fatalities. Driver's education and learning permits have smaller effects. The relationship between rates of licensure and driving age, education, and curfew laws is also examined. In each case, a more restrictive policy is found to reduce licensure of 15-17 year olds. The results suggest that the imposition of curfew laws and higher minimum driving ages are particularly effective traffic safety policies.     

Effects of Increased Auto Safety Belt Use Levels on Fatalities

To reduce the annual toll of highway deaths, more than 30 states have passed laws mandating the use of safety belts. All have been effective at raising safety belt use; equipped with different provisions and enforced with unequal care, however, they have done so to different degrees. The article estimates the relationship between attained belt use and fatalities averted. Monthly 1982-1986 fatality, collision, belt use, and other data from 64 areas in nine states were collected, then analyzed using a Poisson multiple regression model. The analysis indicates that an increase in belt use from 14-40% averts about 13% of fatalities; a more pronounced increase to 50% averts about 18%. An increase from 50-75% averts about 16% of remaining fatalities. Three significant conclusions emerge. First, previous estimates appear to have understated, in general, the overall effectiveness of belt use laws. Second, the benefits of programs to boost safety belt use in this country from its current level of about 50% to up to 75%, estimated on the basis of more direct evidence from U.S. data than previously available, appear to be very large. Third, Poisson and other multiple regression models including explicit allowance for other causal factors can usefully complement other statistical approaches in traffic safety studies.     

Why Has Safety Improved at Rail‐Highway Grade Crossings?

The number of collisions and fatalities at rail-highway intersections in the United States has declined significantly over the past 30 years, despite considerable increases in the volume of rail and highway traffic. This article disaggregates the improvement into its constituent causes. Negative binomial regressions are conducted on a pooled data set for 49 states from 1975 to 2001. The analysis concludes that about two-fifths of the decrease is due to factors such as reduced drunk driving and improved emergency medical response that have improved safety on all parts of the highway network. The installation of gates and/or flashing lights accounts for about a fifth of the reduction. The development in the 1970s and early 1980s of the Operation Lifesaver public education campaign, and the installation of additional lights on locomotives in the mid 1990s, each led to about a seventh of the reduction. Finally, about a tenth is due to closure of crossings resulting from line abandonments or consolidation of little-used crossings.     

THE HIDDEN COSTS AND RETURNS OF INCENTIVES—TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AMONG CEOs

We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students—thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire by inducing less trustworthy behavior—giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, thxe availability of penalizing incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining from implementing the punishment threat, the agent exhibits significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust seems to reinforce trustworthy behavior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use the punishment threat, although CEOs use it significantly less. (JEL: C91, C92, J30, J41)     

A Revised Economic Analysis of Restrictions on the Use of Cell Phones While Driving

Evidence that cell phone use while driving increases the risk of being involved in a motor vehicle crash has led policymakers to consider prohibitions on this practice. However, while restrictions would reduce property loss, injuries, and fatalities, consumers would lose the convenience of using these devices while driving. Quantifying the risks and benefits associated with cell phone use while driving is complicated by substantial uncertainty in the estimates of several important inputs, including the extent to which cell phone use increases a driver's risk of being involved in a crash, the amount of time drivers spend using cell phones (and hence their aggregate contribution to crashes, injuries, and fatalities), and the incremental value to users of being able to make calls while driving. Two prominent studies that have investigated cell phone use while driving have concluded that the practice should not be banned. One finds that the benefits of calls made while driving substantially exceed their costs while the other finds that other interventions could reduce motor vehicle injuries and fatalities (measured in terms of quality adjusted life years) at a lower cost. Another issue is that cell phone use imposes increased (involuntary) risks on other roadway users. This article revises the assumptions used in the two previous analyses to make them consistent and updates them using recent data. The result is a best estimate of zero for the net benefit of cell phone use while driving, a finding that differs substantially from the previous study. Our revised cost-effectiveness estimate for cell phone use while driving moves in the other direction, finding that the cost per quality adjusted life year increases modestly compared to the previous estimate. Both estimates are very uncertain.     

Employee Misuse of Information Technology Resources: Testing a Contemporary Deterrence Model

Recent research in information systems and operations management has considered the positive impacts of information technology (IT). However, an undesirable side effect of firms’ increasing reliance on IT to support the distribution and delivery of goods and services to customers is a greater exposure to a diverse set of IT security risks. One such risk is intentional employee misuse of technology resources. In this article, we draw upon modern deterrence frameworks to develop a predictive model of technology misuse intention that incorporates formal and informal sanctions as well as employment context factors. The model specifies previously untested relationships between formal and informal sanctions, thereby providing fresh insight into the role of sanctions in deterring technology misuse in organizations. Our results suggest that a predisposition toward the need for social approval and moral beliefs regarding the behavior are key determinants of technology misuse. Contrary to criminological research that has questioned the relative importance of formal sanctions in the deterrence process, we also found that the threat of formal sanctions has both direct and indirect influences on technology misuse intention. Further, from an employment context standpoint, employees who spend more working days away from the office (i.e., “virtual” mode) appear more inclined to misuse their organization's technology resources. The findings have implications for the research and practice of technology management.     

Factors Associated with the Enactment of Safety Belt and Motorcycle Helmet Laws

It has been shown that road safety laws, such as motorcycle helmet and safety belt laws, have a significant effect in reducing road fatalities. Although an expanding body of literature has documented the effects of these laws on road safety, it remains unclear which factors influence the likelihood that these laws are enacted. This study attempts to identify the factors that influence the decision to enact safety belt and motorcycle helmet laws. Using panel data from 31 countries between 1963 and 2002, our results reveal that increased democracy, education level, per capita income, political stability, and more equitable income distribution within a country are associated with the enactment of road safety laws.     

NORM ENFORCEMENT: ANGER,INDIGNATION, OR RECIPROCITY?

The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third‐party punishment is surprisingly thin. In this paper, we report the results of an experiment designed to replicate the anger‐based punishment of directly affected second parties and evaluate two distinct explanations for third‐party punishment: indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation‐driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency.     

The Role of Heavy Drinking in the Risk of Traffic Fatalities

Recent studies have identified a "hard core" of drinking drivers who do not fit a "social" drinker profile and may require medical intervention. This article builds on these studies by quantifying the role of heavy drinking in motor vehicle fatalities. Data on male alcohol-involved fatally-injured drivers (AIFIDs) were obtained from the U.S. Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) for the years 1989–1990 (n = 8876). The AIFIDs were grouped into either a "heavy" or "light" drinking category based on drinking behaviors inferred from prior driving records and blood alcohol concentrations (BAC). The majority of male AIFIDs were between the ages of 20–39 (70%). Sixty-five percent had a BAC of 150 mg/dl or greater, and 41% had a BAC in excess of 200 mg/dl. AIFIDs with high BACs were more likely to have histories of DUI convictions and license suspensions than AIFIDs with low BACs. According to the study's criteria, 73% percent of the AIFIDs could be classified as "heavy" drinkers. There were no driving variables that differentiated the heavy and light drinker groups, indicating that heavy drinking per se is the primary factor that distinguishes the groups. Male alcohol-involved fatally injured drivers are comprised mostly of heavy drinkers who may suffer from serious drinking problems or alcoholism. Successful interventions may require medical treatment as well as punitive criminal justice policies.     

EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL CONTRACTS IN SOVEREIGN BANK LENDING

This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a “punishment” effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities (“loss of reputation”). Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default and decreases the borrower's present discounted value of the net benefits of future borrowing, which create dynamic incentives. Using data on bank loans to developing countries for 1973–1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel.     

基于网络效应与不完全信息的垄断企业R&D阻挠行为

本文构建了不完全信息静态博弈模型,研究基于产品网络效应的垄断企业,面临潜在进入与现实的进入威胁情况下的R&D最优阻挠行为.研究结论表明:在面临潜在进入威胁的情况下,如果R&D行为是一种开创性发现或发明时,垄断企业采用不阻挠战略;如果R&D行为是一种渐进式创新行为时,垄断企业采用提前阻挠战略是最优的;而不同程度的潜在进入威胁引致的阻挠策略是存在区别的,当垄断企业认为进入者进入概率很大时,其最优阻挠行为是快速阻挠;当垄断企业认为进入者进入概率很小时,其最优阻挠行为是慢速阻挠.在现实进入发生的情况下,无论进入者进入市场的推出产品的方式是快还是慢,垄断企业最优阻挠战略是采用慢速阻挠战略.同时,通过数字模拟分析,验证了上述结论;并讨论了产品网络效应强度与垄断企业选择不同R&D阻挠行为的关系.     

Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted toward the defectors, but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished individual, whereas the cooperators even increase the resources devoted to punishment in this case. Our data also discriminate between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own payoff to the group's average or the group's total payoff cannot explain the fact that cooperators target their punishment at the defectors. Fairness theories that assume that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that cooperators punish defectors even if payoff inequalities cannot be reduced. Therefore, retaliation, i.e., the desire to harm those who committed unfair acts, seems to be the most important motive behind fairness‐driven informal sanctions.     

Experimental Evidence Against the Paradigm of Mortality Risk Aversion

This article deals with the question of how societal impacts of fatal accidents can be integrated into the management of natural or man‐made hazards. Today, many governmental agencies give additional weight to the number of potential fatalities in their risk assessments to reflect society's aversion to large accidents. Although mortality risk aversion has been proposed in numerous risk management guidelines, there has been no evidence that lay people want public decisionmakers to overweight infrequent accidents of large societal consequences against more frequent ones of smaller societal consequences. Furthermore, it is not known whether public decisionmakers actually do such overweighting when they decide upon the mitigation of natural or technical hazards. In this article, we report on two experimental tasks that required participants to evaluate negative prospects involving 1–100 potential fatalities. Our results show that neither lay people nor hazard experts exhibit risk‐averse behavior in decisions on mortality risks.     

A Risk-Based Method for Modeling Traffic Fatalities

We describe a risk-based analytical framework for estimating traffic fatalities that combines the probability of a crash and the probability of fatality in the event of a crash. As an illustrative application, we use the methodology to explore the role of vehicle mix and vehicle prevalence on long-run fatality trends for a range of transportation growth scenarios that may be relevant to developing societies. We assume crash rates between different road users are proportional to their roadway use and estimate case fatality ratios (CFRs) for the different vehicle-vehicle and vehicle-pedestrian combinations. We find that in the absence of road safety interventions, the historical trend of initially rising and then falling fatalities observed in industrialized nations occurred only if motorization was through car ownership. In all other cases studied (scenarios dominated by scooter use, bus use, and mixed use), traffic fatalities rose monotonically. Fatalities per vehicle had a falling trend similar to that observed in historical data from industrialized nations. Regional adaptations of the model validated with local data can be used to evaluate the impacts of transportation planning and safety interventions, such as helmets, seat belts, and enforcement of traffic laws, on traffic fatalities.     

战略阻绝效应对战略联盟决策的影响分析

本文将对战略联盟决策的分析纳入SCP范式,并通过构造在位者和潜在进入者之间的三阶段博弈模型来分析战略阻绝效应对战略联盟决策的影响.本文认为:在位者的合适的战略联盟行为具有战略阻绝效应,可以通过改变潜在进入者的进入预期、影响进入者的行为并促进在位者的支付,这种支付的改变将拓宽战略联盟的决策空间,在位者将在更高的联盟成本或更低的固定边际成本下降程度上建立战略联盟.     

Are We Adapting to Floods? Evidence from Global Flooding Fatalities

There has been a growing interest in understanding whether and how people adapt to extreme weather events in a changing climate. This article presents one of the first empirical analyses of adaptation to flooding on a global scale. Using a sample of 97 countries between 1985 and 2010, we investigate the extent and pattern of flood adaptation by estimating the effects of a country's climatological risk, recent flood experiences, and socioeconomic characteristics on its flood‐related fatalities. Our results provide mixed evidence on adaptation: countries facing greater long‐term climatological flooding risks do not necessarily adapt better and suffer fewer fatalities; however, after controlling for the cross‐country heterogeneity, we find that more recent flooding shocks have a significant and negative effect on fatalities from subsequent floods. These findings may suggest the short‐term learning dynamics of adaptation and potential inefficacy of earlier flood control measures, particularly those that promote increased exposure in floodplains. Our findings provide important implications for climate adaptation policy making and climate modeling.     

Evaluating the Perceived Efficacy of Randomized Security Measures at Airports

Both the increase in traveler numbers and the heightened threat posed by terrorism in recent years represent significant challenges to airport security measures. To ensure that a high level of security is maintained, randomized security checks have been proposed as a promising alternative to traditional security approaches. The use of randomized checks means that only a specific number of people are selected for security screening. However, the likely effects of such a change in security procedures on travelers’ security perceptions and on the deterrence of criminal activities remain unclear. Thus, the present study examines how varying the percentage of people screened during security checks influences people's security perceptions. In two online experiments, the participants were asked to imagine that they sought to smuggle an explosive dummy past an airport security check. The only information provided was the number of people screened during security checks, which was manipulated between-subjects in the first experiment and within-subjects in the second experiment. The participants then had to rate their security perception (i.e., the perceived likelihood of successfully smuggling the explosive dummy). The findings show that people perceive traditional security checks to be safer than randomized checks, irrespective of whether 90% or 30% of people are screened. Hence, if randomized security checks would indeed be implemented, it would automatically lead to a decreased perception of security. Furthermore, this decreased security perception might lead to an actual reduction in security, as the deterrence of criminal activities could also be reduced.     

Unjust punishment in organizations

What causes leaders to punish subordinates unjustly? And why might leaders keep punishing subordinates unjustly, even when this increases workplace misconduct? In the current paper we address these questions by suggesting that power and status cause leaders to punish unjustly. We review evidence on the effects of power and status on punishment, review how unjust punishments foster misconduct, and highlight how this creates a self-perpetuating feedback loop—leaders are more likely to punish in an unjust manner when subordinates engage in misconduct, but subordinates’ misconduct is partly caused by unjust punishments. We also discuss how leader-subordinate distrust may be at the heart of this phenomenon and how organizations may counteract unjust punishments. We draw attention to research areas that have received little attention and draw up an agenda for future research. Taken together, we integrate the literatures on power, status, punishment and trust, review evidence on when unjust punishments become perpetuating, challenge research suggesting that leaders are cautious when punishing, and guide future research on the topic of punishment in organizations.