劳动法视域下新生代农民工权利缺失问题

中国经济崛起和城市化进程过程中农民工的贡献有目共睹,城市让生活更美好的诱惑使得中国的新老两代农民工从农村流入城市,2008年1月1日的《劳动合同法》和《劳动争议调解仲裁法》让社会看到了改善农民工权利状况的希望,然而新生代农民工的权利保护尤其是作为一名劳动者的权利保护的现状依然不如人意,没有救济的权利不是真正的权利、迟来的正义是非正义,每年岁末对于农民工权益的突击性保障并不能从根本上解决问题,把包括农民工权益保障的社会问题纳入法治框架内、通过探析新生代农民工权利阙如问题及原因进而发现从制度层面进行解决才是解决农民工权益保障问题的根本途径。     

The Consequences for Women in the Academic Profession of the Widespread Use of Fixed Term Contracts

Women have been disadvantaged within the academic profession due to its gendered nature. Some commentators have alleged that temporary contracts may create opportunities for women and that women exhibit a stronger preference for such contracts than men. Over recent years, there has been a sharp rise in the proportion of academic staff employed on fixed term contracts in UK universities. This article examines whether the consequence of this has been to create a bridge for women, leading into and upwards within the profession, or a trap. Drawing on new empirical evidence gathered from academic staff, the conclusions are that segregation is decreasing slowly, but not because of fixed term contracts, and that fixed term contracts create traps and profound disadvantages for both sexes. Women are slightly disadvantaged by forms of patronage that operate to permit some fixed term staff to gain more secure posts. Moreover, relative to men, these professional women neither gain nor perceive any comparative benefits from fixed term contracts as opposed to open‐ended contracts.     

Two-sided market situations with existing contracts

The main aim of this paper is to study two-sided market situations where there are existing contracts which are exogenously given. These existing contracts could come from a previous competitive period or from any other circumstances. In any case, all these existing contracts provide an initial feasible solution for the two-sided market situation, perhaps non optimal in the sense the agents do not obtain jointly the maximum profit that they could get by cooperation. Therefore, the agents could be interested in improving their results through cooperation but taking into account the existing bilateral contracts. Thus, taking as starting point what each agent has got with the existing contracts, they have to distribute among themselves the extra amount that they could get by cooperation. For this kind of cooperative situation we propose different models and prove some results about the nonemptiness of the core and its relationship with the Owen set.     

Trade union support for fathers' use of work–family benefits – lessons from Sweden

Trade unions have traditionally been male-dominated organizations serving men's interests as family breadwinners, primarily through wage-setting. This study explores whether unions will contest the gendered division of parenting to develop values and practices that support men as caregivers. It takes place in Sweden, where unions are strong and fathers have legislated rights to paid parental leave. A mail survey of local unions revealed that the vast majority of unions did not believe it was important to focus attention on men as family caregivers. Only about one-fourth reported activities to improve men's benefit knowledge; only about one-third reported that they helped to implement parental leave at the workplace and only about one-fourth had negotiated contracts that extended leave benefits for fathers. Unions were more active in supporting men as fathers when they prioritized women's equal employment opportunity and when fathers requested union help. Stronger unions were more likely than others to have won enhanced benefits; contracts tended to increase compensation rather than offer more leave time. Swedish unions are in a strong position to promote, help implement and extend work–family benefits for fathers, dissolving the boundary between work and family spheres, but this potential has not yet been realized.     

Eigenverantwortung als Element eines neuen psychologischen Vertrages

As a result of work flexibilisation, employers increasingly demand from their employees to assume selfresponsibility. New psychological contracts, which emerge in the process of work flexbilisation, mirror this development. The present study analyses the relevance of self-responsibility in the employer perspective on psychological contracts in 14 companies in Switzerland. Each of the contracts corresponds to one of three contract types which drastically, moderately or conservatively diverge from the traditional contract offering employment security. With respect to the contents of self-responsibility, entrepreneurship and employee flexibility, the differences between the contracts are small. Within the companies these contract contents appear to be unbalanced, as high demands but few offers are made. In order to compensate this imbalance, psychological contracts should be actively managed and clearly communicated. Human resource measures should provide general conditions that employees can assume self-responsibility.     

LABOR MARKET SHARE CONTRACTS WHEN THE FIRM HAS TWO VARIABLE INPUTS

This paper extends Weitzman's analysis of share contracts. Firstly, a second variable input is introduced into a firm's production technology. Some share contracts give the firm an incentive to reduce worker compensation by manipulating the second variable input. This implies that contracts which possess this property cannot support the same long-run equilibrium as would be achieved with a wage contract. Secondly, a positively sloped labor supply curve is introduced. It is shown that while share contracts reduce involuntary unemployment, they may not reduce total unemployment vis-a-vis wage contracts. The paper identifies the factors which determine relative employment variability.     

Befristete Beschäftigung: Chance oder Risiko?

The paper investigates whether increased labor market flexibility leads to a reinforcement of the existing segmentation of the labor market or whether it is dismantling the barriers in the labor market. Using spell data (employment and unemployment periods) from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP, time period: 1984–1999) both determinants of fixed-term contracts and their consequences (renewed temporary employment, unemployment) are investigated with the help of random-effects logit-models. The results show that respondents’ characteristics (amount and type of human capital, formerly experienced periods of unemployment), structural variables (branch, firm size), and occupational characteristics (position, marginal employment) are influencing the risk of getting a temporary job. Furthermore it becomes evident that fixed-term contracts are increasing the risk of getting a temporary job again or of becoming unemployed after termination of the temporary job. These results show that fixed-term contracts above all are part of the secondary labor market, and that they especially have negative consequences for the employees in this segment. On the other hand fixed-term contracts can be seen as a chance in the way that they offer at least an alternative to unemployment. Hence, a too narrow evaluation of temporary employment would be too simplistic.     

Does labor contract completeness drive unionization? Experimental evidence

Flynn (2005) proposes that the degree to which labor contracts are complete may be a major driving force behind the propensity of employees to unionize. We find behavior consistent with this hypothesis in an experimental production game in which subjects are assigned to playing either employers or employees. The rate at which employees opt for a proxy for unionization more than triples when the labor-contracting regime under which they are working shifts from incomplete to complete labor contracts. Complete labor contracts drive out positive reciprocity, anger workers, and increase their desire to unionize.     

Career Planning in Spain: Do Fixed-term Contracts Delay Marriage and Parenthood?

The aim of this paper is to find an empirical connection between the striking increase in the use of fixed-term contracts in Spain and the observed delay in the age at marriage and maternity. Using the eight waves of individual information from the European Household Panel for Spain, we find that for men, the decision whether to get married is strongly negatively affected by holding unstable contracts or not working, relative to when an indefinite contract is held. However, for women, results suggest that holding fixed-term contracts is not a deterrent for the decision whether to get married. With respect to the decision of whether to enter into parenthood, results indicate that for all childless women, either with no partner, holding fixed-term contracts delays entry into motherhood relative to the holding of indefinite contracts. The discouragement effect is stronger for women with no partner, though.JEL classification: D1, J1     

No contract or unfair contract: What's better?

We investigate the welfare implications of unfair incentive contracts in comparison with interactions without contracts. Reciprocal people should cooperate conditionally in the latter situation but punish unfairness by non-cooperation. We confirm that some people do cooperate conditionally in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, some subjects do not cooperate if they face an unfair incentive contract in a similar context. However, there is no correlation between these two types of reciprocity. At an aggregate level, all contracts – no matter how fair they are – improve welfare even if agents are conditionally cooperative.     

TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS IN FRANCHISE CONTRACTS

Efficient contracts set incentives through the assignment of rights and profit shares., Although efficient contracts have been used to explain the nature of the firm, the use of contractual rights in specific business contracts is relatively unexplored. We analyze contractual rights in franchise systems, in particular the right to add franchisees. An exclusive territory assigned to an initial franchisee is not an immutable guarantee, but rather a starting point for subsequent renegotiation in the franchise relationship. Exclusivity is therefore profitable when franchisee efforts are critical to the venture. A sample of franchise contracts reveals evidence consistent with the model's prediction.     

Contracts for intimate relationships

This paper analyzes the extent to which intimate relationships established by contract differ from, and are more egalitarian than, those established by traditional legal marriage. Three types of intimate contracts are examined: contracts between legally married spouses, contracts written as a prelude to legal marriage, and contracts written by unmarried cohabitors as an alternative to legal marriage. The paper addresses two major questions: (1) To what extent do the relationships established by contract differ from those established by legal marriage? (2) To what extent do these contracts support more egalitarian family forms? While considerable variation by type of relationship was found, with the cohabitors departing the most from the traditional legal model, even the married couples wrote contracts that were significantly different from the model imposed by law. They were much more likely to structure their relationship as a partnership rather than as a hierarchy, and to hold their income and property as community property. Further, they were more likely to share the responsibilities for both economic support and homemaking tasks (in contrast to the legal assignment of these duties on the basis of sex). Thus, when compared to the relationships established by law, the 50 intimate contracts in this sample seemed to support more egalitarian family forms.     

Organizational Uncertainty and Labor Contracts in China's Economic Transition

Lifetime employment was a cornerstone of the Chinese socialist system constructed under Mao. In this system, organizations served the function of social security, and as a result, many organizations were overburdened with bloated work forces and retirees that drew from organizational coffers well into old age. Labor contracts fundamentally alter this system, as they allow firms to end the socialist institution of lifetime employment. Yet there is significant variation on the institutionalization of labor contracts in organizations. Based on a sample of 81 firms in industrial Shanghai, I show that organizations that are experiencing uncertainty in the economic transition are more likely to institutionalize labor contracts on an organizationwide basis. There are two types of organizational uncertainty in the economic transition: economic uncertainty and administrative uncertainty. In cases of economic uncertainty, firms that lost money in 1990 and firms that are burdened by large forces of retired workers are more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. In the case of administrative uncertainty, firms that are at the highest levels of the industrial hierarchy are also significantly more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. Although these upper level firms were the most protected under the command economy, they are being forced to handle the greatest among the responsibilities in the economic transition, and as a result, they experience the greatest sense of being set adrift by the state.     

Contracts in Family Therapy: Who,When, Where,What and Why?

The essential variables of contracts and their values in terms of the relevant network, the setting, and the goals and plans of treatment are briefly explored. The limitations of overt contracts in relation to system directed changes are described.     

FLEXIBLE CONTRACTS AND SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING

Theory suggests that when workers choose between permanent and flexible contracts, their utility should tend to equalize across contract types. New estimates of job satisfaction show the critical role played by unmeasured worker heterogeneity. They reveal that flexible contracts are a strong negative determinant of satisfaction with job security but are often a positive determinant of other dimensions of job satisfaction. As a consequence, flexible contracts have either a weak negative influence or no influence on overall job satisfaction. Moreover, flexible contracts generally have no impact on overall life satisfaction of the employed. These results appear broadly consistent with the presence of equalizing differences. (JEL J28, J41)     

Public Private Partnerships,the Levels of Public Investment and the New Member States

Some of the features of public private partnerships (PPPs) are outlined. The arguments that PPPs provide additional investment are critical examined, and the way in which the accounting treatment may influence the use of PPPs examined. The costs of PPPs are compared with ‘conventional’ public investment and it is argued that PPPs are a relatively expensive way of undertaking public investment. The idea that PPPs effectively transfer risk from government to private companies is assessed. Issues relating to the nature of contracts under PPPs, the transactions costs and the implementation of the contracts, are briefly considered. For the New Member States, it is suggested that national accounting rules and perceived constraints on budget deficits may encourage the use of PPPs, even if that use is not warranted in terms of costs of public investment.     

CONSTRAINED BY HOURS AND RESTRICTED IN WAGES: THE QUALITY OF MATCHES IN THE LABOR MARKET

This paper examines the explicit loss born by workers who face constraints in their working hours by analyzing differences in actual and desired hours and wages. Men tend to be underemployed while women are evenly split between over- and underemployment. Losses in surplus are generally small, but 10% of underemployed men and women experience losses of more than 34% or 50% of surplus, respectively. The loss measure is also an important determinant in predicting labor market transitions, meaning increases in surplus losses generate a higher probability of changing from workers' present jobs or changing the number of hours. ( JEL J22, J41)     

Collective Bargaining and Alcoholism:

In this project 106 collective bargaining contracts were analyzed to identify union-management responses to the problem of alcoholism in the workplace. The original contracts were collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and published on microfiche by the Microfilming Corporation of America. The contracts in this set were executed between 1977 and 1982, and cover all private sector employers with over 900 employees in Michigan. The purpose of this study was to determine the present state of collective bargaining language as a basis for identifying how employers in a unionized setting handle the problem of alcoholism at the work site. The authors discovered that alcoholism is most frequently dealt with in the disciplinary procedure. Clauses dealing with insurance benefits are the next most frequent site. There is evidence of alcoholism increasingly becoming an area for labor-management cooperation. The paper concludcs with some suggestions as to how EAP practitioners can enhance the success of programs in a unionized setting.     

Delayed-payment contracts as a means of discouraging unionization

Delayed-payment, self-enforcing implicit contracts are a viable means of discouraging unionization. A contract which would be terminated if employees unionize would reduce the expected gains from unionization for employees, because the firm would not be required to make the delayed payment. These contracts thus reduce the likelihood of unionization and are equivalent to requiring employees to post performance bonds that are forfeited to the firm if the workers unionize. Such contracts would benefit workers as well as the firm, and thus be viable, if unionization would impose deadweight losses (most likely as a result of discouraging specialized investment) and the firm’s promises are credible. Delayed-payment contracts designed for other purposes, such as discouraging shirking, would also discourage unionization if unionization increased the likelihood that the contract would be terminated. I am grateful to the anonymous referee for helpful comments on two drafts of the paper, particularly the suggestion on organization.     

CONTRACT DELEGATION WITH BARGAINING

In the theoretical literature on contract delegation, it is assumed that the contractor has all the bargaining power when contracts are proposed to the subcontractee. In this case, the principal prefers centralized to decentralized contracting structures. This paper analyzes the consequences of relaxing this assumption. It is shown that when contracts are determined by bargaining, the principal might prefer decentralization to centralization. Furthermore, it is shown that this can happen even when subcontractees have very little bargaining power. The results explain, for example, the coexistence of centralized and decentralized contracting in public procurement. (JEL D23, D82, L22)