消费者短视和以旧换新情形下设计架构与定价策略研究

耐用品的耐用性会抑制了新一代耐用品的销售,企业通常会采用以旧换新政策来激励新一代耐用品的销售。企业有两种产品设计架构策略:一体化架构策略与模块化架构策略,同时企业也有两种定价策略:静态定价策略和动态定价策略。在这种情况下,企业该如何确定产品设计架构和定价策略?在假定两期内消费者是短视情形下,论文建立了消费者与企业博弈模型分析和比较了三种情况。研究发现,无论是静态定价还是动态定价,无论是模块化架构还是一体化架构,购买了第一代产品的消费者都会整体更换成第二代产品;随着第二代核心系统的质量提升,以旧换新促使企业产品架构选择从一体化架构转变为选择模块化架构;当采用动态定价、第二代核心系统质量提升适中和折扣因子高时,企业会选择模块化架构;当企业采用模块化架构时,以旧换新政策会降低模块化产品第二代核心子系统和基础子系统之间的兼容性;如果两代产品之间的质量差距比较大,企业将会选择动态定价策略,反之会选择静态定价策略。     

考虑战略消费者行为风险的动态定价策略

本文研究的是存在战略消费者行为风险的动态定价问题,垄断厂商在需求不确定的有限时间内销售定量易逝商品,追求既定风险下的期望收益最大化;战略消费者在动态定价下基于参考价格安排购买时机.研究表明,厂商和消费者的行为策略间存在完美博弈均衡;在均衡价格范围内,战略购买行为改变了各交易主体的收益或支付,扩大了厂商收益不确定性风险;风险敏感的厂商定价趋于保守;交易信息透明是厂商实现预定目标的引导条件.     

考虑消费者策略行为的供应链两周期定价与契约设计

针对由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的供应链,考虑消费者的策略性跨期购买行为,构建了两周期动态博弈模型,分析了消费者策略性程度对两周期均衡结果、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,比较了分散式与集中式决策的均衡偏差,设计了与消费者策略性程度相关的两周期收益共享契约与"两周期收益共享+转移支付"组合式契约。研究表明:分散式决策下,消费者策略性程度有利于增加消费者剩余和社会福利,但会对供应链成员不利;某些情形下,消费者策略性程度会使分散式与集中式决策的系统利润差值增大;当消费者策略性程度相对较低时,两周期收益共享契约不仅可实现供应链完美协调,还可增加消费者剩余和社会福利;当消费者策略性程度较高时,通过组合式契约可实现供应链完美协调,但此时消费者策略性程度的增强可能对消费者剩余和社会福利产生负面影响。     

考虑多种等待成本策略型消费者的零售商定价研究

策略型消费者为选择购买时机而估计立即或推迟购买产品的效用时,除了考虑价格和可得性,还应考虑等待成本。考虑消费者等待成本的差异性,将消费者分为高等待成本消费者、居间等待成本消费者和零等待成本消费者。基于报童模型和理性预期均衡原理,考虑三种类型策略型消费者的不同比例,构建了零售商的定价决策模型。分析比较了三种情形的定价决策：以高等待成本消费者为销售目标的定价（TM定价）、以高等待成本和居间等待成本消费者为销售目标的定价（TMξ定价）以及以所有消费者为销售目标的定价（TA定价）。研究显示,即使消费者都是理性的,由于等待成本的差异也会表现出短视型或者是部分理性的消费特征。采用TM定价时,零售商最优收益随高等待成本消费者比例的增大而提高;采用TMξ定价时,零售商最优收益随零等待成本消费者比例的提高而降低;采用TA定价时,零售商有固定的最优收益,零售商可以通过权衡每个消费者群体的保留价格和相应的买家数量来获得最优的定价策略。当零等待成本消费者的比例大于阈值,不管其他消费者的类型和比例如何,都应采用TA定价策略。在存在降价销售期的情况下,零售商在两个销售阶段的均衡价格与消费者在这两个销售阶段的等待成...     

考虑捐赠行为的食品动态定价策略研究

由于质量控制不当和库存过多导致的浪费是企业管理易腐食品面临的主要挑战。针对当前食品浪费严重的问题，建立考虑变质率的动态定价模型，研究捐赠行为下单一定价、两次定价与多级折扣定价三种定价策略对食品企业最优决策的影响。通过数值分析，发现捐赠行为能够提升企业利润且在多级折扣定价策略下效果更为显著，但当折扣次数较少时，单一定价策略对考虑捐赠的企业而言更优；食品最初质量、变质率、打折时间点、捐赠时间点、税收返回比率均是影响企业定价决策的重要因素；若质量差异越大，企业在多级折扣定价策略下的利润会减少，而考虑捐赠行为会使得企业利润呈上升趋势；在变质率越高时，考虑捐赠的单一定价策略会降低企业的利润，但对多级折扣定价策略下的利润影响不大；当折扣时间越接近于捐赠时间点时，基于捐赠行为的多级折扣定价策略会更优；当捐赠时间点越接近于保质期时，考虑捐赠的价格策略会优于不考虑捐赠时的价格策略。此外，研究还表明增加税收返回比率对考虑捐赠下的定价策略不一定是有利的。     

针对策略型消费者定价问题研究进展

本文针对策略型消费行为和定价问题的相关研究进行了简单的整理和探究,通过对相关文献的阅读和整理,希望发现一些今后研究上的启示。本文从策略型消费者的出现出发,经过对相关研究的方向、重点对文献进行区分,找出各类研究的相同和不同之处,并讨论了研究的可扩展性。     

考虑零售商实行歧视行为的两阶段动态定价策略研究

消费者对产品使用的习惯性将影响其复购选择,而企业根据消费者的历史消费行为制定相应的价格策略也影响着消费者的行为。本文构建了一个两阶段动态定价模型,研究企业是否存在歧视行为及消费者的产品习惯程度对企业定价策略的影响,利用博弈方法得到了不同情境下的制造商和零售商的最优策略。研究表明:(1)消费者对产品的习惯程度不仅能够影响消费者行为,也能影响企业定价策略;(2)转移成本加大了企业对消费者的歧视程度;(3)企业倾向于采取歧视定价策略即给新客户提供价格优惠而给老客户收取高价有利于自身利益最大化;(4)企业第一阶段的市场份额不能影响第二阶段定价,但能够影响企业两阶段利润。     

竞争环境下基于顾客策略行为的易逝品动态定价研究

在两个提供相同易逝品的零售商折线竞争下,从顾客策略行为出发,研究竞争环境下两零售商的动态定价策略。首先建立供大于求的情况下两零售商动态定价模型,给出了均衡价格满足的条件,并探讨了在一些特殊情况下均衡价格的特性。然后将这一模型扩展到供小于求的情形,探讨模型的求解方法。算例分析了在折线竞争模式下零售商在面对顾客策略行为时,如何动态的决定价格。同时发现,在供大于求的情况下,顾客策略行为导致零售商的收益降低;在供小于求的情况下,一定程度的顾客策略行为可以使零售商获得更高的期望收益。     

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Myopic and Strategic Consumers: Theory and Experiment

We investigate retailers’ dynamic pricing decisions in a stylized two‐period setting with possible supply constraints and demand from both myopic and strategic consumers. We present an analytical model and then test its predictions in a behavioral experiment in which human subjects played the role of pricing managers. We find that the fraction of strategic consumers in the market systematically moderates the optimal pricing structure. When this fraction exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer offers relatively small late season markdowns to discourage strategic consumers from waiting and to incentivize them to buy during the early season; otherwise, the retailer offers relatively large markdowns to divert all strategic consumers to the late season, where the majority of revenue is made. Our model analyses suggest that the latter policy is optimal under fairly broad conditions. Our experiment shows that after some significant learning, aggregate behavior is able to approximate the key qualitative predictions from our model analysis, with one notable deviation: in the presence of a mixture of myopic and strategic consumers, subjects act somewhat myopically – they underprice and oversell in the main selling season, which significantly limits their ability to generate revenue in the markdown season.     

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Items by a Monopolist Facing Strategic Consumers

We introduce a dynamic pricing model for a monopolistic company selling a perishable product to a finite population of strategic consumers (customers who are aware that pricing is dynamic and may time their purchases strategically). This problem is modeled as a stochastic dynamic game in which the company's objective is to maximize total expected revenues, and each customer maximizes the expected present value of utility. We prove the existence of a unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium pricing policy, provide equilibrium optimality conditions for both customer and seller, and prove monotonicity results for special cases. We demonstrate through numerical examples that a company that ignores strategic consumer behavior may receive much lower total revenues than one that uses the strategic equilibrium pricing policy. We also show that, when the initial capacity is a decision variable, it can be used together with the appropriate pricing policy to effectively reduce the impact of strategic consumer behavior. The proposed model is computationally tractable for problems of realistic size.     

考虑策略性消费者的生鲜农产品定价和库存决策

消费者的策略性行为使零售商的生鲜农产品的定价和库存决策面临更大挑战。本文基于报童模型,综合考虑消费者的策略性行为,对生鲜农产品价值下降进行离散化处理。刻画策略性消费者的决策行为,构建零售商的单阶段和两阶段定价及库存决策模型,分析了产品价值剩余率对消费者行为、零售商最优定价、最优库存水平以及零售商利润的影响机理。研究发现,在单阶段模型中零售商最优价格和最优库存水平均随产品价值剩余率的递增而递增;而在两阶段模型中,第二阶段最优价格随价值剩余率的变化趋势可能存在阈值。     

A Model of Consumer Inertia with Applications to Dynamic Pricing

This paper introduces a decision model of consumer inertia. Consumers exhibit inertia when they have an inherent bias to delay purchases. Inertia may induce consumers to wait even when it is optimal to buy immediately. We embed our decision model within a dynamic pricing context. There is a firm that sells a fixed capacity over two time periods to an uncertain number of both rational and inertial consumers. We find that consumer inertia has both positive and negative effects on profits: it decreases demand (in period one) but intensifies competition among consumers for the product (in period two). We show that our model of inertia is consistent with well‐established behavioral regularities, such as loss aversion and probability weighting in the sense of prospect theory, and hyperbolic time preferences. We offer practical recommendations for firms to influence the level of consumer inertia. These include offering returns policies (to mitigate potential consumer losses), providing decision aids (to avoid perception errors), and offering flexible payment options (to lower transaction costs).     

制造商广告和零售商动态定价联合决策模型

考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,制造商以批发价格为零售商提供一种产品,零售商再以零售价格将产品销售给顾客;制造商可以做广告来提高销售量,零售商的零售价格和制造商的广告不仅对本期的需求有影响,而且对下期的需求也有影响.在这样的条件下刻画两周期的需求函数,提出一个两周期动态定价和广告联合模型.在集中式供应链下,采用两阶段逆向归纳法给出两周期定价和广告决策,分析价格敏感系数和广告敏感系数对决策的影响;在分散式供应链下,制造商为Stackelberg博弈的领导者,零售商为追随者,采用四阶段逆向归纳法给出两周期定价和广告决策的均衡解,并给出了批发价格协调供应链的条件.结果表明,下期的定价和广告决策很大程度上依赖于本期的定价和广告决策.     

A Dynamic Model of Product Quality and Pricing Decisions on Sales Response

This paper presents a dynamic model that examines the influence of price and customer perception of product quality on the sales rate of a firm producing durable goods. The sales rate of the firm is modeled as a function of its price, average product life, perceived quality, and market potential. Specifically, the model considers: (1) the process by which perceived quality is determined by including the effects of the average life of a product and quality weighted units in the market; (2) the time delay in the influence of actual quality on perceived quality; (3) the process by which demand (i.e., potential sales) is converted to realized sales due to the effects of price and perceived quality; and (4) the saturation effect and associated non-linearity in the demand function. The model presented is a reformulation and extension of the model originally proposed by Bass [2]. The validity of the model is tested using historical data on For Mustang.     

航空客运平行航班动态定价模型

航空公司在同一航线上,提供多个不同时刻起飞的航班,我们称这样的航班为平行航班。本文应用随机控制理论建立了两个平行航班动态定价连续时间数学模型,证明了最优策略的性质,得到了最优动态定价综合策略,并给出了最优控制的时间阈值点。数值实验结果表明,这种时间阈值点的综合控制策略不仅易于实施,而且,应用该优化模型得到的总收入比两个平行航班独立决策时得到的总收入大。     

零售商的动态定价和服务模型分析

假定需求是价格,服务水平的线性函数,采用最优控制方法求解最优价格和服务函数,分析了时间衰变因子对最优价格的影响以及两种需求弹性的性质。最后借助数值计算的方法研究了控制变量和状态变量的轨迹以及模型参数对目标函数值的影响情况。