中国养老保险隐性债务显性化研究

养老保险隐性债务是现收现付制养老金制度的固有特征;养老保险隐性债务的显性化问题是源于现收现付制养老保险向基金制的转轨。养老保险制度的转轨成本源于隐性债务,但在量上并不等于隐性债务,只有在制度转轨过程中显性化出来的那部分隐性债务才是转轨成本。中国养老保险制度改革的目标是部分基金制,因而只是部分旧制度下的隐性债务会显性化。隐性债务的显性化是一个复杂的动态变化过程,作者用系统动力学的方法进行模拟测算,得出中国未来各期的政府清偿隐性债务的估测量值,以供决策部门参考。     

A note on intergenerational risk sharing and the design of pay-as-you-go pension programs

Different versions of pay-as-you-go public pension programs may have entirely different effects on the intergenerational distribution of income risk. If the pension benefit is a fixed proportion of previous labor income, a pay-as-you-go program increases the net income risk of all generations. On the other hand, a pay-as-you-go program characterized by a fixed labor income tax rate and uncertain pension benefits provides intergenerational risk sharing. Received: 10 December 1996 / Accepted: 24 November 1997     

Beggar thy thrifty neighbour

This paper explores the international spillover effects of ageing through capital markets when countries have different pension systems. We use a two-country two-period overlapping-generations model, where the two countries only differ in their pension schemes. Two forms of population ageing are considered, namely, an increase in longevity and a fall in fertility. It is shown that, in the long run, a country using a funded pension system experiences negative spillovers from the fact that the other country uses a pay-as-you-go system. The short-run spillovers, however, are opposite to the spillovers in the long run.      

Private versus public old-age security

We directly compare two institutions, a family compact—a parent makes a transfer to her parent in anticipation of a possible future gift from her children—with a pay-as-you-go, public pension system, in a life cycle model with endogenous fertility wherein children are valued both as consumption and investment goods. Absent intragenerational heterogeneity, we show that a benevolent government has no welfare justification for introducing public pensions alongside thriving family compacts since the former is associated with inefficiently low fertility. This result hinges critically on a fiscal externality—the inability of middle age agents to internalize the impact of their fertility decisions on old-age transfers under a public pension system. With homogeneous agents, a strong-enough negative aggregate shock to middle-age incomes destroys all family compacts, and in such a setting, an optimal public pension system cannot enter. This suggests the raison d’être for social security must lie outside of its function as a pension system—specifically its redistributive function which emerges with heterogeneous agents. In a simple modification of our benchmark model—one that allows for idiosyncratic frictions to compact formation such as differences in infertility/mating status—a welfare-enhancing role for a public pension system emerges; such systems may flourish even when family compacts cannot.     

Pareto improving transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system in a model of endogenous growth

In this paper we investigate the possibility of Pareto improving social security reforms within a framework of endogenous growth. Belan et al. (1998) propose a transition from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system to a system of savings–subsidization. We follow this approach and prove that a Pareto improving conversion from the PAYG system to a fully funded one is possible. Finally, we compare the subsidy system with the fully funded system and discuss the problem of implementing the transition to the fully funded system. Received: 07 March 1999/Accepted: 13 December 1999     

Pension reform, employment by age, and long-run growth

We study the effects of pension reform on hours worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older workers, and aggregate growth in a four-period OLG model. The model explains important facts well for many OECD countries. Our simulation results prefer an intelligent pay-as-you-go system above a fully funded private system. Positive effects on employment and growth are the strongest when the pay-as-you-go system includes a tight link between individual labor income and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base.     

养老保险基金模式选择的人口学分析

从人口学角度看,养老保险基金的两种基本模式——现收现付制和基金制分别表现为时期平衡和队列平衡。退休者的生活消费均来源于在职职工创造的财富,因此,不仅现收现付制,而且基金制养老保险也体现了代际之间的再分配关系。人口老龄化、劳动力人口数量、人口素质和人口迁移是影响养老保险基金模式选择的主要人口因素。我们要综合考虑人口因素和经济因素来选择我国的养老保险基金模式。     

Pay-as-you-go financed public pensions in a model of endogenous growth and fertility

Employing an overlapping generations endogenous growth model in which parents derive utility from having children and, additionally, expect children to support them in old age, this paper explores the interrelation between growth, fertility, and the size of pay-as-you-go financed public pensions. It is shown that small sized public pensions stimulate per capita income growth, but further increases in public pensions eventually reduce it. Fertility, on the other hand, falls by an increase in public pensions if they are either small or large. Medium sized public pensions, however, may stimulate fertility. Received: 9 September 1997 / Accepted: 10 April 1998     

Population aging and PAYG pensions in the OLG model

This paper shows the effects on a pay-as-you-go pension system of the demographic change in the standard overlapping generations model. Firstly, we consider a setting with exogenous fertility and then a model with endogenous fertility. In both cases, population aging due to increased longevity implies a reduction in pensions payouts.     

Fertility-related pensions and cyclical instability

In this paper, we study a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, endogenous fertility and public pensions. By assuming Cobb–Douglas technology and logarithmic preferences, we show that the introduction of a fertility-related component in the pay-as-you-go pension scheme may destabilise the long-term equilibrium and cause endogenous fluctuations when individuals have static expectations. The possibility of cyclical instability increases (resp. reduces) when both the subjective discount factor and relative weight of individual fertility in pay-as-you-go pensions (resp. the parents’ taste for children) increase(s). Interestingly, when public pensions are contingent on the individual number of children, the financing of small-sized benefits may cause the occurrence of a flip bifurcation, two-period cycles and cycles of a higher order. In addition, we show through numerical simulations that these results hold in a more general setting with a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution utility function and a constant elasticity of substitution production function. Our findings identify a possible novel factor responsible for persistent deterministic fluctuations in a context of overlapping generations, while also representing a policy warning regarding the destabilising effects of fertility-related pension reforms, which are currently high in both the theoretical debate and the political agendas of several developed countries.     

Pension reform and labor market incentives

This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go pension system with a tax–benefit link affects retirement and work incentives of prime-age workers. We find that postponed retirement tends to harm incentives of prime-age workers in the presence of a tax–benefit link, thereby creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor supply. We show how several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old workers or, indeed, both groups under appropriate conditions. We characterize the excess burden of pension insurance and show how it depends on the supply elasticities of both decision margins and the effective tax rates.     

Social security reform and the support for public education

Old age pensions and public education account for a large share of public budgets. We link both programs through a tax-transfer system that is also sensitive to labor market distortions. We analyze the impact that alternative pension reforms have, through the political process, on publicly financed education. We explain how changes in the pension system design affect the link between the two programs and also labor market incentives. These effects, if they exist, act in opposite directions. Overall, we find that most proposals that entail a partial privatization of pensions reduce the willingness of the society to fund public education.     

Demographic change and social security

This paper gives an overview over some central aspects of the highly complex topic, pointing out, e.g. the need for more longitudinal research in understanding effects of structural changes in demography and economy on social security. Starting from challenges by an ageing population for health and pension schemes it is briefly discussed whether changes in labour force participation or restructuring public expenditure can soften financing problems. Concerning reforms in pension schemes first changing retirement ages is briefly discussed and then some of the shortcomings in the debate on capital funding versus pay-as-you-go fincancing.Revised, updated and extended version of a lecture, given at the First Annual Congress of the European Society for Population Economics, Rotterdam, September 18, 1987. Revision and extension were inspired by two referees.     

Demographic change, endogenous labor supply and the political feasibility of pension reform

Options for reforming unfunded public pension schemes that are now being discussed all share the feature that the burden induced by demographic change would be shifted towards presently living and away from unborn generations. Existing models of the political economy of pension reform can not explain why such reform options are being discussed at all. We present an alternative model in which the possibility of evasion of workers from payment of social security taxes is taken into account by modelling a labor supply function. It turns out that the burden of demographic change may fall completely or at least predominantly on the pensioners. Thus this type of model can much better explain recent trends in legislature on unfunded public pension systems in industrial democracies. Received: 7 January 1999/Accepted: 20 December 1999     

Social security reforms and early retirement

Many reform proposals of the social security systems in various OECD economies suggest to scale down the non-actuarial parts of the pension systems. These reforms have a flavor of increased efficiency at the costs of welfare losses for low-income individuals. Assessing the economic effects, we investigate five different reform proposals by means of a numerical overlapping generations model for the Norwegian economy. The model features an endogenous retirement age and heterogeneous individuals within generations. It turns out that the various reforms, which scale down the public non-actuarial pension system, lead to increases in the retirement age and steady-state welfare gains for all income classes. Received: 7 December 2000/Accepted: 29 January 2002 All correspondence to ?ystein Th?gersen. Financial support from the Research Council of Norway (The Economic Research Program on Taxation) is gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted to Lans Bovenberg, John Ermisch, Erling Steigum and two referees for valuable comments and useful discussion. Responsible editor: John F. Ermisch.     

Fertility waves,aggregate savings and the rate of interest

During the last fifty years there have in many countries been large movements in the growth of labor productivity, real wage rates, the rate of interest, and the household savings ratio. In this paper we use an overlapping generations model to study if demographic shocks, like the baby boom, can generate the kind of movements observed. Simulations show this is indeed the case. We also study the interactions between a pay-as-you-go pension system and demographic disturbances.We are grateful to Laurence Ball, Alex Cukierman and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy

This paper studies the relationship between public education and pay-as-you-go social security in a representative democracy, where the government reacts both to voting and lobbying activities of workers and pensioners. While an intergenerational conflict prevails concerning actual social security contributions, workers may prefer public education for its positive effect on later pension benefits. Population aging diminishes the relative lobbying power of pensioners, leading to a higher contribution rate, educational expansion, and higher per capita income growth. Received: 05 April 1999/Accepted: 20 December 1999     

Attitudes Towards Saving in Polish Society During Transformation

Since 1999 the complex reform of the old-age pension system was introduced in Poland and the process of changes is still ongoing. The multi-pillar system replaced the pay-as-you-go system. Voluntary third pillar will guarantee higher pensions for those that decide to save more. However, the systemic changes were placed in the new market economy just being implemented in Poland. New economic reality involves serial of processes influencing management of the current budget. On one hand the principles of market economy impose rigorous environment for management of the disposal income while on the other the dynamically developing market of goods, services and modern banking systems create pressure to spend. The evolution of pension system naturally poses questions concerning how the savings and saving behaviour are perceived in the Polish society during economic transformation. The results of survey conducted in the end of 2004 show that the precaution and life cycle motives of saving are observable in the Polish society but restrain seems to be marginal. In addition, attitudes towards saving are varied by some demographic and socio-economic features. These findings confirm statements referring to relation between the growth in material and social standards and acceptance of consumption style of life [i.e. Katona: 1975, Psychological Economics (Elsevier, New York); Lunt and Livingston: 1992, Mass Consumption and Personal Identity (Open University Press, Buckingham)]. Poles with higher social-economic position are rejecting self-restraint shifting towards consumerism. Nevertheless, common opinion of the respondents advocated savings is in contrary with declared avoiding restraint what is in line with other authors describing attitudes towards saving in conflict [Webley and Nyhus: 2001, Everyday representation of the Economy (WUV Universitätsverlag, Wien)].     

The old age security hypothesis and optimal population growth

The old age security approach is used to study the relationship between the rate of growth of the population and capital accumulation, within a Samuelson-Diamond overlapping generations framework. It is shown that a decentralized economy will fail, in general, to achieve the Pareto optimal path. However, a pay-as-you-go social security scheme in which the old get transfers which are proportional to the number of their children may restore optimality. On the other hand, child support systems or subsidies to capital can guarantee the optimal capital: labor ratio, but not the optimal population growth rate, while a lump sum social security system can guarantee the optimal population growth rate, but not the optimal capital: labor ratio. Finally, in a monetary economy any policy aimed at correcting the interest rate will restore full optimality.An earlier version of this paper was written during a visit to the University of California, San Diego. The paper benefited from the comments of two referees.