Subjective measures of household preferences and financial decisions

In intertemporal models of household consumption or portfolio choice, household behaviour depends on, for example, the household's rate of time preference, the rate of risk aversion, and the household's information set. In this paper we use a survey of Dutch households which contains direct subjective information on risk aversion and time preference and on interest in financial matters. We first describe these data and analyze how they relate to household characteristics and household income. We then investigate whether these variables are related to households' financial decisions on home ownership, mortgages and ownership of risky assets. Our results are broadly in accordance with economic theory.     

Risk attitudes and risky behavior

In economic theory, risk aversion is a characteristic of the typical utility function of money. Observations of how people deal with risks in real life have cast some doubts on the prevalence of risk aversion. People buy insurance, but they also gamble and take investment risks. Many of the conclusions in the discussions of utility derive from experiments employing some kind of lottery choices. While the experiments have given interesting ideas for theory, there has been little testing of the extent to which the obtained measures of risk attitudes correlate with actual behavior. Data from the VSB panel were used to answer three questions: (1) Can hypothetical risky choice questions be meaningfully answered by ordinary survey respondents? (2) What are the relationships between different measures of risk attitudes and actual portfolio choices of risky assets? (3) What is the relationship between risk attitude and playing in lotteries, lotto, etc.?     

Marriage and the Allocation of Assets in Women’s Defined Contribution Plans

The goal of this paper is to understand the effect of family decision-making on the investment decisions of married men and women. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, we investigate how the spouse’s relative control over financial resources in the household and the life-cycle stage affect the investment choices of married women and men. The results show that married women who have more control over the financial resources are less likely to invest their Defined Contribution Plans (DCPs) in risky assets. Also, women who are married to relatively older men are less likely to take on risk with their DCPs. There is little evidence that the wife’s characteristics affect the investment decisions of married men.     

Income in jeopardy: How losing employment affects the willingness to take risks

Identifying the determinants of risk-taking is crucial for our understanding of a variety of choices. Using German panel data, we find that people become more risk-averse when losing work. The immediate income loss does not mediate this effect. It seems also unrelated to the loss of non-monetary benefits of work and to changes of worker’s emotional state. However, we find that risk aversion responds the more strongly to losing work the more future income is at stake, and that the effect manifests itself already on the eve of job loss when people do not yet suffer from the consequences of the event. We conclude that lower future income expectations and more uncertainty about future incomes may explain the effect of job loss on risk attitude. Our results might imply that a recession may reinforce itself as it induces people to fear job loss, which raises their risk aversion and might therefore reduce the willingness to invest in risky projects. Moreover, self-assessed risk attitude seems to measure absolute risk aversion and thus not only an underlying risk preference parameter.     

Gambling versus investment: Lay theory and loss aversion

Gambling and investment are two domains that involve financial decisions. The present research investigates people’s lay theories about gambling and investment, and how these lay theories affect loss aversion in these domains. Lay people’s understanding of gambling and investment is often largely based on information that is immediately available to them. Moreover, information about losing money by gambling and earning money through investments are more predominant than information about earning money by gambling and losing money through investments. Hence, we hypothesized and found that people tend to hold lay theories that gambling is more likely to cause losses and less likely to bring gains compared to investment (Study 1); and we observed a stronger loss aversion when the same monetary decision was framed as gambling rather than as an investment (Studies 2 to 6). This domain-framing effect held in both hypothetical and incentivized settings.     

Certainty Broadcasts Risk Preferences: Verbal and Nonverbal Cues to Risk-Taking

People often attempt to ascertain how risky another person is willing to be. Even when this information is not purposely divulged, people may unwittingly broadcast their willingness to take risks by displaying cues to their level of certainty. Because subjective reports of feeling certain predict risk behavior, we examined whether targets’ certainty could be discerned unobtrusively and be used to predict their risky decision-making. In small groups, participants discussed two risk problems, made risk decisions, and then wrote an essay about their decision-making process. Participants’ nonverbal behavior and speech content during the group interaction, and their subsequent essay content were assessed by naïve coders and objective word-count software for cues to certainty. Subjective assessments of nonverbal behavior and objective assessments of language content revealed that certainty cues predicted greater risk propensity. Therefore, across the three communication modalities of nonverbal behavior, speech, and text, more certainty cues revealed risky behavior.     

Taking risks in investing in the equity market: racial and ethnic differences

Some policy makers and policy analysts have proposed that Social Security should be privatized to enable participants to achieve higher returns through investment in the stock market. How well individual retirees would fare financially under a privatized system largely depends on their decision to invest in the equity market, rather than in other types of investment vehicles. For that reason, it is important to investigate the degree to which minority people are currently investing in this market. This article presents the findings of a study that compared the investment behavior of black and Hispanic people aged 51 to 61 with the investment behavior of their white counterparts. The major findings indicate that black and Hispanic people: (a) are less likely to invest in the equity market than are white people, and (b) tend to invest smaller percentages of their assets in the equity market. Implications for policy are discussed.     

Risk-taking behavior in the presence of nonconvex asset dynamics

The growing literature on poverty traps emphasizes the links between multiple equilibria and risk avoidance. However, multiple equilibria may also foster risk-taking behavior by some poor people. We illustrate this idea with a simple analytical model in which people with different wealth and ability endowments make investment and risky activity choices in the presence of known nonconvex asset dynamics. This model underscores a crucial distinction between familiar static concepts of risk aversion and forward-looking dynamic risk responses to nonconvex asset dynamics. Even when unobservable preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, observed behavior may suggest that risk aversion actually increases with wealth near perceived dynamic asset thresholds. Although high ability individuals are not immune from poverty traps, they can leverage their capital endowments more effectively than lower ability types and are therefore less likely to take seemingly excessive risks. In general, linkages between behavioral responses and wealth dynamics often seem to run in both directions. Both theoretical and empirical poverty trap research could benefit from making this two-way linkage more explicit.     

Regret aversion and the reluctance to exchange lottery tickets

The current research finds that people are willing to forego a direct material gain, if that protects them from future regrets. In two experiments participants endowed with a lottery ticket were offered to exchange their ticket for another ticket from the same lottery. Even though they could receive a bonus for exchanging, many participants chose not to do so. Experiment 1 finds that a manipulation that prevented the anticipation of regret by offering the ticket in a sealed envelope made more participants exchange their ticket. Experiment 2 finds that an increased potential of regret over not-exchanging made more participants exchange as well. In both experiments the effect of the manipulation on choices is mediated by anticipated regret. The experiments show that people are willing to forego a material gain to prevent future regrets and that the reluctance to exchange lottery tickets is (partly) caused by regret aversion.     

Out-of-pocket vs. out-of-investment in financial advisory fees: Evidence from the lab

The implications of the method of payment to financial advisors on the behavior of individuals are of interest to economists and regulators around the globe. This paper uses an experimental approach to compare two common alternative forms of payment. The first is “out-of-pocket” (an upfront payment from a checking account), and the second is “out-of-investment” (a deferred payment from an investment portfolio account). We document that for the same financial advice, the subjects in the first treatment were willing to pay on average 25 per cent less than the subjects in the second treatment – payment following an investment outcome knowledge, where the payment was framed in terms of gains. We introduce an additional out-of-pocket payment structure where the actual payment is deferred until after the subject discovers the outcome of the investment. Thus, the design can be broken down into two distinct possible effects, an out-of-pocket vs. out-of-investment framing effect and a pre-outcome vs. post-outcome timing effect. We find that the timing effect is the key element: across out-of-pocket payment structures, the subjects were willing to pay significantly less in the pre-outcome treatment than their counterparts were in the post-outcome treatment. Our results highlight the difference between post-service and pre-service payments in a broader context, and provide an explanation for why allowing late payment, after the service has been performed and its outcome revealed, may increase the ex-ante willingness to pay for the service.     

Investor preferences for positive social externalities and state-owned enterprises’ facilitated access to capital

State-ownership of commercial companies exists around the world, and it is important to understand its effect on financing and investment decisions. Empirically, firms that are partially state-owned (SOE) usually profit from easier access to capital. We propose a novel explanation for this: investors’ social preferences can affect capital allocation if SOEs are perceived as socially beneficial. In support of this we found that people attribute social benefits more to SOEs than to private firms, and their propensity to invest depends on this attitude. Further, in an incentivized modified stochastic public goods game, participants invested in risky options with positive externalities even when the aggregate of private return and externality was lower than the return of an investment option with only private returns. For the case of the EU, we discuss alternative explanations such as state guarantees and political lending in the light of regulations of state aid. We conclude that even if these regulations prohibit direct or indirect state aid for SOEs, state-ownership can affect capital allocation through investors’ social preferences.     

Long-term effects of teaching behavioral strategies for managing persistent auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia

1. Attendance at a 10-week class designed to teach behavioral management strategies to people with schizophrenia was effective in reducing some of the negative characteristics of auditory hallucinations for 12 months and in reducing anxiety for 9 months after completion of the class. 2. The sustained improvement experienced by class participants was characterized by their voices being less frequent and more mumbled and the participants feeling more in control, less distractible, and less anxious. 3. Participants recommended that other mental health consumers take similar classes to learn how to better manage their voices. 4. Monthly support groups may help participants maintain gains lost during the follow-up period.     

Risky choice in interpersonal context: Do people dare because they care?

This paper presents an experimental study investigating the interplay of individuals’ other-regarding preferences and individuals’ risk attitude. Participants (N = 120) had to make choices between a certain and risky payoff only for themselves (individual context) and choices in which the participants were paired with another randomly assigned participant who functioned as a passive recipient (interpersonal context). In the interpersonal context the risky option was beneficial for the other person while the certain option was not. Thus, the interpersonal choice context was an abstract representation of the incentive structure in helping situations, which yield risk only for the helper. Risky options in the interpersonal context yielded different payoff distributions, which allowed us to identify how considerations of fairness affect interpersonal risky choices. To assess other-regarding preferences, a dictator game was played. First we found that participants were generally less risk averse in the interpersonal choices; however, the degree of risk aversion was affected by the distribution of payoffs between decider and recipient. Furthermore, we found that changes of risk aversion in an interpersonal context could be predicted with the proposed splits in the dictator game.     

A behavioral portfolio approach to multiple job holdings

In this paper we present an alternative explanation of multiple job holdings. It is based on a behavioral portfolio approach using prospect theory. Multiple job holdings is often a result of economic hardship but also because of peer comparisons. Workers may decide to take on a risky job like self-employment and engage into new ventures but also hold on to a safe employment in order to stay as close as possible to their reference level. While multiple job holdings might be the case for some, many others might decide to keep on working only at a safe job and do not engage into new risky ventures. This paper presents a behavioral economics model to explain such decisions. We find that the decision to hold multiple jobs depends on the degree of loss aversion, the value of the reference level and on the expected return in the risky venture. The worker will not seek for a risky job if she has an income reference level equal to what she can earn from a safe job. At any other reference level, the worker will seek new ventures provided she is compensated with a higher expected wage and is sufficiently loss averse.     

Big Five Personality Traits and Ambiguity Management in Career Decision-Making

Although ambiguity aversion has been found to impede the process and outcome of career decision-making, knowledge regarding the association between personality characteristics and ambiguity aversion is limited. Thus, the author examined the prediction of the Big Five personality traits for ambiguity aversion and the mediation of tolerance and confidence in ambiguity management. The results obtained with a U.S. sample (N = 239) revealed the following: (a) neuroticism positively predicted ambiguity aversion; (b) extraversion did not predict ambiguity aversion; (c) agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness negatively predicted ambiguity aversion; and (d) confidence in ambiguity management mediated the relationships between agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness and ambiguity aversion. These findings highlight the differential roles of the Big Five personality traits in ambiguity management and the importance of confidence in ambiguity management. The theoretical and practical implications of this study are discussed along with the study's limitations and suggestions for future research.     

OPTIMAL EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP CONTRACTS UNDER AMBIGUITY AVERSION

The aim of this paper is to compute and describe the conditions of an optimal employee ownership contract between an employer and an ambiguity‐averse employee. We then introduce ambiguity aversion in the baseline model of Aubert et al. (2014) using the multiple prior preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and its extension proposed by Maccheroni et al. (2006). This model offers solutions that reconcile labor and financial economics and behavioral economics research findings on employee ownership. The paper focuses on the most common situation where employee ownership has a positive impact on corporate performance, but can also be used as an entrenchment mechanism. We determine the optimal company stock contribution, which corresponds to a perfect subgame Nash equilibrium in the ambiguity framework. Using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we show that the optimal ownership contract is increasing with respect to the lower bound of the return expectation in the case of a high level of effort, and decreasing with respect to the upper bound of the return expectation in the case of a low level of effort. In the framework of Maccheroni et al. (2006), we prove that if aversion to ambiguity is sufficiently high, then we find the same behavior as in the case of no ambiguity. (JEL G11, G32, G34, J33)     

SELECTION INTO AUCTIONS FOR RISKY AND AMBIGUOUS PROSPECTS

We study experimentally the selection into first‐price sealed‐bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect. Most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect, leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect. Transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller. Evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders. A control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes. (JEL C91, D44, D81)     

COSTLY EXTERNAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY IN A MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

The corporate finance literature suggests that a financially constrained firm invests less than an identical unconstrained firm. This does not imply that financial frictions cause firms to invest less than in a frictionless economy. When firms compete for investment funds, an increase in financial frictions can lead individual firms to increase their investment levels. A greater than the frictionless level of investment is likely in low-productivity firms, in cash-rich firms, and in firms with cheap external capital. Government programs that make capital cheaper for small firms may lead to lower levels of investment for all firms and decrease efficiency (JEL O16, E22, E44, G20)     

ARE WOMEN MORE RISK AVERSE?

We find that single women exhibit relatively more risk aversion in financial decision making than single men. Using U.S. sample data, we examine household holdings of risky assets to determine whether there are gender differences in financial risk taking. As wealth increases, the proportion of wealth held as risky assets is estimated to increase by a smaller amount for single women than for single men. Gender differences in financial risk taking are also influenced by age, race, and number of children. Greater financial risk aversion may provide an explanation for women's lower levels of wealth compared with men's. ( JEL J16, D81, G11)     

How many pennies for your pain? Willingness to compensate as a function of expected future interaction and intentionality feedback

Despite increased research efforts in the area of reconciliation and trust repair in economic relations, most studies depart from a victim’s perspective and evaluate the process of trust repair by looking at the impact of restoration tactics on victims’ reactions. We focused on the transgressor’s perspective and present findings from two studies that investigated how the amount of compensation that a transgressor is willing to pay depends on victims’ reactions to the transgression (i.e. whether they claim the transgression happened intentionally or unintentionally) and the time horizon of the relationship between the transgressor and the victim (future vs. no future interaction). We hypothesized and found that transgressors are willing to pay less compensation to a victim who believes the transgression happened intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally), but only so when they share no future interaction perspective together. When transgressors have a future interaction perspective with the victim, intentionality feedback does not affect compensation size.