审计定价与公司治理、盈余管理风险——基于2004—2006年我国A股上市公司的实证研究

本文基于公司内部治理框架,运用2004-2006年我国A股上市公司面板数据,考察盈余管理风险对于审计定价的影响,研究结果显示,当存在其他变量时,独立董事在董事会中的比例、企业的股权集中程度和董事长与总经理两职设置情况对审计定价存在显著影响,这一结果表明,在公司内部治理治理中,独立董事制度、高管层持股对于公司内部治理具有积极意义;加快董事长和总经理的两职分离有助于降低代理成本,降低企业风险,节约审计费用,改善公司内部治理.     

董事会特征与总经理变更

本文以在上海证券交易所1999年前上市的公司为样本,研究董事会特征等治理变量对总经理变更的影响。研究结果表明,对相对业绩下降公司的总经理变更能起到显著解释作用的变量只有董事会会议的次数和公司的领导结构。而其它治理变量,诸如董事会规模、管理董事比例、独立董事比例、股权集中度、董事会成员持股比例等,未能对总经理变更起到显著的解释作用。     

中国中小型上市公司高管特征与企业绩效相关关系研究——基于中国139家中小上市公司的实证研究

本文借鉴已有的公司治理结构中高管与公司绩效关系的研究发现,以中国沪深两市的中小上市公司为研究对象,运用统计学的相关技术对公司中高管的不同特征和公司绩效的关系进行了实证分析。经过对总计139家中小上市企业2006年的业绩和高管特征进行了一系列统计研究,得出如下结论,在这些上市的中小企业中不同学历的董事长在选择执行高管即总经理职位的人选时,有一定的偏好,高学历的董事长更愿意选择与自己教育程度相一致的总经理;其次,本研究发现中国中小型上市公司的高管薪酬与其所在企业的财务绩效存在着显著的正相关关系;高管控股比例与公司绩效没有显著的相关关系;董事长控股与董事长的学历对公司的绩效存在着交互的影响作用。     

股权特征与董事会领导结构关系的实证研究

本文选用 1998 年以前上市的所有 A 股公司作为样本,对样本公司的股权特征与董事会领导结构之间的关系进行了研究。研究结果表明:(1)董事长和总经理两职合一模式的公司比例在逐年下降;(2)含有国家股和国家股比例越高的公司越倾向于总经理和董事长两个职位由同一个人担任;(3)由母公司控股以及中央和部委所属的公司更倾向于由大股东董事长同时担任上市公司董事长;(4)控股股东持股比例越高,控股股东董事长担任上市公司董事长的可能性就越大。     

公司治理视角下的多元化经营与公司绩效

以中国沪、深两市上市公司为研究对象,实证分析中国上市公司内、外部治理机制与多元化经营和价值效应之间的关系.结果表明,董事会特别是公司董事长和总经理两职合一以及独立董事比例是影响公司多元化经营决策的重要内部治理机制变量,外部治理机制对公司的多元化经营决策没有显著影响;多元化经营会导致价值溢价,但这种溢价不显著;内部治理机制中的资产负债率、外部治理机制中的审计意见和产品市场竞争程度是影响多元化经营公司业绩的重要因素,第一大股东的实际控制人身份、审计意见和产品市场竞争程度会显著影响专业化经营公司的经营业绩.     

公司治理机制对企业成长发展影响的实证分析——以河南省A股上市公司为例

本文以河南省A股上市公司1997-2007年间202个样本为例,研究了公司治理机制对企业成长发展的影响问题。回归结果显示,企业成长性与审计师的外部评价结果呈正相关关系,第一大股东如果属于国有性质将会对企业成长起到积极的正面作用,管理层持有公司股票和独立董事比例也将会对企业成长起到积极作用。但是,如果董事长（或副董事长）兼任总经理将会对企业成长起到负面作用。研究还发现上市公司的股权集中度和股权制衡状况对企业成长性的影响并不显著。     

上市公司经营者股权激励的影响分析

上市公司作为现代公司治理结构的最高形态，如何实施股权激励，提高上市公司整体运营效率．是当前我国上市公司中亟待解决的问题。实证分析表明，目前上市公司的经营业绩与公司管理层的持股比例之间基本不相关。国有股份所占比例对经理人员持股比例无显著性影响，法人股份与经理人员持股比例呈显著性正相关关系，社会公众股对公司经理人员的持股情况无显著性影响。经理人员持股比例与公司经营风险呈显著正相关，董事会中非执行董事所占比例愈高，公司更倾向经理人员多持有公司股票。研究得出结论。要使股权激励真正发挥作用，从公司内部来看，必须改善我国上市公司的股权结构并建立和完善经理市场，从公司外部来看，必须完善证券市场。     

论机构投资者在公司治理中角色的定位及政策建议

在研究公司治理和资本市场发展时,机构投资者的作用越来越受到重视,随着机构投资者所持有公司股份的不断上升,他们开始积极参与公司治理.但是,不同类型的机构投资者所持有公司的股权比例、监督成本以及风险偏好等存在较大的差异,因而他们在公司治理活动中的表现也将截然不同.正是基于此,本文通过对机构投资者积极参与公司治理进行数理模型的一般分析,分析了机构投资者是否积极参与公司治理的条件机构投资者持有公司的股权比例、监督成本、风险偏好.结论表明,上述三个因素的变动影响着机构投资者是否进行监督及其监督的临界值.本文对机构投资者积极参与我国上市公司治理进行了适用性分析,并提出一些政策性建议.     

两种商业模式下高管团队与上市房地产企业业绩研究

房产企业销售所遵循的商业模式主要有自营销售和代理销售两种,本文将其作为调节变量引入房地产高管团队特质与地产企业业绩的研究之中,我们在对两种商业模式进行比较的基础上,结合“高层梯队理论”中高管团队的特质要素,对沪深两市2011年上市房地产企业高管团队构成与企业业绩进行实证研究.研究表明,高管团队以及董事长的个人特质与企业业绩相关联,较之代销模式,高管团队的任期与董事长的教育、年龄、任期等在自销模式下与业绩的正相关性较大,而高管团队年龄的异质性则在自销模式下与业绩的负相关更为明显.本文对研究房产企业治理结构与营销手段的协同性问题具有一定的启示作用.     

地理邻近对风险资本参与公司治理的影响

针对地理邻近如何影响风险资本参与被投资企业公司治理问题,基于交易成本理论,构建以制度环境为调节变量、以投资金额为中介变量的第1阶段有调节的中介效应模型。以2004年至2013年中国A股市场公开披露的1个风险资本投资交易为研究样本,采用多元回归,运用依次检验和差异检验方法对概念模型进行验证。研究结果表明,地理邻近显著正向影响风险资本参与被投资企业公司治理,表明治理成本在风险资本参与公司治理决策中产生重要作用;地理邻近提升风险资本对企业的投资金额,且风险资本的投资金额也与风险资本参与公司治理显著正相关;地理邻近通过提高风险资本的投资金额正向影响风险资本参与公司治理,说明投资金额在地理邻近和风险资本参与被投资企业公司治理中有部分中介作用;企业所在地的制度环境正向调节地理邻近对风险资本投资金额的影响,制度环境越好,风险资本对地理邻近的企业投资金额越多,地理邻近通过投资金额影响风险资本参与被投资企业公司治理的间接效应越强。结果表明,地理邻近存在双重作用,不仅有利于风险资本增加投资金额,还有利于风险资本参与公司治理。     

国有控股、经营者变更和公司绩效

本文从国有控股上市公司董事长职业生涯考虑角度,研究董事长变更和绩效的关系。发现董事长免职和公司绩效恶化正相关,控股股东对董事长的考核以长期绩效和相对绩效(相对于前任董事长)为主,董事长任期和免职负相关,和控股股东的良好关系可以降低董事长被免职的概率。研究表明,国有控股上市公司经营者变更的激励模式与国际公众公司相近。     

Director tenure and contribution to board task performance: A time and contingency perspective

Director tenure is a topic of great interest in the corporate governance debate. Researchers try to assess the effects of tenure on director contribution, board effectiveness and firm performance. Regulators, corporations, and institutional investors advocate for term limits for outside directors to reduce the risks of impaired governance. Despite the burgeoning interest, there is lack of consensus on the mechanisms shaping directors' contributions over time. We argue that next to the ‘loss of independence’ and ‘knowledge acquisition’ hypotheses, respectively predicting a negative and positive effect of tenure on task performance, socio-cognitive and behavioral approaches elucidate the way in which directors' contributions rise and decline with time. Using a multiple case study approach, we document wide variability in directors' contributions at similar levels of tenure. We find this is due to a series of contingencies including whether directors are novice or experienced, the frequency and nature of board interactions, and the relative power of a director. This variability is particularly clear in longer serving directors for whom we find polarizing results: while some grow stale in the saddle, others sustain high levels of contribution despite extreme tenures. The latter finding is at odds with agency-based assumptions and general predictions from the literature. Overall, our study offers a tentative explanation as to why setting an ‘ideal’ tenure for outside directors has proven so difficult and encourages boards and policy makers to consider the influence of director-level features as well as board dynamics in shaping directors' contributions.     

The Cadbury Committee recommendations on corporate governance – a review of compliance and performance impacts

In December 1992, the Cadbury Committee published their Code of Best Practice. The recommendations, which largely reflected perceived best practice at the time, included separating the roles of CEO and chairman, having a minimum of three non-executive directors on the board and the formulation of audit committees. The Code also advocated that a more active role be taken by institutional investors in the promotion of good practice in corporate governance. This paper discusses how agency problems may be (partially) resolved by corporate governance, reviews the evidence on compliance with the Cadbury Code and examines the relationship between board structure and firm performance, looking for evidence that the Code has enhanced board performance. While there is no empirical evidence of an association between board structure and firm value, there is some evidence that compliance with the Cadbury recommendations enhances board oversight with respect to the manipulation of accounting numbers and the discipline of the top executive.     

The changing role of the supervisory board chairman: the case of the Netherlands (1997–2007)

Over the last ten years, the corporate governance context in most Western countries has changed as a result of irregularities, increased regulation, heightened societal expectations and shareholder activism. This paper examines the impact of the changing context on the role of chairmen of supervisory boards in the Netherlands. Based on a combination of thirty semi-structured interviews with board members of leading Dutch corporations and secondary data on the position of supervisory board chairmen at the top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands, the study reveals that board chairmen have become increasingly involved in both their control and service roles. While the demographics (i.e., age, tenure, gender and nationality) of chairmen have hardly changed over the last decade, chairmen are spending considerably more time on boards and committees, have reduced the number of board interlocks and have become more active on the forefront of the corporate governance discussion. The paper highlights several implications for scholars and practitioners.     

The double-edged sword of CEO/chairperson duality in corporatized state-owned firms: evidence from top management turnover in China

This study examines how board leadership structure (CEO duality) affects the corporate governance of corporatized state-owned firms where the state shareholders use these firms to serve both profit and non-profit objectives. We propose that CEO duality will generate a positive (negative) significant impact on the firms’ corporate governance when state owners tend to monitor their CEOs on the basis of profit (non-profit) considerations. We test our hypotheses by examining the relations between CEO duality and CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies that are ultimately controlled by central or local governments. We find that CEO duality is negatively related to turnover in marginal profit-making firms where turnover would be value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality is detrimental to these firms’ corporate governance because it entrenches relatively poorly performing CEOs. Duality is also negatively related to turnover in high-profitability firms where turnover would be non-value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality might positively contribute to the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non-value enhancing turnover. Overall, our study suggests that CEO duality is a double-edged sword in corporatized state-owned firms.     

《萨班斯法案》对美国公司董事会影响的分析

2002年度美国出台的《萨班斯法案》全方位地对安然等事件暴露出来的问题作出相应的调整性规定,必将对公司治理产生深切的影响。《萨班斯法案》对审计委员会提出了修正性和提高性要求,本文选择外部董事、女性董事、财务专家、CEO兼任董事会主席、CEO在提名委员会任职等指标进行分析。实证分析结果说明:《萨班斯法案》有效消除了董事会和管理层任人唯亲的现象,董事会的独立性和专业性均有所提高。其实,《萨班斯法案》颁布之前就有加强公司治理的要求,公司治理就有改进的趋势,但《萨班斯法案》关于审计委员会方面的明文规定加速了公司董事会的变化,使得公司治理改革超越了法律的既定要求。     

Conformance and performance roles of bank boards: The connection between non-performing loans and non-performing directorships

This study evaluates how non-performing loans and different types of board turnover—which we link to performing directorship (natural turnover) and non-performing directorship (forced turnover)—impact the economic performance (ROA) of banks. The proposed model and hypotheses, based on the conformance and performance roles of boards, are tested on a rich sample that includes all banking firms operating in Costa Rica between 2000 and 2012. The results indicate that the negative effect of non-performing loans on ROA is significantly greater in banks with non-performing directorship associated with high rates of unexpected changes in the board. The findings of the study highlight that the competence of boards matters. The results also give evidence of the importance of balancing financial and non-financial goals if superior governance and economic performance are the objectives pursued by organisations.     

政治治理、管理层权力与国有企业过度投资

党组织参与公司治理是我国国有上市公司治理的重要特征。本文以2011-2016年国有上市公司为样本,研究了政治治理、高管权力与过度投资的关系。结果表明,管理层权力与过度投资显著正相关,政治治理对管理层权力起抑制效应,减小了管理层权力较大企业过度投资的可能性。党委书记或党委副书记兼任董事、党委书记或党委副书记兼任高管分别对管理层权力与过度投资的正向关系产生抑制效应,而党委书记任董事长与党委书记任总经理的政治治理模式则分别与管理层权力与过度投资的正向关系产生协同效应。分组检验结果表明,地方国有企业中管理层权力与过度投资的正向相关关系较之中央国有企业更为显著,政治治理的对于管理层权力与过度投资关系的抑制作用在中央国有企业中比在地方国有企业中更为显著;在2015年新文件发布之后,管理层权力与过度投资的正向相关关系不再显著,政治治理对管理层权力的抑制效应较新文件发布前更为显著,降低了管理层权力较高的企业过度投资的可能性。     

Board of directors and insider trading with share repurchase programs

This study examines the relationship between insider trading and board of directors’ characteristics around stock repurchase announcements. It is hypothesized that information disparity between insiders and shareholders from share repurchases announcements creates opportunities for insiders to time their trading. However, there is little evidence on whether board characteristics reduce the probability of insider trading with repurchase announcements. Using data from firms listed on Forbes 500 between 1998 and 2004, we found that insider trading is related to share repurchase announcements. In order to focus on board of directors’ role, we controlled for board characteristics that may change the repurchase decision. Our results provide corroborative evidence of insider net selling around repurchase announcements and the advantages of board characteristics to offset insider trading. In particular, the results suggest that board tenure, directors’ ownership and board directorship change positively insider trading around repurchase announcements. Hence, Securities and Exchange Commission should consider rigorous restrictions on share repurchase announcements and be aware of potential influence of the corporate governance device.