The Effect of Demand–Supply Mismatches on Firm Risk

A supply chain management (SCM) system comprises many subsystems, including forecasting, order management, supplier management, procurement, production planning and control, warehousing and distribution, and product development. Demand–supply mismatches (DSMs) could indicate that some or all of these subsystems are not working as expected, creating uncertainties about the overall capabilities and effectiveness of the SCM system, which can increase firm risk. This article documents the effect of DSMs on firm risk as measured by equity volatility. Our sample consists of three different types of DSMs announced by publicly traded firms: production disruptions, excess inventory, and product introduction delays. We find that all three types of DSMs result in equity volatility increases. Over a 2‐year period around the announcement date, we observe mean abnormal equity volatility increases of 5.62% for production disruptions, 11.19% for excess inventory, and 6.28% for product introduction delays. Volatility increases associated with excess inventory are significantly higher than the increases associated with production disruptions and product introduction delays. Across all three types of DSMs, volatility changes are positively correlated with changes in information asymmetry. The results provide some support that volatility changes are also correlated with changes in financial and operating leverage.     

Changes in Management Ownership and the Valuation Effects of Equity Offerings

Seasoned equity issues trigger share price declines, and this is usually interpreted as evidence of signalling. We find that seasoned equity issues also typically result in much lower managerial ownership in U.S. firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a stock price decline when managerial ownership falls. We conduct several tests to distinguish agency explanations form signalling explanations, and conclude that both effects are present.     

Revisiting the stock price impact of quality awards

In an event study, Hendricks and Singhal [Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. Quality awards and the market value of the firm: an empirical investigation. Management Sci 1996;42:415–36.] find evidence that firms that win quality awards are further rewarded with a stock price increase on the day of the award announcement. We revisit Hendricks and Singhal (1996), extend their research and find four reasons why management, owners and analysts should be cautious about expecting an abnormal return when a firm wins a quality award. First, in our sample of Baldrige Award winners, the evidence of a stock price response on the announcement day is only marginally significant. Second, in our sample of State quality award winners, the announcement day relationship between stock returns and winning awards is not significant. Third, in the most recent subperiod, 1992–1997, we find no evidence of positive abnormal returns. Fourth, the marginally significant Baldrige results are actually driven by just four companies. A company-by-company microanalysis reveals that only 50% of the award winners experienced positive abnormal returns. The diminishing stock price response on event day does not necessarily imply a lack of stockholder rewards. Evidence from other studies suggests that the stockholders are rewarded for successful total quality management (TQM) implementation, but the rewards can come long before and after the formal award is presented. From a shareholder value perspective, TQM still matters but the award ceremonies may not.     

Corporate governance and the market reaction to stock repurchase announcement

This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance on market reaction around of a stock repurchase announcement. We argue that corporate governance affects the ability of a stock repurchase to alleviate agency costs related to free cash flows, and the credibility of the undervaluation signal sent by the announcement of buyback programs. We find a higher 3-day cumulative abnormal return to programs announced by firms with better corporate governance practices than those with bad governance (1.6% and 0.85% respectively), and the market reaction is significantly higher following the successive scandals in year 2001 (Enron, Arthur Anderson, WorldCom??) and the resulting Sarbanes?COxley Act of 2002. Further investigations indicate that firms with a lower Free Cash Flow to Asset ratio have a higher market reaction, which is consistent with the information signaling hypothesis, and this is more significant in firms with good governance practices, and following post Sarbanes?COxley Act.     

财务特征对担保方定价策略影响的实证研究

2007年证监会和银监会联合发布《120号通知》要求强制披露上市公司对外担保实施以来,详细查阅上市公司信息披露公告获知,2007至2014年间超过40%的上市公司存在对外担保业务;提供担保公司的资产负债率均值54.07%、资产收益率均值为3.07%,未提供担保公司的资产负债率均值43%、资产收益率均值4.5%,揭示担保公司财务特征对担保行为选择具有一定影响。为深入诠释该现象,本文基于"担保价格不仅取决于担保是否给公司带来正净现金流,而且取决于提供担保后所有者权益占公司比例的变化程度"的理性担保方定价策略,构建担保供需理论模型,逻辑推理给出研究假设。利用2007至2014中国A股主板非金融类上市公司的样本进行检验发现:(1)提供担保公司数量先随公司所有者权益占资产总额比重的增加而增加,但当超过某一阈值后随公司所有者权益比重的增加而减少,特别资产负债率影响对外担保行为由增到减拐点的阈值:国有上市公司在80%左右,非国有公司在70%左右。(2)提供担保公司数量先随公司盈利能力增强而增加,但超过某一阈值后随公司盈利能力增强而减少,特别公司盈利能力影响对外担保行为由增到减拐点的阈值:国有上市公司在11%左右,非国有公司在13%左右;给出国有上市公司由于政府的隐性担保带来的资信福利,导致国有上市公司在同等条件下,资信水平较非国有公司高估,导致担保契约增加拐点和担保契约减少拐点都比非国有公司财务状况要差。     

中国A股市场增发效应与投资者保护

国内学者对增发效应的研究主要集中在董事会拟增发公告效应上,对增发的中长期效应较少涉及,虽然对增发公告效应的研究也很有意义,但对于倡导理性的投资者而言,则其重要性不如增发的中长期效应。本文在一个比较长的时间窗口内考察了我国A股市场1998—2004年间获准增发上市公司增发的中长期效应和增发上市日效应,实证分析结果表明,在拟增发公告效应出现5%-10%负效应基础上,流通股股东增发的中长期效应继续出现显著的负效应,并且流通股股东的超额收益率与上市公司利润增长率和增发价格折扣率显著正相关,与其它因素不存在显著的相关关系。     

锚定比率可以衡量股价高估吗？——基于崩盘风险视角的经验证据

股价高估指的是公司市场价值超出其内在价值的现象,但如何衡量内在价值一直存在争议。借鉴行为金融文献中锚定效应的概念,结合中国资本市场的特殊性,本文提出了锚定比率(简称"RPR")这一新的股价高估指标。为了证实该指标的有效性,本文利用事后的股价崩盘风险进行了相关检验。结果表明:第一,锚定比率与股价崩盘风险正相关;第二,更少的分析师跟踪、更多的散户持股以及更高的股票流动性均会强化锚定比率对股价崩盘风险的影响;第三,在控制常用的股价高估指标、两类代理问题和管理层"捂盘"行为后,本文的结果依然成立;第四,利用崩盘事件,本文证实了锚定比率会加剧股价下跌的程度,且长期来看股价会保持"惯性"而非"反转"。本文的研究表明投资者做决策时对股价高点存在明显的锚定效应,丰富了锚定效应在中国资本市场中的运用。更重要的是,本文提出了一个可能更适合于中国资本市场的股价高估指标,该指标意味着资本市场定价机制的不完善是导致股价高估和频繁崩盘的重要原因,这对于改善资本市场定价效率、降低股价崩盘风险有一定的启示作用。     

The Stock Market Reaction to Investment Decisions: Evidence from Italy

Based on a study of new investment announcements from 1989 to 1995 by Italian firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find a positive stock price reaction to new investment decisions. The stock price reaction is larger for joint venture announcements. The market response is also larger for non-state owned companies and when the announcement is released in a period of rising stock prices. The announced investment has no impact on the non-voting shares but increases the voting shares' market price through a significant revaluation of their vote-segment. We find some evidence that new investments lead to management's private benefits rather than towards firm value. This is consistent with the typical Italian corporate governance structure, where a majority shareholder safely controls a listed company while having only a fractional claim on the firm's cash flows.     

上市公司初始股权结构分析

上市公司发起人对初始股权结构的设计是筹资者与投资者之间的第一次也是非常重要的一次“契约安排”。在价格管制与额度发行背景下,发起人必须在发股收入最大化与持股比例最大化之间有所取舍,不能两者兼得。本文建立了指导发起人在实现自身利益最大化目标下壬响设计初始股权结构的模型,并以此模型计算结果为最优初始股权结构。对上市公司初始股权结构设计现状进行的实证研究,发现实际发起人持股比例远高于最优持股比例,并对“65％现象”进行了新的解释。     

Corporate social responsibility disclosure and market valuation: evidence from Spanish listed firms

Using a sample of listed Spanish companies pertaining to the IBEX35 index for the period 2007–2011, this paper examines whether those firms with higher CSR disclosure ratings are more valued by market participants. This study also complements the literature addressing the value relevance of CSR disclosure by further analyzing not only the direct effects of CSR reporting on stock prices but also its indirect effects through its interaction with main accounting variables (i.e., earnings and book value of equity). CSR reports can also affect stock price indirectly because the sustainability report may be perceived by investors to be a source of further and complementary information regarding the nature, composition and trends of the traditional value-relevant accounting variables. Finally, this study also analyzes whether CSR disclosure by firms operating in environmentally-sensitive industries is assessed differently by market participants than CSR disclosure by companies operating in other industries. By using a modified Ohlson (Contemp Account Res 1:661–687, 1995) model, it is found that CSR disclosure do have both a direct and indirect effect on stock prices by modifying the value-relevance of earnings and book value of equity. Moreover, CSR disclosure by companies operating in environmentally-sensitive industries is associated with higher market valuations than CSR disclosure by companies operating in nonsensitive industries. This may be due to the fact that CSR disclosures provide information that allow investors to make better assessments of the increased risk related to potential litigation and future environmental liabilities, thereby reducing information asymmetries and the risk of adverse selection.     

Selection of supply portfolio under disruption risks

This paper deals with the optimal selection of supply portfolio in a make-to-order environment in the presence of supply chain disruption risks. Given a set of customer orders for products, the decision maker needs to decide from which supplier to purchase custom parts required for each customer order to minimize total cost and mitigate the impact of disruption risks. The selection of suppliers and allocation of orders is based on price and quality of purchased parts and reliability of delivery. The two types of disruption scenarios are considered: scenarios with independent local disruptions of each supplier and scenarios with local and global disruptions that may result in all suppliers disruption simultaneously. The problem is formulated as a single- or bi-objective mixed integer program and a value-at-risk and conditional value-at-risk approach is applied to control the risk of supply disruptions. The proposed portfolio approach is capable of optimizing the supply portfolio by calculating value-at-risk of cost per part and minimizing expected worst-case cost per part simultaneously. Numerical examples are presented and some computational results are reported.     

家族董事席位超额控制与股价崩盘风险——基于关联交易的视角

本文基于关联交易的视角,以2008-2017年沪深A股上市家族企业为研究对象,考察了家族董事席位超额控制程度与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。研究发现,家族董事席位超额控制程度与企业的股价崩盘风险、控股家族的关联交易行为正相关;同时,控股家族的关联交易行为对企业股价崩盘风险有显著的正向影响,并且这种影响在家族董事席位超额控程度较高的公司中更为明显。进一步分析发现,机构持股比例较低、两职合一、董事会规模较小时,家族董事席位超额控制程度与企业的股价崩盘风险、控股家族的关联交易规模之间的正相关性更强;控股家族的关联交易规模对企业股价崩盘风险的正向影响更显著,其与家族董事席位超额控制程度的交互关系对股价崩盘风险的正向影响更明显。最后,控制潜在的内生性问题,并进行一系列的稳健性检验后,研究结论依然成立。本文不仅从关联交易的视角探讨了家族董事席位超额控制对资本市场的影响,也为家族企业股价崩盘风险的成因提供了更多的理论解释。     

管理层股权激励与企业未来盈余定价——来自中国资本市场的证据

本文探讨管理层股权激励对企业未来盈余定价的影响,并进一步将企业未来盈余分解为行业成分和公司特质成分,考察股权激励对不同成分未来盈余定价的影响,以及不同模式股权激励对上述关系影响的差异。利用实施股权激励的中国A股上市公司2006-2016年间的数据,本文发现：（1）股权激励提高了当期股票收益率与企业未来盈余的相关性。说明管理层股权激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价;（2）管理层股权激励并不影响投资者对行业成分未来盈余定价,但会加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价;（3）管理层的股票型激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价,同时也能加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价,但股票期权激励并无上述作用。研究结果意味着,整体而言股权激励能够缓解管理层与股东之间信息披露的代理问题,激励管理层向外部投资者披露更多高质量的公司基本面信息,从而降低投资者对公司特质未来盈余信息的搜寻成本,最终通过加速公司特质未来盈余信息融入股价来促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价。本文揭示了管理层股权激励促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价的微观机制,同时,研究结论对提高中国证券市场的信息效率提供了重要的理论参考。     

机构投资者与股市泡沫的形成

机构投资者"高换手率"现象引发许多争议。本文测算证券价格泡沫与检验机构投资者的微结构交易数据后发现,机构投资者的交易导致证券价格泡沫,放大了内在价值信息的反应,导致市盈率因为机构投资者的交易而高估。进一步研究证券收益的序列相关性发现,机构投资者的交易造成的价格变动符合Campbell,Grossman和Wang(1993)^[1]模型的噪音过程,即机构投资者的交易所造成的证券价格变动和证券内在价值变动无关,具体表现在证券价格短期上涨与后续期间证券价格的反转,股价呈序列负相关性。本文的研究发现证明,机构投资者的交易风格具有"投机"特征,导致了证券价格偏离内在价值,引发股市泡沫。     

代理冲突下企业多元化投资行为的实物期权分析

利用实物期权的方法,本文分别建立了以股东利益最大化以及企业价值最大化为目标时的负债企业多元化投资模型.通过两种决策目标下多元化投资政策的比较,分析了负债代理下股东存在的投资决策非最优化问题.结果发现,若负债企业在投资前后都不存在债务风险,股东的投资决策将符合企业价值最大化原则;若投资能使债务由无风险变为有风险,企业将过度投资;若投资前后都存在风险,企业将投资不足.     

我国公司A+H交叉上市的溢出效应分析

交叉上市对一国国内市场和国内公司的发展有重要的影响.本文通过实证考察我国公司以A H方式交叉上市对A股市场的影响,揭示了我国交叉上市的溢出效应.研究结果显示,A H交叉上市对A股市场的影响主要表现在资金分流效应(市场扩容)的负面影响上,分散风险效应等正面影响尚未有效发挥作用.因此,监管层在推出海外上市公司回国交叉上市的鼓励政策时,至少在短期内必须考虑内地市场对扩容的承受能力.     

股东为什么在解禁后会减持股票?——基于背景风险分析的股票解禁效应研究

背景风险指投资者因持有非交易性资产而承担的风险,会降低投资组合效率。本文以2016年全年1502家公司限售股解禁事件为样本,从背景风险的角度分析了股东的解禁减持行为,并对限售股解禁的价格效应进行了研究。实证结果表明,背景风险因素对解禁后股价异常收益具备显著负向影响。基于背景风险的投资组合调整效应相较于"高位套现"效应对股价变动的影响更为显著。研究还发现解禁规模对股票异常收益具备显著负向影响;公司规模及异常换手率,在解禁期间缓解了股价的下降;不同的解禁性质对股价也有一定影响,相较于定向增发解禁,首发IPO解禁对股价的影响更大。     

股价暴涨的风险:基于中国股市的实证

股价暴涨直观上带来高收益，激发市场正面情绪，那么为什么暴涨被视为风险?本文利用2006年至2016年中国A股上市公司数据，通过计量建模对暴涨股票的特征和日后的市场表现进行刻画。实证发现：（1）股价暴涨频度高的股票，呈现低资产收益率、高市值账面比、多散户持股、少沪深300成份股等特点；（2）易发生暴涨的股票其长期超额收益率更低，未来有更大的暴跌风险和更高的收益率波动率；（3）对于运营基本面较差、市场过于乐观、信息披露质量较低的股票，暴涨后的暴跌风险更加明显。研究结论在不同代理变量选择、多种计量模型设定下均稳健成立。本文揭示了暴涨不仅仅是极端价格波动，而且更容易发生在高风险股票中，未来蕴含着更大的潜在损失。暴涨是实实在在的风险。     

股权结构与择时披露

本文从股权集中度视角出发,分别探讨了国有控股公司和民营控股公司股权集中度对上市公司择时披露行为的影响。结果表明,对于国有控股公司股权集中度与管理层选择周末披露的概率呈正U型关系;对于民营控股公司股权集中度与管理层选择周末披露盈余公告的概率呈倒U型关系。进一步,由于我国民营上市公司控制链较长,终极控制权与现金流权分离问题严重,我们又从终极控制权,以及终极控制权与现金流权分离度角度研究了民营上市公司择时披露的影响因素。与股权集中度影响类似,我们发现在民营上市公司中,终极控制权持股比例与管理层选择周末披露盈余公告的概率呈倒U型关系,终极控制权与现金流权分离度与管理层选择周末披露盈余公告的概率呈正向关系。     

Bertrand寡占市场企业交叉持股时定价策略和最优持股的研究

本文首先研究了公司间交叉持股的利益分配问题,导出了n个公司间交叉持股的利润分配公式。以此为基础,导出了Bertrand寡占市场公司间交叉持股时价格反应函数和均衡价格的一般表达式。通过构建一个两阶段动态博弈,着重研究了Bertrand双寡头市场两厂商交叉持股时的均衡策略问题,给出了厂商间均衡定价与最优持股,分析了均衡策略对厂商经济行为及市场绩效的影响。研究结果表明,可替代品市场的两厂商间交叉持股具有反竞争、促合作的效应。较之非交叉持股,均衡交叉持股提高了均衡价格水平,降低了两厂商各自的产量水平,使各自在较低产量水平下获得较高的利润,从而实现了两厂商间双赢的局面。然而,交叉持股将导致消费者剩余减少,社会经济福利降低。