Asian Americans: growth,change, and diversity

The 1980 US census counted 3.5 million Asian Americans, up from 1.4 million in 1970. Asian Americans made up just 1.5% of the total US population of 226.5 million as of April 1, 1980, but this was the 3rd largest racial or ethnic minority after blacks and Hispanics. Asians increased far more during the 1970s (141%) than blacks (17%) or Hispanics (39%). This Bulletin examines the characteristics of Asian Americans, how their numbers have grown, where they live, how different groups vary in age structure, childbearing, health, and longevity. It reports on the kinds of households Asian Americans form and how they fare with regard to education, occupation, and income. Asian Americans are now often perceived as the model minority. As a whole, they are better educated, occupy higher rungs on the occupational ladder, and earn more than the general US population and even white Americans. This Bulletin presents the 1st comprehensive look at many important facts about Asian Americans and how the groups differ. Special tabulations of data collected in the 1980 census are provided. The 1980 census data are the latest available to give a true picture at the national level of Asian Americans and the various groups among them. The Bulletin examines the current numbers of Asian Americans and how this population is defined. The major Asian American groups are Chinese (21%), Filipinos (20%), Japanese (15%), Vietnamese (21%), Koreans (11%), and Asian Indians (10%). Except for the latest-arrived Vietnamese, the fertility of the 6 groups is lower than the white average. The following areas are also discussed: mortality and health; families and households; education; Asian youth; employment; income and poverty; and future prospects.     

Racial differences in per capita income, 1960–76: The importance of household size,headship, and labor force participation

Racial differences in average per capita income are decomposed, as are changes over time for both races. The 1960–76 decline in household size accounted for 13 percent of the per capita income inprovement of both races. Whereas real increases in earnings of husbands contributed most to improvements in well-being in husband-wife households, increases in income from sources other than earnings were most important to female headed households. During a period in which a growing proportion of both races resided in female headed households and racial differences in living arrangements widened, the per capita income of female headed households relative to husband-wife households declined.     

Economic determinants of fertility: Results from cross sectional aggregate data

Census data for areal units, SMSA’s in 1960 and cities in 1940, are used to test hypotheses and estimate parameters concerning the influence of a variety of socioeconomic variables on fertility rates of ever married white and nonwhite women aged 25–29, 30–34, 35–44, and 45–49. An economic model of the demand for children is adopted as the theoretical framework. The principal findings are that the market earnings opportunities for wives have an important negative effect on the fertility rate and that male income, representing the income of husbands, has a small but positive effect on fertility. The implication of these results is that changes in economic variables, for example, improvements in the employment opportunities and wages for wives or the establishment of a children’s allowance program, may be expected to affect fertility.     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

Race,wages, and assimilation among Cuban immigrants

This study uses data from the 1980 and 1990 Census and the 1994–2000 Current Population Survey to examine the determinants of earnings among male Cuban immigrants in the U.S. by race. Nonwhite Cuban immigrants earn about 15 percent less than whites, on average. Much of the racial wage gap is due to differences in educational attainment, age at migration, and years in the U.S., but the gap remains at almost 4 percent after controlling for such factors. Nonwhite Cuban immigrants also have lower returns to education than whites. A comparison to white, non-Hispanic U.S. natives indicates that nonwhite Cubans not only earn less initially than white Cubans on arrival in the U.S., but also do not significantly close the racial earnings gap over time.     

The effects of income level,income distribution,education and urbanization on fertility rates among 28 administrative regions of China

Conflicting empirical evidence on the role of income distribution on fertility rates is the impetus for this 1982 study of providence-specific Chinese Census data, excluding Tibet. The findings support the prior thesis of Repetto but utilize the micromethods and per household income measures of the competing findings of Boulier. It is cautioned that in the Chinese analysis equal income distribution depresses fertility, but China may not reflect world wide patterns. China did not have until recently a market incentive system, and there are income measurement problems. The data are per capita economic output not per capita income, and those high output areas which did not produce low fertility may actually have had households with low incomes. The importance of this research is in establishing that cross-province data are a useful tool in understanding the influence of income distribution on fertility. As with most developing countries, women's education, for instance, at least junior high education explained the largest variation of fertility differences among the 28 provinces. The urbanization variable when controlling for income was positive, unlike the other developing countries. The 1949 Chinese government's spatial industrial policy encouraged urbanization and industrialization in rural areas and family planning programs such that highly urbanized provinces have low population density. A variety of variables on income level, income distribution, education, and urbanization are discussed. OLSQ regressions were generated utilizing such independent variables as output per capita in yuan (YOUTHPC80), the square of YOUTHPC80 (YOUTHPC802), YOUTHPC80 multiplied by the average family size in each province (YOUTHPH80), and the squared value of YOUTHPH80.     

The Decomposition of Economic Outcomes as a Result of Changes in Brazil’s Male Age–Education Structure

In Brazil, the age and education compositions of the male labor force is changing with great regional variation. Based on Demographic Census microdata, results indicate that cohort size has a negative impact on earnings, but this effect is decreasing over time. In this study we consider the impact on earnings by age and education, as well as estimated income inequality reduction and racial differentials. Fertility decline and improve regarding educational attainment had a significant influence on the decline of income inequality in the country. Moreover, the non-white population has been experiencing less success in relation to educational achievement, compared to the white population.     

Explaining changes in married mothers’ employment over time

Employment of married mothers with preschool children rose dramatically between 1971 and 1990. Using CPS data, we find that about one-fifth of the increase in labor supply can be attributed to changes in mothers’ demographic characteristics (age, education, and number of children). Changes in the earnings opportunities of new mothers and their husbands explain another one-fifth of the growth in employment. Over the two decades, infants up to three months old became less of a barrier to employment, while women’s labor supply became more sensitive to their own earnings opportunities and less sensitive to those of their husbands.     

Female status and fertility behaviour in a Metropolitan Urban area of Bangladesh

The paper examines hypotheses that certain aspects of status of married women such as (i) decision-making power; (ii) employment status and (iii) educational status, are positively associated with use of contraception and inversely related to fertility performance. The study is based on 1,130 women of reproductive age (15-49) who are currently married and living with their husbands and reported to be fecund. The data are drawn from a cross-section of working and non-working women of Dacca City. The hypothesis that each of the above status variables is related to fertility behaviour (measured as current use of contraception and number of children ever-born) is confirmed, with the sole exception of the relationship between female employment status and fertility behaviour. Female participation in the labour force has little or no effect on use of contraception, particularly among those who belong to higher education and income groups. However, in the lower education and income groups, fertility and use of contraception vary with work experience. The findings clearly point out the need to improve the status of women in order to achieve a breakthrough in the use of contraception and a reduction in fertility.     

An analysis of variations in U. S. fertility and female labor force participation trends

This study is based on time series data from 1947–1977 on fertility and female labor force participation, and examines (a) the effects of male relative income and female earnings on the level and timing of fertility and female labor force participation, and (b) the relative importance of variations in relative income and female wage rates in explaining the fluctuations in both fertility and female labor supply. The results suggest that relative income exerts a significant positive effect on fertility and a negative effect on female work effort. However, female wage rates appear to be the dominant factor in explaining variations in fertility and female labor force participation over the past two decades, with increases in female earnings leading to both depressed fertility and increased labor force participation of women.     

Minority status and family size: A comparison of explanations

Summary In this study, the family sizes of Chinese, Japanese and Filipino Americans are compared with those of whites, using data from the 1970 public use samples for California and Hawaii. The two hypotheses derived from the 'minority status' hypothesis are tested; the latter states that minorities experience tensions and anxiety which lead to lower fertility compared with native whites of Anglo-Saxon ancestry under certain conditions. We also examine the effect of assimilation in terms of variables known to affect fertility, and control for several age and acculturation variables. Analysis, based on a regression decomposition model, gives some support to the argument that the family size of minority groups differs from that of native whites because of incomplete assimilation and because independent variables affect fertility differently. However, since the independent effect of minority status per se is generally to raise fertility for Japanese and Chinese Americans, and lower it for Filipinos, we reject this version of the minority status hypothesis. Our general conclusion is that family size differentials in a pluralistic society may be part of a persisting pattern of sub-cultural differentiation, and do not necessarily reflect any 'tensions and anxiety' of minority status.     

Employment gains and wage declines: The erosion of black women’s relative wages since 1980

Public policy initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s, including Affirmative Action and Equal Employment Opportunity law, helped mitigate explicit discrimination in pay, and the expansion of higher education and training programs have advanced the employment fortunes of many American women. By the early 1980s, some scholars proclaimed near equity in pay between black and white women, particularly among young and highly skilled workers. More recent policy initiatives and labor market conditions have been arguably less progressive for black women’s employment and earnings: through the 1980s, 1990s, and the first half of the 2000s, the wage gap between black and white women widened considerably. Using data from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-MORG), this article documents the racial wage gap among women in the United States from 1979 to 2005. We investigate how demographic and labor market conditions influence employment and wage inequality among black and white women over the period. Although shifts in labor supply influence the magnitude of the black-white wage gap among women, structural disadvantages faced by black women help explain the growth in the racial wage gap.     

Ethnic variations in the relationship between income and fertility

The effects of husband'spotential andrelative incomes on completed fertility, as well as their effects on certain parity progression probabilities, are examined within samples of Anglos, Blacks and Mexican Americans. Relationships are estimated using data from the one-percent 1960 and 1970 U.S. Public Use Samples. The results reveal different patterns of relationship by ethnicity between the measures of income and the measures of fertility. The effects on completed fertility of the income measures are positive for Anglos and negative for Blacks, while in the case of Mexican Americans the effect ofpotential income is negative and that ofrelative income is positive. Income effects on the parity progression probabilities are similar in pattern to those from the analyses using completed fertility, although somewhat different patterns tend to appear at different birth orders, especially among Anglos.     

Marriage markets and nonmarital fertility in the United States

We merge census microdata with vital statistics data to examine the effect of women's marriage opportunities on nonmarital fertility rates and ratios across 75 U.S. metropolitan areas. Measures of the quantity and "quality" of marriageable men simultaneously specific for women's age, race, education, and place of residence reveal especially poor marriage prospects for highly educated black women. The effect of mate availability on nonmarital fertility is generally modest. Among white women, marriage opportunities are associated inversely with the nonmarital fertility rate, perhaps reflecting an increased likelihood that a premarital conception will be legitimated. Marriage opportunities also reduce nonmarital fertility ratios for young black and white women. The nonmarital fertility rate is lower among women whose marriage pool includes a large percentage of nonemployed males. Only a small proportion of the racial difference in nonmarital fertility appears attributable to differences in the marriage markets of black and of white women.     

Minority status and family size: A comparison of explanations

In this study, the family sizes of Chinese, Japanese and Filipino Americans are compared with those of whites, using data from the 1970 public use samples for California and Hawaii. The two hypotheses derived from the ‘minority status’ hypothesis are tested; the latter states that minorities experience tensions and anxiety which lead to lower fertility compared with native whites of Anglo-Saxon ancestry under certain conditions. We also examine the effect of assimilation in terms of variables known to affect fertility, and control for several age and acculturation variables.

Analysis, based on a regression decomposition model, gives some support to the argument that the family size of minority groups differs from that of native whites because of incomplete assimilation and because independent variables affect fertility differently. However, since the independent effect of minority status per se is generally to raise fertility for Japanese and Chinese Americans, and lower it for Filipinos, we reject this version of the minority status hypothesis. Our general conclusion is that family size differentials in a pluralistic society may be part of a persisting pattern of sub-cultural differentiation, and do not necessarily reflect any ‘tensions and anxiety’ of minority status.     

Racial differences in occupational status and income in South Africa, 1880 and 1881

Using data on employed men from the 1980 and 1991 South African Censuses, we analyze the determinants of occupational status and income. Whites are found to have much higher occupational status, and especially income, than members of other racial groups. Most of the racial differentials in occupational status can be explained by racial differences in the personal assets that determine occupational attainment (especially education), but only a much smaller fraction of the White/non-White income differential can be so explained. Despite a modest reduction between 1980 and 1991 in the role of race in socioeconomic attainment, the overall picture shows more stability than change.     

Dual-earner migration. Earnings gains, employment and self-selection

This paper examines how spouses in dual-earner couples weigh each partner’s expected wage growth in the decision to migrate. Previous research suggests that husbands’ job prospects dominate the migration choice irrespective of their relative earnings potential. Based on British panel data, this paper employs an endogenous switching model and estimates wage differentials of migrating vs. staying for husbands and wives corrected for double selectivity of migration and employment. Dual-earner couples attach a positive weight to each partner’s expected wage gains when deciding to migrate. Moreover, migrant wives’ employment decreases temporarily, and there are significant selection effects in migration and employment amongst non-migrants.     

Race and exits from white collar jobs: Differences in downward mobility processes among African American, Latino, and White males

Does race affect the route to downward mobility from white collar occupations? Data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics are used to assess the minority vulnerability thesis, which maintains there are race-specific processes of down ward occupational mobility among males from white collar occupations. Findings indicate that, consistent with theory, a racialized continuum exists across six years of the work-career. For Whites, the path to downward mobility is relatively narrow and structured by traditional stratification-based causal factors, namely, human capital, back ground socioeconomic status, and job/labor market characteristics. For African Americans, the route to downward mobility is broad-based and not captured by traditional stratification factors and Latinos occupy an intermediate ground between Whites and African Americans. Further, as predicted by theory, the racial gap in mobility processes between Whites and racial minorities is pronounced at the lower-tier of white collar employment. Finally, implications of the findings for understanding labor market inequalities on the basis of race are discussed.     

Demographic change,rising earnings inequality,and the distribution of personal well-being, 1959–1989

This paper uses new methods to determine the sources of the sharp fall and then the steep rise in personal income inequality between 1959 and 1989. The increase in the proportion of single-head families tended to boost inequality over the entire period. Forty percent of the reduction in income inequality in the 1960s occurred because of the decline in earnings inequality among male heads of families; more than one-third of the increase in inequality after 1969 occurred because inequality in male earnings soared. Since 1979 females’ gains in earnings have increased inequality because these gains have been concentrated increasingly in families with high incomes     

Modelling potential impact of improved survival of Indigenous Australians on work-life labour income gap between Indigenous and average Australians

This study compares the work-life labour income of Indigenous and average Australians and assesses the potential effect of bridging the mortality gaps on their work-life earnings using a life-table model which took account of the survival, employment and income trajectories from 25 to 64 years. Age-specific employment and average annual income data were derived from the 2006 Census for three educational groups: incomplete secondary, completed secondary, and higher levels of education. Results show that depending on educational qualifications, the work-life labour income of Indigenous people is likely to be around two-fifths to two-thirds of the work-life labour income of average Australians. If Indigenous Australians were to have the same level of survival as average Australians, the work-life labour income gap would narrow by about 4–7 % points. Bridging the adult mortality gap alone has only a small effect on bridging economic gaps persisting between Indigenous and other Australians.