Summary statistics on indenture and associated migration affecting the West Indies, 1834-1918

Abstract This paper presents summary statistics of immigration into the West Indies, under indenture or government sponsorship, during the period 1834-1918. The sources reveal a few discrepancies, but are sufficiently consistent to permit the construction of a series for each of the ethnic groups introduced. Most of the problems involved in constructing these series centre around the fact that a variety of sources have to be utilised. Immigration figures of East Indians, Portuguese, Chinese, Europeans and others into the several West Indian colonies have been prepared for each calendar year or season, but to conserve space are presented here in summary form. In the case of African immigration it is possible to give their country of origin. The only group of immigrants who were involved in return movements of any consequence are the East Indians.     

German Reunification: Welfare Gains and Losses East and West

A framework of welfare accounts (Juster and Stafford, 1985; Headey, 1993; see also Goodin et al., 1999) is used to assess gains and losses to East and West Germans in the post-reunification period, 1990–1997. The welfare accounts have three segments: a capital/stocks account, an income/flows account and a subjective welfare/psychic income account. This framework differs from conventional welfare economic accounts in explicitly defining and measuring welfare in psychological terms ... as perceived utility/satisfaction. It has recently been argued that this approach is required, if one accepts that individual utilities are not exogenous but are affected by changing comparisons with others (Duesenberry, 1949; Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Hollaender, 2001). Our hypotheses are that in the post-reunification period West German welfare was sacrificed – in all three segments of the accounts – in order to permit resources to flow to East Germans and to boost their stocks, flows and utilities. The hypotheses are supported in the case of West Germans, but results are mixed for East Germans. Our data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) which began in 1984 in West Germany and has involved reinterviewing a very large representative national sample every year since. The panel was extended to East Germany in June 1990, before formal reunification occurred, and so provides a picture of stocks, flows and utilities before the effects of integration into the Federal Republic were felt.     

Income Comparisons Among Neighbours and Satisfaction in East and West Germany

A series of studies have suggested that changes in others’ income may be perceived differently in post-transition and capitalist societies. This paper draws on the German Socio-economic Panel Study (SOEP) matched with micro-marketing indicators of population characteristics in very tightly drawn neighbourhoods to investigate whether reactions to changes in their neighbours’ income divide the German nation. We find that the neighbourhood income effect for West Germany is negative (which is in line with the ‘relative income’ hypothesis) and slightly more marked in neighbourhoods that may be assumed to be places where social interactions between neighbours take place. In contrast, the coefficients on neighbourhood income in East Germany are positive (which is consistent with the ‘signalling’ hypothesis), but statistically not significant. This suggests not only that there is a divide between East and West Germany, but also that neighbours may not be a relevant comparison group in societies that have comparatively low levels of neighbouring.     

Net immigration of gainful workers into the united states, 1870–1930

This paper presents a socioeconomic occupational grouping of the foreign-born gainful workers of the United States at each census from 1870 through 1930. This series is then used to estimate the net immigration of gainful workers into the United States during each of the six decades from 1870 to 1930 cross classified by occupational group and sex. The following three conclusions are then drawn from the above two series. First, the socioeconomic position of the foreign-born population of the United States remained relatively stable from 1870 to 1910 but then increased appreciably from 1910 to 1930. Second, although most of the contribution that immigration made to the United States labor force was in the form of semiskilled and unskilled workers, the relative importance of professional, clerical, and skilled workers increased almost continuously from 1870 to 1930. Third, the “new immigration” was not less skilled than the “old immigration”. On the contrary it was actually more skilled than the “old immigration”.     

Has East Germany Overtaken West Germany? Recent Trends in Order‐Specific Fertility

Some 20 years after reunification, the contrast between East and West Germany offers a natural experiment for studying the degree of persistence of Communist-era family patterns, the effects of economic change, and fertility postponement. After reunification, period fertility rates plummeted in the former East Germany to record low levels. Since the mid-1990s, however, period fertility rates have been rising in East Germany, in contrast to the nearly constant rates seen in the West. By 2008, the TFR of East Germany had overtaken that of the West. We explore why fertility in East Germany is higher than in West Germany, despite unfavorable economic circumstances in the East. We address this and related questions by (a) presenting an account of the persisting East/West differences in attitudes toward and constraints on childbearing, (b) conducting an order-specific fertility analysis of recent fertility trends, and (c) projecting completed fertility for the recent East and west German cohorts. In addition to using the Human Fertility Database, perinatal statistics allow us to calculate a tempo-corrected TFR for East and West Germany.     

Immigrants’ ages and the structure of stationary populations with below-replacement fertility

A sustained regime of low fertility plus immigration yields an unusual kind of stationary population. The author demonstrates that all stationary populations have a common structure, and that the familiar replacement-level fertility population is the youngest among the many stationary populations corresponding to a particular life table. This finding has important consequences for policy because although fertility increase and immigration are equally effective at halting population decline, immigration is inferior as a means of rejuvenating low-fertility populations. In fact, an immigration-based policy could make a low-fertility population older rather than younger. The paper includes examples using U.S. and West German vital rates.     

Immigration data and national population estimates for the United States

The immigration component in national population estimates is comparatively small, but it is not insignificant and may indeed be an important source of error. Therefore, it warrants the considera-tion of those concerned with population estimates. The paper considers alternative methods for deriving estimates of immigration from the raw data and presents estimates of net immigration from 1950 to 1965. They are developed from estimates previously published by the Bureau of the Census, but they differ at some points where new data have become available or where a review of the data has led to a change in judgment on how best to use them. The paper also presents suggestions on how immigration statistics might be altered for purposes of improving the estimates.Census data may be used to estimate net immigration by three different methods, but upon analysis each method proves to be inadequate. Hence, data based on visas surrendered at the port of entry must be the principal source of immigration estimates. These data have their limitations because (1) they do not cover net arrivals of citizens from abroad and from Puerto Rico, (2) they do not report departures of aliens, and (3) they do not allocate all immigrants to year of entry. Alien registration and passenger data offer possible alternative estimates.The paper attempts to measure unrecorded immigration, discusses how net arrivals of citizens from abroad and from Puerto Rico may be estimated, and how the age, sex, and race of immigrants may be treated.     

A macroeconometric disequilibrium analysis of current and future migration from Eastern Europe into West Germany

This paper attempts to evaluate the impact of current and future immigration flows on major macroeconomic variables of the West German economy. The analysis is based on a macroeconometric disequilibrium model for the West German economy. This model is extended until 1995 and used for several simulation experiments. Special attention is given to the notion that the effects of immigration are regime-specific, i.e., they depend on the type of disequilibrium prevailing on the goods and labor market.We are grateful for helpful comments made by Michael Burda, Gustav Heidbrink, Werner Smolny and three anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Trends in marriage and divorce in Peninsular Malaysia

Summary Median age at marriage for women has risen sharply for each of the three major ethnic groups - Malays, Chinese and Indians, in Peninsular Malaysia since 1957. The sharpest rise has been recorded for Malays and Indians, whose median age at marriage was barely over 17 in 1957. A shortage of potential husbands in the traditionally sanctioned ages contributed to the rise for Malays and Indians, but was probably not the paramount reason; average age differences between the spouses narrowed, but median age at marriage for men actually rose. During the same period, the previously extremely high divorce rates amongst Malays have fallen sharply, though wide inter-state differences remain. The sharp changes in marriage patterns reflect, and in turn are partly responsible for, far-reaching social and economic changes. They have profoundly affected fertility levels and patterns, as well as intra-familial relationships.     

What's happening to marriage in East Asia?

This article presents an overview of marriage patterns in East Asia. Globally, marriage patterns are changing. In East Asia, cultural patterns are slowing the changes in attitude toward marriage that are occurring in the West. There are implications of changing attitudes for government planners. This issue of Asia-Pacific Population and Policy is based on a series of studies of marriage and family life in Japan, South Korea, and the US. Data were obtained from the 1994 Japan Survey on Work and Family Life; the 1994 South Korea Survey on the Quality of Life; and the 1992-94 US Survey of Families and Households. Findings are reported on marriage age, attitudes toward marriage, attitudes post-marriage, and work patterns during marriage. Both Japan and South Korea have below replacement level fertility and traditional gendered division of labor in the household. In South Korea, women who work 35 or more hours/week spend 31 hours/week on housework, while husbands contribute 14 hours/week. In the US, the equivalent figures were 26 hours for full-time working wives and 9 hours for husbands. In Japan, wives spent 30 hours on housework, while husbands spent 3 hours. Full-time work outside the home involved 57% of married women in Japan, 27% in South Korea, and 66% in the US. Notwithstanding the double burden, women in South Korea and Japan experience pressure from competitive school systems for their children. After-school academic programs are expensive. The trend is for greater reluctance to marry. Replacement level fertility is unlikely unless full equality is achieved in the family.     

International migration of professionals

Abstract Using chiefly data published by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service this paper presents a statistical summary of the trends in professional immigration into the United States. The proportion of immigrants who are professionals has been steadily increasing during recent decades, and change in immigration laws produced a sharper increase since 1965. The second trend of importance is the increasing proportion of professional immigrants who come from the less developed nations of the world. The effects of immigration on American science and medicine are discussed. Important benefits appear to have accrued to the U.S. The effects on the countries of origin are less beneficial. Finally, the reasons behind the migration of professionals are discussed.     

Aging in Japan: population policy implications

This article was prepared for the International Conference on Aging in the East and West in 1995. The focus is on trends in aging in Japan and demographic determinants and consequences. Findings are presented from a 1990 study conducted by the Institute of Population Problems on acceptance of alternative population policies aimed to slow population aging in Japan. Japan is the seventh most populous country in the world, and the current growth rate is around 0.3%. Declines in fertility and mortality have contributed to the low growth rate. Population aging accelerated over the decades. The present share of aged population is 14.1%. The aged population is expected to continue to increase from 14.9 million in 1990 to 32.7 million in 2020 (25.8% in 2025). Decreases in the aged population are not expected until after the mid-2040s. The proportion of very old (ages 75 years and older) will dramatically increase to 14.5% in 2025. The primary demographic determinant of population aging and fertility decline is identified as the higher proportion of never-married and the higher age at marriage. One of the consequences of population aging is the increase in the age dependency ratios and the aged-child ratios. The proportion of intergenerationally extended households declined over time, but the pace of decline has slowed recently. The proportion of aged in one person or couple only households has risen but not to the same extent as the West. The majority of older old still live with a married child. Logistic analysis of 1985 survey data reveal that the custom of the elderly living with the eldest child remains. The 1985 survey also revealed much indecision about a pronatalist policy or a fertility policy. Logistic analysis of 1990 public opinion survey data shows acceptance of immigration as a policy alternative to slowing population aging. Acceptance varied by socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors. A pronatalist policy received stronger acceptance. However, reference is made to Kojima's literature review, which suggests that indirect policies on fertility and a comprehensive family policy would be more effective in raising fertility than a population policy.     

Fertility levels and trends in Indonesia

Summary Fertility estimates from the 1973 Indonesian Fertility Mortality Survey are presented and compared with estimates from the 1971 population census. Although there are some differences, on the whole the two sources are remarkably consistent, indicating the same regional differentials: highest fertility in Sumatra (T.F.R. in rural areas around 7.0), followed by West Java and Sulawesi, Bali, then Central and East Java (T.F.R. in rural areas around 50). Coale's Index of Overall Fertility (If) is 39 per cent higher in rural Sumatra than in rural East Java. Fertility in urban areas is somewhat below rural fertility in all regions. The age pattern of fertility in Sumatra, Sulawesi and West Java is consistent with Henry's notion of 'natural fertility', and indeed the survey data show these regions to be almost innocent of deliberate practice of contraception. The lower fertility levels in Central and East Java appear to be related to patterns of extended lactation and post-partum abstinence, though modern contraception promoted by the national family planning programme is also on the increase. Though lower than elsewhere, both actual fertility and stated ideal family size in Central and East Java are well above the levels needed to achieve replacement levels of fertility.     

The Demand for Immigration to the United States

This paper examines trends and cross-national variation in the active demand for immigration to the United States in the period of 1984–1993, using data from the Visa Office and various other sources. The analysis is restricted to legal immigration in numerically limited categories. The results show that the total number of active immigrant visa applicants steadily increased in the aggregate and in each of the preference categories. Moreover, the active demand for immigration was highly skewed, with the majority of applications coming from a dozen countries: Mexico, the Philippines, India, mainland China, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, Hong Kong, and Pakistan. Most of these highly-backlogged countries displayed a significant increase in the growth rate of demand for immigration. The paper also shows a substantial cross-national variation in the active demand for immigration and explores its structural determinants. The regression results indicate that the level of economic development in sending countries and U.S. economic and cultural relations with sending countries play important roles in the determination process. Policy implications of the findings are also discussed.     

The Middle East population puzzle

An overview is provided of Middle Eastern countries on the following topics; population change, epidemiological transition theory and 4 patterns of transition in the middle East, transition in causes of death, infant mortality declines, war mortality, fertility, family planning, age and sex composition, ethnicity, educational status, urbanization, labor force, international labor migration, refugees, Jewish immigration, families, marriage patterns, and future growth. The Middle East is geographically defined as Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Gaza and the West Bank, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. The Middle East's population grew very little until 1990 when the population was 43 million. Population was about doubled in the mid-1950s at 80 million. Rapid growth occurred after 1950 with declines in mortality due to widespread disease control and sanitation efforts. Countries are grouped in the following ways: persistent high fertility and declining mortality with low to medium socioeconomic conditions (Jordan, Oman, Syria, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza), declining fertility and mortality in intermediate socioeconomic development (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran), high fertility and declining mortality in high socioeconomic conditions (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and low fertility and mortality in average socioeconomic conditions (Israel). As birth and death rates decline, there is an accompanying shift from communicable diseases to degenerative diseases and increases in life expectancy; this pattern is reflected in the available data from Egypt, Kuwait, and Israel. High infant and child mortality tends to remain a problem throughout the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and the Gulf States. War casualties are undetermined, yet have not impeded the fastest growing population growth rate in the world. The average fertility is 5 births/woman by the age of 45. Muslim countries tend to have larger families. Contraceptive use is low in the region, with the exception of Turkey and Egypt and among urban and educated populations. More than 40% of the population is under 15 years of age. The region is about 50% Arabic (140 million). Educational status has increased, particularly for men; the lowest literacy rates for women are in Yemen and Egypt. The largest countries are Iran, Turkey, and Egypt.     

The Sources and Diversity of Immigrant Population Change in Australia, 1981–2011

Australia has one of the largest percentages of immigrant populations in the developed world with a highly regulated system of immigration control and regular censuses to track their changes over time. However, the ability to explain the population change through the demographic components of immigration, emigration, and death by age and sex is complicated because of differences in measurement and sources of information. In this article, we explore three methods for reconciling the demographic accounts from 1981 to 2011 for the Australia-born and 18 foreign-born population groups. We then describe how the immigrant populations have changed and what has contributed most to that change. We find that the sources of immigrant population change have varied considerably by age, sex, country of birth, and period of immigration. Immigrants from Europe are currently the oldest and slowest-growing populations, whereas those from elsewhere are growing rapidly and exhibit relatively young population age structures. Studying these patterns over time helps us to understand the nature of international migration and its long-term contributions to population change and composition.     

Die Transformation der Jugendhilfe in Ostdeutschland im Kontext von Tradition, Diskontinuität und Strukturbildung

Changes in the child care legislation in 1990 led to the development of a new helping culture both in West and East Germany at the same time. Paternalistic relations to the clients had to be replaced by autonomy focused and thus professional interaction patterns. So clients were involved in the process of choosing adequate educational support. By comparing two East German youth welfare agencies we show the factors that impede the process of restructuring an appropriate professional-client relationship. The most important factor is the fallacy of mistaking educational support for education itself.     

The precarious mosaic: Divergence and convergence in the Canadian 80s

Two recent national surveys producing cross-sectional and longitudinal data reveal that almost one in two Canadians continue to oppose the government's bilingualism policy, while the same proportion claim that racial and cultural groups in their communities are being discriminated against. Anglophones and Francophones continue to have divergent views of their levels of influence in Canadian life, while East Indians and Pakistanis, Jews and Canadian Indians remain targets of discrimination. Yet the two surveys also point to increasing convergence. There has been a modest rise in the endorsement of bilingualism, and an increase in the inclination of Francophones to view their influence and future positively. There also has been a softening of negative attitudes towards Jews, Orientals, and Blacks, and a tendency to be more receptive to racial and religious intermarriage. Ongoing divergence is thus being accompanied by increasing convergence.     

Israel's population: the challenge of pluralism

This Bulletin describes the interplay of demographic and sociopolitical processes in Israel since the founding of the state in May 1948 and projects what it might be until the year 2015. Heavy Jewish immigration, especially during the mass immigration of 1948-51, has balanced the high natural increase of Moslems, who comprise the majority of Israeli Arabs, so that the proportion of Jews in Israel's population at the end of 1982 (83% of 4.1 million) was little changed from June 1948 (81% of 806,000). Even with Jewish immigration now low, this proportion is likely to be no lower than 76% in 2015, the Jewish proportion could be only 50% in a Greater Israel as Israel annexes the Occupied Areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip where 1.2 million Arabs now live. Oriental Jews from less developed North African and Asian countries, 15% of Israel's Jewish population in 1984, with their largescale immigration to the mid-1960s and initially higher fertility, have managed to outnumber European-American Jews by 1970. This was an important factor in the 1977 shift of political dominance from the leftwing Labor parties, supported by the better educated, socialist leaning European-American Jews, to the rightwing Likud bloc, espousing economic policies based on more private initiative and Israel's historic rights to Judea and Samaria (West Bank). Western oriented Jews of European or American origin, although still the country's establishment, comprised only 40% of Israel's population by 1981. By 2015, their share is likely to be down to 30% within Israel's present boundaries and would be only 22% of the population of a Greater Israel. First raised by 19th century Zionists in Europe who set off the drive for the reestablishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, the quesions of whether or not Israel will be a Jewish state and remain a Western society will continue salient into the 21st century.