A cross-national comparison of the impact of family migration on women's employment status

In this paper we consider the effects of family migration on women's employment status, using census microdata from Great Britain and the United States. We test a simple hypothesis that families tend to move long distances in favor of the male's career and that this can have a detrimental effect on women's employment status. Unlike many previous studies of this question, our work emphasizes the importance of identifying couples that have migrated together, rather than simply comparing long-distance (fe)male migrants with nonmigrant (fe)males individually. We demonstrate that women's employment status is harmed by family migration; the results we present are surprisingly consistent for Great Britain and the United States, despite differing economic situations and cultural norms regarding gender and migration. We also demonstrate that studies that fail to identify linked migrant couples are likely to underestimate the negative effects of family migration on women's employment status.     

The end of “Catholic” fertility

Catholic and non-Catholic fertility during the post-World War II period are compared in this paper. Evidence accumulated across five sample surveys of fertility in the United States, which were conducted at five-year intervals from 1955 through 1975, forms the basis for the analysis; both cohort and period measures are employed. Starting from a situation where Catholic fertility was very little higher than that of non-Catholics, it is shown that the differential increased markedly during the baby boom and then declined to a point where the two trends nearly come together in the mid-1970s. Interpretation of the recent convergence in the light of various theories that have been put forward to explain the differential suggests that it will be an enduring phenomenon.     

Limit cycle oscillations of the human population

This paper investigates a mathematical model for the growth of an age-structured population. The model includes the idea (due to Easterlin) that fertility is affected by the size of the cohort in which an individual is born. It is important to note that the model investigated represents only a reasonable first step in the direction of reality from the unrealistic assumption that mortality and fertility do not change with passing time. It is shown that this general model can lead to self-excited, persistent oscillations (called limit cycles in mathematical parlance) of the birth trajectory of the population. Using data for the United States from the twentieth century, it is shown that variations in the number of births are consistent with the model discussed.     

New perspective in population assistance

The United States Agency for International Development (AID), in a proposal to Congress, has suggested that before assistance is extended to developing countries, its impact on the country's population growth should be considered and development projects accepted that contribute directly to fertility declines. Foreign development projects will be examined for their direct and indirect impact on population growth. Some projects related to education, employment and economic development may be found, by their very nature, to encourage fertility decline and emphasized as a result of the impact examinations. Other projects may be changed to stress the features that are conducive to slowing population growth. The population impact examination proposal has been included in this year's legislation to authorize the continuation of United States development assistance programs for the fiscal year 1978.     

Income and reproductive motivation

It is often assumed that family size and income would be positively related if unwanted births among the less advantaged were prevented. But this assumption rests on a prior expectation that family-size preferences bear a direct relation to income in modern societies. Data on such reproductive preferences in relation to economic status from 13 studies in the United States dating between 1936 and 1966 do not support the notion of a positive association between reproductive preferences and income. Only when Catholics are considered is there even a U-shaped relation between family-size desires and income. These results cast doubt on the notion that the economic theory of demand for consumer durables is relevant to reproductive motivation. Rather, the data lend credence to the idea that significant non-economic influences associated with prosperity depress family-size desires among the well-to-do. Only if these influences are specifically weakened by a counter-force (such as Catholicism) do wealthier people show a preference for somewhat larger families. In no case, however, are the Catholic/non-Catholic differences in reproductive preference large. Moreover, no economic group, even among non-Catholics, prefers very small families.     

Income and reproductive motivation

Abstract It is often assumed that family size and income would be positively related if unwanted births among the less advantaged were prevented. But this assumption rests on a prior expectation that family-size preferences bear a direct relation to income in modern societies. Data on such reproductive preferences in relation to economic status from 13 studies in the United States dating between 1936 and 1966 do not support the notion of a positive association between reproductive preferences and income. Only when Catholics are considered is there even a U-shaped relation between family-size desires and income. These results cast doubt on the notion that the economic theory of demand for consumer durables is relevant to reproductive motivation. Rather, the data lend credence to the idea that significant non-economic influences associated with prosperity depress family-size desires among the well-to-do. Only if these influences are specifically weakened by a counter-force (such as Catholicism) do wealthier people show a preference for somewhat larger families. In no case, however, are the Catholic/non-Catholic differences in reproductive preference large. Moreover, no economic group, even among non-Catholics, prefers very small families.     

Social structure and U.S. inter-state fertility differentials in 1900

This paper investigates the importance of agricultural land shortages versus modernization of the society in influencing inter-state differentials in fertility in 1900, when the United States was in midtransition. Urbanization and manufacturing characteristics of states were the strongest correlates of variations in the index of total fertility because urban-industrialism depressed both the probability of marriage and marital fertility. Other modern characteristics of American states were also important in understanding variations in marital fertility. Low labor force employment of children and farm mechanization, integrally related characteristics, seemed to depress levels of marital fertility in many parts of the United States, independent of the urban-industrial system. Agricultural land opportunity had little overall effect on marital fertility; however, it was quite important in understanding variations in patterns of marriage.     

Intended and Ideal Family Size in the United States, 1970–2002

Cross‐nationally, observed fertility is well below mean levels of reported ideal family size and also usually well below survey respondents' fertility desires and intentions. The United States is an exception. In this article we: (1) discuss the importance of fertility ideals and intentions for understanding observed fertility levels, (2) propose a model that can account for variable attitude‐behavior consistency, and (3) use this model as a framework to examine trends in American women's fertility ideals, intentions, and actual fertility. Our study uses data from the General Social Surveys and the Current Population Surveys. We ask whether preferences and intentions for moderate family sizes have eroded with time. The answer is remarkably clear: the dominant American ideals and intentions are for two or three children, and these preferences have persisted across the last three decades. The unusual aggregate correspondence between fertility intentions and behavior in the United States is explained by an apparent offsetting of factors that increase/decrease fertility relative to intentions.     

Aiming at a moving target: Period fertility and changing reproductive goals

Summary Common sense suggests that changes over time in aggregate period fertility rates should be closely, related to changes in desired completed fertility after controlling for contraceptive failure, and desired spacing and timing; the nature of the relationship is, however, far from clear. This paper shows that when desired completed fertility undergoes swings, like those in the United States in recent decades, the turning points in period fertility will precede those in desired completed fertility by as much as five years and the amplitude of the swings in period fertility will be more than twice as great. Cumulated fertility, on the other hand, will lag behind reproductive goals. Period fertility rates will exceed desired completed fertility when desires are increasing and fall below it when desires are decreasing. These theoretical results help to explain some salient features of the American baby boom and bust. It is also shown that during a demographic transition, period fertility will fall more rapidly than desired completed fertility, and that towards the end of the transition, period fertility will increase.     

Age distribution and the stable equivalent

Some populations, like that of the United States in the 1950's, have a smaller proportion of women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with continuance of their age-specific birth and deaths rates, a continuance which produces the condition known in demography as stability. Others, like that of the United States in the 1930's, have relatively more women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with stability. A way of studying ages is to calculate how many women of stable age distribution would be equivalent from the viewpoint of reproduction to the women observed. This stable equivalent was 69,535,000 or 16 percent below the observed United States female population in 1955, and 12 percent above the observed in 1935. The stable equivalent is a measure of fertility potential, closely related to R. A. Fisher's reproductive value. Calculations for four countries illustrate how a fall of the birth rate, for example in demographic transition, occasions an age distribution in which the stable equivalent is greater than the observed number of women. The notion of stable equivalent is useful for comparison because changes in it are nearly invariant with respect to the age-pattern of fertility used. The statement that the United States stable equivalent increased by 11 percent between 1960 and 1965 holds irrespective of whether the 1960 or the 1965 age-specific fertility and mortality rates are used as standard.     

Marital moratorium and fertility control in China

Abstract Since 1949, the issue of marital postponement has been extensively discussed in China. Unlike some other means of fertility control (e.g. abortion and oral contraception), marital postponement has been welcomed with the fewest misgivings. Lately, marital postponement has also been given renewed emphasis by those outside China who see a weak link between various current national family planning programmes based on improved technology and the goal of fertility reduction. One aim of this paper is to render a comprehensive account of the marital postponement programme in China in the course of the birth control campaign during the last two decades. The second objective is to discuss the lessons that may be learned from it, and its implications for the current fertility controversy in the United States. Four general conclusions emerge from a careful analysis of the available documents: (1) in China, proponents of delayed marriage were divided on the question of how to secure its general acceptance. One issue dividing them was whether or not China's Marriage Law of 1950 should be amended in order to achieve it. Those who favoured raising the minimum legal age disagreed on the details of the presumably needed change. There is enough evidence to suggest that medical personnel were the chief advocates of compulsory postponement of marriage. The government rejected this legalistic approach and, in so doing, agreed with Chen Ta (a noted demographer) and others who sought to achieve postponement of marriage through appropriate social and economic measures. (2) Decisions to delay matrimony in different socio-cultural settings are not necessarily identical sociological phenomena. In some societies, (e.g. the United States), they may amount to no more than a course of action that enables individuals involved to realize or develop alternate goals in life. In others (e.g. China), they are literally acts of rebellion. (3) The fertility policy dispute has been carried on in a context of revolutionary change, and involved persons who have committed themselves to transforming the Chinese family. This prior commitment was mainly responsible for the relative lack of controversy about marital postponement as a means of fertility control. (4) Use of contraception is private, hidden from open view. But postponement of marriage is public and may be a source of inter-generational and interpersonal conflict. In China and other parallel situations, a decision to delay marriage is in itself against tradition. In this sense, a full-scale marital moratorium cannot but be more than a partial assault on the hold that the family has over its offspring. This must be unequivocally reflected in discussions of fertility control policy everywhere.     

Religion as a determinant of marital fertility

This paper develops hypotheses about the effects of husbands‘ and wives‘ religious affiliations on fertility. The hypotheses are based on two central ideas. First, religions differ in their fertility norms and corresponding tradeoffs between the quality and quantity of children; differences in religious beliefs between husband and wife may thus lead to conflict regarding fertility decisions and possible resolution through bargaining. Second, a low level of religious compatibility between the spouses may raise the expected probability of marital dissolution and thereby decrease the optimal amount of investments in spouse-specific human capital. Analyses of data from the 1987–1988 National Survey of Families and Households conducted in the United States suggest that both of these effects play important roles in explaining the observed linkages between the religious composition of unions and fertility behavior. JEL classification: J1, J11, J13 Received February 17, 1995 / Accepted February 15, 1996     

Regional—sub-cultural explanations of black fertility in the United States

This paper re-examines the relevance of the hypothesis concerning the Southern sub-culture and black fertility in the United States. According to zero-order correlation analysis, Southern-born blacks show higher fertility than those born in other regions. But a dummy-variable regression technique applied to the data from the 1970 public-use sample indicates that the Southern origin — independent of other factors-is not different from other regions. Southern birth has the effect of increasing black fertility, but much less so than birth in the North Central region. Southern blacks show higher fertility because of their lower socio-economic background. It is concluded that geographical regions in the United States have little or no cultural meaning in explaining reproductive behaviour.     

Economic development and fertility

Two schools of theorists have been concerned with the effect of economic development on fertility. One school has contended that economic development has an inhibiting effect on fertility. The demographic transition which has occurred among the non-developed countries confirms their viewpoint. Another school of thought, including in its members Thomas Malthus, has believed that economic development promoted fertility. Much empirical evidence may also be brought to bear to support this viewpoint.The present paper attempts to reconcile these viewpoints. It is hypothesized that the direct effect of economic development is to increase fertility. However, various factors which usually accompany the process of economic development serve to reduce fertility. These include an increase in the level of education and a reduction in infant and childhood mortality. Making use of data for 41 nations pertaining to the decade of the 1950's, it is found that fertility is directly associated with per capita net national product when controls for other relevant variables are in8tituted. On the other hand, per capita newspaper circulation is inversely related to fertility, and infant mortality is directly related.If the hypothesis advanced in this paper is correct, relatively large governmental expenditures on health and education will enhance the reduction in fertility obtainable from an increase in national economic level alone.     

Estimating birth stopping and spacing behavior

A decomposition of age-specific marital fertility rates into indices related to spacing and stopping is developed by using Coale and Trussell's indices and the first few parity progression ratios. This approach leads to estimates of the mean birth interval among low-parity births that can be used to address the issue of fertility control early in marriage. In this way the model addresses several of the most serious limitations of Coale and Trussell's approach. The usefulness of the proposed indices is demonstrated by applications to historical data from the United States and Europe.     

Credential inflation and educational strategies: A comparison of the United States and the Netherlands

This paper analyzes the trend in the effect of education on social class attainment, and uses this information to test hypotheses on the impact of credential inflation on educational decision making in the United States and the Netherlands. After having shown evidence for credential inflation of three educational transitions, it was shown that credential inflation between two generations increased the likelihood of making a transition into tertiary education in the Netherlands, and into high school completion and into 4-year university degrees in the United States. This supports the theory that education functions as a positional good, and if education loses value people need more of it in order to reach the same social class as their parents. Cross-national variation is explained with the theory that education in the United States functions more as a positional good than it does in the Netherlands.     

Voluntary childlessness: A review of the evidence and implications

This paper reviews evidence on the incidence, correlates, and implications of voluntary childlessness in the United States. Overall, the evidence points toward the increasing prevalence of this phenomenon, with some analysts projecting that as much as 30 percent of recent cohorts of American women will remain permanently childless. These high rates are shown to be similar in magnitude to rates of childlessness projected for recent cohorts of women in several European countries with fertility patterns comparable to those of the United States. Explanations for the increasing prevalence of childlessness are also considered. The second half of this paper examines existing evidence on the correlates of voluntary childlessness. In this connection, special attention is paid to education, area of residence, labor force status, income, and geographic mobility. This section also explores the implications of increasing childlessness and selected ways to redistribute the cost of children.     

Population change in Meso-America: The Tip of the demographic Iceberg

This paper examines the demographic situation in Mexico and Central America (Meso-America) and looks at the momentum for growth implied by recent population shifts. Despite successes in reducing fertility levels in many Meso-American countries, the dramatic declines in mortality among infants and children have given rise to a "death dearth" that is contributing to a new "baby boom" in these countries; thus our subtitle, "The Tip of the Iceberg."The impacts of such population growth on education, the economy and migration are considered in some detail. The anticipated inability of country economies to provide jobs for the thousands of young adults entering the labor force in future years could result in significant increases in the number seeking to migrate in a northerly direction. Thus, the United States is also vitally interested in the demographic shifts taking place south of its border.The need for a more unified regional approach to some of the social and economic problems facing these nations is pointed out as is the need for a more rational immigration policy on the part of the United States in light of the potential increase in immigration in future years.     

Religion as a Determinant of Economic and Demographic Behavior in the United States

This note reviews and synthesizes research on the effects of religion on various economic and demographic behaviors of individuals and families in the United States, including the choice of marital partner, union formation and dissolution, fertility, female time allocation, education, wages, and wealth. Using a theoretical framework based on Gary Becker's contributions to the economics of the family, it demonstrates that religious affiliation affects economic and demographic behavior because of its impact on the costs and benefits of many interrelated decisions that people make over the life cycle. In addition, for behaviors that pertain to married-couple households, religious affiliation matters because it is a complementary trait within the context of marriage. Religiosity, another dimension of religion, also affects economic and demographic outcomes, partly because it accentuates differences by religious affiliation, partly because religious involvement has generally beneficial effects on health and well-being.     

A Theory of Marital Fertility Transition

In this paper a theory of marital fertility transition that treats birth control diffusion processes and the effects of mortality decline and economic and social development on fertility within a common analytical framework is developed. Utility-cost concepts provide the means for an integrated treatment. Family size utility functions are used and the theory is focused on the effects of development and diffusion on the utilities and costs of alternative family sizes. The principal innovation lies in the conceptualization and analysis of diffusion of birth control, in which the psychic costs of violating social norms against birth control play a central role. When norms shift in favour of birth control, the psychic costs of birth control fall, causing a decline in the demand for children. In highly integrated populations this process can occur very rapidly, resulting in rapid diffusion of birth control and sudden and rapid fertility decline.