The fertility of teachers in England and Wales

Data on the fertility of teachers in grant earning schools in England and Wales were collected in 1955 as part of a general survey into the social characteristics of teachers. The survey was financed by the Nuffield Foundation with a contribution from the Population Investigation Committee. A subsequent article will discuss some possible determinants of fertility and in particular the interrelationship between social mobility and fertility. The present note describes changes in cohort fertility of teachers since 1915 and compares average family size with that of other sections of the population. The average number of children per married male teacher declined from 1.81 for the pre-1920 cohort to 1.47 for 1930–34. Segmental data after 1935 indicate a rise to approximately 2 children per family. Comparison with the Family Census suggests that the number of children of teachers is between 10% and 20% below that of all professions combined when the age at marriage of the wife is taken into account.     

Fertility,social mobility and urban migration in Brazil

In the course of a sample survey of the adult population of eight cities in southcentral Brazil conducted in 1959 and early 1960, material was obtained respecting total family size after ten or more years of marriage. This was analysed in order to determine what variations in mean family size could be observed in relation to class status and social mobility. The results generally corroborate those of J. Berent for England and Wales–that is, that fertility is inversely related to class status, and that for a given class, the lower the class of origin, the higher the fertility. There was no confirmation, however, of J. Goldberg's findings in Detroit that the inverse relationship between class and fertility is due to the presence in urban populations of the rural-born, and suggestions are put forward which may explain this result in Brazil. A tentative estimate suggests that the net effect of social mobility had been to reduce the sample's total births by something of the order of 3 per cent.     

Fertility and social mobility

This article contains an analysis of part of the results of an inquiry into social mobility undertaken jointly by the Nuffield Research Unit of the London School of Economics and the Population Investigation Committee, in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, based on nation-wide sample material collected by the Social Survey in England and Wales in 1949. Grateful acknowledgment is made to the Inter-Departmental Committee on Economic and Social Research for facilitating the collaboration with these government departments. In this paper, the relationship between fertility defined in terms of average family size of marriages of at least twenty years duration and social mobility is discussed. Two aspects of the latter phenomenon are discussed, namely, the position of sons on the social scale in relation to that of their fathers, and the change in the social status of a family in the period between the date of marriage and the date of the inquiry.

The conclusions reached stand in apparent contradiction to R. A. Fisher's ‘Theory of Infertility Selection’. It is shown that socially promoted families tend on the one hand to carry with them the family-building habits of the class of their origin, and, on the other, to acquire to some extent the fertility characteristics of the class into which they move.

The study of ‘personal’ social mobility throws some light on the question of the choice of the time-basis of socio-economic status allocation.     

Marriage form and fertility in rural China: an investigation in three counties

Using data from two surveys in three counties where the prevalence of uxorilocal marriage differs greatly, this paper analyzes impact of marriage form, individual, family, and social factors on fertility and its regional differences. The results show that, under the Chinese patrilineal joint family system, uxorilocal marriage does not universally increase fertility, which is likely to be determined by other factors. It is further found that fertility differs greatly in the three regions, and is significantly lower in regions where uxorilocal marriage is common than in regions where virilocal marriage is dominant. Women’s marriage cohort, age at first marriage, and number of sisters all have significant effects on fertility. These findings address the process and consequences of change in rural family and marriage customs during the current demographic and social transition.     

Reproduction,Compositional Demography,and Economic Growth: Family Planning in England Long Before the Fertility Decline

This article offers a radical reinterpretation of the chronology of control over reproduction in England's history. It argues that, as a result of post–World War II policy preoccupations, there has been too narrow a focus in the literature on the significance of reductions in marital fertility. In England's case this is conventionally dated to have occurred from 1876, long after the industrial revolution. With a wider angle focus on “reproduction,” the historical evidence for England indicates that family planning began much earlier in the process of economic growth. Using a “compositional demography” approach, a novel social pattern of highly prudential, late marriage can be seen emerging among the bourgeoisie in the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There is also evidence for a more widespread resort to such prudential marriage throughout the population after 1816. When placed in this context, the reduction in national fertility indexes visible from 1876 can be seen as only a further phase, not a revolution, in the population's management of its reproduction.     

Some aspects of mating and fertility in the West Indies

This paper deals with certain problems in fertility analysis in the West Indies that have their origin in two characteristics of the populations involved: the diversity of family forms and the imbalance between the sexes. Considerations of the main features of these family types, in terms of a fourfold classification as well as in terms of the threefold classification adopted at recent censuses (single, common law and married), show that many techniques relied on in the study of fertility among European populations are inapplicable to West Indian populations.

The limited data available permit only rough estimates of the rates of formation of different types of unions: but these emphasise that formal marriage usually takes place late in the childbearing period, generally after the couple has had one-or more children, that the formation of keeper unions begins considerably earlier and that the common law type is a transitional state between the looser keeper union and the state of formal marriage.

There seems to be no chance of studying fertility differentials among the several family types in terms of reproduction rates. Census data however provide three measures for this purpose, all of which show that fertility is highest for the married type and lowest for the single or keeper union. These differentials seem to run counter to the more usual pattern of fertility differentials which show fertility lowest among groups of high socio-economic standing.

Imbalance between the sexes is of importance primarily in the problem of arriving at satisfactory indices of fertility, though it may also have contributed somewhat to the establishment of the pattern of low marriage rates. Wide discrepancies between rates based on males and rates based on females appear, both in respect of fertility levels at given points of time and in respect of fertility trends. These discrepancies seem closely related to the imbalance between the sexes in. the reproductive age span. Under these conditions the use of joint G.R.B's clearly offers a more realistic measure of fertility than rates based on either sex.     

Role of the social and cultural factors in human fertility in India

During the 1940s and 1950s in India, a relatively low level of fertility of 6–8 children per woman of unbroken marriage is implicated by the social and cultural factors; the fertility was probably depressed by 15–20 percent. An appraisal of the trends over the last 2–3 decades of the pertinent variables—age at marriage (an early and almost universal marriage); the widow remarriage rates; the induced abortion rate; postpartum infecundability (breastfeeding) and postpartum abstinence; the son preference; and the other sexual attitudes and taboos—suggests that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the fertility enhancing and retarding forces were offsetting each other. But, over the next two decades, the variables responsible for enhancing the fertility level will play a more dominant role than the corresponding fertility-reducing factors. However, the role of induced abortion remains somewhat unclear. For any significant reductions in the national crude birth rate in India during the 1990s, the family planning efforts will have to be considerably accelerated.     

Assessing the Predictive Value of Fertility Expectations Through a Cognitive–Social Model

This paper grounds its analysis in a novel model (Bachrach and Morgan in Popul Dev Rev, 39:459–485, 2013) that suggests that responses to questions about fertility intentions may reflect distinct phenomena at distinct points in the life course. The model suggests that women form "true" intentions when their circumstances make the issue of childbearing salient and urgent enough to draw the cognitive resources needed to make a conscious plan; before this, women report intentions based on cognitive images of family and self. We test the implications of this model for reported fertility expectations using NLSY79 data that measure expectations throughout the life course. We find that early in the life course, before marriage and parenthood, women’s fertility expectations are associated with family background and cognitive images of family and future self. Later in the life course, as women experience life course transitions that confer statuses normatively associated with childbearing—such as marriage—and parenthood itself, their reported expectations are better predictors of their fertility than before they passed these life course milestones. Our empirical results provide support for a model which has important implications for both the measurement and conceptualization of women’s intended and expected fertility.     

Marriage and divorce in twentieth century American cohorts

Marital status life tables have provided a basis for describing the marriage, divorce, and mortality experience of U.S. cohorts born 1888-1950. In brief, marriage occurred earlier and became more universal from the earliest cohorts to those of the late 1930s. More recent cohorts show declines in the proportion ever marrying and increases in the mean age at marriage. Period data for 1980 and cumulative cohort data by age suggest the likelihood of a continuing retreat from first marriage. Divorce has been rising steadily, with the latest cohorts indicating that 46 percent of male marriages and 42 percent of female marriages will end in divorce. Period data for males in 1980 raise the possibility that levels of divorce may have reached a peak, but cumulative cohort data by age show no such pattern. The present results are consistent with the view that a fundamental change in the traditional concept of marriage is underway. Traditional marriage involved the husband providing the wife with economic support and protection in return for her companionship and maternal services. Strong social pressures urged men and women to marry, and made the coveted services married persons provided each other difficult to obtain elsewhere. Recent economic changes have undermined the social and economic forces that maintained the institution of marriage. The U.S. economy has grown to include a large service sector in its labor force, and that growth has produced a dramatic increase in female labor force opportunities (Oppenheimer, 1970). The resultant large scale participation of women in economic activity blurs the traditional division of labor by sex, and goes to the very heart of the traditional marriage "bargain." At the same time, economic changes have weakened family ties by encouraging lower fertility, stressing achieved as opposed to ascribed characteristics, and fostering geographical mobility (Goode, 1970). The "marital union" of the past may be giving way to the "marital partnership" of the future, which will accommodate informal as well as formal marriages, less dependence between spouses, greater egalitarianism, lower fertility, and higher levels of divorce.     

Social status and fertility: A study of a town and three villages in Northwestern Iran

Studies of the relationship between social status and fertility in developing societies have shown diverse results. This study suggests that such findings result in part from problems in the conceptualization of social stratification and social status. In developing societies such as Iran the differentiation of modern and traditional cultural (and occupational) groups within social classes has resulted in the emergence of a dual hierarchy. Measures of social status must therefore reflect these conceptually distinct hierarchies, rather than be limited to linear scales. Figures from a study in a town and three villages in northwest Iran undertaken in 1973 are analyzed. Findings indicate that for women in towns, as social status increases within both traditional and modern occupational hierarchies (husband's occupation) and as measured by income, education and index of modern items, there is a general and almost monotonic decrease in the number of living children, children ever-born, and ideal number of children, with an increase in age at marriage and contraceptive use. The social and cultural homogeneity of the village sample is reflected in the relatively small variations in fertility-related behaviour and attitudes; however, fertility differences between landed and landless villages appear similar to the pattern found in the urban samples. The differences in the fertility behaviour of village and urban women of similar income and educational status indicate that fertility behaviour is related partially to class and partially to status distinctions between urban and rural communities.     

Mobility,Non-Familial Activity,and Fertility

In this analysis of fertility data from a sample of non-Catholic faculty couples in an American university, temporal patterns and variations in education, employment, marriage, and parenthood of the husbands and wives are discussed in reference to (1) the social mobility-fertility hypothesis and (2) a non-familial activity-fertility hypothesis.The couples are divided into four groups on the basis of family size and mobility status: (1) mobile-small, (2) non-mobile-small, (3) mobile-large, and (4) non-mobile-large. Whatever their mobility status, the four groups of husbands successfully completed requirements for the doctoral degree at about the same age and became established at about the same time in life and within the profession. Whatever their husbands' social origins, the wives also differ little with respect to educational attainment and in their work experiences in prematrimonial days. However, a different pattern is found in the work experiences of the wives since marriage. Those with two children are more likely to be employed after marriage and parenthood.On the other hand, a good many more wives with four or more children not only never worked before marriage but also remained outside the labor force after marriage (in the earlier years of marriage as well as after the tenth anniversary). The present data thus seem to support an analytically useful distinction between the "working wives" and the "working mothers."     

A fertility survey in the Maltese Islands

In order to determine whether fertility is declining in Malta, a sample was taken by the Maltese Central Statistical Office in mid-1955, along the line of the Family Census of 1946 in Great Britain. The size of the sample was 10,000, and the response very good. The sample shows no noticeable decline in fertility since the marriage cohorts of the beginning of the century. Some decline is noticeable int he fertility of the later durations of marriage, but completed family size remained more than 6 for the cohorts of the 1920's. This contrasts with the declining fertility shown by the enquiry in Great Britain, and the figure of 6 is in fact much greater than the completed families born to cohorts in Great Britain at the end of Queen Victoria's reign. Fertility seems in fact to be still rising in Malta for the first 18 months of marriage; and the first decade of marriage continues to show an average of 4 births. It seems therefore that the recent decline in the birth rate is to be attributed to changes in the populatino structure rather than in marital fertility. The continued high fertility implies a very rapid rise in population in the absence of emigration.     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

Fertility Decline in Czechoslovakia During the Last Two Centuries

The decline of fertility in Czechoslovakia on the territory of the Czech Socialist Republic began with a rise in the age at marriage; the decline of marital fertility began only after 1860. On the territory of the Slovak Socialist Republic marital fertility began to decline after 1900 without previous significant changes in the age at marriage. The differences between the demographic behaviour in the two parts of Czechoslovakia have persisted, although they are now gradually disappearing. There are other significant regional differences in the fertility decline caused by the overall process of economic and social development. The end of the demographic transition in the Czech Socialist Republic came during the 1930's and in the Slovak Socialist Republic during the 1960's.     

Another look at fertility and social mobility

This is a response to Basil Zimmer's contention that the classical hypothesis connecting social mobility with fertility was rejected in the Princeton Fertility Study because of a faulty mode of analysis. Arguing from the findings of a strong association in a sample of Aberdeen women, Zimmer asserts that if social origin and destination were taken into account, the same relationship would have emerged in the U.S. data. The evidence from the Princeton Study is reviewed and new evidence presented which confirms the original findings of no relationship.     

Bridewealth and Birth Control: Low Fertility in the Indonesian Archipelago, 1500–1900

Before the onset of the present demographic transition, population growth in Indonesia had reached unprecedentedly high levels. This article demonstrates that such high levels were a recent phenomenon. Prior to 1900 rates of natural population increase were low to very low in most areas in Indonesia. This runs counter to expectations based on Hajnal's “Eastern marriage pattern,” which could imply high growth levels in extended family areas, such as most Indonesian regions outside Java in the past. Usually, the low population growth rates in Southeast Asia are attributed to high mortality owing to high levels of violent conflict. It is argued that other factors contributing to such high levels of mortality should receive more attention. In this article it is also argued that low fertility rates, too, played a role in generating low rates of natural increase. The article discusses the influence of marriage patterns, household structure, methods of birth control, adoption, and slavery on fertility.     

A Transaction Cost Approach to Outsourcing by Households

Below‐replacement fertility and late marriage reflect, in part, the incompatibility of women's family and paid work roles. The outsourcing of childcare and housework to market and state service providers offers a strategy for reconciling work–family conflicts. By referring to the household as an organizational unit, I use the transaction cost approach (TCA) of organizational economics to discuss the factors that facilitate or impede outsourcing by households. In my analysis the frequency, specificity, and uncertainty level of the transaction, as well as normative and social beliefs, can facilitate or impede the household's decision to outsource. Monetary considerations, preferences, and government policies might moderate the effect of the transaction cost on this decision. The analysis further demonstrates that gender is an important factor, because transaction costs are often not distributed equally within households.     

婚姻形式与生育水平:对中国农村三个县的考察

应用在招赘婚姻高度流行区、中度流行区和低度流行区的调查数据 ,研究了婚姻形式以及个人、家庭和社会因素对生育水平的影响及其区域差异。研究结果有助于理解农村人口在社会转型中婚姻与生育的变化过程和后果 ,为在农村稳定低生育率提供新的思路和途径。     

Factors Associated with the Finnish Fertility Decline Since 1776

The analysis of annual age-specific fertility rates in Finland over more than 200 years reveals the existence of a significant early fertility decline at the end of the eighteenth century preceding the secular decline that started around 1910. A reconstruction of age-specific proportions married by a simulation model based on Coale's marriage model indicates that the mean age at marriage increased and the proportion ever-marrying decreased substantially during the period of the early fertility decline. A modification of the index of family limitation applied under certain assumptions to overall fertility rates also indicates that fertility was essentially natural until 1910. Cross-lagged correlation analysis shows that infant mortality does not influence subsequent fertility in the pre-modern period. Finally, a number of socio-economic indicators are related to fertility, and conclusions are drawn from the Finnish case about several hypotheses in the field of demographic transition.     

基于符号互动论视角下的个体生育态度探究

近年来随着人口老龄化进程的明显加快,以及不同地区、城市出现的生育率持续走低等情况,中国未来人口数量的变化成为了一个十分重要的议题。近年来,国家先后制定了“双独生二胎”、“单独生二胎”以及全面放开二胎等鼓励民众生育的相关政策;相关学者也从人口学和经济学等视角对生育问题展开了诸多研究。本研究则是从符号互动论这一微观社会学视角出发,试图了解民众（主要集中在1970年至1995年出生的群体）生育态度是否会受到社会心理因素,尤其是从小生长的家庭环境中,兄弟姊妹等手足人数、手足关系、父母对待子女公平与否和出生排行的影响;以及当前生活环境,如社会治安状况、经济发展前景和政治稳定性等方面的主观判断对生育态度的影响;最后研究还将结婚意愿、性别等因素纳入到影响个体生育态度的分析模型之中。研究结果发现,兄弟姊妹等手足越多者,未来越倾向要生孩子;手足间关系越好者,未来也越倾向于要生孩子;排行中间的比排行老大的生孩子意愿高;无论父母对自己和手足公平情况怎样,都不会影响其生育态度。此外在所有外在环境中,经济状况是影响人们生育态度的主要因素,有结婚意愿者更倾向于生育孩子,男性也显著比女性更倾向于生育孩子。