Is the fertility of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans converging to the U.S. norm?

This paper examines the process of assimilation in fertility behavior for Asians and Pacific Islanders in the US, using census-based estimates of recent fertility trends for the period 1965-1980. The authors examine fertility trends for all Asians and all Pacific Islanders, and separately for Asian Indians, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Guamanians, Hawaiians, and Samoans. The authors also examine, for each of these groups, differential fertility by urban-rural residence, educational attainment, nativity, and year of immigration if foreign-born. The fertility of most Asian and Pacific Islander groups in the US fell substantially between 1965 and 1980, as did the fertility of the US population as a whole. The fertility of most Asian groups was initially lower than that of most Pacific Islander groups. Most Asian groups experienced fertility trends not much different from those of the US as a whole. In contrast, most Pacific Islander groups experienced faster than average fertility decline, thereby showing some evidence of assimilation toward the US fertility norm. Differential fertility conformed to familiar patterns; urban fertility tended to be lower than rural fertility. The fertility of the more-educated tended to be lower than the fertility of the less-educated. The fertility of the native-born tended to be lower than the fertility of the foreign-born. The fertility of established migrants tended to be lower than the fertility of recent migrants. Fertility tended to fall not only for each racial group as a whole, but also for each socioeconomic category.     

Birth control,income redistribution,and the rate of saving: The case of Mexico

If different groups of people in a low-income society save at different average rates, a program of birth control may affect the aggregate rate of saving by changing the relative shares of income accruing to these groups. A model is outlined in which this process occurs. The only group that saves is profit recipients; peasants and secondary sector employees consume all their income. A decline in fertility leads to a lower demand for food and a lower price of food. This results in a lower money supply price of labor in the secondary sector, and hence greater profits and greater saving. On the other hand, a fertility decline may eventually produce a higher real standard of living among rural workers, hence a higher supply price of secondary sector labor, lower profits and lower saving. These effects are investigated in a simulation of Mexican economic growth with (a) constant high fertility and (b) a declining birth rate such as might occur if a successful national birth control program were instituted. The birth control program results in a higher rate of aggregate saving over the first several decades, and eventually a lower rate of saving once a higher standard of living has been attained.     

Fertility and economic activity of women in Guatemala city, 1964

Data from a five percent census sample reveal that in Guatemala City in 1964 economically active women, especially domestic servants, had lower cumulative fertility than inactive women, partly because larger proportions of them had never married and were childless. However, even among ever married mothers there was a substantial differential, which was not due to differences in age at first birth. With respect to all women, cross tabulation and regression analysis show that age, marital status and educational attainment were more strongly associated with fertility than was activity status, but the latter also had a significant net association. Selection for sterility was not likely. Being contrary to expectations expressed in the literature, the very low fertility of the domestics received further attention. Live-in domestics had considerably lower fertility than those who lived out, which was also the case in the United States in 1960. These data and other evidence strongly suggest that this differential is due to a widespread employer preference for single or childless women. The concept of role incompatibility is therefore inapplicable to domestic servants. These findings add to the considerable evidence showing lower fertility among economically active women in large urban places in Latin America.     

Child mortality in Malaysia: explaining ethnic differences and the recent decline

Infant and child mortality rates have dropped sharply for all ethnic groups in Malaysia between 1950 and 1988, but persistent ethnic differences remain. In this article we assess the contribution of several potential reasons both for the decline and the remaining differences between the Malay and Chinese sub-populations. Increased use of health inputs is found to explain a substantial part of the decline, but increased education of mothers, and income growth are also important. Longer spacing between births, and, higher average age at birth as a result of lower fertility and higher age at marriage provide only a marginal direct contribution to the fall in mortality. We find that lower mortality among the Chinese is accounted for by their higher incomes and greater propensty to purchase medical care. We also control for self-selection among users of medical care, and find that those who use health care in Malaysia tend to be subject to higher-than-average risks.     

An Analysis of Fertility Differentials by Religion in Kerala State: A Test of the Interaction Hypothesis

In a revelation of overall decline to below replacement fertility in the Kerala state of India, it was generally found that fertility among Muslims is higher and contraceptive prevalence lower than among Hindus and Christians. This paper examines the interaction between religion and other socioeconomic factors, that is, whether the effect of religion on fertility remains constant across other factors. The analysis is based on the data from the National Family Health Survey-1 in Kerala. The analysis found that large Hindu-Muslim fertility differences at a low level of education do not persist at higher levels. For contraceptive use, wider gaps are found at a middle level of education and at a medium level of standard of living than at lower and higher levels. This indicates that couples at different socioeconomic settings make different decisions in spite of belonging to the same religion. The fact that fertility of Muslims at higher levels of socioeconomic status is low, and not much different than the fertility of other religions, suggests that the observed fertility gap between Hindus/Christians and Muslims is a passing phenomenon.     

Income and fertility: The elusive relationship

This paper uses longitudinal data for 1962–1977 to examine the relationship of husband’s income to 1962 expected fertility, to final parity, and to the discrepancy between initial expectations and final parity, separately for four groups of women who in 1962 either had just given birth to a first, second, or fourth child or had just been married. Although economic reasons frequently were cited in 1977 for downward revisions in family size goals, husband’s income was not positively related to fertility in three of the four parity groups. For the merged sample, excluding women with unwanted births, husband’s income showed a small positive relationship to completed fertility.     

Modelling period fertility: Schooling and intervals following a birth in Eastern Africa

We describe a regression-based approach to the modelling of age-, order-, and duration-specific period fertility, using retrospective survey data. The approach produces results that are free of selection biases and can be used to study differential fertility. It is applied to Demographic and Health Survey data for Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe to investigate differential trends in fertility by education. Parity progression fell and the intervals following each birth lengthened between the 1970s and 2000s in all four countries. Fertility fell most among women with secondary education. In contrast to other world regions, postponement of successive births for extended periods accounted for much of the initial drop in fertility in these African countries. However, family size limitation by women with secondary education in Ethiopia and Kenya and longer birth spacing in Zimbabwe also played significant roles. Thus, birth control is being adopted in Eastern Africa in response to diverse changes in fertility preferences.     

Differential fertility and intergenerational mobility under private versus public education

We study differential fertility and intergenerational mobility in an overlapping-generations framework with skilled and unskilled individuals. Assuming unskilled parents are less productive in educating children, we show that they choose higher fertility but less investment for child education than skilled parents. Public education reduces the fertility gap but may increase intergenerational mobility under certain conditions. We also find very different responses of fertility differential and intergenerational mobility to a variation in a preference or technology parameter. As the ratio of skilled to working population rises towards its steady state, average income rises, average fertility falls, but income inequality first rises and then falls.     

Regional-sub-cultural explanations of black fertility in the United States

Summary This paper re-examines the relevance of the hypothesis concerning the Southern sub-culture and black fertility in the United States. According to zero-order correlation analysis, Southern-born blacks show higher fertility than those born in other regions. But a dummy-variable regression technique applied to the data from the 1970 public-use sample indicates that the Southern origin - independent of other factors-is not different from other regions. Southern birth has the effect of increasing black fertility, but much less so than birth in the North Central region. Southern blacks show higher fertility because of their lower socio-economic background. It is concluded that geographical regions in the United States have little or no cultural meaning in explaining reproductive behaviour.     

Individual and aggregate influences on the age at first birth

This study examines the role of both individual adolescent expectations of market and nonmarket income and aggregate influences on first birth timing for Blacks and Whites and for three birth cohorts of American women. Using two panels of the National Longitudinal surveys, results suggest that between-race differences in age at first birth result from differences in individual expectations about market and nonmarket income. Cohort differences in age at first birth result from relationship differences in both individual and aggregate influences, with aggregate influences differentially altering the role of individual expectations on first birth timing. These results suggest that employment policies that reduce poverty and increase wages would effectively delay childbearing. For Blacks, since early childbearing results from lower expectations about future economic success, similar fertility timing patterns between the races would result if Blacks had White employment and wage levels. Over time, these employment and wage policies will not only alter individual expectations about economic success but also will alter the impact of expectations on fertility timing.     

A Study Of Differential Fertility In Bombay

This study is based on special tabulations of the "order of pregnancy," as reported on the birth certificate, according to mother's age, locality, and religion and father's state of birth and duration of stay in Bombay, India. The sample consists of 50 percent of the births registered in 1960 in Bombay (where birth registration has a fairly high degree of completeness).Despite the limitations of statistical information on the complex of factors influencing fertility, it wasfound that three indicators derived from the 1961 census could numerically account for 51 percent of the total variance of the parity averages in the sections of Bombay. Overcrowding (which is an indicator of the level of living) had the strongest influence and accounted alone for 44 percent of the variance. Knowledge of thereligious patternraised thepercentage to49, whileinclusionof theilliteracy measure added only another two to this percentage.An assessment of fertility differences by religious groups, as well as by place of origin of the father, is then carried out. The data show significant differences among religious groups, with Moslems and Buddhists having the highest parity averages, followed by Hindus and Jains. A considerably lower level is shown by Christians, but the lowest parity level is that of the small Parsi community. Mothers whose husbands were born in the south and east were found to show the lowest parity level, while those who have north-born husbands showed the highest level.Finally, the data show consistent increase in age-standardized parity averages with increase of the duration of stay in Bombay. This pattern is observed for each of the three main geographic regions of origin. While this increase is difficult to explain on the basis of the available data, the fact that the pattern of parity differences among regions persists from one duration group to the next lends support to the conclusion that little assimilation seems to have been taking place.     

Evolution of fertility and mortality

Historical and current fertility trends in both Quebec and Canada as a whole are surveyed. While fertility among French Canadians was higher than that in neighboring provinces until the mid-20th century, in 1968 Quebec's crude birthrate was the lowest in Canada, and in 1972 it was 13.8 vs. 15.9 (the national birthrate). This reversal is explained in terms of the demographic transition theory, the declining influence of organized religion, and new opportunities for social mobility for minority groups. The birthrate throughout Canada is also declining. Although recent cohort studies are incomplete because women have not yet finished their reproductive years, it appears that completed family size will be lower than at any time in Canadian history. The period total fertility rate indicates an average family size of 1.8 children in 1976, but it is unclear whether this represents an actual reduction in family size or the postponement of childbearing. The sharpest fertility decline has been among women aged 35-49, but peak fertility rates have shifted from the 20-24 age group to those aged 25-29. Fertility is negatively related to education, and the lowest fertility is found among the intermediate income groups. Since the 1969 lifting of the ban on contraceptive sales and advertising, family planning activities have been stepped up. Also removed was the total ban on abortion. In 1975 there were 14.9 therapeutic abortions per 100 live births, but it has been charged that abortion standards are being applied inequitably from hospital to hospital.     

Patterns of american jewish fertility

The 1971 National Jewish Population Survey provides cross-sectional data on achieved fertility, detailed birth histories, and other information on family formation for a countrywide representative sample of 5,303 ever-married women. Cohort analysis shows that—although at lower levels—Jewish fertility has followed the general trends of American population.     

The per-capita-income criterion and natality policies in poor countries

Discussions of birth rates in less developed countries (LDC’s) are almost always couched in terms of income per-capita or per-consumer-equivalent. A decrease in population growth rate is said to lead to a higher per-capita income (PCI) than would occur with a higher birth rate, and therefore a lower birth rate is advocated. This runs the danger of choosing a course of action that people really do not want. A static analysis of a PCI criterion leads to an optimum which is quite unacceptable. One can raise the PCI of any given group by getting rid of all small sub-groups that have a lower PCI. Static analysis is not directly relevant to those problems of LDC’s, because the relevant control variable is the birth rate. This paper explores some of the ramifications of different birth rates. The general conclusion is that per-capita income alone cannot be a satisfactory criterion for a rational national natality policy. At best it can be but one factor to be taken into consideration in such a policy decision.     

Regional—sub-cultural explanations of black fertility in the United States

This paper re-examines the relevance of the hypothesis concerning the Southern sub-culture and black fertility in the United States. According to zero-order correlation analysis, Southern-born blacks show higher fertility than those born in other regions. But a dummy-variable regression technique applied to the data from the 1970 public-use sample indicates that the Southern origin — independent of other factors-is not different from other regions. Southern birth has the effect of increasing black fertility, but much less so than birth in the North Central region. Southern blacks show higher fertility because of their lower socio-economic background. It is concluded that geographical regions in the United States have little or no cultural meaning in explaining reproductive behaviour.     

The comparative analysis of the dynamics of childbearing women's birth at Yanging County, Beijing]

At the end of 1981 Yanging County had 26 communes, 375 production brigades and a total population of 211,098. A random sampling of 5.07% of the production brigades was taken, which included teams from the plains as well as mountainous regions. The sample had a population of 10,888, or 5.16% of the entire county, among whom 189 subjects were interviewed. These 189 women, whose ages ranged from 35-67, were divided into 5 birth year cohorts (1914, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1946). Findings include: 1) Age at marriage: the average age at marriage (about 17 years) between the 1914 and 1946 groups rose 1.82 years, indicating that early marriage was the norm. The time between marriage and 1st birth has shortened. 2) Fertility data: from 1914 to 1946 the lifetime fertility rate tended to decline from 4.60 to 3.70, but the 1930 cohort was the highest (6.42), followed by the 1920 cohort (6.26). The fertility rate of the 1914 cohort tended to rise in the 1950s after already having reached a peak in the early 1940s, probably because after Liberation fertility rose due to a higher standard of living and a stablized society. The fertility of the 1930 cohort was highest around 1963 when they were already 30 years old. The fertility of the 1940 cohort was also highest beginning around 1963. In both cases, the reason probably was because the national economy improved at this time. Indeed, the national fertility rate rose from a 1960 low of 20.9/1000 to 43.6/1000 in 1963. 3) Contraceptive use: prior to 1972 before there was an offical birth control policy, a sizeable number of women already desired to use contraceptives, the reason being most of these women felt they already had enough children. However, many women did use contraceptives in response to the call to do so. 4) Factors influencing fertility standards: in general, the less a woman's education and the lower her income, the higher was her standard of fertility, and vice versa. 5) The percentage of women who had children who died before the age of 15 ranged from 35.9% of the 67 year olds to 12.6% of the 35 year olds.     

Fertility differentials as evidence of incipient fertility decline in a developing country

Abstract Age data from the 1960 and earlier censuses of Ghana allow the construction of child-woman ratios which appear to indicate the existence of a substantial urban-rural fertility differential. Plausible assumptions of urban-rural mortality differentials increase the apparent fertility differential. In this paper recently published data for Statistical Areas in the country's larger towns are used to demonstrate that one explanation for the fertility differential is almost certainly the enumeration of some females in the towns, while one or more of their surviving children were enumerated outside. Nevertheless, in 1960 the four largest towns exhibited birth levels which are likely to have been about 11% below those of the population in the surrounding regions. Roughly half the differential can be attributed to a general urban-rural differential and half to socio-economic differentials within the towns. It is shown that most fertility reduction within the towns may be explained by delayed female marriage, and that such delay is associated with extended education. It is also shown that amongst the higher socio-economic status groups a small part of the reduction can probably be attributed to the prevention of pregnancy within marriage, and that the making of such attempts is positively associated with extended education, urban birth, participation in first and monogamous marriages, Protestantism, and the holding of views about the harmful effect of high population growth rates on attempts to raise living standards. It is argued that these fertility differentials are evidence of some fertility decline among key groups in the population and that such declines are likely to become more widespread.     

The effect of income on fertility

Abstract Cross-sectional data and long-period time series data have generally shown an inverse relationship between income and fertility. But short-period time series data over the business cycle have shown a direct relationship. The first part of this paper resolves this apparent paradox by showing that it arises from a statistical illusion-specification bias due to omitted lagged variables. The second part of the paper then considers the likely unconditional effect of income on fertility in several sorts of situations: (a) secular income increase in less developed countries; (b) cyclical income change in industrialized countries; (c) secular income increase in industrialized countries; and (d) incentive payments for higher and lower fertility.     

From low to high fertility in Sulawesi (Indonesia) during the colonial period: explaining the 'first fertility transition'

This paper examines the past transition from low to high fertility which, in Indonesia as elsewhere, preceded the return to lower birth rates. Data from two parts of the island of Sulawesi where fertility rose during the colonial period are used to explain both why it rose, and why it was originally low. Economic conditions, it is argued, were the most important factors, affecting fertility via the supply of income and the demand for labour. Two schematic models of the 'first fertility transition' are proposed. In areas with low population densities and area-extensive forms of agriculture responsive to commercial stimuli, birth rates rose as the growth of commerce raised levels of prosperity, facilitated marriage, and undermined institutions such as debt-slavery which had previously acted to restrict marital fertility. In densely populated areas with labour-intensive agriculture and heavy state taxation in labour, fertility rose in response to demands for women's (and possibly child) labour that did not necessarily lead to gains in income.     

Fertility effects of child benefits

We exploit the 1996 reform of the German child benefit program to identify the causal effect of heterogeneous child benefits on fertility. While generally the reform increased child benefits, the exact amount of the increase varied by household income and the number of children. We use these heterogeneities to identify their causal effects on fertility in a difference-in-difference setting. We apply the large samples of the German Mikrozensus and the rich data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The reform effects on low-income couples are not statistically significant. We find some support for positive fertility effects for higher as opposed to lower income couples deciding on a second birth.