Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Abstract Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.     

The LGB Mormon Paradox: Mental,Physical, and Self-Rated Health Among Mormon and Non-Mormon LGB Individuals in the Utah Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System

Much of the literature on mental and physical health among religious LGB individuals has relied on small-N convenience samples. This study takes advantage of a unique, large-N, population-based dataset to test the relationship between religious identity, religious activity, and health, with a specific emphasis on Utah Mormons. In a surprising finding, Mormon LGBs report better mental health than non-Mormon LGBs, while their self-rated and physical health is not significantly different. However, there is some evidence that Mormon LGBs derive fewer health benefits from church attendance than their non-LGB Mormon counterparts. These results may nuance the conventional wisdom regarding the health dynamics of LGB individuals who identify with a conservative, heteronormative religious tradition, and plausible explanations are discussed.     

Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860-1909

Previous studies of the marital fertility transition in Europe have found religious differentials. Using data collected from the population registers of The Hague, our aim in this study is to search for answers to the following questions: whether religious differentials result from socio-economic characteristics; to what extent religious ideology explains the behaviour of religious groups; which proximate determinants account for the religious differentials; and whether the Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition in Europe. The results provide some evidence of relatively low levels of parity-dependent fertility control among Jews before the transition and among Catholics during the transition. Religious ideology probably accounts for the low level of fertility control among Catholics. The ultimate reason for the relatively high marital fertility among Jews before the transition remains unclear. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition.     

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.     

Religious fertility differentials in Thailand, 1960

Abstract Although the evidence supporting high fertility in Thailand is clear-cut, little is known about fertility differentials within the population. As part of a larger investigation, a special 1 % tabulation of the 1960 Thai census data on number of children ever-born to married women has been analysed to determine the extent of differentials by religion and urban-rural status. The findings point to considerable differentials among Buddhists, Moslems, and Confucianists. Standardizing for age, the number of children ever-born to 12/loslems averaged well below the number born to Buddhists. Confucian fertility was intermediate. Within specific age groups, the number of children ever-born to Moslem women was considerably below the Buddhist average and the differentials were sharper in the higher age groups. By contrast, Confucian fertility was highest of all in the age groups under 35, but lower than the Buddhist averages among older women. Significant urban-rural differentials also exist. For both the Buddhist and the Confucian women, fertility is markedly lower in urban than in rural categories. When controlling for both age and urban-rural status, Buddhist and Confucian differences tend to be minimal. By contrast, Moslem fertility was highest in the most urban category - Bangkok - but was considerably lower and substantially below the fertility levels of Buddhists and Confucianists in all other urban-rural categories. The census data in themselves do not permit adequate analysis of the reasons for the differentials. Later age at marriage in urban places may be a significant factor in accounting for the overall differentials in urban-rural fertility ; but this relation is much less clear for specific religious groups, particularly since Moslems marry at a considerably earlier age. More frequent divorce and remarriage may lower Moslem rates. Poorer health may also be a factor.     

Adolescent fertility and religion in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in the year 2000: the role of Protestantism

Social transformations in Brazil in recent years have included a substantial increase in adolescent fertility, a dramatic rise in membership of Protestant religious denominations, and an accompanying decline in the number of Catholics. We used the 2000 Brazil Census to examine differentials in fertility and family formation among adolescents living in Rio de Janeiro by the following religious denominations: Catholic; Baptist; other mainline Protestant; Assembly of God Church; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; other Pentecostal Protestant; and no religion. Results from logistic regression models show that the majority of the Protestants are at a lower risk of adolescent fertility than Catholics, and that among adolescents who have had a child, most Protestants are more likely than Catholics to be in a committed union. Our findings offer some support for the hypothesis that Protestant churches are more effective than the Catholic Church in discouraging premarital sexual relations and childbearing among adolescents.     

Explaining religious differentials in family-size preference: Evidence from Nepal in 1996

We examine how religio-ethnic identity, individual religiosity, and family members' religiosity were related to preferred family size in Nepal in 1996. Analyses of survey data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study show that socio-economic characteristics and individual experiences can suppress, as well as largely account for, religio-ethnic differences in fertility preference. These religio-ethnic differentials are associated with variance in particularized theologies or general value orientations (like son preference) across groups. In addition, individual and family religiosity are both positively associated with preferred family size, seemingly because of their association with religious beliefs—beliefs that are likely to shape fertility strategies. These findings suggest the need for improvements in how we conceptualize and measure supra-individual religious influence in a variety of settings and for a range of demographically interesting outcomes.     

Attitudes toward abortion among catholic Mexican-American women: The effects of religiosity and education

Contrary to observed trends in religious fertility and contraceptive use differentials, Catholic/non-Catholic differentials in attitudes toward abortion have not been converging. This study suggests that this may be due to an interaction between religiosity and education. In a sample of Catholic Mexican-American women in Los Angeles County, the authors found that among respondents brought up in Mexico, education had a liberalizing effect on their attitudes. With the exception of the most devout, the same trend was observed among U.S.-reared respondents. Among the most religious group, however, education had the opposite effect, suggesting that convergence will be delayed.     

Fertility patterns among religious groups in Canada

The U shape that has been traced out by the crude birth rate in the United States and Canada is well known. Falling birth rates reached a low point in the mid-1930’s; the rate rose to a peak in 1947 and remained high through the 1950’s. In terms of cohorts, completed family size was smallest for women born around 1910, whose childbearing was concentrated in the 1930’s. With data from the 1961 census of Canada, trends in cohort marital fertility by religion are examined. The U pattern appears for both Protestants and Jews. For Catholics, a reversal in the downward trend of family size had not appeared by 1961, although the U pattern can be discerned for some subgroups such as Catholics living in big cities and persons of Irish ancestry. In the United States, however, changes in family size for all three religious groups and both whites and nonwhites follow the U pattern. Religious differentials in family size in Canada have been decreasing, but they remain much larger than either religious or color differentials in the United States, which show no decrease. The distinctive features of Catholic fertility in Canada are most pronounced among the regionallyconcentrated French Canadians, suggesting an interplay of religious, regional, and ethnic influences.     

Gender Equity,Religion, and Fertility in Europe and North America

Religion has historically been a pronatalist force, but because it fosters traditional gender role attitudes, its importance for fertility may wane where gender equity is thought to be emerging as the new natalism. In this study, I used World Values Survey and European Values Survey data from 1989 to 2018 to determine whether more religious Northern countries are slower to develop the widespread egalitarian gender role attitudes associated with fertility recovery. I concluded that the “old natalism” and the “new natalism” do not compete with each other as much as their negative association implies that they might. By tracing the evolution of country‐level gender equity in more‐ and less religious countries of Europe and North America, I showed how country‐level religiosity does not dampen the potential for a gender equity‐stimulated fertility recovery. This paper also contributes by showing that the curvilinear relationship between gender equity and fertility has continued into more recent time periods than covered by previous work.     

The intergenerational transmission of fertility in contemporary Denmark: The effects of number of siblings (full and half), birth order,and whether male or female

Using the Danish Fertility Database, we investigate intergenerational fertility transmission, including the relationship between the number of children born to those aged 25 and 26 years in 1994 and the number of their full sibs and half-sibs. We find that the fertility behaviour of parents and their children is positively correlated, and that half-sibs and full sibs have broadly similar effects. We do not find, in this complete national population, the strong birth order effects reported in some earlier studies. Nor do we find evidence of a weakening of intergenerational fertility transmission over time, perhaps because the greater flexibility of lifestyles in this post-transitional phase provides the extended social space within which intergenerational continuities can manifest themselves. We show that members of large families are over-represented in subsequent generations - that they have far more kin than those from smaller families - and that intergenerational continuities in fertility behaviour play a substantial role in keeping fertility higher than it would be in the absence of such transmission.     

The intergenerational transmission of fertility in contemporary Denmark: the effects of number of siblings (full and half), birth order,and whether male or female

Using the Danish Fertility Database, we investigate intergenerational fertility transmission, including the relationship between the number of children born to those aged 25 and 26 years in 1994 and the number of their full sibs and half-sibs. We find that the fertility behaviour of parents and their children is positively correlated, and that half-sibs and full sibs have broadly similar effects. We do not find, in this complete national population, the strong birth order effects reported in some earlier studies. Nor do we find evidence of a weakening of intergenerational fertility transmission over time, perhaps because the greater flexibility of lifestyles in this post-transitional phase provides the extended social space within which intergenerational continuities can manifest themselves. We show that members of large families are over-represented in subsequent generations - that they have far more kin than those from smaller families - and that intergenerational continuities in fertility behaviour play a substantial role in keeping fertility higher than it would be in the absence of such transmission.     

Women’s fertility, religion and education in a low-fertility population: Evidence from South Australia

The old issue of religion and fertility is examined in relation to women s level of education. In-depth interviews exploring influences on parity for Adelaide parents in 2003–04 suggest that more frequent attendance at religious services in childhood, and affiliation with particular religious denominations, are related to both higher preferred and higher achieved parity, even for women with university education. For some university-educated women, their religious upbringing appears to play a part in negating the traditional relationship between higher education and lower fertility. Quantitative data on religion, fertility and educational level from the 1996 Census for women aged 40–44 in South Australia show that women with No Religion had lower fertility than those With a religion, while university-educated women in New Protestan-New Christian groups had higher fertility than university-educated women in other denominations. The findings provide an understanding of some social conditions that support higher fertility in a low-fertility population. Future fertility research in developed countries should include consideration of the influence of religious affiliation and religiosity at disaggregated levels of inquiry.     

Some aspects of mating and fertility in the West Indies

This paper deals with certain problems in fertility analysis in the West Indies that have their origin in two characteristics of the populations involved: the diversity of family forms and the imbalance between the sexes. Considerations of the main features of these family types, in terms of a fourfold classification as well as in terms of the threefold classification adopted at recent censuses (single, common law and married), show that many techniques relied on in the study of fertility among European populations are inapplicable to West Indian populations.

The limited data available permit only rough estimates of the rates of formation of different types of unions: but these emphasise that formal marriage usually takes place late in the childbearing period, generally after the couple has had one-or more children, that the formation of keeper unions begins considerably earlier and that the common law type is a transitional state between the looser keeper union and the state of formal marriage.

There seems to be no chance of studying fertility differentials among the several family types in terms of reproduction rates. Census data however provide three measures for this purpose, all of which show that fertility is highest for the married type and lowest for the single or keeper union. These differentials seem to run counter to the more usual pattern of fertility differentials which show fertility lowest among groups of high socio-economic standing.

Imbalance between the sexes is of importance primarily in the problem of arriving at satisfactory indices of fertility, though it may also have contributed somewhat to the establishment of the pattern of low marriage rates. Wide discrepancies between rates based on males and rates based on females appear, both in respect of fertility levels at given points of time and in respect of fertility trends. These discrepancies seem closely related to the imbalance between the sexes in. the reproductive age span. Under these conditions the use of joint G.R.B's clearly offers a more realistic measure of fertility than rates based on either sex.     

Catholicism and the Economics of Fertility

The economic approach to fertility is an application of the economic theory of consumer behaviour. It is assumed that utility-maximizing decisions regarding children are affected by explicit and implicit prices and income. One of the criticisms of this approach is that social norms tend to be given short shrift. In this paper, we examine the effect of Catholicism on fertility in the United States. Several new findings are presented. Most importantly, it is shown that many studies on Catholicism are flawed because of sample selection bias, which arises because ex-Catholics prefer smaller families than non-Catholics. We also show that religious activity has no effect on fertility if it is treated as an endogenous variable. Further, it is shown that the fertility transition in the United States is partly related to the changing effect of Catholic norms.     

Relation of marriage and education to fertility in the U.S.S.R

Abstract One-half of the variation in Soviet fertility as measured by the child-woman ratio is attributable to the proportion of married women in the 20-24 age group. The familar sociological hypothesis of an inverse relation between human fertility and education also is fully substantiated with data for the 36 major ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R. The second and third best predicting variables fall into the two extreme age groups: (a) those 16 to 19 years of age with more than seven years of school completed and (b) those men and women aged 60 and over with the equivalent formal education. Results of this study support the modified hypothesis that complements previously publicized findings. It asserts that variations in fertility attributable to the traditionally religious values can be explained in terms of the age-specific marriage and educational differentials known to have existed in the past and still characteristic of the multi-national society in the Soviet Union.     

Mortality,marriage, and growth in pre-industrial populations

It has been widely assumed that in pre-industrial European populations postponement of marriage was a major check on fertility, and that marriage was contingent upon access to a livelihood in the form of a homestead or a craft. Death made room for new families, and the age at inheritance might therefore be an index of the age at marriage. High mortality should then mean early marriage and high fertility. When the effect of a uniform increase in the force of mortality on the “natural rate of growth” is estimated quantitatively, it is found that fertility response is of the same magnitude as the change in mortality so that within a wide range mortality differentials alone would not suffice to account for persistent differentials in growth rates. The assumption of a reasonably effective control through the prudential check is thus strengthened.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.