Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

生育率演变的生态学逻辑及人口增长的长期趋势

人口增长的长期过程一直是充满困惑与引发争论的话题,将人类复归到生态系统的普通成员,按照生态学逻辑构建一个由替代生育率内生引导、人口容量外生制约的人口增长新模型,以代替用具体社会经济因子解释短周期人口变动的传统思路,探讨生育率转变的一般模式及人口发展的长期趋势。工业革命以来,全球人口已经或正在经历着第一次、第二次生育率转变,全球生育率演变可以聚类为欧美、亚非拉、撒哈拉以南非洲和东亚四种区域模式;在计划生育政策的推动下,我国在短短的三十年内完整经历了两次生育率转变。极限替代生育率是生育率演变的长期目标,但当前已有一些国家跌破更替水平,这也许会成为各个国家的普遍经历,预示着人口容量约束的日益显性化;世界及主要国家的人口规模正在日益逼近其容量极限,并会在惯性驱动下突破容量限制,达到峰值后再以负增长方式趋近人口容量,同期的生育率也将向极限替代生育率递增复归。按趋势模拟世界和中国的可持续人口容量分别约为65亿人和12亿人。研究设计出测量人口增长惯性的新指标——人口增长惯性系数,它是生育率与实时替代生育率之比或出生率与死亡率之比,相比常用的人口惯性因子更为简便易行。     

Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: a search for commonalities

Near-global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post-industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English-speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German-speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer-term factors that may be common to all.     

中国妇女生育水平变动考证和未来人口发展的策略选择

1990年以来各类人口调查和相关学者的研究结果显示,目前的低生育水平的实现有外在政策强力的作用,更有中国社会经济发展内生化的作用;真实的生育水平既不是调查包括人口普查所显示的那样低(低于1.5),也不是有关部门和政府所想象的那样高。调查显示农村居民平均生育意愿不会高于2个孩子,这是生育率持续稳定的根本。众所周知,为了保证人口稳定持续的发展,应使妇女生育率保持更替水平或至少接近更替水平。从人口发展规律和人口发展与社会经济发展相适应的规律出发,结合当前我国居民生育意愿和生育水平走低的实际,我们应该抓住生育政策调整的最佳时期,调整应该在最佳时期即未来5-10年内完成。     

The Projection Problem

While world population has continued to increase, fertility has been falling. Projections out to the year 2050 currently assume that fertility will continue to decline to, or below, replacement. 1) Past projections have been very wrong. Estimates of population growth have alternated between being far too low and far too high. 2) Similarly, public anguish has alternated between extreme fears of over- and under-population, neither supported by eventualities. 3) We do not understand the causes of the current fertility decline and so have little reason to project its continuation. 4) Many of the Asian countries, which are exemplars of the current decline, are exceptional because of coercion and/or vast infusions of Western capital. 5) The population decline may as readily plateau at 3 children as at 2 children. With an unknowable future, an emphasis on future population is misplaced. Concerns should be for the present. Poor families and a stressed environment are struggling with current population levels right now. Complacency about the future is unjustified by the facts and may derail efforts to ensure the continuation of the fertility decline.     

Below-replacement fertility: Determinants and prospects in South Asia

Although 10 countries and two of China’s special administrative areas, totalling 1,528 million people or 44 per cent of Asia’s total population, are now characterized by fertility rates below long-term replacement levels, no such countries are yet found in South Asia. This paper first examines the characteristics of 12 Asian administrations with very low fertility at various stages of their fertility declines and then compares the findings with the present situation in three South Asian countries, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. This allows a prediction of when the South Asian countries will reach replacement fertility in accord with the trends in two key criteria, the percentage of girls in secondary school and the infant mortality rate. These conclusions are then buttressed for each country by the findings of anthropological demographic research programs in which the authors were involved. The predictions are that all three countries will attain a total fertility rate of 2.1 within the next 30 years and that the UN2000 Revision of the medium population projection is plausible in that regard. However, the authors part company with the UN projection in their assessment that the nature of these societies means that they will all subsequently fall to still lower fertility levels.     

The demography of words: The global decline in non-numeric fertility preferences, 1993–2011

This paper examines the decline in non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences among women in the developing world. These types of response—such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘it’s up to God’—have often been interpreted through the lens of fertility transition theory as an indication that reproduction has not yet entered women’s ‘calculus of conscious choice’. However, this has yet to be investigated cross-nationally and over time. Using 19?years of data from 32 countries, we find that non-numeric fertility preferences decline most substantially in the early stages of a country’s fertility transition. Using country-specific and multilevel models, we explore the individual- and contextual-level characteristics associated with women’s likelihood of providing a non-numeric response to questions about their fertility preferences. Non-numeric fertility preferences are influenced by a host of social factors, with educational attainment and knowledge of contraception being the most robust and consistent predictors.     

When the grass is greener: Fertility decisions in a cross-national context

In research and policy discourse, conceptualizations of fertility decision-making often assume that people only consider circumstances within national borders. In an integrated Europe, citizens may know about and compare conditions across countries. Such comparisons may influence the way people think about and respond to childrearing costs. To explore this possibility and its implications, we present evidence from 44 in-depth interviews with Polish parents in the United Kingdom and Poland. Explanations of childbearing decisions involved comparisons of policy packages and living standards across countries. Individuals in Poland used richer European countries as an important reference point, rather than recent conditions in Poland. In contrast, migrants often positively assessed their relatively disadvantaged circumstances by using the Polish setting as a reference. The findings could help explain why, despite substantial policy efforts, fertility has remained at very low levels in poorer European countries, while migrants from those countries often have higher fertility abroad.     

Demographers’ Involvement in Twentieth-Century Population Policy: Continuity or Discontinuity?

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the development of a crusading spirit and massive technical aid aimed at reducing fertility levels and rates of population growth in developing countries, and also the involvement of demographers in these events. The demographers at Princeton University’s Office of Population Research, Frank Notestein and his colleagues, have been singled out by recent authors as playing a unique role in bringing about these changes, and they have been criticized for encouraging demographers to become involved, so eroding their scientific objectivity. This paper examines the development of relevant population thought and theory in the English-language literature over the first half of the twentieth century. It concludes that in the circumstances of the second half of the twentieth century, it was inevitable that developed countries and their demographers would become involved in controlling fertility levels in developing countries. The OPR story should be seen largely in terms of how the world’s leading demographic center and its demographic transition theory were swept along by global changes. As those developments started, attitudes to population change in densely settled Asia became Malthusian, even as population growth accompanied by mortality decline in Asia demonstrated that, at least in the short term, the positive checks were disappearing.     

Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong province,China, 1975–2005

An analysis of data mainly from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005 mini-census shows how fertility decline between 1975 and 2005 in the province of Guangdong has been influenced by both fertility policy and economic and social development. Guangdong's development since 1975 has been very rapid and has attracted huge numbers of migrants from other provinces. The analysis of the province's fertility trend from 1975 shows clearly the influence of fertility policy on the trend. The analysis also shows that economic development has brought about large changes in population composition by urban/rural residence, education, occupation, and migration status, which, together with large fertility differentials by these characteristics, have contributed substantially to Guangdong's fertility decline, in large part through changes in proportions currently married.     

鼓励生育政策能否提高生育率? ——基于生育成本缺口递增的视角

中国总和生育率的下降引发调整生育政策的讨论,但鲜有对鼓励生育政策的效果评估与理论解释.通过马斯洛需求层次理论构建生育成本缺口递增假说,并基于世界人口政策数据库与OECD家庭数据库对基于转移支付的鼓励生育政策进行了效果评估,得出如下结论:第一,生育成本是一种动态结构,需求跃迁导致生育成本缺口增速快于收入增速,进而决定鼓励...     

关于长期稳定低生育水平的理论思考

《中共中央国务院关于加强人口与计划生育工作稳定低生育水平的决定》在实践上和理论上都有划时代的意义 ,也具有国际意义。稳定低生育水平必须加强人口统计学的研究 ,必须科学地掌握稳定低生育水平的数量关系和数量界限。低生育水平会有一定的负效应 ,要用科学的价值观全面衡量低生育水平的利害得失。总的来看利大于弊、利多弊少。低生育水平有利于人口、资源、环境的协调发展和社会的可持续发展。     

Women's lives and rapid fertility decline: Some lessons from Bangladesh and Egypt

The recent experiences of Bangladesh and Egypt show thatfertility can sustain impressive declines even when women's lives remain severely constrained.Since the late 1970s, rural and urban areas in both countries have experienced steadydeclines in fertility, with recent declines in rural Bangladesh similar to those in ruralEgypt, despite lower levels of development and higher rates of poverty. This paperprovides an in-depth exploration of the demographic transition in these two societies andaddresses three basic questions: (1) have measurable improvements in economic opportunities forwomen been a factor in the fertility decline?; (2) can preexisting differences in gender systemsexplain the more rapid fertility decline in Bangladesh, despite the more modest economicachievements?; (3) can the development strategies adopted by the governments ofBangladesh and Egypt, be seen as additional factors in explaining the similar rural fertilitydeclines despite dissimilar economic circumstances? The paper concludes that neither gender systemsnor changes in women's opportunities appear to have contributed to declining fertility.Indeed, low levels of women's autonomy have posed no barrier to fertility decline in eithercountry. However, there is a case to be made that Bangladesh's distinct approach to development,with considerable emphasis on reaching the rural poor and women and a strong reliance onnongovernmental institutions, may have played a part in accelerating the transition in thatenvironment and in helping women to become more immediate beneficiaries of that process.

     

Three Fertility Compromises and Two Transitions

Demographers and those concerned with population policy are increasingly focusing on the steep fertility declines that occurred in developed countries from the 1960s and the consequent widespread below-replacement fertility levels. The decline has been termed the Second Demographic Transition. This paper argues that the recent demographic change can best be understood and analyzed if we broaden the concept to include the first demographic transition, and the three demographically more settled periods preceding, separating, and following the two fertility transitions. These more settled periods or “compromises” are examined to ascertain their nature and so to help predict the likely developments in the present or third compromise. It is argued that the third compromise has now extended for 20 years with little movement in fertility rates or other socioeconomic behavior which has been said to be associated with the second transition, and that this provides sufficient evidence for analysis. The approach has two key aspects. First, it is confined in Europe to countries that distinctly experienced the full five demographic periods, namely northwestern and central Europe. Second, the analysis gains strength by including non-European countries that progressed through all five stages, namely the English-speaking countries of overseas European settlement: USA, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.     

Sub-replacement fertility in national populations: Can it be raised?

This paper comments on the four main functions demographers perform: fact-finding, analysis, prediction, and policymaking. Successes in the first two of these are counterbalanced by weakness in predictive ability. The focus of the comments, however, is on policy. Demographers were influential in promoting efforts to lower very high fertility but are ineffectual in proposing policies that could reverse the tendency of fertility to sink well below replacement levels. The paper argues for a break from exclusive reliance on the standard measures of modern welfare states intended to raise fertility and urges exploration of radically new approaches. Two promising innovations are briefly outlined: one would give the right to vote to all citizens regardless of age, the voting right of minors being exercised by parental proxy, and another that would reform state-administered pension schemes by arranging a direct transfer of working children’s mandatory contributions to social security funds to their retired parents.     

Conflicting Preferences: A Reason Fertility Tends to Be Too High or Too Low

Fertility has often seemed to be too high or too low, relative not only to social and economic goals, but also to reproductive preferences. In developing countries actual fertility has often been higher than desired family size, while in developed societies fertility tends to be below replacement level even though people generally say that they want at least two children. In explanations of fertility extremes, or of the discrepancies between desired and actual fertility, the effect of partners' holding different preferences has tended to be overlooked. Individual preferences expected to lead to replacement‐level reproduction may in combination generate substantially higher or lower fertility. In explaining such outcomes, a crucial question is what happens when spousal preferences diverge. Given that personal practices or social norms may systematically favor high or low preferences in the event of disagreement, chance alone will ensure that desired and actual fertility do not coincide.     

Sixty years of change in Tibetan fertility: An assessment

Existing knowledge of Tibetan historical population development is mostly based on ‘best-guess’ estimates and is heavily politicized. Using census data, I reconstruct the development of Tibetan fertility in China since the 1940s, with the objective of providing an independent assessment that can be used as benchmark for future studies and debates on Tibetan demography. Following major social and economic transformations starting in the 1950s, Tibetan fertility unexpectedly increased from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. As noted in several existing studies, Tibetan fertility in China then declined swiftly from the early 1980s onwards and has now reached values close to replacement level. Focusing on the 1950–70 period, I examine factors that contributed to shaping the Tibetan fertility increase in more detail. This confirms that changes in nuptiality and disease-related infertility both played a role in pushing up fertility rates among Tibetan women in China.     

稳定低生育水平 理性与实践的思辩

作者对稳定低生育水平进行了界定 ,认为在 2 1世纪一个相当长的历史时期内 ,定义低生育水平为等于或低于更替生育水平。作者还结合我国 30年计划生育政策演变的历史进行实事求是的理性的思辩 ,并指出稳定低生育水平是人口和计划生育工作 30年实践的科学总结     

The Momentum of Real Population Under Linear Fertility Transition

Population momentum is the ratio of a population's ultimate size after a demographic transition to its initial size before the transition. For stable population and instantaneous drop to replacement fertility, Keyfitz found a simple formula for the momentum. Although Keyfitz's formula has been extended to cover gradual demographic transitions, the stable initial population, however, is still an obstacle to approaching reality. Using the solution of the Lotka equation with time-varying vital rates and extending it to negative values of time, exact and accurate formulae for the momentum of any initial population that undergoes a linear fertility transition are expressed. Examples using the data from the United Nations indicate that the accurate formula works well for the age structures that are far from stable such as the more and less developed regions, as well as that close to stable such as the least developed region.