Factors Associated with the Finnish Fertility Decline Since 1776

The analysis of annual age-specific fertility rates in Finland over more than 200 years reveals the existence of a significant early fertility decline at the end of the eighteenth century preceding the secular decline that started around 1910. A reconstruction of age-specific proportions married by a simulation model based on Coale's marriage model indicates that the mean age at marriage increased and the proportion ever-marrying decreased substantially during the period of the early fertility decline. A modification of the index of family limitation applied under certain assumptions to overall fertility rates also indicates that fertility was essentially natural until 1910. Cross-lagged correlation analysis shows that infant mortality does not influence subsequent fertility in the pre-modern period. Finally, a number of socio-economic indicators are related to fertility, and conclusions are drawn from the Finnish case about several hypotheses in the field of demographic transition.     

Changes in fertility in Japan by region: 1920–1965

Changes in fertility for the 46 prefectures of Japan are traced from 1920 to 1965, using census and vital statistics. During the period, substantial declines were recorded in both marital-fertility levels and the proportions of women of childbearing age who were married. Regional variation is pronounced in the timing of the onset of the decline in marital fertility. Only in the most industrialized districts did marital fertility begin to fall before 1950; thereafter, sharp declines were recorded in all parts of Japan. The marriage proportion, in contrast, was falling rather steadily throughout the islands between 1920 and 1950, after which the proportion stabilized. The decline in overall fertility that occurred before 1950was caused, then, primarily by a reduction in the proportion married; only after 1950 did a decline in marital fertility become a. major factor. The time pattern of change in marital-fertility levels and proportions married for Japan differs from that observed in western Europe, where low proportions married are recorded in the earliest national censuses. Apparently a fall in proportions married in western Europe preceded by one or two centuries the major sustained declines in marital fertility that were part of the so-called demographic transition.     

Recent trends in Tanzanian fertility

This paper provides an assessment of the nature and magnitude of Tanzania's recent fertility decline, using robust methods for the identification of fertility trends. A decline in Tanzanian fertility began some time in the late 1970s or early 1980s. The pattern of decline exhibits similarities to patterns identified some years ago in Zimbabwe and Kenya. The decline has been especially marked in urban areas. It has been accompanied by a rapid rise in contraceptive prevalence from the very low levels before 1990 to just under 20 per cent of currently married women of reproductive age. Although falling marital fertility associated with a rise in contraceptive use is the main contributor to the decline in fertility, a rise in the average age at marriage has also made a (smaller) contribution, as has the AIDS epidemic. The fact that fertility is declining in Tanzania raises questions about the social and economic requirements for fertility transitions to begin in sub-Saharan Africa.     

A fertility survey in the Maltese Islands

In order to determine whether fertility is declining in Malta, a sample was taken by the Maltese Central Statistical Office in mid-1955, along the line of the Family Census of 1946 in Great Britain. The size of the sample was 10,000, and the response very good. The sample shows no noticeable decline in fertility since the marriage cohorts of the beginning of the century. Some decline is noticeable int he fertility of the later durations of marriage, but completed family size remained more than 6 for the cohorts of the 1920's. This contrasts with the declining fertility shown by the enquiry in Great Britain, and the figure of 6 is in fact much greater than the completed families born to cohorts in Great Britain at the end of Queen Victoria's reign. Fertility seems in fact to be still rising in Malta for the first 18 months of marriage; and the first decade of marriage continues to show an average of 4 births. It seems therefore that the recent decline in the birth rate is to be attributed to changes in the populatino structure rather than in marital fertility. The continued high fertility implies a very rapid rise in population in the absence of emigration.     

Determinants Of Cumulative Fertility In Ghana

The relatively few studies conducted on fertility differentials in Ghana have not controlled for the effect of important demographic variables, such as age at first marriage and current age of respondent. This paper attempts a multivariate analysis of the relationship between cumulative fertility and age at first marriage, level of education, religion, form of marriage and residence of husband. Data drawn from a census sample survey in 1971 include 72,816 currently married females aged 15–49 years. Age at first marriage was inversely related to cumulative fertility. The differentials were more pronounced for older women. Among the older women, the differentials were larger for rural than urban women. There were also significant fertility differentials associated with level of education, religion and form of marriage. Husband’s residence was a poor predictor of cumulative fertility. As a policy measure, it is suggested that priority be given to providing young women with more education or employment opportunities as an alternative to early marriage.     

The Decline of Fertility in Los Angeles,California, 1880–1900

Data from the 1900 U.S. Census of Population show that fertility in Los Angeles California, declined by more than 50 per cent between 1880 and 1900. Women's mean age at first marriage, which rose by approximately three years, contributed to the decline, but change in marital fertility was more important than change in nuptiality. Although the fertility of in-migrating U.S.-born women was lower than that of California-born women, the decline was not explained by in-migration. The emergence of a class differential in fertility, with couples of higher status having fewer children than those of lower status, and the simultaneous weakening of class differentials in secondary-school attendance, together suggest that the rise of universal secondary schooling probably did not account for the marital fertility decline experienced in middle- and upper-status families.     

Local variations of fertility in taiwan

Abstract Taiwan has attracted a considerable amount of demographic interest in recent years because of a marked decline of fertility since 1956. In this paper the authors utilize data from the household registration system to analyse variations of fertility among 292 local administrative areas in 1961. The study reveals a strong negative correlation between total fertility and a series of indicators of social development and communication. Most of the variation in fertility is accounted for by differences in the fertility of married women aged over 30 and in the age at marriage. The decline of total fertility is accounted for primarily by a reduction of the marital fertility of women over 30. The adoption of family limitation was by no means confined to urban centres, but apparently originated there and spread rapidly to small towns and rural areas.     

Demographic and Socio-economic Influences on Recent British Marital Breakdown Patterns

The advantages of large-scale multi-purpose surveys compared with official divorce records for examining marital breakdown are assessed, and the extent of under-recording of the concept of breakdown in the latter source is estimated. Demographic and socio-economic differentials in breakdown are examined and the former are found to be generally more powerful. A proportional-hazards life-table model is used to establish the impact of childlessness on divorce in a more satisfactory way than hitherto. Among fertile couples, the length of the first birth interval is found to be particularly important as a risk factor influencing breakdown. Controlling for demographic factors, such as age at marriage and fertility status, is shown to modify the observed crude differences between social classes. Housing tenure and personal factors associated with the couple's individual circumstances are more important than social class in explaining marital breakdown, with age at marriage retaining a strongly persisting and remarkably constant effect whatever other variables are included in the analysis.     

A look at Asia's changing youth population

This report summarizes findings from a recent East-West Center study on demographic and social changes among young people aged 15-24 years in 17 countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia. Nearly every country in Asia has experienced fertility decline. Decline began in Japan and Singapore during the 1950s, followed by declines in Hong Kong, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and China during the 1960s. Declines occurred during the 1970s in Indonesia, India, and Myanmar. A "youth bulge" occurred about 20 years later due to declines in infant and child mortality. This bulge varies by country with the timing and magnitude of population growth and subsequent fertility decline. The proportion of youth population rises from 16% to 18% about 20 years after the beginning of fertility decline and declines to a much lower stable level after several decades. The bulge is large in countries with rapid fertility decline, such as China. Governments can minimize the effects of bulge on population growth by raising the legal age at marriage, lengthening the interval between first marriage and first birth, and increasing birth intervals. School enrollments among adolescents are rising. In South Korea, the population aged 15-24 years increased from 3.8 to 8.8 million during 1950-90, a rise of 132% compared to a rise of 653% among school enrollments. It is expected that the number of out-of-school youths will decline from 5.1 to 3.6 million during 1990-2025. Youth employment varies by gender. Policies/programs in family planning and reproductive health will need to address the changing needs of youth population.     

Two and a half centuries of demographic history in a Bavarian village

Abstract A village genealogy containing family histories of couples married between 1692 and 1939 serves as the basis for a study of the demographic history of a Bavarian village. The past patterns of marriage, re-marriage, widowhood, illegitimacy, bridal pregnancy, marital fertility, family size, and birth intervals are examined. Both the age at marriage and illegitimacy increased and then declined during the nineteenth century, apparently in response to changes in restrictive marriage legislation. Differences in fertility for occupational groups were insignificant. Marital fertility remained extremely high before 1900 suggesting the absence of any substantial family limitation within marriage. A rise in marital fertility that occurred during the last half of the nineteenth century appears to result from a change in breast-feeding customs. The actual number of children surviving to maturity for most couples was kept quite low, however, through late marriage and high infant mortality. Only during the twentieth century are substantial declines in infant mortality and fertility evident.     

Analysis of the determinants of fertility decline in the Czech Republic

In this paper, we analyze the decline in the total fertility rate (TFR) in the Czech Republic during the economic transition. To identify transition-specific features of this decline, we estimate a Heckman–Walker multistate model of the birth process using data from the 1998 Family and Fertility Survey. We find that the negative effect of transition on TFR is mostly driven by a sharply increased influence of higher education, limited ability to combine employment with childbearing and lack of adequate childcare facilities. We also detect a significant role of the increased use of contraception, motivated by both economic and demographic reasons.     

Marriage form and fertility in rural China: an investigation in three counties

Using data from two surveys in three counties where the prevalence of uxorilocal marriage differs greatly, this paper analyzes impact of marriage form, individual, family, and social factors on fertility and its regional differences. The results show that, under the Chinese patrilineal joint family system, uxorilocal marriage does not universally increase fertility, which is likely to be determined by other factors. It is further found that fertility differs greatly in the three regions, and is significantly lower in regions where uxorilocal marriage is common than in regions where virilocal marriage is dominant. Women’s marriage cohort, age at first marriage, and number of sisters all have significant effects on fertility. These findings address the process and consequences of change in rural family and marriage customs during the current demographic and social transition.     

Japan’s changing fertility mechanisms and its policy responses

This paper discusses Japan’s decline in fertility over the past 50 years. The change in Japan’s postwar fertility is analysed using formal demographic tools such as parity progression ratios and decomposition methods. The analytical results show that before the oil crisis of 1973, the reduction in marital fertility played a dominant role, while the delayed timing of marriage has been a principal factor since the mid-1970s. The delayed timing of first and second births has also played a relatively important role in determining actual fertility levels in the 1990s. The paper examines various socio-economic factors contributing to these demographic shifts over time in postwar Japan. A number of policies and programs implemented over the past decade by the Japanese government to boost fertility are briefly described, together with their limitations.     

Population pressure and fertility in pre-transition Thailand

Before the demographic transition in Thailand, fertility was high, but not uniformly so. As in other pre-transition settings, Thai fertility responded to pressures and opportunities created by socioeconomic structure and land availability. Drawing upon provincial data from the 1947 and 1960 censuses of Thailand, we find a strong 'frontier effect' on Thai fertility in the 1950s. Fertility was higher in sparsely settled frontier provinces and lower in provinces with higher population density relative to cultivatable land. This finding is robust and holds up with controls for agricultural employment, land quality, and the sex ratio (an indicator of sex-selective migration). The effect of population pressure lowers the likelihood of marriage and of marital fertility. The findings from Thailand are consistent with the research of Easterlin on the nineteenth century United States and with other pre-transition societies. We suggest how demographic transition theory might be broadened to include fertility dynamics in pre-transition societies.     

Trajectories of Fertility and Household Composition in the Demographic Profile of the Czech Republic

The household composition matrix is a representation of the demographic structure of households, specific to age groups of household members and household heads. As such, the matrix reflects also the environmental conditions, housing in particular, that mould households' demographic structure. By specifically depicting the presence of children in households, household composition could be viewed as gauging fertility within the context of housing conditions. This stance is examined in an application to Czech census data for the year 1991, at the commencement of an intense process of socio-economic transformation that accompanied the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe. Within this process, housing had an inadvertent impact upon the structure of households in general, and upon fertility decline in particular. By using the standard matrix representation of household composition, correspondence between trajectories of age-specific fertility and household composition emerge throughout the Czech Republic. This correspondence illustrates the potential household composition analysis carries for fertility measurement and estimation in rapidly changing economic environments.     

The impact of war, famine, and economic decline on marital fertility in ethiopia

We examine recent fertility trends in Ethiopia for evidence of short- and long-term responses to famine, political events, and economic decline. We use retrospective data on children ever born from the 1990 National Family and Fertility Survey to estimate trends in annual marital conception probabilities, controlling for women's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The results of our analysis provide evidence of significant short-term declines in conception probabilities during years of famine and major political and economic upheaval. In the longer term, marital fertility in both urban and rural areas declined in the 1980s after increasing moderately in the 1970s.     

Eastern Europe: pronatalist policies and private behavior

Fertility trends in the 9 Eastern European socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia) are reviewed. Official policy in all these countries but Yugoslavia is explicitly pronatalist to varying degrees. Attention is directed to the following areas: similarities and differences; fertility trends (historical trends, post World War 2 trends, and family size); abortion trends (abortion legislation history, current legislation, abortion data, impact on birth rates, abortion seekers, health risks, and psychological aftereffects); contraceptive availability and practice; pronatal economic incentives (impact on fertility); women's position; and marriage, divorce, and sexual attitudes. The fact that fertility was generally higher in the Eastern European socialist countries than in Western Europe in the mid-1970s is credited to pronatalist measures undertaken when fertility fell or threatened to fall below replacement level (2.1 births/woman) after abortion was liberalized in all countries but Albania, following the lead of the USSR in 1955. Fertility increased where access to abortion was again restricted (mildly in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at various times, and severely in Romania in 1966) and/or economic incentives such as birth grants, paid maternity leave, family and child care allowances, and low interest loans to newlyweds were substantially increased (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to some extent, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the German Democratic Republic in 1976). Subsequent declines in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania suggest that policy induced increases in fertility are short-lived. Couples respond to abortion restrictions by practicing more efficient contraception or resorting to illegal abortion. It is evident that the region's low birth rate is realized mainly with abortion, for withdrawal remains the primary contraceptive method in all countries but Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. It seems that cash incentives have advanced the timing of 1st and 2nd births without substantially increasing the 3rd births required to keep national fertility above replacement level. Demographic factors alone will most likely keep birth rates low in several Eastern European countries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Due to the low birth rates in the 1960s, there will be fewer women in the prime childbearing ages of 20-29 in at least Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It becomes clear that policy efforts to influence private reproductive behavior can only be moderately successful if the living conditions are such that women are determined not to have more than 1 or 2 children.     

The change of fertility and factors impacting it in Shanghai City in the past thirty years]

In 1981 a 3% random sampling of women born between 1931-66 was taken in Shanghai to study their menstrual and marital histories, pregnancies, contraceptive use, education, and occupation. In the last 30 years the fertility rate and the rate of natural population increase began to decline beginning around 1957-58. The changes in fertility rate fall into 3 periods: 1) between 1958-61 the fertility rate fell from 238.6/1000 to 159.2/1000, averaging 26.5/1000 annually; there was a slight period of stability from 1961-63; 2) between 1963-67 it fell from 155.8/1000 to 56.3/000, averaging 24.9/1000 annually and between 1967-68 there was a slight increase; and 3) between 1968-74 it fell from 63.2/100 to 26.4/1000, averaging 6.1/1000 annually. The fertility rate of various age groups also declined during the last 30 years. The average number of children for married women was 1.92. Factors influencing the fertility rate include: 1) birth control policy: the changes in the fertility rates were dominated by the birth control policy; for instance, from 1956-60, after late marriages were officially advocated, the average age at 1st marriage for men was 1.64 years older than before; between 1962-64, those women with more than 3 children were sterilized. 2) Education: the higher the educational attainment, the later was the age at 1st marriage, the more effective was the use of contraceptives and the lower the standard was for fertility; 3) occupation: the type of job influenced the age at marriage, as well as the frequency of miscarriage and live births; 4) attitude towards children: the total number of children women reported they would like averaged out to be 1.7; 5) urban and rural differences: the fertility rate for Shanghai City was not only lower than for Shanghai County, it fell at a faster rate; 6) changes in the age structure of fertile women affected the fertility rate; and 7) others: nutrition, the ability to propagate, age at 1st marriage, plus economic and social factors all affected fertility.     

Marital Status and Reproductive Performance in Kipsigis Women: Re-evaluating the Polygyny-Fertility Hypothesis

The effects of marital status on fertility and offspring survivorship are examined with data on six marriage cohorts of Kipsigis women, agro-pastoralists of south western Kenya. Neither marriage order, nor the average number of co-wives married to a man during a woman's reproductive years, is associated with completed family size, nor with any of the components of reproductive performance. The mechanisms whereby polygyny might potentially lower the reproductive performance of polygynously married women in the Kipsigis and other populations are discussed in some detail, with particular reference to resource shortages, sexual and economic favouritism, the observance of post partum taboos, disease, husband's age, co-wife co-operation, education, sterility, and age at menarche and marriage.     

Family limitation among the Old Order Amish

Summary This paper shows that the Indiana Amish, a high-fertility Anabaptist population, regulate their marital fertility according to their family finances. We linked demographic data from the Indiana Amish Directory with personal property tax records at 5, 15 and 25 years after marriage and found fertility differences by occupation and wealth. Correlations between family size and wealth at the beginning, middle and end of childbearing years were positive. Wealthier women exhibited higher marital fertility, had longer first birth intervals, were older at the birth of their last child, and had larger families than poorer women. Over the past 30 years, marital fertility has remained constant among older women; but birth rates among younger women have been rising rapidly.