Cohabiting partners’ economic circumstances and marriage

Past studies of the transition to marriage generally have relied on information about only one individual or have attempted to measure characteristics of potential spouses indirectly. Drawing on data from the two waves of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), we examine the effects of economic circumstances of both partners in cohabiting unions on the transition to marriage. Focusing on both partners in a relationship affords a more direct test of the relative importance of men’s versus women s economic circumstances. Our findings suggest that only the male partner’s economic resources affect the transition to marriage, with positive economic situations accelerating marriage and deterring separation. Our results imply that despite trends toward egalitarian gender-role attitudes and increasing income provision among women, cohabiting men s economic circumstances carry far more weight than women’s in marriage formation.     

Gender differences in the marriage and cohabitation income premium*

Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I identify causal effects of marriage and cohabitation on total family income. My goals are to compare men's and women's changes in financial status upon entering unions and to assess the relative contributions of adjustments in own income, income pooling, and changes in family size. Changes in own income that are due to intrahousehold specialization prove to be minor for both men and women relative to the effects of adding another adult's income to the family total. Women gain roughly 55% in needs-adjusted, total family income, regardless of whether they cohabit or marry, whereas men's needs-adjusted income levels remain unchanged when men make these same transitions.     

Catholicism and marriage in the united states

This study examines the effects of a Catholic background on age at first marriage, the odds of never marrying, and the odds of ever divorcing. Estimates using Catholic upbringing are compared with estimates using Catholic at the time of the survey. A case is made that if the latter measure of Catholicism is used, serious selection bias problems occur in some cases because this measure excludes defectors and includes converts. Further, it is shown that a Catholic upbringing generally has no effect on men’s age at first marriage and has a positive effect on the age when women marry. It is also shown that older Baptist men are substantially more likely than Catholic men to experience a divorce. Older Catholic women are somewhat less likely to experience a divorce than non-Baptist Protestant women. There is no Catholic effect on the odds that younger men and women will divorce.     

Age at marriage and proportions marrying

This paper deals with the recent widespread increase in marriage rates in the Western world. The principal materials used are data on the proportions single in each age group at various times. These data are used to estimate how far the ‘marriage boom’ has reflected decreases in the proportions of persons remaining single throughout life or reductions in the age at marriage of those who do marry. The conclusion is that changes of both types have occurred; the mean age at marriage has been declining in several countries at a rate of more than one-tenth of a year per annum. A number of ancillary technical problems relating to the analysis of nuptiality are discussed.     

Child marriage in India]

Child marriages have been practiced in India for thousands of years. Even though its popularity has now decreased due to changes in law and society, it is still a major problem, causing a great deal of hardship. Even though laws prohibited child marriage as early as 1860, statistics show that, on the average, Indians marry very young (1972: females at age 17; males at age 22 years of age; 34 females and 13 males under age 15). The following are incentives to marry young and have large families: 1) religion teaches that only those with descendants go to heaven; 2) unmarried women are traditionally scorned; and 3) most importantly, economic reasons encourage people to have large families as soon as possible, e.g., male children are encouraged to marry to obtain the dowry as soon as possible and children are considered a source of income in India. Child marriage in India causes the following problems: 1) a high infant mortality rate, as much as 75% in rural areas; 2) an imbalance in the male to female ratio (1901: 970 females/1000 males; 1971: 930 females/1000 males) because women who marry young tend to lose their health earlier; 3) a population explosion: in 1971, the Indian population was found to be increasing at the rate of 225/1000.     

The Gendered Double Standard of Aging in US Marriage Markets

Using data on marriages collected in most US states between 1970 and 1988, we show that the older men are when they marry, the more years senior to their brides they are, whether it is a first or higher‐order marriage. While older men with more education marry down in age slightly more than less educated older men, the pattern of men marrying further down if they marry later holds strongly for all education groups. We consider several possible explanations for the tendency of men to marry further down in age if they are older at marriage. While we have no direct measure of physical attractiveness, we argue that the most compelling interpretation is that men, more than women, evaluate potential spouses on the basis of appearance. Because the prevailing standard of beauty favors young women, the older men are when they marry, the less they find women their own age attractive relative to younger women, leading them to marry further down in age if they are older at marriage. The consequence for women of men's preference for youth is more often that they remain unmarried than that they end up married to much older or less educated men.     

Trends in age at marriage in postwar Ireland

Age at marriage in the Republic of Ireland has declined substantially from the very high level that prevailed in 1946. Between 1946 and 1969 the median age of grooms fell from 32 to 26 and of brides from 27 to 24. To some extent this is a reflection of the declining importance of the rural population but to a much greater extent it is due to the falling age at marriage among all sections of the population. Simultaneous with the decline in age at marriage, the frequency distributions of brides' and grooms' ages have become both more skewed and more peaked. Thus earlier marriage has also meant greater uniformity in age at marriage, but the phenomenon of first marriage at a fairly advanced age persists. There has been a marked trend towards greater equality between husbands' and wives' ages over the postwar period: the proportion of marriages in which there was less than five years' gap between the ages of the bride and groom rose from 49 percent in 1946 to 71 percent in 1969. The percentage of marriages in which the groom was ten or more years older than the bride has fallen from 22 to seven percent. The evidence suggests that the “marriage market” became less favourable to males (especially older males) over the period and that part of the narrowing in the gap in relative age of brides and grooms has been due to the greater willingness of younger males to marry. It also seems that changes in the age structure of the unmarried population has had an impact on the age distribution of grooms.     

Trends in marriage and divorce in Peninsular Malaysia

Summary Median age at marriage for women has risen sharply for each of the three major ethnic groups - Malays, Chinese and Indians, in Peninsular Malaysia since 1957. The sharpest rise has been recorded for Malays and Indians, whose median age at marriage was barely over 17 in 1957. A shortage of potential husbands in the traditionally sanctioned ages contributed to the rise for Malays and Indians, but was probably not the paramount reason; average age differences between the spouses narrowed, but median age at marriage for men actually rose. During the same period, the previously extremely high divorce rates amongst Malays have fallen sharply, though wide inter-state differences remain. The sharp changes in marriage patterns reflect, and in turn are partly responsible for, far-reaching social and economic changes. They have profoundly affected fertility levels and patterns, as well as intra-familial relationships.     

Construction of nuptiality tables for the single population in India: 1901–1931

In this paper abridged nuptiality tables for the single population of India have been constructed for the three consecutive decades 1901–1911, 1911–1921 and 1921–1931. No significant time trend has been observed in the nuptiality rates among the single population of India. The rates are initially small, but increase rapidly until they reach a maximum at ages 25–30 for bachelors and 15–20 for spinsters, following which they gradually decline. During 1901–1931, unlike Western countries, India had not experienced any revolution in marriage habits encompassing traditional child marriages. The distinctive marks of the Indian age patterns of marriage are higher age-specific marriage rates combined with lower ages at marriage and lower proportions of people who never marry with relative stability of marriage habits during the early part of the twentieth century.     

Demography of the marriage market in the United States

In this paper, a new index designed to measure the relative availability of unmarried men and women is introduced. Termed the "Availability Ratio," the measure is defined as the number of suitable persons divided by the average competition. Suitability, in turn, is defined in terms of race, age and education. After various experimental tests, particular age and eeducational constraints were empirically derived from marriage data. Persons of opposite sex sharing living quarters are tested as unavailable. Estimates are also made of those presumed to be unsuitable on the basis of the % of persons aged 45-74 who have never married. Adjustments for the census undercount are given. 1980 and 1970 estimates are presented for the US population. Subsequent analyses will focus on metropolitan areas, which are more likely to function as actual marriage markets in contrast to the nation as a whole. The substantive evidence indicates that women under 25 are in a good position to find a mate, but that after this age, their prospects deteriorate rapidly. The outlook is especially poor for the more educated women at older ages, especially black women. At ages 40-49, for example, there are fewer than 3 suitable men available for every 10 college-educated women. The results suggest that the combination of preferences of women for older men (or men's tastes for younger women), combined with higher survival rates for women at older ages, results in a very unbalanced market situationn for all but the youngest cohorts of men and women.     

The Economic Foundations of Cohabiting Couples’ Union Transitions

In recent decades, cohabitation has become an increasingly important relationship context for U.S. adults and their children, a union status characterized by high levels of instability. To understand why some cohabiting couples marry but others separate, researchers have drawn on theories emphasizing the benefits of specialization, the persistence of the male breadwinner norm, low income as a source of stress and conflict, and rising economic standards associated with marriage (the marriage bar). Because of conflicting evidence and data constraints, however, important theoretical questions remain. This study uses survival analysis with prospective monthly data from nationally representative panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation from 1996–2013 to test alternative theories of how money and work affect whether cohabiting couples marry or separate. Analyses indicate that the economic foundations of cohabiting couples’ union transitions do not lie in economic specialization or only men’s ability to be good providers. Instead, results for marriage support marriage bar theory: adjusting for couples’ absolute earnings, increases in wealth and couples’ earnings relative to a standard associated with marriage strongly predict marriage. For dissolution, couples with higher and more equal earnings are significantly less likely to separate. Findings demonstrate that within-couple earnings equality promotes stability, and between-couple inequalities in economic resources are critical in producing inequalities in couples’ relationship outcomes.     

Cohabitation and Marital Expectations Among Single Millennials in the U.S.

Cohabitation has surpassed marriage as the most common union experience in young adulthood. We capitalize on a new opportunity to examine both marital and cohabitation expectations among young single women in recently collected, nationally representative data (National Survey of Family Growth 2011–2015) (N?=?1467). In the US there appears to be a ‘stalled’ second demographic transition as single young adult (ages 18–24) women have stronger expectations to marry than cohabit and the vast majority expects to, or has, already married. Among young women expecting to marry, the majority (68%) expect to cohabit with their future spouse but about one-third expect to follow a traditional relationship pathway into marriage (to marry without cohabiting first). In addition, women from disadvantaged backgrounds report the lowest expectations to marry, but there is no education gradient in expectations to cohabit. Marriage expectations follow a “diverging destinies” pattern, which stresses a growing educational divide, but this is not the case for cohabitation expectations. Our results, based on recently collected data, provide insight into the contemporary context of union formation decision-making for the millennial generation.

     

International Migration, Sex Ratios, and the Socioeconomic Outcomes of Nonmigrant Mexican Women

This article assesses whether international migration from Mexico affects the marital, fertility, schooling, and employment outcomes of the Mexican women who remain behind by exploiting variation over time as well as across Mexican states in the demographic imbalance between men and women. I construct a gauge of the relative supply of men for women of different age groups based on state-level male and female population counts and the empirically observed propensity of men of specific ages to marry women of specific ages. Using Mexican census data from 1960 through 2000, I estimate a series of models in which the dependent variable is the intercensus change in an average outcome for Mexican women measured by state and for specific age groups, and the key explanatory variable is the change in the relative supply of men to women in that state/age group. I find that the declining relative supply of males positively and significantly affects the proportion of women who have never been married as well as the proportion of women who have never had a child. In addition, states experiencing the largest declines in the relative supply of men also experience relatively large increases in female educational attainment and female employment rates. However, I find little evidence that women who do marry match to men who are younger or less educated than themselves.     

Turning back the ticking clock: the effect of increased affordability of assisted reproductive technology on women’s marriage timing

This paper exploits variation in the mandated insurance coverage of assisted reproductive technology (ART) across US states and over time to examine the connection between increased access to ART and female marriage timing. Since ART increases the probability of pregnancy for older women of reproductive age, greater access to ART will make marriage delay less costly for younger single women of reproductive age. Linear probability models are estimated to investigate the effects of ART state insurance mandates on changes in marital status of women in different age groups using the 1977–2010 Current Population Survey. Results show that greater access to ART is associated with marital delay for white (but not for black) women: white women in states with an ART insurance mandate are significantly less likely to marry between the 20–24, 25–29, and 30–34 age ranges, but significantly more likely to marry between the 30–34 and 35–39 age ranges.     

Does It Matter What She Wants? The Role of Individual Preferences Against Unmarried Motherhood in Young Women’s Likelihood of a Nonmarital First Birth

Most young people in the United States express the desire to marry. Norms at all socioeconomic levels posit marriage as the optimal context for childbearing. At the same time, nonmarital fertility accounts for approximately 40 % of U.S. births, experienced disproportionately by women with educational attainment less than a bachelor’s degree. Research has shown that women’s intentions for the number and timing of children and couples’ intent to marry are strong predictors of realized fertility and marriage. The present study investigates whether U.S. young women’s preferences about nonmarital fertility, as stated before childbearing begins, predict their likelihood of having a nonmarital first birth. I track marriage and fertility histories through ages 24–30 of women asked at ages 11–16 whether they would consider unmarried childbearing. One-quarter of women who responded “no” in fact had a nonmarital birth by age 24–30. The ability of women and their partners to access material resources in adulthood were, as expected, the strongest predictors of the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. Nonetheless, I find that women who said they would not consider nonmarital childbearing had substantially higher hazards of fertility postponement and especially of marital fertility, even after controlling for race/ethnicity, mother’s educational attainment, family of origin intactness, self-efficacy and planning ability, perceived future prospects, and markers of own educational attainment and work experience into early adulthood.     

Breaking the racial barriers: Variations in interracial marriage between 1980 and 1990

Using PUMS data from the 1980 and the 1990 U.S. Census, I apply log-linear models to examine interracial marriage among whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. Rarely, but increasingly between 1980 and 1990, interracial marriage of whites occurs most frequently with Asian Americans, followed by Hispanics, and then by African Americans. Interracial marriage tends to be educationally homogamous and the odds of interracial marriage increase with couples ’ educational attainment. Among interracially married couples with different educational attainments, both men and women from lower status racial groups but with high education levels tend to marry spouses from a higher status racial group with low education levels     

The marriage squeeze

If the sex-age structure of the population is equilibrated, observed marriage patterns are assumed to reflect preferred mate selections. With regard to age, these preferences can be expressed in terms of the probabilities of unmarried persons of given ages marrying persons of various ages. To study the situation of unequilibrated sexes, these probabilities can be used to compute, for each combination of ages of groom and bride, the expected number of grooms and the expected number of brides. If either of these numbers exceeds the other, the corresponding sex is in a "marriage squeeze." The comparison among the expected number of grooms, that of brides, and the observed number of marriages supplies information on the effects of the squeeze.In Australia, marriage statistics of 1949 were considered to reflect preferred selections. In 1958, men of most ages were in a squeeze. As a consequence, some relatively younger and older men did not get married, and some relatively younger and older women improved their chances of marriage in the year under consideration. 291-299.     

Economic Independence and Union Formation in Sweden

Although sociologists, demographers, and economists are generally agreed that economic independence enhances the likelihood that men will marry, there is disagreement concerning its effect on women. The view that economic independence weakens women's incentive to marry has probably been the most influential, although it has been subjected to few rigorous empirical tests with individual-level data. In the present paper we examine the predictors of forming a first cohabiting union, of progressing from this union to marriage, and of marrying without previously cohabiting by applying hazard regression to event-history data from the 1992 Swedish Family Survey, supplemented by earnings data extracted from the national taxation register. We test a battery of measures that reflect people's past, current, and potential attachment to the labour market. We find that the correlates of union formation for women are largely indistinguishable from the correlates of union formation for men, and that far from being less likely than other women to cohabit or to marry, women with a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency are more likely to do so.     

Old money,the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy

In a courtship game, wasteful conspicuous spending may provide information about some components of a suitor’s income. But conspicuous spending may be costly not only for the potential husband but also for the woman: it reduces the wealth of the man she may marry. In the optimal contractual arrangement, the bride’s cost moderates the threshold value of the conspicuous spending that she requires for marriage. We also find that a sound observable financial background (‘old money’) benefits both the suitor and the woman, and reduces wasteful spending on status goods. Furthermore, we analyze how a change in the intensity with which the suitor seeks the woman may affect the equilibrium pattern of conspicuous spending.     

The conflicting effects of delayed marriage and declining divorce rates on cumulative fertility in Indonesia

The impact of nuptiality patterns on fertility in Indonesia is examined with multivariate analysis controlling for 8 socioeconomic variables. Data were obtained from the 1987 Indonesian Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. Marriage is usually universal by age 35, and in this study all women 30 years had been married at least once. 20% were married at 15 years and 45% married at 18 years. For those married more than once, prevalence of 1st marriage was 7% for women 15-24 years, 15% for 25-34 years, and 29% for 35-49 years. In 1976 and 1987, the age at 1st marriage and number of times married were both strongly and negatively correlated. The % never marrying between 15-49 years rose from 21.5% to 26.4% between 1980-87. Cumulative fertility w as related to both age at 1st marriage and number of times married. Muslim women, women in Java and Bali, and rural women all marry at younger ages. 27% of the variance in age at 1st marriage is explained by women aged 25-34, current residence, region, religion, language, education, and work or not before marriage. The number of times married is also associated with socioeconomic characteristics without control, i.e., Muslim women 25-34 years were 3 times more likely to have been married more than once than in other faiths. With controls for socioeconomic factors, only 13% of the variance is explained and being Muslim has no statistically significant effect. The important net effects were being interviewed in Balinese, age, and age at 1st marriage. In the analysis of cumulative fertility, age at 1st marriage consistently is related to cumulative fertility in almost every socioeconomic group when age and number of times married is controlled for. Women married more than once have lower fertility. 36% of the variance is explained by all the variables. Being married more than once leads to having 2.1 fewer children. A 5-year delay in marriage leads to .75-1.1 fewer children. When other variables are controlled for, neither educational level nor prior work experience has a statistically significant effect on cumulative fertility. In the contraception analysis, women married more than once used contraception less. Among women 35-49, those marrying later had higher contraceptive use, but in general contraceptive use declined with age. More information is needed on why marriage patterns are changing.