China Commemorates T.R.Malthus

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What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Comment on ‘The random variation in rates based on total enumeration of events’ by J. R. Udry,C. Teddlie,C. M. Suchindran

This comment builds on the work of Udry et al., developing a model of random variation of vital rates in small geographical areas. The model is based on the division of the variance of vital rates into three parts; that which would occur in a homogenous population; that due to population heterogeneity; and that due to yearly fluctuations in the underlying basis for the mean value of the probability of the vital event in question. Contrary to Udry et al., this model demonstrates that population heterogeneity must decrease the overall vital rate variance. Using birth rates presented in Udry et al., a test of the new model demonstrates the importance of the third factor, yearly fluctuations, in determining year-to-year variation in birth rates.     

Anti-homosexual prejudice . . . as opposed to what? Queer theory and the social psychology of anti-homosexual attitudes

This article uses Sedgwick's distinction between minoritizing and universalizing theories of sexuality to analyze variability in social psychologists' studies of anti-homosexual prejudice, focusing on studies of attitudes. Anti-homosexual prejudice was initially defined in conversation with gay liberationists and presumed, among other things, that fear of homoerotic potential was present in all persons. Later social psychologists theorized anti-homosexual prejudice in strict minoritizing terms: as prejudice towards a distinct out-group. In the first section of this paper we discuss corresponding shifts in the conceptualization of anti-homosexual attitudes. Next, using a universalizing framework, we re-interpret experiments on behavioral aspects of anti-homosexual attitudes which were originally conceptualized using a minoritizing framework, and suggest avenues for future research. Finally, we examine how queer theory might enrich this area of social psychological inquiry by challenging assumptions about the politics of doing scientific work and the utility of identity-based sexual politics.     

No.1 Poultry Farmer

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Will They Stay? Foreign-Born Out-Migration from New U.S. Destinations

Immigrants living in new destinations in 1995 were 2.5 times more likely to have migrated to another labor market by 2000 as immigrants living in traditional places. The researchers look at two competing explanations for immigrants’ differential internal migration patterns, namely that immigrants prefer areas with relatively large nativity concentrations which provide them with social support versus immigrants are target earners who prefer robust labor markets with strong employment growth and high wages. Utilizing confidential Census data for 1990 and 2000, the authors develop new destination classifications for 741 labor markets that take into account the differential growth and composition characteristics of 24 Asian, Latin American and Caribbean immigrant groups living in those markets. The empirical analysis of labor market out-migration indicates that immigrants do not see internal migration as an either/or choice between economics and social support but prefer residence places that allow them to maximize both conditions.     

The 1990 U.S. census: how good is good enough?

The 1990 US census is likely to be the most accurate in the nation's history, but it may miss 2 or 3 million people, most of them poor and many of them black or Hispanic. Because the population census is the basis for political apportionment and determines the allocation of a growing share of federal funds to localities and public programs, undercoverage is of great concern to cities, states, and the groups most affected. The statistical methods developed to measure the extent of undercounting in the census have become increasingly reliable, but the official census count has never before been adjusted on the basis of these methods. This article describes plans for the 1990 census and examines a growing controversy over adjustment for an undercount.     

Immigrant residential segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas, 1990–2000

This paper examines the extent of spatial assimilation among immigrants of different racial and ethnic origins. We use restricted data from the 1990 and 2000 censuses to calculate the levels of dissimilarity by race and Hispanic origin, nativity, and year of entry, and then run multivariate models to examine these relationships. The findings provide broad support for spatial assimilation theory. Foreign-born Hispanics, Asians, and blacks are more segregated from native-born non-Hispanic whites than are the U.S.-born of these groups. The patterns for Hispanics and Asians can be explained by the average characteristics of the foreign-born that are generally associated with higher levels of segregation, such as lower levels of income, English language ability, and home ownership. We also find that immigrants who have been in the United States for longer periods are generally less segregated than new arrivals, and once again, much of this difference can be attributed to the characteristics of immigrants. However, patterns also vary across groups. Levels of segregation are much higher for black immigrants than for Asian, Hispanic, and white immigrants. In addition, because black immigrants are, on average, of higher socioeconomic status than native-born blacks, such characteristics do not help explain their very high levels of segregation.     

Does the Hispanic Paradox in U.S. Adult Mortality Extend to Disability?

Studies consistently document a Hispanic paradox in U.S. adult mortality, whereby Hispanics have similar or lower mortality rates than non-Hispanic whites despite lower socioeconomic status. This study extends this line of inquiry to disability, especially among foreign-born Hispanics, since their advantaged mortality seemingly should be paired with health advantages more generally. We also assess whether the paradox extends to U.S.-born Hispanics to evaluate the effect of nativity. We calculate multistate life tables of life expectancy with disability to assess whether racial/ethnic and nativity differences in the length of disability-free life parallel differences in overall life expectancy. Our results document a Hispanic paradox in mortality for foreign-born and U.S.-born Hispanics. However, Hispanics’ low mortality rates are not matched by low disability rates. Their disability rates are substantially higher than those of non-Hispanic whites and generally similar to those of non-Hispanic blacks. The result is a protracted period of disabled life expectancy for Hispanics, both foreign- and U.S.-born.     

Social indicators of marital instability,U.S.A., 1920–1969

A social indicators model which included demographic variables (birth rate and aged child ratio), economic variable (unemployment) and marriage rates (control variable) was utilized in explaining changes in divorce rates over time. Analysis of time series data for two distinctive periods in the U.S.A. (1920–1940 and 1946–1969) revealed the following significant results:

1. Demographic changes in the age structure of the population while controlling for marriage rates explains significantly larger amounts of the variance in marital instability than economic changes alone (unemployment).
2. In the post-World War II era unemployment was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of marital instability when control for demographic changes were established.
3. In the post-World War II era marriage rates appear to be a significant predictor of divorce rates when control for demographic changes were maintained.
4. In the post-World War II era marriage rates were found to be more sensitive to changes in economic conditions than marital instability (divorce rate).

     

Racial-Ethnic Differences in U.S. Married Women’s and Men’s Housework

Married women continue to spend more time doing housework than men and economic resources influence women’s housework more strongly than men’s. To explain this, gender theorists point to how gender figures into identities, family interactions, and societal norms and opportunity structures. The extent of this configuration varies culturally and, in the United States, by race-ethnicity because of how race-ethnicity conditions access to resources and influences gender relations within marriages. Housework levels and gender differences may be lower in Black married couples compared to other couples because of Black women’s higher historical levels of employment and consequently long-standing need to balance work and family responsibilities. Race-ethnicity also likely conditions the symbolic meaning and thus association of economic resources and housework. We use pooled time diary data from the 2003 to 2007 American Time Use Study from 26,795 married women and men to investigate how and why race-ethnicity influences housework. Our results indicate Hispanic and Asian women do more cooking and cleaning compared with White and Black women and the inverse relationship between women’s earnings and housework is steeper for Hispanic women compared with other women. We find no evidence that married Black men devote more time to housework than White men, either core or occasional, unlike earlier studies.     

Left Out? Lesbian,Gay, and Bisexual Poverty in the U.S.

This paper analyzes the risk of poverty for self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people from mid-2013 through 2016 in the National Health Interview Survey, a nationally representative survey of households that includes a sexual orientation question based on identity (n = 112,143). The study tests the role of family structure—living with a spouse or partner and having children—on the risk of poverty for LGB and heterosexual respondents. After controlling for education, demographic, and health measures in a probit model, lesbians and gay men are as likely to be poor as similar heterosexuals, but bisexual women and men are significantly more likely to be poor, regardless of relationship status. Single and childless gay men are also more likely to be poor than single heterosexual men. Being in a relationship reduces the likelihood of poverty for people of all sexual orientations, but the data show evidence of a gender composition effect: married male same-sex couples are less likely and unmarried female same-sex couples more likely to be poor than their married counterparts. Marriage reduces gay men’s poverty risk more and children increase their poverty risk less than for heterosexual men.     

U.S. population in the 21st century: Which scenario is reasonable?

A major Census Bureau study released in January 1989 has evoked renewed warnings in the media and among some population analysts that the U.S. faces population decline in the next century if it does not increase fertility and/or raise immigration. The report's middle scenario rests on an assumed future total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.8, life expectancy of 81.2 years, and net immigration of 500,000 annually. These mid-range assumptions would yield a United States population of 268 million by 2000, peaking at 302 million in 2040 and falling to 292 million by 2080. Questionable assumptions in the report's most likely scenario are discussed. These are:

1. that immigrants bear children at the same rate as their equivalent age and racial group in the United States population.
2. that the high TFR of Hispanics will not raise the overall 1.8 TFR foreseen for whites as the Hispanic proportion of the white population continues to grow.
3. that net yearly immigration will fall to 575,000 in 1990 and 500,000 by 2000. The Census Bureau's "high" assumption of 800,000 net yearly may be more realistic.

The report's low growth scenario projects future population size that is more reassuring than alarming: 264 million in 2000, rising to 288 million in 2030, and falling to 266 million in 2080. Thus, in ninety years the United States would still have 20 million more people than now. While some fear that such slow growth will lower United States influence and bring labor shortages and an aging population, the nation's quality of life would be less at risk with a population of 266 million than with one approaching the one-half billion projected by the Census report's high estimates.     

Immigrants and natives in U.S. science and engineering occupations, 1994–2006

Between 1994 and 2006, the ratio of foreign-born scientists and engineers (FSE) to native scientists and engineers (NSE) doubled. I decompose this change into a migration effect (which accounts for migration in general), a proportional college effect (which accounts for the relative proportions of college graduates among migrant and native workers), and a proportional science and engineering (S&E) effect (which accounts for the relative proportions of S&Es among migrant and native college-educated workers). Results show that the migration effect explains about three-quarters of the increase in FSE/NSE during the entire period under study. The proportional S&E effect, which captures changes in the ratio as a result of immigration of S&Es in excess of what would be expected from general migration alone, was largest in 1995–1998, which were years of sustained economic growth. Conversely, a slower economy coincided with a declining proportional S&E effect after 2000. Increases in the annual cap on H-1B visas, an important avenue of entry for foreign-born S&Es, had little effect on the ratio. In short, during 1994–2006, the association between economic swings and the specific, more than proportional migration of S&Es was much stronger than the association between the latter and changes in the H-1B cap.     

Incarcerating death: Mortality in U.S. state correctional facilities, 1985–1998

Using data from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics and Census Bureau, I estimate death rates of working-age prisoners and nonprisoners by sex and race. Incarceration was more detrimental to females in comparison to their male counterparts in the period covered by this study. White male prisoners had higher death rates than white males who were not in prison. Black male prisoners, however, consistently exhibited lower death rates than black male nonprisoners did. Additionally, the findings indicate that while the relative difference in mortality levels of white and black males was quite high outside of prison, it essentially disappeared in prison. Notably, removing deaths caused by firearms and motor vehicles in the nonprison population accounted for some of the mortality differential between black prisoners and nonprisoners. The death rates of the other groups analyzed suggest that prison is an unhealthy environment; yet, prison appears to be a healthier place than the typical environment of the nonincarcerated black male population. These findings suggest that firearms and motor vehicle accidents do not sufficiently explain the higher death rates of black males, and they indicate that a lack of basic healthcare may be implicated in the death rates of black males not incarcerated.     

U.S. Immigrants’ labor market adjustment: Additional Human capital investment and Earnings Growth

New Immigrant Survey-Pilot data are used to address the long-standing debate over whether immigrants to the United States assimilate economically. Using panel data and an individual fixed-effect specification, I find evidence indicating rapid economic assimilation, on the order of an average increase in earnings of 12%-13% during the 12-month survey period. Results indicate partial support for Duleep and Regets' Immigrant Human Capital Investment (IHCI) model, indicating an inverse relationship between initial earnings and earnings growth and showing some evidence of the expected interaction between skill transferability and skill level when predicting human capital investment decisions. Having more years of education, English proficiency, and lower earnings at the baseline are associated with a higher probability of enrolling informal school in the United States. Overall, findings suggest substantial economic integration within the first year after establishing permanent residency.