Re‐theorizing Family Demographics

Two dominant theories within family research foresee a long‐term decline in marriage, fertility, and partner stability. They also assume that this “less‐family” scenario will be spearheaded by higher‐educated strata. Trends in the latter half of the twentieth century seemed to provide ample support for both predictions. However, recent signs of change in family behavior raise doubts about their continued validity. In a number of countries we see a halt to, and even reversal of, fertility decline and of couple instability. In parallel, we observe a reversal of the social gradient on both dimensions. Applying a multiple equilibrium framework, we propose a theoretical framework that helps explain both the phase of marital and fertility decline and the subsequent recovery. We focus especially on the endogenous dynamics of the process, which, we argue, depend on the conditions that favor rapid diffusion. Our core argument is that the turnaround is driven by the diffusion of gender‐egalitarian norms.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

Effects of child mortality on subsequent fertility of women in some rural and semi-urban areas of certain Latin American countries

Abstract With the rapid decline in child mortality in developing countries there is considerable interest in understanding its effects on fertility. According to the theory of demographic transition, mortality declines are accompanied by fertility declines after a time lag, as countries go through the process of economic development. However, the immediate effects of a mortality decline on fertility have not been uniform as in many countries fertility has actually increased. For example, in many Latin American countries where mortality declines have been very rapid there have not been any appreciable changes in fertility. Only in recent years has there been a noticeable decline in the urban areas of some nations. While it is possible to examine the effects of various socio-economic factors on mortality and fertility at the macro-level, any real understanding of how mortality itself influences fertility would require information at the micro-level on couples who have experienced child mortality and who are also exposed to the risk of childbearing.     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.     

The effects of migrant remittances on population–environment dynamics in migrant origin areas: international migration, fertility, and consumption in highland Guatemala

International migration impacts origin regions in many ways. As examples, remittances from distant migrants may alter consumption patterns within sending communities, while exposure to different cultural norms may alter other behaviors. This paper combines these insights to offer a unique lens on migration’s environmental impact. From an environmental perspective, we ask the following question: is the likely rise in consumption brought about by remittances counterbalanced by a reduction in fertility in migrant households following exposure to lower fertility cultures? Based on ethnographic case studies in two western highland Guatemalan communities, we argue that the near-term rise in consumption due to remittances is not counterbalanced by rapid decline in migrant household fertility. However, over time, the environmental cost of consumption may be mitigated at the community level through diffusion of contraception and family planning norms yielding lower family size.     

Socialist system creates favourable social environment for fertility decline in China

The Chinese experience suggests that the socialist system can create more favorable conditions for a decline in fertility than the capitalist system. This is related to 5 factors: 1) changes in the traditional functions of the nuclear family; 2) popularization of education and the transmission of culture; 3) improvements in the status of women; 4) rapid decreases in mortality, especially infant mortality; and 5) social security for the aged. In addition, the structure of social organizations and the widespread dissemination of information about birth control methods have facilitated family planning practice. The impact of theswe structural factors has been intensfied by the Chinese social environment, which has changed individual attitudes toward family size. Overall, the social environment has created attitudinal change while implementaton of the national family planning policy has made the fertility decline in China possible.     

Characteristics of fertility transition in China]

Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.     

Economic motives for family limitation

Abstract Taiwan can boast one of the most rapid rates of economic development in the world over the past 20 years. Taiwan is also in the midst of the demographic transition. The nature of the connection between economic development and the onset and progress of the fertility decline is far from clear, however. Rather than explore the relation between income and fertility change, this paper will be concerned with some of the economic motivations which may be responsible for fertility decline during the demographic transition. Inquiries in this area have been handicapped by having to rely on aggregative or on household data which included only a very limited set of economic variables (other than income) along with demographic data. In order to re-examine the linkages between economic change and fertility change at the family level, a special survey was conducted in Taiwan in 1969. While recognizing that economic factors are not wholly, perhaps not even primarily, responsible for the lowering of the birth rate, the central interest of this paper is the complex of cost and benefit considerations which may contribute to a decline of the rate, using the new data for Taiwan.     

Age and marital status at first birth and the pace of subsequent fertility

Taking care to minimize the truncation bias inherent in cross-sectional data and controlling for other variables, this paper demonstrates the strong effects of both age and marital status at first birth on the pace of subsequent fertility. These effects are particularly strong in the interval immediately following the first birth but persist even into the fourth interval. Important differences are found with respect to the experience of rapid fertility, rather than in the mean lengths of intervals. These results add to the growing attention to the social dimensions of age as a variable in fertility processes.     

Increasing contraceptive use in Bangladesh: The role of demand and supply factors

This article analyzes the determinants of contraceptive use in Bangladesh, focusing on the roles of demand for additional children and of family planning service supply. Data from the Matlab Family Planning Health Services Project are used to examine the contributions of these factors to the difference in prevalence of modern contraceptive use between the project area and a control area served by the government family planning and health programs. Results of multivariate analysis deriving from the Easterlin synthesis framework show the importance of family planning supply factors in reducing psychic and resource costs of fertility regulation and in activating latent demand for contraception. Demand for birth limiting and for birth spacing emerge as important explanatory factors; demand for birth spacing is greater in the project area, and both demand measures exert a stronger effect on contraceptive behavior in that area.     

A cost benefit analysis of the barbados family planning programme

Abstract Of the Caribbean islands, Barbados has the lowest fertility level. The crude birth rate in 1970 was only 20·5 per 1,000, which is one of the lowest found in any country of similar economic development anywhere in the world. In 1960 the crude birth rate was much higher, at about 33·6 and for almost 40 years before that had fluctuated around a value of 33. Thus, a decline of about 40% has been achieved within the comparatively short period of a decade. The reasons for this rapid decline are of particular interest to all those concerned with population growth and economic development in the less developed areas. In Barbados, the importance of population control and the role of family planning was recognised early by the government and other civic agencies, and the Barbados Family Planning Association (BFPA), an autonomous national family planning agency, was established. Since its modest beginning in 1955 the BFPA has grown to be a major social institution, comprising 14 clinics situated in various localities throughout the island. In 1970, a full-time staff of 28 were providing services to an estimated 10,000 clients, about 20% of all women of reproductive age. Funds for the BFPA have come from local government with considerable assistance from international agencies.     

Fertility in botswana: The recent decline and future prospects

Recent estimates of fertility in Botswana suggest a rapid decline of more than two births per woman between 1981 and 1988. This paper proposes that the baseline fertility was overestimated but that nonetheless fertility declined by about one birth per woman during the 1980s. The decline in fertility was linked to a deterioration in social and economic conditions caused by a major drought in the early 1980s and to the increased availability of family planning services in the same period. Fertility apparently began to rebound in the late 1980s in response to improved conditions, which came about as a result of a successful drought relief program. Future declines in fertility depend on the continued success of the family planning program, particularly in rural areas.     

Epidemiologic transition in the United States: the health factor in population change

The general theory of epidemiologic transition is explained. The theory hypothesizes that long-term changes in health and disease patterns in any society are related to the demographic and social conditions in that country. Mortality is considered to be the major factor in population change. The theory is illustrated by a detailed consideration of birth and death trends in the U.S. Mortality decline began in the U.S. in the middle of the nineteenth century. Associated with this decline was a gradual shift from death due to infectious disease to mortality caused by degenerative, man-made, and stress-related diseases. The transition favored women, children, and whites. Medical progress was less responsible for the change than were improvement in living conditions and changes in the nature of certain diseases. The magnitude of this decline in mortality is illustrated by an analysis of 5 specific indicators of mortality. Changes in the U.S. fertility patterns were also unplanned and attributable to socioeconomic factors rather than to medical advances. Comparison of the transition in the U.S. with the same movement in England shows that the U.S. experience fits the Western or Clasical Model of the epidemiologic transition theory. This experience cannot be used as a model for the transition occurring now in the Third World. In those countries, programs organized in the context of general social development projects could be expected to influence trends in mortality and fertility.     

Maybe Next Month? Temperature Shocks and Dynamic Adjustments in Birth Rates

We estimate the effects of temperature shocks on birth rates in the United States between 1931 and 2010. We find that days with a mean temperature above 80°F cause a large decline in birth rates 8 to 10 months later. Unlike prior studies, we demonstrate that the initial decline is followed by a partial rebound in births over the next few months, implying that populations mitigate some of the fertility cost by shifting conception month. This shift helps explain the observed peak in late-summer births in the United States. We also present new evidence that hot weather most likely harms fertility via reproductive health as opposed to sexual activity. Historical evidence suggests that air conditioning could be used to substantially offset the fertility costs of high temperatures.     

生育性别偏好行为的双向选择——来自陕西省神木县的调查发现

本研究根据神木县经济、社会发展以及政策调整,结合群众的生育观念调查和访谈,以出生人口性别比变动趋势分析生育性别偏好的发展和变化。研究发现,在经济、社会发展以及政策调整进程中,存在生育性别偏好的双向选择：一方面,男孩功能随着经济与社会发展出现减弱,促进了不再追求生育儿子的生育性别偏好正向选择;另一方面,在男孩偏好文化顽固的地区,经济社会发展与政策调整刺激了男孩偏好,加剧了偏好儿子的生育性别偏好逆向选择。研究有利于明确经济、社会以及政策对于生育性别偏好的影响,从而为进一步制定有效的性别失衡治理政策提供依据。     

Our population predicament: a new look

Issued to mark the Population Reference Bureau's 50th anniversary, this issue updates the story of world population presented in its popular predecessor of 1971, "Man's Population Predicament." Estimated at 1/2 billion in 1650, world population reached about 2 billion in 1930, 4 billion in 1975, and is projected to be about 6 billion in 2000. Most of today's rapid growth is occurring among the 3/4 of the world's peoples living in less developed countries where the post-World War II gap between high birth rates and falling death rates has only recently begun to narrow. This growth, coupled with high consumption in developing countries, is putting tremendous pressures on the Earth's resources, environment, and social fabric. New evidence on Europe's population transition and from China, Indonesia, and Thailand in the 1970s suggests that well-designed family planning programs can speed fertility decline but rapid worldwide attainment of replacement level fertility will also require special development efforts and measures that go beyond family planning. Current projections of the world's ultimate peak population range from 8 billion in the mid 21st century to 11 billion in about 2125, depending on when replacement-level fertility is reached. China's drive for a drastic birth rate reduction and the oil crisis might change fertility behavior more rapidly than most demographers have heretofore thought likely.     

A note on measuring the independent impact of family planning programs on fertility Declines

This note critically evaluates recent cross-national studies that estimate the independent effect of family planning programs on the fertility of the developing world. The evaluation demonstrates that past research is biased to produce overestimates of net program impact. A new estimate is derived to account more completely for the effects of the social context and socioeconomic development on fertility. This estimate indicates that 5 percent of the variation in crude birth rate decline for 89 developing countries is due to family planning programs. This is substantially less than past estimates.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

Uncertain Aims and Tacit Negotiation: Birth Control Practices in Britain, 1925–50

Evidence from oral history interviews is used to suggest the need to reevaluate our understanding of the dynamics of fertility decisions and behavior in the first half of the twentieth century. Those interviewed stressed their vague and haphazard approach to contraceptive use, in sharp contrast to the dominant depiction in studies of fertility decline that emphasize the degree to which individuals made deliberate and calculated choices about family size based on an assessment of the costs and benefits of childrearing. Details of individual contraceptive strategies elucidate the complexities of birth control behavior: couples, lacking explicit aims for family limitation, adopted diverse methods of birth control, using them for different reasons, at different times, with varying degrees of determination and confidence and frequently with very little direct discussion or planning. Explicit articulation of aims was not a necessary prerequisite of the spread of birth control; accepted gender roles meant that responsibilities and obligations emerged gradually and tacitly. As a result, nevertheless, low fertility was effectively achieved.     

Approaches to the Fertility Transition in Victorian England

The secular decline of marital fertility which took place in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century England and Wales is considered by using a number of approaches. Among the theoretical approaches considered are those of transition models, and social diffusion. The former overemphasises the role of industrialization and urbanization; the latter is inappropriate when dealing with the development of a small-family ideal in Victorian society. Explanations of fertility decline using ecological and time-series analysis are considered. The registration districts of England and Wales provide the framework for analyses of spatial variations in marital fertility and its correlates in 1861, 1891 and 1911. A time-series analysis attempts to establish the sequential nature of social, economic and demographic changes during the sixty years preceding the First World War. The following points are emphasised in conclusion. The Victorian fertility transition was not directly related to the development of an urban-industrial society, the social diffusion of family ideals or the use of appliance methods of contraception. But its immediate cause was probably linked to the substantial increase in family planning literature available from the 1870s, and the challenge that this posed to the tradition of unlimited marital fertility. This critical change in social attitudes to family planning was facilitated both by developments in mass education and, ultimately by the decline of infant mortality.